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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

SURVEY OF GREATER GERMANY

Section III

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Date February 15, 1943

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STRATEGIC SURVEY OF GREATER GERMANY

SECTION III

Political and Social Conditions

15. Historical Survey. A. (1) General. The 80,000,000, Germans living in the center of Europe constitute the largest single language group on the Continent outside the Soviet Union. In 1870 the population of the new German Empire was just as large as that of France, but whereas the French population remained practically stationary, the population of the German Empire increased 150 percent during the next forty years. For the past half century Germany has been the most populous state of the west with the exception of Russia and the United States. As startling as Germany's increase in population was the growth of her commerce and industry after 1871. Even before 1914 Germany was the strongest military and economic power on the Continent, clamoring for "living space" or, as it was called then, a "place in the sun" for her growing population and commerce. Though essentially a land power, Germany's position in world trade had grown very strong and she had acquired a sizeable colonial empire, one of the largest merchant marines, and was building a navy, before 1914, second only to that of Great Britain. The Germans achieved their influence through the cunning of Bismarck, the skill and discipline of their generals and soldiers, the genius of their scientists and technicians, the enterprise of their industrialists and merchants, the initiative and industry of their businessmen and civil servants, and the thrift of their peasants and workers.

Emerging belatedly out of chaos, modern Germany has never achieved that social, political and intellectual stability which is characteristic of the evolution of the United States, Great Britain, and France or even of smaller nations like Sweden or Holland. Nor have the Germans found any stable adjustment of their relations to the other peoples of

the Continent. Germany's geographic location in the heart of Europe has made the vicissitudes of her policies a matter of great concern to the rest of the European nations. Most of Germany's frontiers are open frontiers and Germany had to suffer in the centuries of her disunity a great deal of political and military interference from outside nations, but whenever Germany was fully united, her powerful resources have made her a formidable threat to all her neighbors. Enjoying the benefit of the inner line, she could hope to attack them single-handed. This is what happened when Hitler's army began to overrun the entire Continent.

On the other hand, German civilization has never yet found unity in itself. It contains too many conflicting forces and inner contradictions. Bismarck's German Empire, ruled very largely by the Prussian upper classes, had excluded Catholic Austria which had been the leader of the Holy Roman Empire and the Germanic confederacy of 1815-1866, was execrated by a majority of German Catholics and by the growing social democratic movement. The democratic and liberal Weimar Republic, ruled by social-democrats and the Catholic Center Party, was an abomination to pan-Germans, Nazis, and Communists. And Hitler's totalitarian dictatorship would not continue were it not for the instruments of force and terror at its disposal.

(2) Political Frontiers of Bismarck's Empire. On January 18, 1871, during the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck's "German Empire" was proclaimed in Versailles. This Empire united less than 4/5 of all the Germans. On the other hand, only 92 percent of its inhabitants were Germans, for more than 4,000,000 Poles and Lithuanians, 150,000 Danes, and more than 200,000 Frenchmen lived under German rule. In the south, this Empire left out the Germans of the Hapsburg Empire. Not in all cases did nationality and political faith correspond. Though the Alsatians were of Germanic race many of them retained their loyalties

to a democratic France. In the east, however, the German frontiers extended far beyond the German national borderline. These linguistic and racial borderlines were confused and the political frontiers had been drawn by Russia and Prussia at the Congress of Vienna on the grave of Polish liberty, but the awakening of the Slav nations renewed the age-old fight between Teuton and Slav nations, and in spite of all repressive governmental measures, the position of the Germans became more and more precarious. The Slav revival helped to weaken the position of Prussia and Germany, as it was instrumental through the Czechs to accelerate the collapse of Hapsburg rule over Austria.

(3) The social structure of the Bismarkian Empire. In spite of its impressive exterior of military and economic strength, the most serious rift in its structure was a social one. The chief force making for progress of the German population and its standard of living, was the growing urban population, which means the growing middle classes and workers' class. About the middle of the 19th century, they had been strongly liberal and had made the attempt to reform the political order of Germany in the revolution of 1848-49, but they had not been able to overcome the old reactionary forces which were entrenched in the dynastic state governments and enjoyed the protection of the Russian Tzar. Thus the attempt to create a liberal and national government in Germany failed and the middle classes were content to accept national unification as a gift from the Prussian government and forego liberal rights--the more so since the lower classes might also benefit from them. Bismarck's solution of the German problem by "blood and iron" discredited liberal and democratic ideas. The old conservative and military forces of Prussia continued to rule German affairs, and since the German economic system was expanding and no great economic crisis occurred between 1871 and 1914, most of the other classes became disinterested in politics.

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The Prussian junkers managed to maintain themselves at the highest rung of the social ladder. The Prussian junkers, strengthened by an admixture of the nobility from other German states who played a role in the federal bureaucracy, retained all their military traditions and class pride. They strengthened their economic position during the 19th century by taking over a great deal of peasants' land in the eastern provinces, most of the peasants becoming a class of landless agricultural laborers struggling hard against the competition of imported cheap labor from Poland. Inter-marriage with the families of wealthy industrialists and constant state subsidies enabled the junkers to maintain their economic parity with the leaders of heavy industries and high finance. The marriage of these two groups was a political alliance as well: Import duties on grain, iron and steel products closed the German market and resulted in additional profits for the big industrialists and landowners.

In 1871 two-thirds of all the Germans made a living in agriculture, and only one-third in industry and commerce. The same percentage lived in villages or cities respectively. In 1913 the opposite proportion prevailed. Moreover, the entire growth of the German population from 40 to 67,000,000 took place in the cities and resulted in an immense increase of the German middle classes. But these middle classes were not united in themselves. They were overwhelmed by the phenomenal success of Bismarck's power politics and were, in addition, frightened by the anti-capitalistic agitation of the new Socialist movement. They ceased to act as a unit in German politics. The large class of German civil servants and professional people were inclined to take orders from the conservative government, while the industrialists and bankers made common cause with the junker-led Conservative party or the almost equally reactionary National Liberal party. Only the Kleinburgertum, i.e. the lower middle classes, like shopkeepers, grade school teachers or salaried employees, tended to vote progressive, but as a mass the German middle

classes either never became or ceased to be Republican or Democratic--the more so since the imperial government of Germany did not interfere very much with cultural freedom. The German middle classes never became the vehicle of a vigorous liberal and democratic tradition. After 1918, they failed miserably to provide enlightened leadership in the Weimar Republic, and their failure to cooperate with the social democratic movement probably was the chief single reason for the collapse of the German democracy.

The political movement of the German industrial proletariat organized in the social democratic party, founded in 1869, and committed by its program to Marxian Socialism, became the largest and best organized political party in Germany before 1914. Backed by a powerful trade union movement, it became subsequently the principal support of the democratic Weimar Republic. Although theoretically committed to social revolution and the erection of a socialist workers state, German socialism was in practice moderate and believed in democratic evolution rather than active revolution. By 1914 about 30 percent of the German voters had found their place in the social-democratic camp which was a world by itself separated from the official Germany.

Another cause of division in the social structure of Bismarckian Germany was its denominational conflict. Imperial Germany, dominated by the Prussian upper classes, was professedly Protestant. The strong Roman Catholic minority, which formed a majority in the Rhinelands, Bavaria, Upper Silesia and in the Polish Provinces, was most anxious to retain its old traditions and liberties. Roman Catholicism became more than the symbol of the universal Church, it became a political party, the Center Party. This name was chosen since the party wanted to be neither Left nor Right and also strove with success not to become identified with a single social class. It combined Catholic noblemen with Catholic laborers, Catholic intelligentsia and Catholic peasantry.
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In cultural and educational affairs, the Center Party tended to cooperate with the conservatives, but in other political fields, it opposed many policies of the imperial regime and strove for a reform of the existing social and constitutional order. Since the Catholics were often dubbed internationalists and were kept out of the councils of state, they were ultimately driven into cooperation with the social democratic party. The Weimar Republic lasted as long as the cooperation of Social Democrats and Center Party.

(4) The Constitution of the Bismarckian Empire. Although this Empire was in appearance a federal state with a constitutional order, it had in reality neither a true federal nor a constitutional government. Prussia, which comprised 2/3 of its territory and population and an even larger percentage of its industrial wealth, exercised hegemony over the German states. The Prussian king became the German Emperor and the Prussian Prime Minister German Chancellor, securing a far-reaching control over the executive branches of government for Prussia. Officially the sovereignty of the Empire was not vested in the Emperor but in the united German princes who were represented on the Bundesrat (federal council), but Prussia, on account of her size, dominated the federal council, which failed to counteract the initiative taken by Prussia in all fields of legislation and administration. Certain functions were not even under the control of the federal council, most important among them the army. The army was a Prussian army with few reservations for the contingents of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wuerttemberg which, however, were lifted in wartime.

Even less of a control over the political life of Germany was exercised by the German parliament, the Reichstag, elected by universal manhood suffrage. Reichstag elections afforded an opportunity for registering popular opinion, which showed on the whole from 1917-1914 c

trend toward liberalism and socialism. By 1912 about 40 percent of the national vote fell to the opponents of the existing monarchical order. But the Reichstag controlled neither foreign nor domestic policy, nor could it exercise any effective control over the army or even public finance. The Reich government could rely on the support of the Bundesrat in fighting parliamentary control and even more the desire for parliamentary government. This placed Prussia in supreme control of German affairs and under the Prussian constitution of 1850, and conservatives had remained the all-powerful group. The notorious Prussian three-class electorial law, which remained in force until 1918, effectively excluded the Left parties from asserting themselves in the Prussian parliament. The German Reichstag and the Prussian parliament had roughly the same number of seats. In 1912 the social democratic party received 120 seats in the Reichstag, but 70 in the Prussian parliament. After 1918, when both parliaments were elected by universal suffrage, the Prussians Social Democratic party proved stronger than those of other German states.

The influence of Prussia was, therefore, all pervasive in the Bismarckian Empire and within Prussia the old conservative groups ruled unchallenged. The junkers were supreme in the army. They controlled the powerful Prussian civil service and the new federal bureaucracy, modelled on its pattern. All the high political posts were held by them; though the mass of civil servants were selected from other classes, all liberal elements were eliminated from a government career. Only men of conservative convictions, particularly those who had passed through the reserve officers' corps, were likely to find a place in state service. Even outside the army and the civil service, in the free professions, the liberals often found their progress blocked by the same forces.

B. The Results of the World War.

(1) The Military Defeat. The causes of the German collapse in 1918 are closely connected with the constitutional order of the German Empire. The full support of the masses of the population, including the socialists, was bought by the promise that the German government would not try to conquer additional territory, but would conduct a war of national defense. The truce made among the parties in August 1914 did not last, since the military leaders and industrialists started active propaganda for the acquisition of additional provinces, whereas the liberal and democratic forces began to argue that the unstinted contribution of the German war effort made by all classes and parties called for a better distribution of political control. The reform of the Prussian electoral law was the means by which a liberal reform of the Empire could be expected. The demand for a liberal reform of the German constitution and a reasonable foreign policy championed by the liberal parties clashed with the desire of the ruling classes to maintain the reactionary order and to acquire domination in Europe. The army proved stronger than the German Chancellor who vainly tried to calm the mutual agitation. Actually the German General Staff, exploiting the victories of the German Army and the legendary reputation of Hindenburg, exercised absolute control, not merely over strategy, but also over German politics since 1917.

General Ludendorff held out for a victorious, a dictated peace to the end. The opportunity was passed by to open peace negotiations in time on terms which might have salvaged something from the wreckage. He insisted on the declaration of unlimited submarine warfare which brought the United States into the war. He dictated the conqueror's peace of Brest-Litovsk which could be enforced only by bayonets which

Ludendorff could have better employed in France. This treaty, imposed on prostrate Russia, showed the Allies what a defeat would mean to them and stirred them to redoubled efforts to escape a similar fate. At the same time it disillusioned weary German patriots who believed they were fighting a "defensive" war. Although Ludendorff was a consummate military tactician, he made himself in politics the leader of the reactionary Prussian junker class and the noisy pan-German nationalism. Germany had not been prepared in 1914 for a long war and the blockade was crippling industrial production and inflicting the sufferings of hunger and illness upon the broad masses. In spite of this, Ludendorff decided to use all the military force which Germany could muster for one last offensive in France. The German army in the spring of 1918 had still a slight superiority in numbers over the Allied forces. It was still an excellent army though doubt and elements of dissatisfaction had crept into it. The officers' corps, consisting of 50,960 active officers, to which 226,130 reserve officers had been added, remained faithful to duty to the end. But the feudal character of the officers' corps had determined the selection of the new officers largely along lines of educational and social position. Fighting experience and ability in military leadership were at a discount so far as army promotions were concerned. The rank and file of the army consisted then largely of older men who were not likely to be uncritical and were offended by the strict class division which was maintained among army officers. The germ of revolt was latent when Ludendorff took his last strategic gamble in the spring offensive of 1918. This offensive fell short of success, and with no reserves in manpower and raw materials left and with American troops pouring into the front lines, the ultimate defeat of Germany was certain. It took Ludendorff two months to admit the hopelessness of the situation, and only the break of the Balkan front,

which laid Austria-Hungary open to invasion by the Allies, convinced him of the necessity of preparing the way for armistice negotiations. Ludendorff's gamble left Germany no choice but surrender, and with its social fabric worn out and with the masses having lost all faith in the existing military and political order, Germany plunged into a state of revolution.

(2) The Weimar Republic. The German "revolution" of 1918 was not a well-directed mass movement. It did not proceed on a national scale. In fact, the revolution started in Munich earlier than in Berlin. The turmoil of thos months was the result of the collapse of the old regime and no preparations had been made for the establishment of new authorities. The Social Democrats, in particular, had not agitated for the overthrow of the old regime during the war. They had tried to insist upon a reasonable foreign policy and a liberal reform of the constitution but apart from certain small groups, they had not actively worked for revolution. There was a serious split within the Social Democratic Party with regard to the extent to which parliamentary opposition should be pushed and the disunity created by this debate had weakened Socialist leadership. Neither one of these two major groups, the so-called Majority Party and the Independent Party, was prepared to take over the government when the Emperor and princes fled, but by force of circumstances they were compelled to accept the responsibility for the chaos that followed in the wake of defeat. To them this did not seem the moment to achieve a socialist state, in spite of the fact that under the influence of the Russian revolution, desire sprang up among the German masses to follow the Communist pattern. The Social Democrats clung to their democratic ideas, but having no military weapons at their disposal and no administrative experience of their own, they were compelled to accept the cooperation of the old bureaucracy and of

what was left of the reactionary military machine. In alliance with them the Socialist government opened the way for democratic elections after defeating the danger of Spartacus, as the Communist movement was then called. The elections for a national assembly gave the Socialists 46 percent of the national vote and with the Democratic Party and Center Party, the democratic forces controlled almost 3/4 of the National Assembly of Weimar. The Assembly, however, did not encourage a thorough reform of the social structure of Germany. Industrialists, junkers, and officers were left to enjoy their traditional social positions, although a political constitution was adopted which embodied all the tried features of democratic and parliamentary government. Nothing was done to exclude those groups from public life, which had been responsible for the disaster of 1918. Even after a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in 1920 was battered down with the help of the trade unions, nothing was accomplished to punish or to block anti-republican movements and propaganda. This had a disillusioning effect on the active elements of the Social Democratic Party, who presently joined the Communist Party.

(3) The Treaty of Versailles hung like a mill stone around the neck of the infant German democracy from the very beginning, for it saddled upon the new Republic the loss of all German colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmedy, the Danish borderlands, Danzig, the Polish "Corridor", Upper Silesia, Posen, and Memel. The reparation clauses increased the burdens to be borne by the Republic and made the reorganization of public finances and a steady economic policy difficult. The inflation wiped out the savings of the middle classes and reduced them to the economic level of the proletariat worker class. The French occupation of the Ruhr and the general strike in the Rhineland improverished them still more. These events disrupted German society more than anything since the days of the French Revolution.

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(4) The Fall of the Republic. Aristocrats, former Pan-Germans, civil servants and former army officers who had lost their positions on account of the German disarmament, could scarcely be expected to hail the Republic with enthusiasm. Far from being moved to gratitude by the fact that the Weimar Republic saved them from Bolshevism and left them secure in their positions and privileges, industrialists and junkers were inspired with contempt for a regime which dared not govern against them and could not govern without them.

The generosity and indulgence shown by successive republican cabinets toward their reactionary enemies on the right was matched by the severity displayed toward their revolutionary enemies on the left. Justice was lenient toward nobles, business magnates, army officers and monarchist Putschists who conspired against the Constitution. It was savage and brutal toward workmen or peasants who plotted proletarian revolution. The police and courts of the Reich remained largely in the hands of their old masters, few of whom respected the Republic. The entire civil service was also left untouched. This German bureaucracy, famous for its efficiency and devotion to service, lost little of its traditional monarchist sympathy. Liberal and far-sighted policies were often sabotaged by reactionary officials. The labor legislation of the Weimar Republic was excellent. But the old ruling classes became progressively more scornful. In the course of its history the Weimar Republic lost or never gained the respect of the old ruling classes and at the same time failed to enlist the devotion of the lower social classes. From year to year the number of the supporters of the regime dwindled, and were lost to the parties of the extreme right and the extreme left.

What little social and political stability the Weimar Republic still possessed was destroyed by the world economic crisis of 1929-31. This economic depression literally tore asunder the integuments

which still held German society together. The economic insecurity caused by bankruptcy, monetary deflation, and mass unemployment aggravated all the psychic insecurity caused by national humiliation and spiritual disunity. New tensions developed in millions of people. Parliamentary debate became impossible and Chancellor Bruening was forced to rule by presidential decree on the basis of article 48 of the Constitution. Increasing numbers of workers joined the Communist Party. At the other end of the social scale junkers and industrialists became more reactionary and anti-republican. The German lower middle classes, hardest hit by the depression, found themselves for a second time within a decade confronted with degradation to a proletarian level. Along with the debt-ridden peasantry they turned their backs on the empty shell of the Weimar Republic and joined the ranks of Hitler's National Socialist Party. Hitler's eventual triumph was above all the product of economic and social disintegration.

C. (1) National Socialism. As a political philosophy Hitler's National Socialism is most attractive to groups which lack reserves of wealth and spiritual strength and are therefore afflicted most severely by economic adversity. It found financial support among insecure landed aristocrats, investment bankers, and industrialists who are always the first victims of deflation among the upper classes, It found political support among Kleinbürgertum, which in Germany was poised between the forces of organized labor and monopolistic big business. As a mass movement Nazism is the product of a sense of insecurity and a lust of aggression on the part of the lower middle classes and of the peasantry which after 1929 responded favorably to anti-capitalistic and anti-proletarian slogans and to the appeals of super-patriotic fanaticism. Hitler, the messiah of the Nazi Party, embodied in his person all the frustrations and resentments of the

lower middle classes and millions of ex-soldiers. He emerged from the World War, as did millions of others, wounded in body and soul, disorganized and maladjusted, incapable of returning to civilian life and devoured by a consuming passion for national restoration.

(2) The Party Program. The intellectual soil out of which National Socialism sprang is the Pan-Germanism of the pre-war period. As in the case of Pan-Germanism its principal articles of faith are: ultra-nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-Marxism, anti-pacifism and anti-Semitism. It condemns Free Masonry, parliamentary government, internationalism, every variety of cosmopolitanism, and in fact repudiates most of the heritage of Western civilization. In its program the NSDAP reveals all the contradictions of its origin. On the one hand, it makes its appeal to the frantic Kleinbürgertum and peasantry by championing morality, religion, puritanism and super-nationalism and by condemning big business, the landed gentry, banks and monopolies along with Marxism trade unionism and proletarian radicalism. On the other hand, it secured much of its money from the very industrialists and junkers whom it denounced. Its nationalistic racialism, its megalomania, it took over from the Pan-Germans like much of the rest of its program.

Three other things need to be said in connection with the National Socialist program and political philosophy. The first is that National Socialist doctrine is opportunistic; each article of faith springs from an immediate situation and is altered or abandoned as soon as the situation that produced it changes. The second is that Nazi doctrine is based on terror, because its bearer is a single and exclusive political party which is totalitarian and sovereign. In National Socialist Germany there is not and cannot be any free competition of conflicting ideas and programs as in any modern democracy. What Plato calls the grand dialectic of public debate is impossible in

Germany. Nazism persuades through its use of terror. Finally, since the outbreak of the Russian war it is becoming ever more clearly apparent that National Socialism, despite all the disclaimers of its leaders, cannot be content with the conquest of the European continent, but must, owing to the contracted raw material base of its economy, seek to extend its realm far beyond Europe.

(3) National Socialism in Retrospect. Looking back over the last ten years since Hitler came to power the National Socialist movement appears in a perspective that is clear and unmistakable. National Socialism is in its essence a military revolution. It aimed from the very beginning at the resumption of the war against the democracies and against Bolshevism which in the mind of Hitler had never ceased. All the principal features of Hitler's foreign and domestic policies fit into this pattern: the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the re-introduction of the principle of universal military service in 1935, the economic rearmament of Germany through the Four Year Plan in 1936 which aimed at the maximum economic self-sufficiency of Germany in foodstuffs and essential raw materials, the forcible annexation of Austria, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia and finally in March 1939 its military occupation.

Throughout this period Hitler never lost sight of his two fundamental concerns: military and economic preparation for war. The Reichswehr of 100,000 men and 4,000 officers was expanded into the present Wehrmacht of millions of men and several hundred thousand officers. Since February 4, 1938 Hitler also obtained complete mastery over the hitherto more or less independent Wehrmacht, while the German navy and air force were National Socialist from the beginning. When Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch were pensioned, all other anti-Nazi officers were pensioned off with them. From that

time forward, the dangerous antagonism between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht was a thing of the past.

No less canny and thorough was Hitler's economic planning for the war, which, he saw, was bound to come. In 1914 Germany had no Economic General Staff, for only a short decisive war was expected. The organization of Germany's military economy in the first World War was a belated improvization. Even as late as 1916 the directors of German economy lacked precise statistics on productive capacity and the raw materials needed for the war.

By 1939 Germany had profited from the lessons of the first World War in this matter also. For years before the outbreak of the War an Economic General Staff was at work. Years before, the Reich Office for Economic Planning and laboriously gathered precise statistics of the prospective needs of the Wehrmacht and the minimum needs of the civil population in time of war. It had calculated in advance the prospective production of iron and steel as well as the stock piles of indispensable raw materials. It had made an exhaustive study of the entire industry of Germany which embraced 300 branches of industry and 180,000 industrial plants, their organization, their labor force according to age and training, their consumption of raw materials, and their needs of coal and electrical power. Upon this foundation the German Economic General Staff built its program of war production. In this way Hitler set up all the fundamental features of a war economy long before the actual outbreak of the war, controlling prices and fixing wages, rationing raw materials and restricting consumer goods industries, and calculating his manpower to meet the needs of the army and industry. Mindful of the dictum of Frederick the Great to the effect that bayonets may win battles but economic factors determine the result of a war, the German Economic General Staff this time prepared for a long war at least on the economic front.

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16. Population

a. Introduction

The German Reich, with a resident population(1) of 79,375,281 on May 17, 1939 (a legal population(2) of 78,072,258) is, next to the Soviet Union, the European state richest in population. Of this total resident population, almost half (38,761,645) were males. Area covered by the 1939 census includes the Reich as of 1937, former Austria (annexed March 1938), Sudetenland (former Czech territory annexed October, 1938). It does not include Memelland (ceded in March, 1939), the free city of Danzig (annexed September, 1939), former Polish territory annexed directly to the Reich (October, 1939), the Belgian communes of Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet (annexed May, 1940), and the former Yugoslav territory of Untersteiermark (annexed April, 1941). Nore does it include territory which to date has not been de jure annexed to greater Germany, and yet for all practical purposes is part of the Reich: the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia (created by a German decree of March 16, 1939), the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine (the former French provinces of Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle), taken over at the close of the French campaign.

The following table shows additions of population and territory to the Reich, 1939-42:

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(1) Resident population (Wohnbevölkerung) - all persons in the area at the time of the census.

(2) Legal population (Ständige Bevölkerung) -- population without garrisons and the labor services.

ADDITIONS OF POPULATION AND TERRITORY TO THE REICH, 1939-1942

Territory	Area sq.km.(2)	Population (1)		Density sq. km.
		Number (1)	Date	
OSTPREUSSEN	36,991.75	2,488,122	1939 Census	67.26
Add - Memelland(3)	2,416.07	154,694	Est.Jan.,1940	64.03
Add - Former Polish territory	16,245.43	995,769	Est.Dec.,1939	61.29
Subtract-Reg.-Bez.Westpreussen	2,925.93	301,808	1939 Census	103.15
Total	52,727.32	3,336,777		63.28
DANZIG-WESTPREUSSEN	- - - -	- - - -		
Add - Danzig	1,892.90	390,593	Est.Dec.,1939	206.35
Add - Former Polish territory	21,236.82	1,594,993	Est.Dec.,1939	75.11
Add - Reg.-Bez.Westpreussen	2,925.93	301,808	1939 Census	103.15
Total	26,055.65	2,287,394		87.79
WARTHELAND	- - - -	- - - -		
Add - Former Polish territory	43,905.19	4,693,722	Est.Dec.,1939	106.91
SCHLESIEN(4)	37,013.14	4,868,764	1939 Census	131.54
Niederschlesien	26,981.05	3,286,539	1939 Census	121.81
Oberschlesien	10,032.09	1,582,225	1939 Census	157.72
Add - Former Polish territory	10,586.16	2,758,859	Est.Dec.,1939	260.61
Total Oberschlesien	20,618.25	4,341,084		210.55
Total Schlesien	47,599.30	7,627,623		160.25
PROTEKTORAT BÖHMEN-MÄHREN	48,901.48	7,380,000	Est. 1940	193.12
RHEINPROVINZ	24,476.92	7,915,830	1939 Census	323.40
Add - Eupen, Malmedy, Moresnet	1,056.00	68,590	Est.Jan.,1940	64.95
Total	25,532.92	7,984,420		312.71
LUXEMBURG	2,586.40	301,367	1938 projection from 1935 figures	116.52
ALSACE	8,294.00	1,219,341	1936 Census	114.70
LORRAINE	6,228.00	696,246	1936 Census	111.79
UNTERSTEIERMARK	9,620.00	775,000	Est. 1941	80.56
Total GERMAN REICH, May 17, 1939	583,408.08	79,375,281		136.05
Total territory added without Luxemburg, Alsace Lorraine	155,860.05	18,812,220		120.70
Total territory added including Luxemburg, Alsace, Lorraine	172,968.45	21,029,174		121.58
Total GERMAN REICH without Luxemburg, Alsace, Lorraine	739,268.13	98,187,501		132.82
Total GERMAN REICH including Luxemburg, Alsace, Lorraine	756,376.53	100,404,455		132.74

(1) Wherever it is possible to determine, resident population (Wohnbevölkerung) is given.
(2) Without inland water.
(3) The usual area given for Memelland is 2,848 sq. km. (1,099 sq. mi.). Wirtschaft und Statistik, 2 März Heft, 1939, page 209, indicates that this area includes 414 sq. km. of inland water, leaving a land area of 2,434 sq. km. In calculating the area of Ostpreussen, however, German statistics appear to be based on a land area of 2,416.07 sq. km. for Memelland.
(4) On Jan. 18, 1941, separated into the 2 provinces of Oberschlesien and Niederschlesien.

In addition, by the end of 1939 the Baltic Germans had been returned to the Reich, the Tyrolian Germans were in process of "repatriation" from Italy, and the various movements disguised to create ethnically pure areas in eastern Europe were under way. Also, the influx of foreign labor to strengthen the sinews of German war industry was beginning; and it is more than probable that tremendous internal migrations, consequent upon the geographic relocation of strategic industry and the shift of workers from "non-essential" (consumers' goods) to "essential" occupations was under way. No information is obtainable concerning this internal migration, a factor which is vital in determing vulnerable areas of the German economy.

The military significance of size of population considered independently of all other factors is questionable; that, given certain economic and technological conditions, or a given state of morale, population is an important factor, cannot be questioned. The Polish campaign, for example, proved that manpower alone was not the determining factor. It did not prove that manpower is a negligible factor in modern war. Given relative equality in technology and resources, it is possible that manpower alone might become the determining factor.

The table below shows, for the administrative districts of the Reich on May 17, 1939, area in square kilometers, total resident population with sex breakdowns and density per square kilometer, and corresponding data for legal population.

Coexistent with its division into administrative districts (in general, the historic states of Germany), the Reich is divided, for party purposes, into 42 Gaue. At present, Gau boundaries and administrative boundaries do not in all cases coincide; but indications point to a reorganization of territory to the end that both party and administrative units may be identical. Former Austria is a case in point: in 1939 the territory was reorganized so that the seven administrative districts are identical with the seven party Reichsgaue. The table below gives the population and area of the NSDAP Gaue (population as of 1939, area as of Jan. 1, 1941). Concerning this table, the following facts should be noted:

(1) Gau Koeln-Aachen includes Eupen-Malmedy.

(2) Gau Ostpreussen includes Memelland.

(3) Luxemburg (area ca. 2586.4 sq. km; population 301,367) is attached to Gau Moselland, making a total area of 14,462.47 sq. km. and a total population of 1,668,721.

(4) Lorraine (area ca. 6228 sq. km., population 696,246) is attached to Gau Westmark, making a total area of 13,644.72 sq. km., and a total population of 2,588,486;

(5) Alsace is probably attached to Gau Baden, although there is no confirmation of this.

(6) The Gauleiter (party leader) of Moselland is Chief of the Civil Administration (Chef der Zivilverwaltung) in Luxemburg; the Gauleiter of Westmark is Chief of the Civil Administration in Lorraine. The Gauleiter of Baden is Chief of the Civil Administration in Alsace.

POPULATION AND AREA OF GERMANY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS, MAY 17, 1939.

Administrative Divisions	Area sq.km.	Resident Population				Legal Population			
		Total	Male	Female	Density sq. km.	Total	Male	Female	Density sq. km.
Ostpreussen	36.991.75	2.488.122	1.244.966	1.243.156	67.3	2.413.447	1.172.413	1.241.034	65.2
Stadt Berlin	883.63	4.338.756	1.982.007	2.356.749	4910.2	4.321.521	1.964.772	2.356.749	4890.6
Mark Brandenburg	38.274.99	3.007.937	1.528.856	1.479.081	78.6	2.912.388	1.435.415	1.476.973	76.1
Pommern	38.400.86	2.393.844	1.204.030	1.189.814	62.3	2.330.445	1.143.067	1.187.378	60.7
Schlesien	37.013.14	4.868.764	2.332.332	2.536.432	131.5	4.788.352	2.253.997	2.534.355	129.4
Sachsen	25.528.56	3.618.458	1.796.948	1.821.510	141.7	3.549.429	1.729.485	1.819.944	139.0
Schleswig-Holstein	15.681.97	1.589.267	816.875	772.392	103.3	1.538.888	767.204	771.684	98.1
Hannover	38.638.76	3.476.056	1.755.978	1.720.078	90.0	3.441.173	1.705.731	1.735.442	89.1
Westfalen	20.214.84	5.209.401	2.575.431	2.633.970	257.7	5.146.791	2.514.381	2.632.410	254.6
Hessen-Nassau	16.845.22	2.675.111	1.300.083	1.375.028	158.8	2.632.836	1.259.270	1.373.566	156.3
Rheinprovinz	24.476.92	7.915.830	3.838.375	4.077.455	323.4	7.827.795	3.752.240	4.075.555	319.8
Hohenzoller.Lande	1.142.26	73.706	35.145	38.561	64.5	73.169	34.747	38.422	64.1
Preussen	294.092.90	41.655.252	20.411.026	21.244.226	141.6	40.976.234	19.732.722	21.243.512	139.3
Bayern	77.837.28	8.222.982	4.034.594	4.188.388	105.6	8.050.473	3.864.848	4.185.625	103.4
Sachsen	14.994.70	5.231.739	2.472.891	2.758.848	348.9	5.185.329	2.428.252	2.757.077	345.8
Württemberg	19.507.73	2.896.920	1.411.254	1.485.666	148.5	2.851.385	1.366.746	1.484.639	146.7
Baden	15.069.65	2.502.442	1.212.037	1.290.405	166.1	2.457.323	1.167.879	1.289.444	163.1
Thüringen	11.762.73	1.743.624	860.055	883.569	148.2	1.713.849	830.889	882.960	145.7
Hamburg	746.04	1.711.877	820.134	891.743	2294.6	1.698.388	806.778	891.610	2276.5
Hessen	7.691.40	1.469.215	718.064	751.151	191.0	1.445.933	695.385	750.548	188.0
Mecklenburg	15.720.88	900.413	457.660	442.753	57.3	876.412	434.723	441.689	55.7
Braunschweig	3.672.00	583.338	297.891	285.447	158.9	569.171	283.888	285.283	155.0
Oldenburg	5.396.27	577.648	300.913	276.735	107.0	555.916	279.553	276.363	103.0
Bremen	323.84	450.084	226.573	223.511	1389.8	410.390	203.847	206.543	1267.3
Anhalt	2.314.32	431.422	219.912	211.510	186.4	420.606	209.211	211.395	181.7
Lippe	1.215.17	187.220	91.841	95.379	154.1	183.713	88.410	95.303	151.2
Schaumburg-Lippe	340.29	53.195	26.372	26.823	156.3	52.053	25.289	26.764	153.0
Saarland	1.924.37	842.454	419.358	423.096	437.8	823.978	400.993	422.985	428.2
Reichsgau Wien	1.218.98	1.929.976	872.943	1.057.033	1583.3	1.912.608	855.575	1.057.033	1569.0
" Niederdonau	23.534.98	1.697.676	842.432	855.244	72.1	1.671.458	816.596	854.862	71.0
" Oberdonau	14.236.83	1.034.871	514.934	519.937	72.7	1.018.721	499.095	519.626	71.5
" Steiermark	17.387.96	1.116.407	552.974	563.433	64.2	1.107.039	543.879	563.160	63.7
" Kärnten	11.554.77	449.713	225.949	223.764	38.9	439.721	216.399	223.322	38.0
" Salzburg	7.153.27	257.226	127.984	129.242	36.0	253.618	124.602	129.016	35.4
" Tirol Vorarlberg	13.124.51	486.400	241.233	245.167	37.1	478.292	233.348	244.944	36.4
" Sudetenland	22.587.21	2.943.187	1.402.621	1.540.566	130.3	2.919.648	1.379.372	1.540.276	129.3
German Reich	583,408.08	79,375,281	38,761,645	40,613,636	136.1	78,072,258	37,488,279	40,583,979	133.8

Population and Area of NSDAP Gaue

No.	Party Gau	Area in sq.kilometers	Population(1)
		Districts as of Jan. 1, 1941	
1	Baden	15,089.94	2,502,023
2	Bayerische Ostmark	29,599.96	2,370,658
3	Berlin	883.66	4,338,756
4	Danzig-Westpreussen	26,057.32	2,287,394
5	Duesseldorf	2,672.48	2,261,909
6	Essen	2,825.11	1,921,326
7	Franken	7,618.49	1,077,216
8	Halle-Merseburg	10,202.37	1,578,292
9	Hamburg	746.62	1,711,877
10	Hessen-Nassau	15,029.84	3,117,266
11	Kaernten	11,553.63	449,713
12	Koeln-Aachen	8,161.80	2,432,095
13	Kurhessen	9,200.26	971,887
14	Magdeburg-Anhalt	13,910.20	1,820,416
15	Mainfranken	8,432.28	840,663
16	Mark Brandenburg	38,278.46	3,007,933
17	Mecklenburg	15,721.66	900,427
18	Moselland	11,876.07	1,367,354
19	Muenchen-Oberbayern	16,410.63	1,938,447
20	Niederdonau	23,502.01	1,697,676
21	Niederschlesien(2)	26,984.78	3,286,539
22	Oberdonau	14,216.02	1,034,871
23	Oberschlesien(2)	20,635.90	4,341,084
24	Ost-Hannover	18,005.71	1,060,509
25	Ostpreussen	52,731.03	3,336,777
26	Pommern	38,409.00	2,393,844
27	Sachsen	14,994.70	5,231,739
28	Salzburg	7,152.96	257,226

(10698)

No.	Party Gau	Area in sq.kilometers	Population(1)
		Districts as of Jan. 1, 1941	
29	Schleswig-Holstein	15,687.47	1,589,267
30	Schwaben	10,231.34	946,212
31	Steiermark	17,383.87	1,116,407
32	Sudetenland	22,608.23	2,943,187
33	Sued-Hannover-Braunschweig	14,552.86	2,136,961
34	Thueringen	15,762.95	2,446,182
35	Tirol-Voralberg	13,126.06	486,400
36	Wartheland	43,905.19	4,693,722
37	Weser-Ems	15,044.02	1,839,302
38	Westfalen-Nord	14,588.82	2,822,603
39	Westfalen-Sued	7,656,50	2,678,026
40	Westmark	7,416.72	1,892,240
41	Wien	1,215.52	1,929,976
42	Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern	20,656.91	2,974,373
	Total NSDAP Gaue,Jan.1,1941	680,709.35	90,030,765

(1) The figures given are for the resident population of May 17, 1939, for those areas which were Reich territory at that time. The only exception is Memelland (a part of Ostpreussen), for which the figures used were those for the projected (fortgeschriebene) population as of January 1, 1940. For areas which were later annexed to the Reich from Poland (Wartheland, Danzig-Westpreussen, and parts of Ostpreussen and Oberschlesien) the figures used are those for the population at the end of 1939. For areas still later annexed from Belgium to Gau Köln-Aachen (Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet), the figures used are for the population as of the middle of 1940.

(2) Formed on January 18, 1941 from the Gau Schlesien.

b. The Balance of Migration

Increase or decrease of population in specified areas from one census period to another is conditioned by (a) the excess of births or deaths; (b) internal migration coincident upon the operation of economic factors such as the exploitation of new natural resources or the working-out of old ones, the re-location or new development of industrial areas, or the movement from the land to the cities and vice versa.

A large area which has gained population since 1933 through migration lies in central and northwestern Germany. It is bounded on the north by the Baltic and the North Seas; on the east, by the Regierungsbezirke Stettin, Potsdam, and Merseburg; on the south, by Thüringen; on the west, by the Regierungsbezirke Kassel, Minden, and Osnabrück. Within this area only the Regierungsbezirk Aurich and the Hansestadt Hamburg lost population through migration. Altogether, this area gained by migration ca. 900,000 persons (3.9% of its population in 1933)--a figure which surpasses the natural increase of births (ca. 846,000 persons).

This increase centered in the Regierungsbezirk Potsdam plus Berlin, with a net gain by migration of over 300,000 persons. Other areas with large net gains were Mecklenburg (6.7% of its 1933 population), Schleswig-Holstein (6.8%), Oldenburg (8.5%), Bremen (8.7%), Lüneburg (7.4%), Braunschweig (11.0%), and Anhalt (13.6%).

Aside from this compact territory, other areas with large net gains by migration were the Regierungsbezirk Königsberg (36,700 persons, or 3.8%), the Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern(124,800 persons or 7.0%), and Württemberg (75,100 persons, or 2.8%). The three capitals of Königsberg, Munich, and Stuttgart absorbed most of these gains.

Areas which lost most population by migration were the Reichsgau Sudetenland (-8.3%), and the former Austrian territory comprising the Reichsgaue Wien (-4.2%), Niederdonau (-2.8%), and Steier-

mark (-1.8%). This territory lost ca. 419,000 persons between 1939 and the preceding census periods (1930 in the Sudetenland, 1934 in former Austria). The loss was due to numbers of Czech citizens who left the Sudetenland for Bohemia and Moravia after the partition of Czechoslovakia; ca. 93,000 Jews who left Vienna and its environs after the Anschluss; and persons who left these regions for better economic opportunities within the Altreich.

Other areas which lost population were eastern Prussia and the Bayerische Ostmark. The Regierungsbezirke Gumbinnen, Allenstein, Köslin, and the Grenzmark, plus the Province Schlesien, together lost a quarter of a million inhabitants. The Bayerische Ostmark (Regierungsbezirk Niederbayern und Oberpfalz), with a loss of around 46,100 in population, lost thus over half the number of its excess of births.

Two well-established industrial districts--the Land Sachsen and the western area of Germany--also showed net losses of population through migration. In Sachsen, this trend was concentrated especially in the Regierungsbezirke Chemnitz and Zwickau, where the movement was of such proportions as to counteract the natural increase of births and result in a loss of population over 1933. In the west, the Regierungsbezirke Münster, Arnsberg, Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Köln together lost 217,000 persons; the Regierungsbezirke Koblenz and Wiesbaden and the Land Hessen lost 53,000 inhabitants.

The following table shows the balance of migration for the larger administrative districts of the Reich.

(10698)

(10698)

GERMANY: BALANCE OF MIGRATION IN THE LARGER ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS, 1933 to 1939

Administrative District	Resident Population May 17,1939 (in thousands)	Population increase or decrease (-)		Excess of births or deaths (-)		Gain or loss (-) by migration	
		from June 16, 1933(2) to May 17, 1939					
		in 1,000	%	in 1,000	%	in 1,000	%
Reg.-Bez.Königsberg....	1,059.1	101.7	10.6	65.0	6.8	36.7	3.8
" Gumbinnen(1)..	559.2	13.1	2.4	32.0	5.9	- 18.9	- 3.4
" Allenstein....	568.0	15.5	2.8	44.4	8.0	- 28.9	- 5.2
" Westpreussen..	301.8	24.5	8.8	21.0	7.6	3.5	1.2
Prov.Ostpreussen(1)..	2,488.1	154.8	6.6	162.4	7.0	- 7.6	- 0.3
Stadt Berlin.....	4,338.8	96.2	2.3	18.5	0.4	77.7	1.8
Reg.-Bez.Potsdam.....	1,691.3	276.0	19.5	52.3	3.7	223.7	15.8
" Frankfurt.....	1,316.6	39.8	3.1	40.7	3.2	- 0.9	- 0.1
Prov.Mark Brandenburg.....	3,007.9	315.8	11.7	93.0	3.5	222.8	8.3
Reg.-Bez.Stettin.....	1,237.8	97.0	8.5	58.0	5.1	39.0	3.4
" Köslin.....	676.8	20.1	3.1	40.8	6.2	- 20.7	- 3.1
" Grenzm.Posen-Westpreussen	479.2	8.7	1.8	28.9	6.1	20.2	4.3
Prov.Pommern.....	2,393.8	125.8	5.5	127.7	5.6	- 1.9	- 0.1
Reg.-Bez.Breslau.....	1,971.9	18.0	0.9	89.0	4.6	- 71.0	- 3.6
" Liegnitz.....	1,314.7	41.0	3.2	48.6	3.8	- 7.6	- 0.6
" Oppeln.....	1,582.2	44.7	2.9	127.4	8.3	- 82.7	- 5.4
Prov.Schlesien.....	4,868.8	103.7	2.2	265.0	5.6	- 161.3	- 3.4
Reg.-Bez.Magdeburg.....	1,388.3	84.4	6.5	40.1	3.1	44.3	3.4
" Merseburg.....	1,579.4	93.1	6.3	70.9	4.8	22.2	1.5
" Erfurt.....	650.8	40.3	6.6	26.0	4.3	14.3	2.3
Prov.Sachsen.....	3,618.5	217.8	6.4	137.0	4.0	80.8	2.4
Prov.Schlesw.-Holstein	1,589.3	169.0	11.9	72.8	5.1	96.2	6.8
Reg.-Bez.Hannover.....	967.6	63.1	7.0	29.2	3.2	33.9	3.7
" Hildesheim....	636.6	42.5	7.2	24.3	4.1	18.2	3.1

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" Lüneburg.....	554.3	61.5	12.5	25.1	5.1	36.4	7.4
" Stade(3).....	506.0	38.4	8.2	26.2	5.6	12.2	2.6
" Osnabrück.....	515.9	49.0	10.5	34.8	7.5	14.2	3.0
" Aurich.....	295.7	12.3	4.3	23.1	8.1	- 10.8	- 3.8
Prov.Hannover(3).....	3,476.1	266.8	8.3	162.7	5.1	104.1	3.2
Reg.-Bez.Münster.....	1,602.7	41.4	2.7	113.2	7.3	- 71.8	- 4.6
" Minden.....	928.7	56.9	6.5	45.7	5.2	11.2	1.3
" Arnsberg.....	2,678.0	71.1	2.7	127.5	4.9	- 56.4	- 2.2
Prov.Westfalen.....	5,209.4	169.4	3.4	286.4	5.7	- 117.0	- 2.3
Reg.-Bez.Kassel.....	1,213.7	64.8	5.6	55.8	4.9	9.0	0.8
" Wiesbaden.....	1,461.4	25.5	1.8	37.3	2.6	- 11.8	- 0.8
Prov.Hessen-Nassau...	2,675.1	90.3	3.5	93.1	3.6	- 2.8	- 0.1
Reg.-Bez.Koblenz.....	871.6	15.6	1.8	39.1	4.6	- 23.5	- 2.7
" Düsseldorf....	4,183.2	104.7	2.6	174.5	4.3	- 69.8	- 1.7
" Köln.....	1,595.7	51.1	3.3	54.4	3.5	- 3.3	- 0.2
" Trier.....	495.7	32.6	7.0	22.2	4.8	10.4	2.2
" Aachen.....	769.6	21.6	2.9	37.2	5.0	- 15.6	- 2.1
Rheinprovinz.....	7,915.8	225.6	2.9	327.4	4.3	- 101.8	- 1.3
Hohenzollerische Lande.....	73.7	0.7	1.0	2.9	4.0	- 2.2	- 3.1
Preussen (1)	41,655.3	1,935.9	4.9	1,748.9	4.4	187.0	0.5
Reg.-Bez.Oberbayern....	1,958.7	182.2	10.3	57.4	3.2	124.8	7.0
" Niederbayern.. u.Oberpfalz...	1,562.4	47.6	3.1	93.7	6.2	- 46.1	- 3.0
" Pfalz.....	1,049.8	65.4	6.6	53.5	5.4	11.9	1.2
" Oberfranken u. Mittelfranken.	1,885.5	62.3	3.4	70.5	3.9	- 8.2	- 0.4
" Mainfranken...	840.7	44.6	5.6	43.6	5.5	1.0	0.1
" Schwaben.....	925.9	46.3	5.3	34.5	3.9	11.8	1.3
Bayern..	8,223.0	448.4	5.8	353.2	4.5	95.2	1.2
Reg.-Bez.Chemnitz.....	1,032.6	- 8.0	- 0.8	27.7	2.7	- 35.7	- 3.4
" Dresden-Bautzen....	1,947.4	31.9	1.7	38.7	2.0	- 6.8	- 0.4
" Leipzig.....	1,393.0	25.2	1.8	28.3	2.1	- 3.1	- 0.2
" Zwickau.....	858.7	- 14.0	- 1.6	19.4	2.2	- 33.4	- 3.8

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Sachsen....	5,231.7	35.1	0.7	114.1	2.2	- 79.0	- 1.5
Württemberg.....	2,896.9	200.6	7.4	125.5	4.7	75.1	2.8
Ldk.-Bez.Konstanz.....	380.3	22.1	6.2	16.8	4.7	5.3	1.5
" Freiburg.....	655.6	26.2	4.2	26.4	4.2	- 0.2	- 0.0
" Karlsruhe.....	706.7	31.0	4.6	28.2	4.2	2.8	0.4
" Mannheim.....	759.8	10.2	1.4	31.8	4.2	- 21.6	- 2.9
Baden.....	2,502.4	89.5	3.7	103.2	4.3	- 13.7	- 0.6
Thüringen.....	1,743.6	84.1	5.1	64.6	3.9	19.5	1.2
Hansestadt Hamburg....	1,711.9	36.2	2.2	39.3	2.3	- 3.1	- 0.2
Hessen.....	1,649.2	40.2	2.8	58.3	4.1	- 18.1	- 1.3
Mecklenburg.....	900.4	95.5	11.9	41.7	5.2	53.8	6.7
Braunschweig.....	583.3	70.4	13.7	14.1	2.8	56.3	11.0
Oldenburg.....	577.7	82.5	16.7	40.4	8.2	42.1	8.5
Anhalt.....	431.4	57.0	18.4	17.3	4.8	49.7	13.6
Bremen(3).....	450.1	50.9	12.8	16.0	4.0	34.9	8.7
Lippe.....	187.2	11.7	6.7	8.4	4.8	3.3	1.9
Schaumburg-Lippe.....	53.2	3.2	6.5	1.8	3.5	1.4	2.9
Saarland.....	842.5	30.2	3.7	37.9	4.7	- 7.7	- 1.0
Reichsgau Wien.....	1,930.0	- 161.6	- 7.7	- 73.8	- 3.5	- 87.8	- 4.2
" Niederdonau....	1,697.7	- 27.5	- 1.6	20.0	1.2	- 47.5	- 2.8
" Oberdonau.....	1,034.9	24.0	2.4	18.2	1.8	5.8	0.6
" Steiermark.....	1,116.4	- 6.5	- 0.6	13.8	1.2	- 20.3	- 1.8
" Kärnten.....	449.7	13.4	3.1	13.0	3.0	0.4	0.1
" Salzburg.....	257.2	11.4	4.6	4.1	1.7	7.3	3.0
" Tirol mit Verw. -Bez Vorarlberg	486.4	15.2	3.2	13.1	2.8	2.1	0.4
Reg.-Bez.Aussig.....	1,328.6	- 143.2	- 9.7	2.6	0.2	- 145.8	- 9.9
" Eger.....	803.5	- 53.4	- 6.2	20.7	2.4	- 74.1	- 8.6
" Troppau.....	811.1	- 18.8	- 2.3	25.0	3.0	- 43.8	- 5.3
Reichsgau Sudetenland.	2,943.2	- 215.4	- 6.8	48.3	1.5	- 263.7	- 8.3
Deutsches Reich(4)	79,375.3	2,934.4	3.8	2,841.4	3.7	93.0	0.1

(1) Territory of May 17, 1939, without Memelland. (2) Saarland, June 25, 1935; former Austria, March 22, 1934; Sudeten territory Dec. 1, 1930. (3) Exchange of territory between Bremen and Hanover on Nov. 11,1939 is taken into account. (4)Without Memelland, Danzig, the annexed Polish territory, and Eupen-Malmedy-Moresnet.

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c. Rural-Urban Distribution

(1) Germany, 1939 frontiers

The German census classifications define "rural" population as including all those inhabitants of agglomerations of less than 2,000; "urban" population as agglomerations of 2,000 or over. In 1939, only three-tenths of the German population lived in communities of less than 2,000. Of the remaining 54.3 millions of urban population, 24.2 millions lived in th 62 Reich cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. Approximately 8 million persons (ca. 10% of the German population) were concentrated in the three cities of Berlin, Wien and Hamburg.

The following table gives a breakdown of rural-urban population for Germany by size of community.

Rural-Urban Population of the German Reich,[a] May 17,1939

SIZE OF COMMUNITY	Communities		Resident Population	
	Number	%	Number	%
Rural Population (less than 2,000):	51,727	91.9	25,052,096	31.6
Less than 100	3,505	6.2	233,043	0.3
100-499	30,324	53.9	8,358,465	10.5
500-999	12,039	21.4	8,402,305	10.6
1,000-1,999	5,859	10.4	8,058,283	10.2
Urban Population (2,000 and over):	4,541	8.1	54,323,185	68.4
2,000-4,999: towns (Landstädte)	3,026	5.4	9,143,868	11.5
5,000-19,999: small cities (Kleinstädte)	1,189	2.1	10,604,224	13.3
20,000-99,999: middle cities (Mittelstädte)	264	0.5	10,387,651	13.1
100,000 and over: large cities (Grosstädte)	62	0.1	24,187,442	30.5
100,000-199,999	33	0.1	4,577,106	5.8
200,000-499,999	17	0.0	5,757,164	7.2
500,000-999,999	9	0.0	5,872,563	7.4
1,000,000 and over	3	0.0	7,980,609	10.1
Total	56,268	100.0	79,375,281	100.0

(a) Territory middle of 1939 without Memelland.

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The table below gives general rural-urban population distribution for the 1939 administrative divisions of the Reich.

GERMANY[a]: RURAL-URBAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

Administrative Division	Total Communities		of these					
			Rural (under 2,000)			Urban (over 2,000)		
	Number	Resident Population	Number of Communities	Resident Population Number	Resident Population %	Number of Communities	Resident Population Number	Resident Population %
Ostpreussen	4,606	2,488,122	4,513	1,284,570	51.6	93	1,203,552	48.4
Stadt Berlin	1	4,338,756	-	-	-	1	4,338,756	100.0
Mark Brandenburg	3,085	3,007,937	2,866	1,163,652	38.7	219	1,844,285	61.3
Pommern	2,807	2,393,844	2,664	1,062,479	44.4	143	1,331,365	55.6
Schlesien	4,104	4,868,764	3,832	2,007,542	41.2	272	2,861,222	58.8
Sachsen	2.925	3,618,458	2,680	1,275,135	35.2	245	2,343,323	64.8
Schleswig-Holstein	1,381	1,589,267	1,289	546,479	34.4	92	1,042,788	65.6
Hannover	3,779	3,476,056	3,580	1,618,750	46.6	199	1,857,306	53.4
Westfalen	1,413	5,209,401	1,067	745,193	14.3	346	4,464,208	85.7
Hessen-Nassau	2,357	2,675,111	2,227	1,095,432	40.9	130	1,579,679	59.1
Rheinprovinz	2,665	7,915,830	2,296	1,205,135	15.2	369	6,710,695	84.8
Hohenzoller.Lande	120	73,706	116	56,191	76.2	4	17,515	23.8
Preussen	29,243	41,655 252	27,130	12,060,558	29.0	2,113	29,594,694	71.0
Bayern	8,006	8,222,982	7,558	3,774,658	45.9	448	4,448,324	54.1
Sachsen	2,414	5,231,739	2,064	1,065,578	20.4	350	4,166,161	79.6
Württemberg	1,807	2,896,920	1,609	1,091,506	37.7	198	1,805,414	62.3
Baden	1,448	2,502,442	1,245	842,296	33.7	203	1,660,146	66.3
Thüringen	1,936	1,743,624	1,813	704,336	40.4	123	1,039,288	59.6
Hansestadt Hamburg	1	1,711,877	-	-	-	1	1,711,877	100.0
Hessen	958	1,469,215	838	487,589	33.2	120	981,626	66.8
Mecklenburg	1,677	900,413	1,622	367,330	40.8	55	533,083	59.2
Braunschweig	434	583,338	406	220,285	37.8	28	363,053	62.2
Oldenburg	58	577,648	2	2,992	0.5	56	574,656	99.5
Bremen	12	450,084	5	3,811	0.8	7	446,273	99.2

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Anhalt	277	431,422	250	99,632	23.1	27	331,790	76.9
Lippe	172	187,220	156	92,787	49.6	16	94,433	50.4
Schaumburg-Lippe	73	53,195	70	34,168	64.2	3	19,027	35.8
Saarland	243	842,454	153	121,666	14.4	90	720,788	85.6
Reichsgau Wien	1	1,929,976	-	-	-	1	1,929,976	100.0
" Niederdonau	1,837	1,697,676	1,690	1,003,275	59.1	147	694,401	40.9
" Oberdonau	592	1,034,871	467	447,553	43.2	125	587,318	56.8
" Steiermark	1,191	1,116,407	1,129	646,811	57.9	62	469,596	42.1
" Kärnten	270	449,713	225	224,513	49.9	45	225,200	50.1
" Salzburg	112	257,226	82	84,210	32.7	30	173,016	67.3
" Tirol-Vorarlberg	339	486,400	300	218,467	44.9	39	267,933	55.1
" Sudetenland	3,167	2,943,187	2,913	1,458,075	49.5	254	1,485,112	50.5
Total Reich(b)	56,268	79,375,281	51,727	25,052,096	31.6	4,541	54,323,185	68.4

(a) Territory and Administrative Divisions as of May 17, 1939, without Memelland.

(b) Without Memelland, Danzig, new eastern territories, or Eupen, Malmedy and Moresnet.

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The following table shows the distribution of the 1939 German population in rural-urban communities, by five-year age groups.

1939 GERMAN POPULATION
Distribution in Rural-Urban Communities, 5-Year Age Groups a/
Population in Thousands.

Age	Towns of under 2000 Number	%	Cities of 2000-100,000 Number	%	Cities of over 100,000 Number	%
			I. Male Population			
0-4	1,217.9	9.86	1,281.4	8.68	828.8	7.31
5-9	1,097.5	8.89	1,059.1	7.17	635.5	5.61
10-14	1,218.1	9.86	1,211.3	8.20	733.9	6.47
15-19	1,238.3	10.02	1,353.9	9.17	808.2	7.13
20-24	509.8	4.13	1,167.7	7.91	676.8	5.97
25-29	1,076.6	8.72	1,410.7	9.55	1,096.6	9.67
30-34	1,078.5	8.73	1,358.6	9.20	1,141.8	10.08
35-39	983.5	7.96	1,243.3	8.42	1,068.8	9.43
40-44	726.0	5.88	943.4	6.39	845.1	7.45
45-49	607.0	4.91	786.8	5.33	754.9	6.66
50-54	576.3	4.67	725.4	4.91	725.2	6.40
55-59	536.1	4.34	647.2	4.38	647.5	5.71
60-64	514.7	4.17	596.8	4.04	568.3	5.01
65-69	406.1	3.29	439.5	2.98	388.1	3.42
70-74	291.9	2.36	294.5	1.99	240.6	2.12
75-79	173.0	1.40	162.8	1.10	120.9	1.07
80-84	75.3	.61	65.5	.44	43.0	.38
85-89	21.2	.17	17.9	.12	10.8	.10
90-94	3.1	.03	2.6	.02	1.5	.01
95-99	.3	—	.3	--	.2	—
0-59	10,865.6	87.96	13,188.8	89.30	9,963.1	87.89
Total	12,351.2	100.00	14,768.7	100.00	11,336.5	100.00

(10698)

II. Female Population

Age	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
0-4	1,169.9	9.38	1,229.9	8.13	793.6	6.25
5-9	1,062.5	8.51	1,023.0	6.76	612.2	4.82
10-14	1,196.1	9.59	1,164.2	7.69	712.8	5.61
15-19	1,079.2	8.65	1,286.5	8.50	916.6	7.22
20-24	648.2	5.19	892.4	5.90	748.0	5.89
25-29	995.5	7.97	1,367.8	9.04	1,164.7	9.17
30-34	978.1	7.83	1,346.1	8.89	1,223.0	9.62
35-39	939.8	7.53	1,252.0	8.27	1,148.0	9.04
40-44	847.5	6.79	1,125.5	7.44	1,080.8	8.51
45-49	732.0	5.86	973.7	6.43	981.2	7.73
50-54	667.7	5.35	861.6	5.69	868.9	6.84
55-59	592.7	4.75	746.0	4.93	745.6	5.87
60-64	545.0	4.37	673.8	4.45	651.4	5.13
65-69	420.8	3.37	498.8	3.30	457.3	3.60
70-74	307.5	2.46	353.4	2.33	309.8	2.44
75-79	186.1	1.49	211.6	1.40	180.0	1.42
80-84	84.2	.67	94.5	.62	78.8	.62
85-89	26.1	.21	30.1	.20	24.5	.19
90-94	4.3	.03	5.2	.03	4.0	.03
95-99	.6	—	.6	—	.4	—
0-59	10,909.2	87.41	13,268.7	87.66	10,995.4	86.56
Total	12,483.8	100.00	15,136.7	100.00	12,701.6	100.00

a/ Census of 5-17-39, comprising Germany, Austria and Sudetenland.

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(2) Annexed Polish Territory

The Polish territory annexed to Germany is inhabited mainly by a rural population. Of a total number of 9640.2 thousands in 1931, 6175.0 thousands (64.1%) were classed as rural, and 3456.2 thousands (35.9%) as urban. The annexed area includes 260 cities and towns and 1290 rural boroughs. The most completely urbanized districts are in (1) former Polish Silesia, with the additions of most of the Teschen area and the Hultschin district; (2) the areas centering in Posen (Poznan) and Litzmannstadt (Lodz). The former, now a part of the German province of Oberschlesien, has a great mining and industrial population which works in the coal, iron, zinc and lead mines, or the blast furnaces, rolling mills and zinc and lead foundries. Lodz, with a population overwhelmingly Polish and Jewish, was the former center of the important Polish textile industry. The rest of the Polish territory has most of its population on the land, or in villages os 3,000 or less.

(3) Alsace-Lorraine

The following table shows the distribution of urban and rural population in Alsace-Lorraine in 1936:

Territory	POPULATION				
	Total	Urban		Rural	
		Number	%	Number	%
Lorraine (Moselle)	696,246	361,943	51.98	334,303	48.02
Alsace	1,219,381	669,294	54.89	550,087	45.11
(Haut Rhin)	507,511	277,014	54.58	230,537	45.42
(Bas Rhin)	711,830	392,280	55.11	319,550	44.89

(4) Luxemburg

The following table shows the distribution of urban and rural population in Luxemburg according to the census of December 31, 1935:

Size of community	No. of Communities	POPULATION	
		Number	% of total
RURAL POPULATION	102	105,233	35.44
500 or less	6	2,615	0.88
501-1,000	47	35,855	12.07
1,001-2,000	49	66,763	22.49
URBAN POPULATION	24	191,680	64.56
2,001-3,000	8	19,167	6.45
3,001-5,000	8	31,197	10.51
5,001-10,000	3	16,017	5.39
10,001-15,000	2	24,097	8.12
15,001-20,000	1	15,945	5.37
20,001-30,000	1	27,517	9.27
30,001-and over	1	57,740	19.45
Total	126	296,913	100.00

(5) Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia

The table below analyzes the rural-urban composition of the combined area of Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia, 1930 census. These figures include the Sudetenland and other former Czech territory added to the Reich proper and included in the 1939 German census.

Size of community	No. of Communities	POPULATION		
		Number	% of total	% of urban or rural population
RURAL POPULATION	15,583	5,549,269	51.99	100.00
Under 250	8,203	1,083,490	10.15	19.52
250-500	3,949	1,395,091	13.07	25.14
501-1,000	2,373	1,638,652	15.35	29.53
1,001-2,000	1,058	1,432,036	13.42	25.81
URBAN POPULATION	667	5,125,117	48.01	100.00
2,001-5,000	501	1,522,587	14.26	29.71
5,001-10,000	91	617,804	5.79	12.05
10,001-20,000	47	644,992	6.04	12.58
20,001-50,000	19	620,637	5.81	12.11
50,001-100,000	5	309,524	2.90	6.04
Over 100,000	4	1,409,573	13.21	27.51
Total	16,250	10,674,386	100.00	

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

EMPLOYED PERSONS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, MAY 17, 1939

Area	OCCUPATIONAL GROUP													
	Agric.& Animal Husbandry, Horticulture, Forestry, Fishing		Industry & Handicraft		Commerce & Trade		Public Service & Private Employment (without domestic service)		Domestic Service		Total		% of Total in Industry	% of Total in Agriculture and Forestry
	Total	Males	Total	Males	Total	Males	Total	Males	Total	Males	Total	Males		
Ostpreussen	550,558	297,387	256,555	216,462	159,893	107,673	133,608	98,500	46,095	458	1,146,709	720,480	22.4	48.0
Stadt Berlin	18,485	12,291	1,114,612	739,771	678,671	406,783	389,835	251,379	101,037	1,638	2,302,640	1,411,862	48.4	0.8
Mark Brandenburg	486,447	232,186	583,984	447,497	224,311	154,415	171,534	128,388	55,125	850	1,521,401	963,336	38.4	32.0
Pommern	508,411	281,173	274,052	233,717	173,331	119,484	127,610	96,205	46,300	488	1,129,704	731,067	24.3	45.0
Schlesien	762,056	328,714	847,040	677,141	353,517	234,618	221,064	151,181	96,944	1,226	2,280,621	1,392,880	47.1	33.4
Sachsen	477,752	208,244	795,181	633,142	294,172	197,414	168,713	121,155	65,144	561	1,800,962	1,160,516	54.2	26.5
Schleswig-Holstein	221,245	117,122	246,587	205,296	134,063	91,358	118,336	91,650	35,960	339	756,191	505,765	32.6	29.3
Hannover with Schaumburg-Lippe	698,167	307,696	603,170	500,321	296,664	210,009	172,953	126,553	66,567	381	1,837,521	1,144,960	32.8	38.0
Westfalen with Lippe	470,728	191,663	1,299,368	1,104,333	383,745	250,315	216,408	142,522	114,957	567	2,485,206	1,689,400	52.3	18.9
Hessen-Nassau	382,101	138,290	535,483	436,724	235,628	162,329	140,215	96,436	50,108	470	1,343,535	834,249	39.9	28.4
Rheinprovinz	627,043	290,363	1,843,843	1,511,424	718,114	468,723	354,956	231,705	176,974	1,202	3,720,930	2,503,417	49.6	16.7
Preussen*	5,202,993	2,405,129	8,399,875	6,705,828	3,652,109	2,403,121	2,215,232	1,535,674	855,211	8,180	20,325,420	13,057,932	41.3	25.6
Bayern right of Rhine	1,466,253	651,706	1,307,838	984,159	552,596	334,647	371,536	251,650	122,833	1,166	3,821,056	2,223,398	34.2	38.4
" left " "	153,037	60,194	229,650	182,529	67,331	44,980	46,621	33,984	16,104	84	512,743	321,771	44.8	29.9
Bayern	1,619,290	711,900	1,537,488	1,166,688	619,927	379,627	418,157	285,634	138,937	1,250	4,333,799	2,545,169	35.5	37.4
Land Sachsen	295,410	141,771	1,579,354	1,036,615	514,355	325,415	240,139	166,934	86,766	646	2,716,024	1,671,381	58.2	10.9
Württemberg-Hohenzol. Lande	527,238	222,844	729,992	527,292	205,262	121,800	131,987	86,469	57,308	321	1,651,787	958,726	44.2	31.9
Baden	415,021	171,244	536,841	390,616	195,952	129,132	124,768	83,665	49,070	315	1,321,652	774,972	40.6	31.4
Thüringen	229,444	92,273	459,343	334,322	121,460	77,010	77,831	56,910	28,651	253	916,729	560,768	50.1	25.0
Hessen	220,710	91,296	309,493	247,209	106,257	73,772	66,175	47,517	22,998	179	725,633	459,973	42.7	30.4
Hansestadt Hamburg	20,716	12,840	328,402	248,542	329.403	233,997	105,888	69,085	40,365	476	824,774	564,940	39.8	2.5
Mecklenburg	178,777	103,273	119,409	103,632	65,768	44,861	51,969	38,404	21,702	541	437,625	290,711	27.3	40.9
Oldenburg	109,927	50,532	68,952	59,642	41,622	29,250	55,696	46,440	10,683	55	286,880	185,919	24.0	38.3
Braunschweig	68,767	28,430	138,774	114,123	50,062	32,395	30,558	22,327	12,265	67	300,426	197,342	46.2	22.9
Bremen	6,978	4,220	104,375	84,318	75,109	54,641	24,547	16,218	11,628	79	222,637	159,476	46.9	3.1
Anhalt	39,072	18,035	105,875	89,050	30,768	19,138	20,795	14,929	8,736	68	205,246	141,220	51.6	19.0
Saarland	50,590	11,438	184,551	168,164	63,461	41,925	35,210	24,683	14,146	71	347,958	246,281	53.0	14.5
Reichsgau Wien	28,175	16,040	441,223	293,048	266,254	160,564	147,991	99,167	45,795	798	929,438	569,617	47.5	3.0
Ostmärkische Reichsgaue without Wien	1,394,626	639,297	740,367	606,192	298,484	191,582	205,746	142,663	80,228	1,223	2,719,451	1,580,957	27.2	51.3
Reichsgau Sudetenland	439,782	185,841	719,727	492,822	214,630	140,938	115,448	81,297	37,229	581	1,526,816	901,479	47.1	28.8
Altreich (without Saar)	8,934,343	4,053,787	14,418,175	11,107,877	6,008,054	3,924,159	3,563,742	2,470,206	1,344,320	12,430	34,268,634	21,568,459	42.1	26.1
German Reich	10,847,516	4,906,403	16,504,041	12,608,103	6,850,883	4,459,168	4,068,137	2,818,016	1,521,718	15,103	39,792,295	24,866,793	41.5	27.3

* (Total not exact, because figures include Lippe and Schaumburg Lippe, and do not include Hohenzollerische Lande.)

The table below shows a very rough approximation of the rural-urban composition of the present Protectorate. It was obtained by subtracting rural and urban totals for the Sudetenland, 1939 German census, from the combined Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia totals, 1930 Czech census. It will be noted that percentages of the total for each area are roughly similar.

Size of Community	No. of Communities	POPULATION	
		Number	% of total
RURAL POPULATION (2,000 and under)	12,670	4,091,194	52.92
URBAN POPULATION (Over 2,000)	413	3,640,005	47.08
Total	13,083	7,731,199	100.00

d. Occupational Composition

(1) German Reich, Frontiers of 1939

Germany is one of the most highly industrialized nations of Europe. The occupational composition of employed persons in the Reich, within the frontiers of May 17, 1939 but without Memelland, is indicated by the following table:

Occupational group	Total employed	%	Men	Women
Agriculture and forestry	10,848,000	27.3	4,907,000	5,941,000
Industry and handicraft	16,504,000	41.5	12,668,000	3,836,000
Commerce and trade	6,851,000	17.2	4,459,000	2,392,000
Public service and private employment (without domestic service)	4,068,000	10.2	2,818,000	1,250,000
Domestic service	1,521,000	3.8	15,000	1,506,000
Total	39,792,000	100.0	24,867,000	14,925,000

The table below shows similar occupational composition for large administrative districts as of May 17, 1939, and gives a general picture of the economy of each area. In general, the most highly industrialized areas were in the Prussian province of Sachsen (54.2%),

the Rheinprovinz (49.6%), the Land Sachsen (58.2%), Thueringen (50.1%), Anhalt (51.6%), and Saarland (53.0%). Those administrative divisions with the largest percentages of their populations employed in agriculture and forestry included Ostpreussen (48.0%), Pommern (45.0%), Mecklenburg (40.9%), and former Austria without the Reichsgau Wien (51.3%).

In 1939, persons employed in industry and handicrafts had increased 940,000 (7%) over 1925 to reach a total of 16.5 millions. Of this number, ca. 4.9 million (29.7%) were included in the various branches of the metal industries. Next in numbers employed were the building and construction industries (2.7 millions); and third came the foodstuffs industry, with 1.7 millions gainfully employed.

GAINFULLY EMPLOYED PERSONS IN INDUSTRY AND HANDICRAFT
GERMANY, MAY 17, 1939 (a)

	Total		Male		Female	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
Mining, salt works, peat cutting	796.2	4.8	783.3	6.2	12.9	0.3
Stone and earth	779.1	4.7	664.1	5.3	115.0	3.0
Metal industry	4,897.0	29.7	4,151.7	32.8	745.3	19.5
Iron and metal production, also semi-finished goods.	734.6	4.5	685.5	5.4	49.1	1.3
Iron, steel, and metal goods mfg.	1,184.9	7.2	948.6	7.5	236.3	6.2
Machine, boiler, apparatus, and vehicle building	2,082.8	12.6	1,876.9	14.8	205.9	5.4
Electrotechnics (also installation).	692.1	4.2	492.6	3.9	199.5	5.2
Fine mechanics and optical industry	202.6	1.2	148.1	1.2	54.5	1.4
Chemical industry	532.4	3.2	398.3	3.1	134.1	3.5
Textile industry	1,395.5	8.5	593.6	4.7	801.9	20.9
Paper production and mfg.	309.7	1.9	190.9	1.5	118.8	3.1
Printing and duplicating	276.9	1.7	191.7	1.5	85.2	2.2
Leather and Linoleum	178.8	1.1	136.6	1.1	42.2	1.1
Rubber and asbestos	89.0	0.5	55.0	0.4	34.0	0.9
Wood and wood working	960.8	5.8	871.2	6.9	89.6	2.3
Musical instruments, toys	61.4	0.4	36.0	0.3	25.4	0.7
Foodstuffs	1,655.0	10.0	1,065.3	8.4	589.7	15.4
Clothing	1,561.7	9.5	633.2	5.0	928.5	24.2

Building and construction	2,732.0	16.6	2,652.0	20.9	80.0	2.1
Water, gas, electricity, pro. and supply	237.9	1.4	220.8	1.7	17.1	0.4
Employment without permanent position	40.6	0.2	24.4	0.2	16.2	0.4
Total	16,504.0	100.0	12,668.1	100.0	3,835.9	100.0

(a) Without Memelland.

Since results of the occupational census taken in 1939 were published, however, actual numbers of persons employed in the various categories certainly have shifted in accordance with the demands of the war economy--a reduction in numbers employed in the consumption goods industries, and an increase in occupations vital to the war effort. Precise information as to the nature of these changes is unobtainable.

The following table shows the distribution of German "war" industry just before the outbreak of conflict in September. Since that date, undoubtedly, vital industries have been transferred to areas presumably less vulnerable to bombing--to the east, or to other new districts, so that the relevance of the table to the present situation is not entirely clear. Since 1939, too, the industrial districts of former Poland have been producing for the Reich, as is true also of Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg. These movements and developments, however, probably do not distort the present picture as compared with the 1939 picture enough to make the table without interest.

GERMANY: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN WAR INDUSTRIES, MAY 17, 1939
(All Data in Thousands)

Area	GAINFULLY EMPLOYED						
	Metal Smelting	Iron and Steel Goods	Machines, Vehicles, Ships and Aircraft	Electrical Engineering	Precision and Optical Instruments	Chemicals	Total War Industry
Ostpreussen	1	13	27	4	1	2	48
Berlin	14	76	186	239	23	38	576
Mark Brandenburg	17	41	84	27	9	17	195
Pommern	4	14	22	5	1	5	51
Schlesien	27	36	60	15	3	10	151
Sachsen	29	64	132	13	10	85	333
Schleswig-Holstein	5	18	55	7	3	6	94
Hannover (including Schaumburg-Lippe)	28	34	65	13	6	19	165
Westfalen (with Lippe)	171	118	123	26	2	23	463
Hessen-Nassau	23	38	75	22	11	33	202
Rheinprovinz	217	159	220	54	7	81	738
Preussen*	536	611	1,049	425	76	319	3,016
Bayern right of Rhine	22	80	147	56	18	28	351
" left " "	4	10	25	3	1	31	74
Bayern	26	90	172	59	19	59	425
Sachsen	38	101	228	52	19	30	468
Württemberg (W. Hohen.)	10	71	116	39	29	11	276
Baden	11	53	70	18	16	16	184
Thüringen	3	46	50	15	22	6	142
Hessen	3	20	56	7	2	17	105
Hamburg	4	19	74	13	6	23	139
Mecklenburg	1	9	29	2	0	1	42
Oldenburg	1	3	10	2	1	1	18
Braunschweig	6	10	27	2	2	2	49
Bremen	1	5	43	3	0	2	54
Anhalt	2	4	41	1	1	14	63
Saarland	38	8	11	3	0	1	61
Reichsgau Wien	6	35	42	33	5	14	135
Ostmärkische Reichsgaue without Wien	30	55	34	10	3	7	139
Reichsgau Sudetenland	15	44	31	10	2	14	116
Altreich (without Saar)	645	1,043	1,966	636	193	497	4,980
German Reich	735	1,185	2,082	692	202	532	5,428

* Total approximate, because figures include Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe, and do not include Hohenzollerische Lande.

The most striking fact revealed by the table is the wide distribution of war industry. The five leading regions in war industry as a whole were the Rheinprovinz, Berlin, the Land Sachsen, Westfalen, and Bayern--areas scattered sufficiently to indicate wide diffusion, in spite of allowance made for varying size of area and total population of these administrative divisions. Coincident with this general wide distribution, however, there appears to be a good deal of more localized concentration of specialized branches. In metal smelting, for example, 60% of the workers (in the Altreich) were in Westfalen and the Rheinprovinz. In electrical engineering, 38% of the total (Altreich) workers were in Berlin, but the Rheinprovinz, Bayern and Sachsen also had considerable concentrations. Fine mechanics and optical instrument workers were grouped around several separate centers--Wuerttemberg-Baden, Berlin, Thueringen, and Bayern. Two main foci for the chemical industry were in the Rheinprovinz and the Prussian province of Sachsen. Employment in machine, vehicle, ship, and aircraft construction was established in well-marked separate districts, with the Rheinprovinz-Westfalen area leading, followed by the Land Sachsen, Berlin, Bayern east of the Rhine, the Prussian province of Sachsen, and Wuerttemberg. The pattern of distribution for workers in other iron and steel goods was roughly similar.

(2) Bohemia-Moravia

The economic structure of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia is very similar to that of the Altreich. It is more highly industrialized than former Austria, but less so than the Sudetenland. As a unit, it is an important production center, with a highly mechanized industry specializing predominantly in capital goods.

Latest complete figures on the occupational composition of the Protectorate are contained in the 1930 census, when the distribution was as follows:

Occupation	No. of gainfully employed plus dependents	% of total
Agric., forestry, fishing	1,891,681	27.8
Industry and trade	2,597,639	38.2
Transport	567,360	6.2
Commerce and banking	422,029	8.4
Civil ser., army, professions	465,733	6.8
Other	860,434	12.6
Total	6,804,876	100.0

At the time of the industrial census of 1930, the number of persons employed in certain strategic industries was as follows:

Industry	Number Employed (in thousands)
Stone and earth	80-85
Glass	20
Metals and machines	over 250
Chemicals	22
Textiles	138
Clothing and shoes	179
Building and construction	184
Electric power	12

This is be no means the distribution which obtains at present. The contribution of the Protectorate to the German war effort lies chiefly in its iron and steel industry, which has increased tremendously since the war began. Unfortunately, there are no general statements on numbers of persons employed, but it is possible to gain a general picture of the situation. The Minister of Economics and

Labor in the Protectorate, Walther Bertsch, says that parts of the German armament industry have been moved into Bohemia-Moravia, indicated partly by the continual increase of numbers employed in these industries (e.g., the number of employees in the metallurgical industries increased by ca. 40,000 in 1941 and is still growing in 1942). A greater proportion of these new employees are women.

The growth of the armament industry has expanded plants to the limits of their capacity. Last annual reports of the Skoda works show that production and turnover have reached record peaks; factories are still being enlarged; wages have increased ca. 225% in 1940 over 1939. The Zbrojovka plant in Brno (producing Bren guns) paid 60% more in compulsory social taxes for employees in 1940 than in 1939.

The finishing and the consumption goods industries are being restricted. No statistics of employement in these or in the leather, shoe, chemical, glass, electrotechnical, textile, and metal ware industries are available, but it is probable that workers in these industries (except where they contribute directly to the war effort) have all been shifted over into war industries.

(3) Annexed Polish Territory

The occupational composition of the annexed Polish territory (division of January 1, 1941) as of the census of 1931, is shown by the following table. Figures include both employed persons and dependents, but exclude soldiers in barracks.

Occupational Group	Number (in 000's)	%
Agric., forestry, fishing	4,319	45.9
Mining and industry	2,870	30.5
Commerce and insurance	600	6.4
Communication and transport	476	5.1
Public services and church	241	2.6
Schools and culture	106	1.1
Therapy, sanitary services, welfare	97	1.0
Domestic service	150	1.6
Others	543	5.8
Total	9,402	100.0

(10698)

The gainfully employed population of the category Mining and Industry is broken down by principal branches in the following table:

Occupational Group	Number gainfully employed
Mining	151,715
Founding and metal mfg.	156,579
Chemicals	27,704
Stone and earth	38,328
Timber	80,136
Paper	10,600
Textiles	198,420
Leather	8,979
Clothing	169,316
Foodstuffs	134,251
Printing, etc.	10,738
Building trades	106,312
Water, gas, electricity	9,539
Total	1,102,617

The great bulk of pre-war Polish industry, particularly heavy industry, was concentrated in the Upper Silesian area. Immediately after the Polish campaign, German administrators were sent in to increase production--efforts which were not entirely successful, for at the end of 1940, the productivity of the iron and steel industry had been raised only to 80% of its pre-war level: 82,000 tons of pig iron, 125,000 tons of ingots, and 88,000 tons of finished steel monthly. The great coal mines of the Dabrowica-Silesian basin are operating at full capacity, and the iron, zinc, and lead deposits of Polish Silesia are also being exploited. The Kattowitzer Zeitung, March 9, 1941 evaluates the position of Upper Silesia thus: "As the Reich's forge of weapons and area of creative work Upper Silesia undoubtedly has earned the title of industrial district of the East, and more so as in regard to density of population and large stocks of raw materials it is not inferior to the Ruhr".

(4) Alsace-Lorraine

Last available figures on the occupational composition of Alsace (Haut Rhin and Bas Rhin) and Lorraine (Moselle) are contained in the French census of 1931, where the distribution was as follows:

Occupation	Number gainfully employed	% of total gainfully occupied
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	204,020	22.39
Industry	472,557	51.85
Commerce	99,230	10.89
Domestic Service	26,096	2.86
Liberal professions	109,447	12.01
Total	911,350	100.00

Actual numbers employed (1931) in specific industries by departments follow:

Industry	Number Employed
Mines and mining total	54,532
Moselle	40,170
Haut Rhin	11,752
Bas Rhin	2,070
Quarrying total	3,610
Moselle	1,104
Haut Rhin	988
Bas Rhin	1,518
Chemical industries total	8,964
Moselle	2,070
Haut Rhin	2,340
Bas Rhin	3,312
Textiles total	77,412
Moselle	1,242
Haut Rhin	59,748
Bas Rhin	16,422
Wood total	25,720
Moselle	5,658
Haut Rhin	7,228
Bas Rhin	12,834
Metallurgy total	97,881
Moselle	49,818
Haut Rhin	18,876
Bas Rhin	29,187
Building and construction total	54,417
Moselle	22,494
Haut Rhin	16,536
Bas Rhin	15,387
Stone and brick total	14,172
Moselle	10,281
Haut Rhin	1,924
Bas Rhin	2,967
Leather and hides total	11,393
Moselle	2,346
Haut Rhin	1,664
Bas Rhin	7,383

Clothing total	27,600
Moselle	6,141
Haut Rhin	7,176
Bas Rhin	14,283
Foodstuffs total	24,037
Moselle	6,141
Haut Rhin	5,200
Bas Rhin	12,696

Agriculture is important both for Alsace and for Lorraine. Alsace has a great textile industry, centering in Mülhausen (Mulhouse) and Colmar; and the chemical, dyd, and machine industries are also well known. Lorraine is confined more directly to heavy industry and to mining.

(5) Luxemburg

The census of December 31, 1935, taken during a period of unemployment, showed 45% of the total population of Luxemburg gainfully employed. 26.1% of the female and 64.5% of the male population were engaged in gainful occupations. About 34% of employed persons were in industry and handicraft, and 27% in agriculutre, forestry and fishing. The table below shows occupational composition of gainfully employed persons and numbers and percentages of the total population dependent on workers in the various categories:

Occupational Group	Gainfully employed		Workers plus dependents	
	Number	%	Number	%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	40,766	26.7	61,052	20.6
Industry and handicraft	51,739	33.9	128,156	43.2
Commerce and trade	25,740	16.7	54,127	18.2
Public service, free professions	10,739	7.0	20,248	6.8
Domestic service	6,133	4.0	2,844	1.0
Others	17,846	11.7	30,486	10.2
Total	152,693	100.0	296,913	100.0

(10698)

In the last ten years, the importance of agriculture in the economic structure of Luxemburg has declined, due to the lowering of the birth rate and the migration from the land.

Luxemburg's iron and steel industry is of chief importance for the economy of the area, ranking sixth among the iron and steel producing nations of the world. In the period 1937-39, about 61% of all persons employed in mining and industry worked in iron mines and in iron and steel manufacturing. The following table shows the distribution of workers:

Nationality of workers	Total Industry & Mining			Iron Mining & Iron & Steel Industry		
	1937	1938	1939	1937	1938	1939
Luxemburgers	26,599	27,364	27,502	16,041	16,138	15,853
Germans	2,051	1,973	1,520	1,341	1,284	1,038
Belgians	1,435	1,358	1,186	1,253	1,167	1,018
French	407	377	344	342	328	295
Italians	1,810	1,794	1,510	1,210	1,098	983
Others	607	604	604	420	402	412
Total foreigners	6,310	6,106	5,164	4,571	4,279	3,746
" natives and foreigners	32,909	33,470	32,666	20,612	20,417	19,599

Other industries of importance are (1) stone and earth, with 308 quarries (mostly limestone, dolomite, and gypsum) and 1,410 workers in 1938, and 2 slate quarries with 238 workers in 1936; (2) leather, with ca. 1,000 workers; (3) wood, with ca. 3,000 workers; (4) foodstuffs, with 5,000 workers in 1935; and (5) transport, with around 7,200 workers in 1935.

c. Vital Statistics

Apart from military casualties, war has a considerable effect on vital statistics of belligerents. The civilian death rate tends to rise because of (1) longer hours of employment, (2) lowering of the standard of living, (3) spread of epidemics from war areas, (4) employment of segments of the population in work for which they would

ordinarily be judged unfit. The birth rate ordinarily tends to decline, owing to the mobilization of important numbers of the male population. Birth and death rates studied over a period of time help indicate: (a) standards of living for a civilian population and (b) the "drag" (persons too old to work, babies and young children, nursing mothers) which an economy must sustain.

To date, Germany is the only country which has succeeded appreciably in raising its birth rate through deliberate national policies. These policies, and the theories on which they are based, are an intensification of elements already present in German culture. With reference to fertility, they involve: (a) enforcement of the abortion laws of the Weimar Republic; (b) an intensive propaganda campaign; (c) honors, privileges and advancement to those with children; (d) direct financial aids intended to increase both the number of marriages and the number of children. The system of marriage loans (first passed July, 1933), intended originally partly to alleviate the unemployment situation by withdrawing women from the labor market and partly to stop the migration of agricultural labor to industrial areas, was modified to allow women to enter gainful employment, as a labor shortage developed. Systems of family allowances and grants were introduced also. These measures have been efficacious, to a certain extent, in increasing the birth rate. It is still a controlled rate, however, and considerably below that desired to maintain the increment of males 19-20 years old at not less than the increment of 1930. The crude birth rate in the Altreich increased from 14.7 in 1933 to 19.6 in 1938; rose to 20.3 in 1939, and dropped slightly to 20.0 in 1940. Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig and the Protectorate all show sharp rises in the birth rate in the years following German occupation --rises attributable partly to the extension of the German marriage loan system, and partly to the presence of German troops in the areas. (There is no reliable information on the course of the birth rate in

former Polish territory annexed to Germany, or in the Government-General.)

The following table shows crude vital rates per 1,000 population 1938-1940 (and where data were available, through 1941) for the old Reich, Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig, the German Reich without Eupen-Malmedy and the annexed Polish territory, and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

CRUDE VITAL RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION, 1938-1941

Year	Marriages	Live Births	Deaths***	Excess of Births or Deaths (-)
Old Reich				
1938	9.4	19.6	11.6	8.0
1939	11.1	20.3	12.3	8.0
1940	8.8	20.0	12.7	7.3
Austria**				
1938	13.6	14.1	14.3	- .2
1939	17.7	20.9	15.3	5.6
1940	11.7	21.8	15.0	6.8
Sudetenland				
1938	8.8	15.7	14.2	1.5
1939	14.5	22.0	13.9	8.1
1940	10.2	24.0	14.3	9.7
Danzig				
1938	9.3	23.0	10.4	12.6
1939	8.7	22.9	12.6	10.3
1940	8.5	25.9	13.8	12.1
Total German Reich*				
1938	9.7	19.0	12.0	7.0
1939	11.8	20.4	12.6	7.8
1940	9.1	20.4	13.0	6.4
1941	7.3	18.8	12.3	6.5
Protectorate				
1938	---	14.3	12.5	1.8
1939	---	14.7	13.0	1.7
1940	10.3	16.7	13.4	3.4
1941	9.2	17.3	13.4	3.9

* Without Eupen-Malmedy and former Polish territory.
** The Reichsgaue of the Ostmark do not coincide exactly with former Austria, but differences are so slight that they have no practical effect on figures.
*** Without military casualties, and probably without civilian air-raid deaths.

(10698)

In the Altreich, the death rate has risen by 10% between 1938 and 1940, an increase which is probably accounted for by the withdrawal of the healthiest elements of the population into the armed forces. Average health of remaining population would thus be much reduced. The situation in Austria is similar; in the Sudetenland, a very slight rise in the death rate; and in the Protectorate, a 9% increase. This latter cannot be accounted for by the withdrawal of workers (presumably some of the healthiest elements of the population) into Germany and the consequent changing age composition of Bohemia-Moravia. It must mean, therefore, a considerable deterioration in health, as must also the 16% increase in the death rate of Danzig between 1938 and 1940.

The above is a logical explanation of the German death rates in the table. It is possible, however, that these death rates do not reflect the true state of affairs in Germany, for the following reason. The armed forces are composed of those elements of the civilian population which normally have the lowest death rates. In computing the death rate, if the military cohorts are withdrawn from both total number of deaths and total population, i.e.,

Procedure I Crude death rate = $\frac{\text{civilian deaths}}{\text{population - armed forces}}$ x 1,000,

then the same conditions of health will be accompanied by an increased death rate. On the other hand, if the armed forces are not withdrawn, i.e.,

Procedure II Crude death rate = $\frac{\text{civilian deaths (without army deaths)}}{\text{total population incl. army}}$ x 1,000,

then the same conditions of health will be accompanied by an artificially decreased death rate. Applying Procedure II to the 1939 census population of the Altreich and using actual numbers of reported deaths gives the official reported rate of 12.7 per thousand population. It is probable, therefore, that the real increase in the death rate is greater than that indicated, because the Germans appear to have used Procedure II in their computations.

(10698)

f. Age and Sex Composition

The following table shows male, female, and total population by significant age groups, for Germany, census of May 17, 1939, territory as of the middle of 1939 not including Memelland.

Age Group	Total Male & Female		Total Male		Total Female	
	Number	% of Total	Number	% of Total M.& F.	Number	% of Total M.& F.
Under 6	7,736,713	9.7	3,948,601	4.9	3,788,112	4.8
6-9	4,408,361	5.5	2,241,881	2.8	2,166,480	2.7
10-13	4,883,721	6.2	2,477,625	3.2	2,406,096	3.0
14-15	2,586,241	3.3	1,312,147	1.7	1,274,094	1.6
16-17	2,756,031	3.5	1,398,318	1.8	1,357,713	1.7
18-19	2,856,886	3.7	1,457,262	1.9	1,399,624	1.8
20	759,718	1.0	387,639	0.5	372,079	0.5
21-24	3,661,090	4.6	1,867,190	2.3	1,803,900	2.3
25-29	7,066,989	8.9	3,561,126	4.5	3,505,863	4.4
30-34	7,159,136	9.0	3,597,126	4.5	3,562,010	4.5
35-39	6,698,418	8.4	3,336,271	4.2	3,362,147	4.2
40-44	5,645,449	7.1	2,568,974	3.3	3,076,475	3.8
45-49	4,873,026	6.1	2,160,871	2.7	2,712,155	3.4
50-54	4,463,357	5.6	2,039,753	2.6	2,423,604	3.0
55-59	3,935,638	5.0	1,837,721	2.3	2,097,917	2.7
60-64	3,601,823	4.5	1,703,557	2.1	1,898,266	2.4
65 and over	6,282,684	7.9	2,875,583	3.6	3,407,101	4.3
Total	79,375,281	100.0	38,761,645	48.8	40,613,636	51.2
Under 14	17,028,796	21.4	8,668,107	10.9	8,360,689	10.5
14-64	56,063,802	70.6	27,217,955	34.3	28,845,847	36.3
65 and over	6,282,683	8.0	2,875,583	3.7	3,407,100	4.3
20-34	18,646,933	23.5	9,403,081	11.8	9,243,852	11.6

The following three tables give projected male and female populations for Germany of 1939 borders for the years 1940-1945 inclusive, by single years of age and by 5-year groups, from age 0-99.

The populations are estimated as of January 1st each year, using as a basis the published figures of May 17, 1939. A special derivation was made of the projected births and infantile ages. For the births for 1938-1941 the published values were used with an assumed sex ratio. The 1942-1945 births were projected from the preceding by the trend of births estimated by a composite fertility function for the

years 1927, 1935 applied to the projected females in the years 15-50. The German mortality table of 1932-1934 was used throughout as the projection function.

The population values are given in thousands. From age 85 onward a decimal is retained, giving the values in hundreds, in order to indicate more definitely the trend at the older ages. For 1939 an extra decimal is retained throughout in order to supply means of checking the projected values and comparing with the basic 1939 census data. Only a rough agreement with the latter is shown, because the tabulated values are estimated as of January 1, 1939 while the census was taken on May 17, 1939. This difference is small for the early ages, but becomes more marked at the older ages. Ages 98, 99 were estimated by the trend of the corresponding age groups in the German censuses of June 16, 1925 and May 17, 1939.

Birth figures are available (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich 1938) for the Altreich for the years up to 1937. These supply values for the male and female births showing a sex ratio differing little from 1.064. For the years 1938-1941 only total birth figures are available. These were assumed to yield cohorts of boys and girls in the ratio 0.516. For the projected births a direct check is of course not available. However, an independent derivation was made by postulating a plausible composite fertility function and applying it to the 5-year groups of the projected female populations in ages 15-50. A composite table of the fertility functions (generally defined in terms of the age - specific birth rates in the age groups 15-50) for 1937, 1935 was assumed and checked against corresponding American data of 1931-1935 and the data of some neighboring European countries. Computed total births derived thus are about 10% lower than the published figures for 1938-1941. Accordingly, the latter were used in the tables, assuming a typical sex ratio of the period 1928-1936. The projected births for 1942-1945 were extrapolated from the

figures for the earlier years by using the trend ratios of the estimates based on the composite fertility function.

The tables show age distributions of the population which would have been in the area had there been no war and no migration; they take no account of military casualties or population movements. They do, however, supply a benchmark basis for (1) estimate ranges of combat and labor forces, and (2) plausible inferences as to civilian morale and well-being from such data as may be obtained hereafter regarding mortality and other demographic and social data.

The shortage of male lives in the 1939 data at the ages corres-ponding to births from 1915-1919 inclusive is a direct effect of the war of 1914-1918. The Germans are now (1942) over this "hump" and able to draw their army recruits from larger reservoirs of manpower corresponding to the increase in births after 1919. The preponderance of female lives from age 40 on is most logical, as representing the loss in manpower during the last war for men fighting from age 18 or 20 onward. The preponderance of women over men at the very advanced ages is in accordance with the recognition of the greater survival rates of women over men under peace-time conditions.

In considering man and woman power in Germany, the following factors would seem to be of importance as corrections to the survival set down from the 1939 census records:

(a) The probable migration between the captured countries and the old Germany and the manpower of the conquered countries and its distribution between local agriculture, production of minimum requirements of civilian goods, and availability for German military and war production purposes.

(b) The importance in this migration of an effective policy of non-cooperation among the nationals of other countries.

(c) The practical transportation difficulties in limiting the extent of migration.

(d) The over-all extent of deaths by violence, disease, and under-nourishment in countries like Poland.

(e) The extent of military casualties.

(f) Minimum requirements of German manpower in occupied territories.

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - MALES

Projected Age Distribution[a] 1940-1945
In Thousands, as of January 1, Each Year

Year:	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Births[b]:	778.3	842.8	848.7	788.6	783.3	774.1	763.9
Age							
0	726.5	787	792	736	731	723	713
1	669.5	708	767	772	718	713	705
2	663.9	665	703	762	767	713	708
3	657.4	661	662	700	659	764	710
4	625.7	655	659	660	698	757	762
5	519.0	624	654	658	659	696	755
6	529.4	518	623	652	656	657	694
7	549.7	528	517	621	651	655	656
8	599.5	549	527	516	620	650	654
9	596.5	599	548	527	515	619	649
10	615.0	596	598	547	526	514	618
11	603.4	614	595	597	546	525	514
12	630.2	603	613	594	596	546	524
13	661.8	629	602	613	594	595	545
14	654.4	661	629	601	612	593	595
15	658.1	653	660	628	600	611	592
16	689.9	657	652	659	627	599	610
17	735.8	688	656	651	658	625	598
18	748.9	734	687	654	650	656	624
19	570.5	747	732	685	652	648	654

1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - MALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
20	375.2	569	745	730	683	651	646
21	363.0	374	567	743	728	681	649
22	401.2	362	373	566	741	726	679
23	534.4	400	361	372	564	738	724
24	682.9	533	399	360	371	562	736
25	702.4	681	531	398	359	370	561
26	725.6	700	679	530	397	358	369
27	694.4	723	698	677	528	395	357
28	725.8	692	721	696	675	526	394
29	739.9	723	690	719	694	672	525
30	739.9	738	721	688	717	692	670
31	727.7	737	735	719	686	714	689
32	723.8	725	735	733	716	683	712
33	693.9	721	723	732	730	714	681
34	698.2	691	718	720	730	727	711
35	677.6	696	689	716	717	727	724
36	695.1	675	693	686	713	714	724
37	677.5	692	672	690	683	710	711
38	647.4	675	689	669	687	680	707
39	603.3	644	672	686	666	684	677
40	564.6	600	641	668	683	663	681
41	528.6	562	597	638	665	679	660
42	504.6	526	559	594	635	662	676
43	470.6	502	523	556	591	631	658
44	451.2	468	499	520	552	587	628
45	446.6	448	465	496	516	549	584
46	430.3	444	445	462	492	513	545
47	436.6	427	440	442	458	489	509
48	419.0	433	424	437	439	455	485
49	422.5	415	430	420	433	435	451

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - MALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
50	420.6	419	412	426	416	429	431
51	419.7	416	415	408	421	412	425
52	403.6	415	412	410	403	417	408
53	400.5	399	410	407	405	399	412
54	391.2	395	394	405	402	400	394
55	376.2	386	390	389	400	397	395
56	376.3	371	380	384	383	394	391
57	364.9	370	365	374	378	377	388
58	359.9	359	364	359	368	372	370
59	365.3	353	352	357	352	361	365
60	356.9	358	346	344	350	344	353
61	353.7	349	350	338	337	342	337
62	344.1	345	340	341	330	328	333
63	331.4	335	336	331	332	321	320
64	310.6	322	325	326	321	322	311
65	290.4	301	311	314	315	311	312
66	275.7	280	290	300	303	304	300
67	225.8	265	269	278	288	291	292
68	236.2	216	254	258	267	276	279
69	225.5	225	206	242	245	254	263
70	199.3	214	213	195	229	233	241
71	183.3	188	202	201	184	216	220
72	174.6	172	176	189	189	173	203
73	151.2	163	160	164	176	176	161
74	139.9	140	151	148	152	163	163

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - MALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
75	124.8	128	128	138	136	139	150
76	106.1	113	117	117	125	123	127
77	90.9	95	102	105	105	113	111
78	82.8	81	85	91	93	93	100
79	71.7	73	71	75	80	82	82
80	58.6	62	63	62	65	69	71
81	47.5	50	53	54	53	56	60
82	37.5	40	42	45	46	45	47
83	28.8	31	33	35	37	38	37
84	23.8	23	25	27	29	30	31
85	18.48	19.1	18.7	20.1	21.6	22.8	24.2
86	13.85	14.5	15.0	14.7	15.8	16.9	17.9
87	10.22	10.7	11.2	11.52	11.3	12.2	13.1
88	7.61	7.7	8.0	8.4	8.7	8.5	9.2
89	5.06	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.2	6.4	6.3
90	3.32	3.6	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.6
91	2.06	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.2
92	1.44	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.1
93	.88	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
94	.60	.6	.6	.6	.7	.8	.9
95	.34	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.5
96	.28	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.3
97	.19	.2	.1	.1	.1	.2	.2
98	.12	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
99-w	.06	.1	.1	.1	.0	.1	.1
Total	38,622.7	38,972	39,321	39,605	39,875	40,125	40,370

a/ Basis: Census of 5-17-39 comprising Germany, Austria, and Sudetenland; mortality table of 1932-1934; reported births for 1938,..., 1941 projected by trend of age specific fertility rates of 1927, 1935.

b/ Births in preceding year.

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - FEMALES
Projected Age Distribution [a] 1940-1945
In Thousands, as of January 1, Each Year

Year:	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Births [b]:	730.1	790.5	796.1	739.7	734.8	726.1	716.6
Age							
0	691.6	749	754	701	696	688	679
1	642.0	677	734	738	687	682	674
2	638.4	638	673	730	733	683	678
3	630.5	636	636	671	728	731	681
4	600.7	629	634	634	669	726	729
5	498.9	599	627	633	633	667	724
6	511.3	498	598	626	632	631	666
7	530.2	510	497	597	625	631	630
8	581.3	529	510	496	596	624	630
9	577.8	581	529	509	495	595	623
10	598.3	577	580	528	508	495	595
11	585.5	598	576	579	527	508	494
12	611.0	585	597	576	579	527	507
13	643.8	610	584	596	575	578	526
14	635.8	643	610	583	596	575	577
15	638.8	635.	642	609	583	595	574
16	670.1	638	634	641	608	582	594
17	710.8	669	637	633	640	607	581
18	721.4	709	668	636	632	639	606
19	543.4	720	708	666	634	631	638

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - FEMALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
20	361.8	542	718	706	665	633	629
21	347.1	361	541	717	705	663	632
22	386.9	346	360	540	715	703	662
23	520.0	386	345	359	538	713	701
24	675.1	519	385	344	358	537	711
25	692.7	673	517	384	344	357	535
26	712.5	691	671	516	383	343	356
27	681.7	710	689	670	514	382	342
28	715.4	680	708	687	668	513	381
29	729.5	713	678	706	685	666	511
30	730.6	727	711	676	704	683	664
31	717.8	728	725	709	674	702	681
32	718.3	716	726	723	707	672	700
33	688.8	716	713	724	720	704	669
34	695.9	686	714	711	721	718	702
35	676.8	694	684	711	708	719	716
36	692.7	674	691	682	709	706	716
37	674.7	690	672	688	679	706	703
38	654.0	672	687	669	686	676	703
39	646.5	651	669	685	667	683	674
40	639.7	644	649	667	682	664	680
41	622.0	637	641	646	664	679	661
42	621.1	619	634	638	643	661	676
43	594.4	618	616	631	635	640	658
44	581.9	591	615	613	628	632	637
45	571.7	579	588	612	610	625	629
46	544.0	568	576	585	608	607	621
47	543.9	541	565	572	581	605	603
48	514.4	540	537	561	568	578	601
49	519.3	511	536	533	557	564	573

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - FEMALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
50	506.1	515	507	532	529	553	560
51	499.1	502	511	503	528	525	548
52	478.5	495	498	507	498	523	520
53	469.4	474	490	493	502	494	518
54	453.5	465	469	485	488	497	489
55	433.8	449	459	464	480	482	491
56	431.8	429	443	454	458	474	477
57	411.4	426	423	437	448	452	468
58	406.0	406	420	417	431	442	446
59	412.2	400	399	414	411	425	435
60	401.9	405	393	393	407	404	417
61	391.7	395	398	386	386	399	396
62	384.5	384	387	390	378	378	391
63	364.7	376	375	378	381	370	369
64	342.9	356	367	366	369	372	361
65	320.8	334	346	357	356	359	362
66	307.7	311	324	336	346	345	348
67	248.2	297	301	313	324	334	334
68	264.7	239	286	290	301	312	322
69	254.4	254	229	275	278	289	300
70	227.8	243	242	219	262	265	276
71	209.8	216	231	230	208	249	252
72	205.9	198	204	218	217	196	235
73	179.5	193	186	192	204	204	184
74	170.2	167	180	173	178	190	190

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1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY - FEMALES (CONTINUED)

Age	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
75	153.1	157	154	166	160	165	176
76	131.5	140	144	141	152	146	151
77	113.6	119	127	131	128	138	133
78	106.6	102	107	115	118	116	124
79	95.1	95	91	96	102	105	103
80	78.6	84	83	80	84	90	92
81	65.1	68	73	72	69	73	78
82	53.1	56	58	62	62	59	63
83	40.6	45	47	49	52	52	50
84	36.1	34	37	39	41	43	43
85	28.21	29.4	27.5	30.3	31.7	33.3	35.4
86	22.28	22.5	23.5	21.9	24.2	25.4	26.6
87	16.47	17.4	17.6	18.4	17.1	18.9	19.8
88	12.79	12.6	13.4	13.5	14.1	13.2	14.5
89	8.90	9.6	9.5	10.1	10.2	10.6	9.9
90	5.97	6.6	7.1	7.0	7.4	7.5	7.8
91	3.80	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.0	5.3	5.4
92	2.55	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.7
93	1.80	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4
94	1.25	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6
95	.80	.8	.8	.7	.8	.9	1.0
96	.56	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.6
97	.36	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
98	.24	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
99-w	.15	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1
Total	40,488.8	40,792	41,089	41,335	41,557	41,773	41,964

a/ Basis: Census of 5-17-39 comprising Germany, Austria, and Sudetenland; mortality table of 1932-1934; reported births for 1938..., 1941 projected by trend of age specific fertility rates of 1927, 1935.

b/ Births in preceding year.

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PROJECTED 1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY
5-Year Age Groups, 1939-1945

Year:	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Age			I. Male Population				
0-4	3,343.0	3,476	3,583	3,630	3,673	3,670	3,598
5-9	2,794.1	2,818	2,869	2,974	3,101	3,277	3,408
10-14	3,164.8	3,103	3,037	2,952	2,874	2,773	2,796
15-19	3,403.2	3,479	3,387	3,277	3,187	3,139	3,078
20-24	2,356.7	2,238	2,445	2,771	3,087	3,358	3,434
25-29	3,588.1	3,519	3,319	3,020	2,653	2,321	2,206
30-34	3,583.5	3,612	3,632	3,592	3,579	3,530	3,463
35-39	3,300.9	3,382	3,415	3,447	3,466	3,515	3,543
40-44	2,519.6	2,658	2,819	2,976	3,126	3,222	3,303
45-49	2,155.0	2,167	2,204	2,257	2,338	2,441	2,574
50-54	2,035.6	2,044	2,043	2,056	2,047	2,057	2,070
55-59	1,842.6	1,839	1,851	1,863	1,881	1,901	1,909
60-64	1,696.7	1,709	1,697	1,680	1,670	1,657	1,654
65-69	1,253.6	1,287	1,330	1,392	1,418	1,436	1,446
70-74	848.3	877	902	897	930	961	988
75-79	476.3	490	503	526	539	550	470
80-84	196.3	206	216	223	230	238	246
85-89	55.2	58	59	61	64	67	71
90-94	8.3	9	10	10	11	12	12
95-99	1.0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	38,622.8	38,972	39,322	39,605	39,875	40,126	40,370

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PROJECTED 1939 POPULATION OF GERMANY

5-Year Age Groups, 1939-1945

Year:	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
			II. Female Population				
Age							
0-4	3,203.2	3,329	3,431	3,474	3,513	3,510	3,441
5-9	2,699.5	2,717	2,761	2,861	2,981	3,148	3.273
10-14	3,074.4	3,013	2,947	2,862	2,785	2,683	2,699
15-19	3,284.5	3,371	3,289	3,185	3,097	3,054	2,993
20-24	2,290.9	2,154	2,349	2,666	2,981	3,249	3,335
25-29	3,531.8	3,467	3,263	2,963	2,594	2,261	2,125
30-34	3,551.4	3,573	3,589	3,543	3,526	3,479	3,416
35-39	3,344.7	3,381	3,403	3,435	3,449	3,490	3,512
40-44	3,059.1	3,109	3,155	3,195	3,252	3,276	3,312
45-49	2,693.3	2.739	2,802	2,863	2,924	2,979	3,027
50-54	2,406.6	2,451	2,475	2,520	2,545	2,592	2,635
55-59	2,095.2	2,110	2,144	2,186	2,228	2,275	2,317
60-64	1,885.7	1,916	1,920	1,913	1,921	1,923	1,934
65-69	1,395.8	1,435	1,486	1,571	1,605	1,639	1,666
70-74	993.2	1,017	1,043	1,032	1,069	1,104	1,137
75-79	599.9	613	623	649	660	670	687
80-84	273.5	287	298	302	308	317	326
85-89	88.6	92	92	94	97	101	106
90-94	15.4	16	18	19	20	20	21
95-w	2.1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Total	40,488.8	40,792	41,090	41,335	41,557	41,772	41,964

Note: A difference of 1 unit in some of the totals is introduced in the rounding of the decimals in the 5-year groups.

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The following four tables give population projections, (quinquennial age-groups) by five-year periods, for Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, the annexed Polish territory, and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. As in the case of the projections of German populations, these projections supply also a base for estimating labor power and military cohorts available for the use of the Reich. There are reliable indications that males of military age from Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg are already being drafted into the German army. Males from annexed Poland and the Protectorate, have so far not been utilized for army service; their contribution (and that of their women) to the German war effort has been their labor power. As in the case of the projections of the German population these tables too show age distributions which would have obtained under normal conditions.

PROJECTED 1932 POPULATION OF ANNEXED POLAND[a/]
5-Year Age Groups, in thousands, as of Jan. 1, Each Year.

	1932	1937	1942	1947
I. Male Population				
5-Year Births b/:	.....	823.5	851.7	865.8
Age				
0-4	624.6	671.9	694.9	706.4
5-9	629.6	593.5	638.5	660.3
10-14	471.2	620.7	585.2	629.5
15-19	510.1	464.3	611.6	576.6
20-24	485.4	497.6	452.9	596.6
25-29	461.1	472.0	483.9	440.4
30-34	356.0	448.4	459.0	470.5
35-39	279.2	345.2	434.8	445.1
40-44	235.9	269.0	332.5	418.9
45-49	206.3	224.6	256.2	316.7
50-54	177.6	192.3	209.4	238.9
55-59	163.4	160.5	173.8	189.2
60-64	136.0	141.5	138.9	150.4
65-69	111.6	109.5	113.9	111.8
70-74	71.7	80.2	78.7	86.8
75-79	35.0	43.4	48.6	47.6
80-84	16.0	16.4	20.3	22.7
85-89	5.9	5.1	5.2	6.5
90-94	1.6	1.1	.9	1.0
95-w	.7	.1	.1	.1
Total	4,978.9	5,357.3	5,739.3	6,116.0

(10698)

PROJECTED 1932 POPULATION OF ANNEXED POLAND
(Continued)

	1932	1937	1942	1947
II. Female Population				
5-Year Births b/:	.....	772.4	798.9	812.1
Age				
0-4	605.1	651.7	674.1	685.2
5-9	612.6	577.1	621.6	642.9
10-14	457.0	603.6	568.6	612.4
15-19	508.5	449.5	593.8	559.4
20-24	550.1	497.0	439.4	580.4
25-29	483.4	535.1	483.4	427.3
30-34	407.0	468.8	518.9	468.8
35-39	326.4	393.3	453.1	501.6
40-44	274.5	314.7	379.2	436.9
45-49	233.8	263.8	302.4	364.4
50-54	202.2	222.4	250.9	287.6
55-59	181.4	187.8	206.6	233.1
60-64	157.0	162.5	168.3	185.1
65-69	131.0	132.4	137.1	141.9
70-74	87.0	100.0	101.1	104.6
75-79	45.0	57.0	65.5	66.2
80-84	22.3	23.3	29.5	33.9
85-89	8.5	8.0	8.3	10.6
90-94	2.5	1.7	1.6	1.7
95-w	1.1	.2	.2	.2
Total	5,296.4	5,649.9	6,003.6	6,344.2

a/ Annexed regions of Provinces of Krakow, Kielce, Lodz, Warszawa, Bialystok, Pomorze, Poznan, Slask, and the cities Lodz and Poznan; Census of 12-9-31.

b/ Births for preceding 5 years by age specific fertility rates, Poland, 1931-1932.

PROJECTED 1931 POPULATION OF THE PROTECTORATE BOHEMIA-MORAVIA a/
5-Year Age Groups, in thousands, as of Jan. 1, Each Year.

	1931	1936	1941	1946
I. Male Population				
5-Year Births b/:	.....	398.8	350.6	330.6
Age				
0-4	328.6	336.4	295.7	278.9
5-9	360.1	316.5	324.1	284.8
10-14	228.9	356.0	312.9	320.4
15-19	357.3	226.2	351.8	309.2
20-24	388.0	350.2	221.7	344.8

PROJECTED 1931 POPULATION OF THE PROTECTORATE BOHEMIA-MORAVIA
(Continued)

	1931	1936	1941	1946
Age				
25-29	353.8	379.2	342.3	216.7
30-34	300.0	345.7	370.6	334.5
35-39	239.3	291.9	336.4	360.6
40-44	210.9	231.1	282.0	324.9
45-49	195.8	201.5	220.8	269.4
50-54	180.5	183.8	189.2	207.3
55-59	161.3	165.2	168.3	173.2
60-64	132.7	142.0	145.5	148.2
65-69	97.2	109.5	117.2	120.0
70-74	68.9	72.2	81.4	87.1
75-79	38.0	43.1	45.2	50.9
80-84	16.4	18.3	20.7	21.7
85-89	4.8	5.4	6.0	6.8
90-94	.8	1.0	1.1	1.2
95-w	.1	.1	.1	.1
Total	3,663.4	3,775.3	3,833.0	3,860.7

II. Female Population

5-Year Births b/:	.....	375.6	330.0	311.2
0-4	320.6	325.5	286.0	269.7
5-9	351.5	309.7	314.4	276.2
10-14	222.2	352.5	310.5	315.2
15-19	345.4	216.3	343.2	302.3
20-24	379.3	339.1	212.4	336.9
25-29	352.4	371.2	331.9	207.9
30-34	324.8	344.6	263.0	324.6
35-39	279.7	316.8	336.1	354.1
40-44	245.7	271.9	307.9	326.7
45-49	223.2	237.4	262.8	297.5
50-54	203.0	213.1	226.6	250.8
55-59	181.0	189.9	199.4	212.0
60-64	151.1	163.7	171.7	180.2
65-69	115.0	128.4	139.1	145.9
70-74	87.7	88.1	98.4	106.6
75-79	51.2	57.5	57.8	64.5
80-84	24.4	26.4	29.6	29.8
85-89	7.7	9.0	9.7	10.9
90-94	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.3
95-w	.2	.2	.3	.3
Total	3,867.6	3,963.2	3,903.0	4,014.4

a/ Census of Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia 12-1-30, excluding Sudetenland, but not small portions of territory incorporated in other parts of the Reich.

b/ Births for preceding 5 years by age-specific fertility rates, Czechoslovakia, 1931, 1934.

(10698)

PROJECTED 1931 POPULATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE [a]
5-Year Age Groups, in thousands, as of Jan. 1, Each Year

	1931	1936	1941	1946
I. Male Population				
5-Year Births [b]:	.....	86.3	80.8	77.7
Age				
0-4	92.3	77.8	72.8	70.0
5-9	87.9	89.8	75.7	70.8
10-14	56.5	87.1	89.0	75.0
15-19	75.4	55.8	86.1	87.9
20-24	106.5	73.6	54.5	84.1
25-29	94.3	103.7	71.7	53.1
30-34	81.4	91.6	100.7	69.6
35-39	63.2	78.6	88.4	97.3
40-44	57.1	60.5	75.2	84.6
45-49	55.1	53.9	57.2	71.1
50-54	51.5	51.2	50.0	53.0
55-59	43.5	46.5	46.2	45.2
60-64	33.1	37.7	40.3	40.1
65-69	26.0	26.9	30.6	32.7
70-74	15.8	18.9	19.5	22.3
75-79	9.0	9.6	11.5	11.8
80-84	4.0	4.1	4.2	5.2
85-89	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3
90-94	.2	.2	.2	.2
95-w	-- [c]	--	--	--
Total	954.0	968.7	975.0	975.3
II. Female Population				
5-Year Births [b]:	.....	82.9	77.6	74.7
Age				
0-4	90.8	76.2	71.4	68.6
5-9	86.9	88.6	74.4	69.6
10-14	55.2	86.2	87.8	73.7
15-19	71.9	54.5	85.0	86.6
20-24	79.2	70.3	53.3	83.0
25-29	80.4	77.3	68.5	51.9
30-34	76.1	78.5	75.4	66.9
35-39	66.9	74.2	76.5	73.5
40-44	59.7	64.9	72.0	74.3
45-49	55.7	57.6	62.6	69.4
50-54	52.6	53.1	54.9	59.6
55-59	45.3	49.2	49.7	51.4
60-64	36.5	41.2	44.8	45.3
65-69	29.8	31.6	35.6	38.7
70-74	20.0	23.5	24.9	28.1
75-79	12.4	13.5	15.9	16.9
80-84	5.5	6.5	7.1	8.4
85-89	1.8	2.0	2.3	2.6
90-94	.4	.4	.4	.5
95-w	.1	.1	.1	.1
Total	927.2	949.4	962.6	969.1

[a] By Census of France, 3-8-31, Departments of Bas Rhin, Haut Rhin, Moselle.
[b] Births for preceding 5 years by age-specific fertility rates, France, 1930-32, 1935.
[c] Less than 51 persons.

(10698)

PROJECTED 1936 LUXEMBURG POPULATION [a]
5-Year Age Groups, in thousands, as of Jan. 1, Each Year.

	1936	1941	1946	1951
I. Male Population				
5-Year Births [b]:	....	11.2	10.6	10.3
Age				
0-4	11.3	10.0	9.5	9.3
5-9	13.1	11.0	9.8	9.3
10-14	12.6	13.0	10.9	9.7
15-19	10.5	12.5	12.8	10.8
20-24	12.6	10.3	12.2	12.5
25-29	13.9	12.3	10.0	11.9
30-34	13.7	13.5	12.0	9.7
35-39	11.9	13.2	13.0	11.6
40-44	9.9	11.4	12.6	12.4
45-49	8.9	9.4	10.8	11.9
50-54	8.1	8.2	8.7	10.0
55-59	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.8
60-64	5.9	6.5	6.3	6.4
65-69	4.2	4.8	5.3	5.1
70-74	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.8
75-79	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.1
80-84	.7	.7	.8	.8
85-89	.2	.2	.2	.2
90-94	.1	--	--	--
95-w	-- [c]	--	--	--
Total	149.4	149.1	147.7	145.3
II. Female Population				
5-Year Births [b]:	....	11.2	10.2	9.9
0-4	10.9	9.9	9.4	9.1
5-9	12.7	10.7	9.6	9.1
10-14	12.2	12.6	10.6	9.5
15-19	9.8	12.1	12.4	10.4
20-24	11.9	9.5	11.8	12.1
25-29	13.0	11.6	9.3	11.5
30-34	13.0	12.7	11.4	9.1
35-39	11.8	12.6	12.4	11.1
40-44	10.0	11.4	12.3	12.0
45-49	8.7	9.6	11.0	11.8
50-54	8.2	8.3	9.1	10.5
55-59	7.6	7.7	7.8	8.6
60-64	6.0	6.9	7.0	7.1
65-69	4.8	5.2	6.0	6.0
70-74	3.4	3.8	4.1	4.7
75-79	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.8
80-84	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4
85-89	.3	.3	.4	.4
90-94	.1	.1	.1	.1
95-w	--	--	--	--
Total	147.5	148.4	148.5	147.3

[a] By Census of Luxemburg, 12-31-1935.
[b] Births for preceding 5 years by age-specific fertility rates, Luxemburg, 1935-36.
[c] Less than 51 persons.

(10698)

The following table summarizes by cross addition the four preceding age distributions of the territories of Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, and annexed Poland. Population groups are the totals of the groups of the component regions E
Each population was derived from its own census, roughly, at the beginning of 1931, and its own survival (Lx) and fertility functions of about the same date. For Poland the dates are one year later, i.e. 1932, 1937 etc., but this was ignored in the figures. The population groups are sums of unrounded component values. This entails occasional discrepancies in the last digit.

PROJECTED 1931 POPULATIONS OF ANNEXED REGIONS
Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, Bohemia-Moravia, Annexed Poland
5-Year Age Groups in Thousands

Age	1936	1941	1946
	I. Male Population		
0-4	1,097.4	1,073.4	1,064.8
5-9	1,012.9	1,049.3	1,025.7
10-14	1,076.5	1,000.1	1,035.8
15-19	756.8	1,062.0	986.5
20-24	934.0	739.3	1,037.6
25-29	968.9	910.2	720.2
30-34	899.4	943.8	886.6
35-39	727.6	872.8	915.9
40-44	570.5	701.1	841.1
45-49	488.9	543.5	667.9
50-54	435.4	456.9	507.9
55-59	379.7	395.5	415.0
60-64	327.0	331.2	344.9
65-69	250.0	266.4	269.8
70-74	174.2	182.7	194.7
75-79	97.6	106.9	112.2
80-84	39.5	46.1	50.5
85-89	11.9	12.7	14.8
90-94	2.3	2.3	2.5
95-w:	.3	.2	0.2
Total (10698)	10,250.8	10,696.4	11,094.6

II. Female Population

0-4	1,064.4	1,041.3	1,032.9
5-9	988.0	1,021.1	998.3
10-14	1,054.4	979.4	1,011.9
15-19	730.1	1,034.0	960.6
20-24	918.3	714.5	1,012.1
25-29	996.6	895.5	696.4
30-34	904.9	970.1	871.6
35-39	796.1	878.4	941.6
40-44	661.5	770.6	850.1
45-49	567.6	637.3	742.4
50-54	496.7	540.7	607.1
55-59	434.6	463.3	504.3
60-64	373.4	391.8	417.6
65-69	297.2	317.0	332.6
70-74	215.0	228.2	243.4
75-79	130.1	141.5	150.1
80-84	57.2	67.4	73.2
85-89	19,3	20.7	24.4
90-94	4.1	4.3	4.6
95-w:	.5	.5	.5
Total	10,710.0	11,117.6	11,475.7

The five tables below give projections of male and female populations, by single years of age, for Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, annexed Poland, and the Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate, with a cross-added summary table. Any slight descrepancies in totals between these tables and the preceding 5-year age group tables are the result of rounding the values.

PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-1-30
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
0	67.3	61.0	58.9	64.6	58.5	56.5
1	64.8	57.8	55.3	62.8	56.0	53.5
2	66.0	58.1	54.8	64.0	56.3	53.1
3	67.8	58.8	54.8	65.9	57.0	53.2
4	70.1	59.9	55.0	68.0	58.0	53.4
5	61.6	61.2	55.4	60.6	59.3	53.7
6	61.3	62.7	56.0	59.2	60.9	54.3
7	63.4	64.5	56.8	62.2	62.6	55.1
8	64.0	66.6	57.7	62.9	64.7	56.0
9	66.5	69.0	58.9	64.9	66.9	57.1
10	67.3	60.8	60.3	65.5	59.7	58.5
11	69.2	60.5	62.0	67.6	58.3	59.9
12	72.1	62.7	63.8	73.1	63.9	64.3
13	74.0	63.3	65.9	75.2	64.6	66.5
14	73.4	65.8	68.4	71.3	64.1	66.1
15	70.4	66.7	60.2	68.6	64.9	59.1
16	51.8	68.6	59.9	50.5	67.1	57.9
17	32.1	71.3	62.0	30.2	69.5	60.8
18	34.4	73.0	62.5	31.5	71.4	61.4
19	37.6	72.3	64.8	36.7	70.4	63.3
20	54.1	69.2	65.5	52.2	67.5	63.8
21	71.9	50.8	67.2	69.5	49.6	65.9
22	74.1	31.5	69.8	71.8	29.6	68.2
23	75.1	33.7	71.4	72.9	30.9	70.0
24	75.0	36.7	70.7	72.6	35.9	69.0
25	76.7	52.8	67.7	75.3	51.1	66.1
26	76.2	70.3	49.6	75.2	68.1	48.5
27	76.2	72.4	30.8	74.0	70.3	29.0
28	74.8	73.4	32.9	73.2	71.3	30.2
29	75.3	73.3	35.9	73.6	71.0	35.1
30	68.5	75.0	51.7	67.8	73.7	50.0
31	69.8	74.5	68.7	70.1	73.5	66.6
32	69.8	74.5	70.8	68.8	72.3	68.7
33	70.5	73.1	71.7	70.4	71.5	69.7
34	67.2	73.5	71.6	67.5	72.0	69.4
35	66.3	66.8	73.1	67.9	66.2	71.9
36	61.3	68.0	72.6	64.2	68.4	71.8
37	57.1	67.9	72.5	63.3	67.2	70.5
38	55.7	68.5	71.0	61.5	68.6	69.7
39	51.5	65.2	71.4	59.9	65.7	70.1
40	50.9	64.3	64.7	59.1	66.1	64.5
41	47.1	59.3	65.8	56.1	62.4	66.5
42	45.3	55.2	65.6	54.0	61.5	65.3
43	43.0	53.7	66.0	51.4	59.8	66.6
44	44.8	49.5	62.8	51.3	58.1	63.8
45	40.8	48.8	61.7	47.1	57.3	64.1
46	40.9	45.1	56.9	48.2	54.3	60.5
47	41.0	43.3	52.7	49.8	52.2	59.5
48	39.8	41.0	51.2	46.2	49.6	57.7
49	38.9	42.6	47.1	46.1	49.4	55.9

PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-1-30

In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
50		38.6	46.3		45.2	55.0
51		38.6	42.6		46.1	52.0
52		38.5	40.6		47.5	49.8
53		37.2	38.3		44.0	47.2
54		36.2	39.6		43.7	46.8
55			35.8			42.7
56			35.6			43.4
57			35.3			44.5
58			33.9			41.0
59			32.7			40.5
Total	3.034.7	3,247.6	3,425.2	3,086.3	3,295.7	3,475.2

ANNEXED POLAND, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-9-31

In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1937	1942	1947	1937	1942	1947
Age:						
0	149.7	152.1	156.0	143.7	146.0	149.8
1	136.3	139.3	141.9	132.4	135.4	137.9
2	132.0	136.1	138.0	128.5	132.5	134.3
3	128.8	134.4	136.0	125.4	130.9	132.3
4	125.5	133.0	134.6	122.1	129.4	131.0
5	110.8	131.5	133.6	107.7	128.1	130.1
6	121.0	130.0	132.8	117.7	126.5	129.3
7	123.2	128.1	132.1	118.6	124.7	128.6
8	121.0	125.8	131.3	117.8	122.5	127.9
9	118.4	123.1	130.5	116.0	119.8	127.0
10	121.3	109.0	129.3	117.9	105.9	126.0
11	132.5	119.2	128.0	128.2	115.9	124.6
12	123.3	121.5	126.4	120.4	116.9	122.9
13	123.9	119.4	124.2	120.4	116.2	120.8
14	119.6	117.0	121.6	116.7	114.4	118.2
15	110.4	119.9	107.6	106.5	116.2	104.4
16	108.7	130.8	117.7	105.8	126.3	114.2
17	98.5	121.5	119.8	94.9	118.4	115.1
18	73.1	122.0	117.5	70.9	118.4	114.2
19	73.7	117.5	114.9	71.7	114.5	112.3
20	78.8	108.2	117.4	77.0	104.3	113.9
21	86.4	106.2	127.8	86.1	103.5	123.6
22	111.3	96.0	118.5	112.4	92.7	115.7
23	110.6	71.2	118.7	110.1	69.2	115.5
24	110.3	71.6	114.2	111.1	69.9	111.6
25	108.0	76.6	105.2	108.7	75.0	101.6
26	99.9	84.0	103.2	109.8	83.8	100.7
27	73.5	108.2	93.4	108.5	109.3	90.2
28	90.0	107.6	69.2	104.5	107.0	67.3
29	100.5	107.3	69.7	103.6	108.0	67.9

ANNEXED POLAND, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-9-31 (CONTINUED)
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1937	1942	1947	1937	1942	1947
Age:						
30	97.9	105.1	74.5	100.5	105.6	72.9
31	89.4	97.2	81.7	94.2	106.5	81.3
32	89.4	71.5	105.3	93.7	105.2	106.0
33	86.6	87.5	104.6	92.9	101.3	103.8
34	85.1	97.7	104.3	87.6	100.3	104.6
35	76.4	95.1	102.1	87.4	97.3	102.2
36	74.6	86.8	94.4	85.2	91.1	103.0
37	68.0	86.7	69.4	76.1	90.5	101.7
38	64.4	83.9	84.7	74.6	89.7	97.8
39	61.9	82.4	94.6	70.0	84.5	96.9
40	59.8	73.9	91.9	72.2	84.3	93.9
41	58.5	72.0	83.7	68.4	82.2	87.9
42	54.3	65.5	83.6	62.2	73.4	87.3
43	52.1	61.9	80.7	60.4	71.9	86.4
44	44.2	59.4	79.1	51.5	67.5	81.4
45	47.5	57.3	70.8	59.4	69.5	81.2
46	43.7	55.9	68.8	50.2	65.8	79.1
47	45.3	51.8	62.4	52.4	59.7	70.6
48	45.1	49.5	58.8	52.7	58.0	69.0
49	43.0	41.8	56.2	49.1	49.4	64.7
50		44.7	54.0		56.8	66.5
51		41.0	52.4		47.9	62.8
52		42.3	48.3		49.9	56.8
53		41.9	45.9		50.0	55.0
54		39.6	38.6		46.4	46.6
55			41.0			53.4
56			37.3			44.8
57			38.2			46.3
58			37.5			46.2
59			35.3			42.5
Total	4,608.2	5,160.5	5,691.2	4,755.9	5,286.3	5,801.5

ALSACE-LORRAINE, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 3-8-31
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
0	15.9	14.7	14.9	15.5	14.3	14.5
1	15.4	14.3	14.0	15.2	14.0	13.8
2	15.4	14.3	13.7	15.2	14.1	13.5
3	15.5	14.7	13.7	15.2	14.5	13.4
4	15.5	14.7	13.7	15.2	14.4	13.4
5	18.1	14.9	13.8	17.9	14.6	13.5
6	19.6	15.0	13.9	19.3	14.8	13.7
7	17.4	15.2	14.1	17.1	14.9	13.8
8	17.2	15.3	14.5	17.0	15.0	14.3
9	17.5	15.3	14.5	17.3	15.0	14.3

ALSACE-LORRAINE, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 3-8-31 (CONTINUED)
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
10	17.3	17.9	14.7	17.2	17.7	14.5
11	17.0	19.4	14.9	16.8	19.1	14.7
12	17.2	17.2	15.1	17.0	17.0	14.8
13	17.2	17.1	15.1	17.2	16.8	14.9
14	18.5	17.4	15.1	18.0	17.1	14.9
15	18.2	17.2	17.8	17.8	17.0	17.5
16	11.0	16.8	19.2	10.7	16.6	18.9
17	9.9	17.0	17.0	9.6	16.8	16.7
18	8.6	16.9	16.8	8.4	16.9	16.6
19	8.2	18.2	17.1	8.0	17.6	16.8
20	10.4	17.9	16.8	9.9	17.5	16.7
21	15.8	10.7	16.4	15.1	10.4	16.2
22	16.1	9.6	16.6	15.3	9.3	16.4
23	16.2	8.4	16.5	15.4	8.2	16.5
24	15.2	8.0	17.7	14.6	7.8	17.2
25	20.4	10.1	17.4	15.6	9.6	17.1
26	20.4	15.4	10.4	15.3	14.8	10.2
27	20.9	15.6	9.4	15.5	14.9	9.1
28	20.7	15.8	8.2	15.3	15.0	8.0
29	21.3	14.8	7.7	15.6	14.2	7.6
30	18.1	19.8	9.9	15.5	15.2	9.4
31	18.1	19.9	15.0	15.6	14.9	14.4
32	18.2	20.3	15.2	15.7	15.2	14.5
33	18.7	20.1	15.3	15.9	14.9	14.7
34	18.5	20.6	14.3	15.9	15.2	13.9
35	17.2	17.5	19.2	15.3	15.2	14.8
36	17.1	17.5	19.2	14.8	15.2	14.6
37	15.5	17.6	19.6	14.6	15.3	14.8
38	15.0	18.0	19.4	14.6	15.5	14.6
39	14.5	17.8	19.9	14.9	15.4	14.8
40	12.4	16.6	16.8	13.2	14.9	14.7
41	12.2	16.4	16.8	13.2	14.4	14.8
42	12.3	14.8	16.9	13.3	14.1	14.8
43	11.6	14.3	17.2	12.7	14.2	15.0
44	11.9	13.8	16.9	12.6	14.4	14.9
45	10.8	11.8	15.7	11.6	12.8	14.4
46	10.9	11.6	15.5	11.7	12.7	13.9
47	10.8	11.6	14.0	11.6	12.8	13.6
48	10.8	11.0	13.5	11.4	12.2	13.6
49	10.7	11.2	12.9	11.3	12.1	13.8
50		10.1	11.0		11.2	12.3
51		10.1	10.8		11.1	12.2
52		10.0	10.8		11.1	12.2
53		9.9	10.1		10.9	11.6
54		9.9	10.3		10.7	11.4

ALSACE-LORRAINE, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 3-8-31 (CONTINUED)
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
55			9.2			10.5
56			9.2			10.5
57			9.0			10.4
58			8.9			10.1
59			8.8			9.9
Total	773.3	822.0	862.0	728.6	781.5	828.6

LUXEMBURG, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-31-35
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
0	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9
1	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.9
2	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0	1.9
3	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.9
4	2.6	2.0	1.9	2.4	2.0	1.9
5	2.7	2.0	1.9	2.6	1.9	1.9
6	2.7	2.0	1.9	2.5	2.0	1.9
7	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.1	1.9
8	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.5	2.2	1.9
9	2.5	2.6	2.0	2.5	2.4	2.0
10	2.5	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.6	1.9
11	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.0
12	2.6	2.6	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.1
13	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.2
14	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4
15	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.5
16	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.0	2.4	2.5
17	1.8	2.5	2.6	1.6	2.5	2.4
18	1.9	2.4	2.5	1.7	2.3	2.5
19	2.0	2.6	2.4	1.8	2.4	2.4
20	2.2	2.7	2.5	2.1	2.5	2.4
21	2.5	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.0	2.4
22	2.5	1.8	2.5	2.4	1.6	2.4
23	2.8	1.9	2.4	2.6	1.7	2.2
24	2.6	1.9	2.5	2.5	1.8	2.3
25	2.7	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.0	2.4
26	2.7	2.5	2.0	2.5	2.4	1.9
27	2.8	2.4	1.7	2.6	2.3	1.6
28	2.8	2.7	1.8	2.7	2.5	1.7
29	2.8	2.5	1.8	2.6	2.4	1.7

LUXEMBURG, PROJECTED POPULATIONS, CENSUS 12-31-35 (CONTINUED)
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
30	2.8	2.6	2.1	2.6	2.4	2.0
31	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.3
32	2.7	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.3
33	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.4
34	2.7	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.4
35	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4
36	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.4
37	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.5
38	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.6
39	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.5	2.5
40	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.1	2.4	2.5
41	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.4
42	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.0	2.3	2.4
43	1.9	2.2	2.5	1.9	2.2	2.5
44	1.9	2.1	2.5	1.9	2.2	2.4
45	1.7	1.9	2.4	1.8	2.0	2.3
46	1.9	1.9	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.2
47	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.9	2.2
48	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.8	2.1
49	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.1
50		1.6	1.8		1.7	2.0
51		1.7	1.8		1.7	1.9
52		1.6	1.8		1.6	1.8
53		1.6	1.6		1.7	1.7
54		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.7
55			1.5			1.6
56			1.6			1.6
57			1.5			1.5
58			1.5			1.5
59			1.4			1.5
Total	118.5	124.8	129.6	113.6	120.9	126.7

PROJECTED POPULATIONS OF ANNEXED REGIONS (LUXEMBURG, ALSACE-LORRAINE, ANNEXED POLAND, PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA)
In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
0	235.0	229.9	231.8	225.9	220.8	222.7
1	218.6	213.4	213.1	212.5	207.3	207.1
2	215.6	210.5	208.4	209.8	204.9	202.8
3	214.4	209.9	206.4	208.8	204.4	200.8
4	213.7	209.6	205.2	207.7	203.8	199.7

(10698)

PROJECTED POPULATIONS OF ANNEXED REGIONS (LUXEMBURG, ALSACE-LORRAINE, ANNEXED POLAND, PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA (CONTINUED)

In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
Age:						
5	193.2	209.6	204.7	188.8	203.9	199.2
6	204.6	209.7	204.6	198.7	204.2	199.2
7	206.7	210.0	205.0	200.4	204.3	199.4
8	204.7	210.0	205.5	200.2	204.4	200.1
9	204.9	210.0	205.9	200.7	204.1	200.4
10	208.4	190.4	206.3	203.1	185.9	200.9
11	221.1	201.8	206.9	215.1	195.8	201.2
12	215.2	204.0	207.4	213.0	200.3	204.1
13	217.6	202.3	207.5	215.2	200.1	204.4
14	214.2	202.7	207.6	208.4	198.1	201.6
15	201.7	206.3	188.2	195.4	200.5	183.5
16	173.6	218.6	199.5	169.0	212.4	193.5
17	142.3	212.3	201.4	136.3	207.2	195.0
18	118.0	214.3	199.3	112.5	209.0	194.7
19	121.5	210.6	199.2	118.2	204.9	194.8
20	145.5	198.0	202.2	141.2	191.8	196.8
21	176.6	169.8	213.8	173.1	165.5	208.1
22	204.0	138.9	207.4	201.9	133.2	202.7
23	204.7	115.2	209.0	201.0	110.0	204.2
24	203.1	118.2	205.1	200.8	115.4	200.1
25	207.8	141.7	192.9	202.1	137.7	187.2
26	199.2	172.2	165.2	202.8	169.1	161.3
27	173.4	198.6	135.3	200.6	196.8	129.9
28	188.3	199.5	112.1	195.7	195.8	107.2
29	199.9	197.9	115.1	195.4	195.6	112.3
30	187.3	202.5	138.2	186.4	196.9	134.3
31	180.0	194.2	167.8	182.5	197.4	164.6
32	180.1	169.0	193.7	180.7	195.3	191.5
33	178.6	183.5	194.2	181.9	190.4	190.6
34	173.5	194.5	192.6	173.5	190.1	190.3
35	162.6	182.1	197.0	173.1	181.2	191.3
36	155.4	174.9	188.8	166.6	177.2	191.8
37	143.0	174.8	164.1	156.4	175.5	189.5
38	137.4	173.1	177.8	153.0	176.4	184.7
39	130.1	168.0	188.5	147.0	168.1	184.3
40	125.1	157.4	176.0	146.6	167.7	175.6
41	119.8	150.0	168.8	139.8	161.3	171.6
42	114.0	137.8	168.6	131.5	151.3	169.8
43	108.6	132.1	166.4	126.4	148.1	170.5
44	102.8	124.8	161.3	117.3	142.2	162.5
45	100.8	119.8	150.7	119.9	141.6	162.0
46	97.4	114.5	143.4	111.8	134.8	155.7
47	98.9	108.6	131.2	115.5	126.6	145.9
48	97.5	103.3	125.5	112.0	121.6	142.4
49	94.3	97.4	118.1	108.2	112.7	136.5

PROJECTED POPULATIONS OF ANNEXED REGIONS (LUXEMBURG, ALSACE-LORRAINE, ANNEXED POLAND, PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA (CONTINUED)

In Thousands

	Males			Females		
Year: Age:	1936	1941	1946	1936	1941	1946
50		95.0	113.1		114.9	135.8
51		91.4	107.6		106.8	128.9
52		92.4	101.5		110.1	120.6
53		90.6	95.9		106.6	115.5
54		87.3	90.1		102.4	106.5
55			87.5			108.2
56			83.7			100.3
57			84.0			102.7
58			81.8			98.8
59			78.2			94.4
Total	8,534.7	9,354.9	10,108.1	8,684.4	9,484.4	10,232.0

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

PROVISIONAL EDITION

FREE

POPULATION DENSITIES OF "GREATER GERMANY"

SEA

NORTH

NETHERLAND

BELGIUM

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND

LIECHTENSTEIN

ITALY

YUGOSLAVIA

HUNGARY

LITHUANIA

U S S R

Berlin

Köln

Dresden

Prag

München

Wien

CENSUS AREAS

- Germany, 1939 Frontiers, *census of May 17, 1939*
- Alsace-Lorraine, *census of March 8, 1936*
- Luxemburg, *census of December 31, 1935*
- Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, *census of December 1, 1930*
- Annexed Polish Territory, *administrative count, end of 1939*

BOUNDARIES

Boundary Claimed for "Greater Germany" by Third Reich, January 1, 1941

Other International Boundaries

URBAN POPULATION DENSITY*

Less than 500 | 501 - 1,000 | 1,001 - 2,000 | 2,001 - 4,000 | Over 4,001

RURAL POPULATION DENSITY*

Less than 50 | 51 - 100 | 101 - 200 | 201 - 400 | Over 401

** Density per square kilometer, with figures calculated for "stadtkreise" & "landkreise" (corresponding to "political districts" in Bohemia-Moravia)*

0 25 50 75 100 Miles

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 Kilometers

MAP NO. 1252
24 FEBRUARY 1943

COMPILED AND DRAWN IN THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OSS
REPRODUCED IN THE REPRODUCTION SECTION OSS

No. 17

ETHNIC AND SOCIAL GROUPS

A. Principal Social Groups. Germany has a highly complex social structure. It consists of feudal survivals and of groups developed under the influence of modern industry and power politics. Another social grouping is being created on the basis of the relation to the Nazi Party. Those Germans who belong to and serve actively the Party rise in social position, and the members of the S. S. constitute the highest of all groups. During the present war the social distinctions tend to diminish in importance. The hardships are imposed upon all irrespective of social position, and the Nazis try to convince the people that all suffer, and in case of victory all will profit alike. Nonetheless, the pre-war social groups remain in existence. They are as follows:

(1) The Nobility. Aristocratic elements are found scattered in all parts of Germany and are engaged in both industry and agriculture. They are most numerous east of the Elbe River as landowners, to a less extent in Westphalia, Bavaria and Austria. They number only about 12 to 15,000, but they have in the past exerted a political and social influence out of all proportion to their numerical strength. They supplied leaders in state and society up to 1918, and in many instances even under the Weimar Republic in the bureaucracy and the army. Most Catholic noblemen do not support Nazism whereas the Protestant aristocracy, in the main, does. Those Protestants who have remained orthodox in their religion do so with reservations; but they and the Catholic aristocrats support the war effort for patriotic reasons. The influence of the nobility has diminished sharply under both the Weimar Republic and the Nazi regime. But the unusual capacity for political leadership coupled with the occupancy of many of the highest positions in the army and the SS makes the nobility a persistent source of power.

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(2) The Old Military and Bureaucratic Elite. This elite is and has been recruited from the nobility, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes. Through several centuries of service it has developed standards of occupational and private conduct of honesty, reliability intelligence, devotion to the service, modesty in standard of living. This elite has almost completely placed its services at the disposal of the Nazis. Particularly the old army elite has been pleased over the full support to militarization given by the Nazis.

(3) The Bourgeoisie. The capitalistic bourgeoisie consists of the industrial and commercial elements who have their own businesses, belong to the high managerial group or have sufficient savings to live according to the bourgeois standards. The group has declined in numbers with the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a few. It includes a very small percentage of the population. But it exerts great economic power. Its attitude toward Nazism is mixed. It dislikes Nazi domination of its business, but it is earning profits, wielding power and expanding its holdings abroad. It is fearful of the future, but sees its fate bound to that of the present regime. So it supports the Nazis and the war almost completely.

(4) The Middle Classes. The middle classes include many elements - most professional persons and teachers, most employees and government bureaucrats, artisans, small retail merchants and small factory owners. These elements supply the main support of Nazism. Their economic basis before 1933 was precarious and they credit the Nazis with having saved them from becoming proletarians and given them economic security. They constitute the largest social element in Germany next to the Proletariat. The Nazis have succeeded in filling them with a sense of importance, and are holding out great promises of prosperity in case of the conquest of Europe.

(5) The Proletariat. The workers were before 1933 divided among the socialist, communist and Christian church organizations, with the

overwhelming majority being socialists or communists. The two most active parties before 1933 in appealing to the young workers were the communists and the Nazis. After 1933 the Nazis made special efforts to win over the workers. They demanded loyalty and in return assured them economic security and some social recognition. The attitude of the proletariat toward Nazism is mixed. Both communists and social democrats maintain some precarious underground organizations even within the Nazi institutions. The workers like the economic security, but they dislike the long hours, hard work, the trials of war, and the harsh Nazi control. They participate in the war effort partly out of loyalty to Germany, partly out of fear of the results of a German defeat, partly out of inability to take any other course.

(6) The Peasantry. Many peasants in Protestant Germany supported Nazism even before 1933, whereas the Catholic peasants as a rule did not. Both groups have profited economically by an assured market and high prices since 1933, and on the whole are economically better off under the Nazis than they have been for decades. They support the war effort as loyal Germans, and will accept the Nazis as long as the latter are in power. They constitute one of the most important elements of German society. They are usually not politically active, and depend upon the political leadership of other groups.

(7) The New Nazi Elite. National Socialism had developed its own elite. This new elite is becoming more and more identified with the S.S. and the higher S.S. officers. Its purpose is to rule Germany and the peoples under German control according to the ideals of Nazism. Practically all of the original Nazi Party leaders have risen from obscurity to enormous power. Since 1933 they have mixed with collaborationists out of all the other social groups of Germany - aristocracy, military, bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, middle classes, even the peasantry

and the proletariat. Since the political, economic and military functions have become so interwoven under the Nazis, the new elite belongs to any one or several of these groups. Thus, Goering occupies one of the highest political positions, but at the same time is a Reichsmarshal and has enormous economic wealth and authority. The new elite cooperates closely in maintaining and in expanding its power. An illustration is supplied by the men in control of the Continental Oil Corporation,--representatives of heavy industry, the oil industry, the governmental bureaucracy, the Nazi party, and the army. They all aid in achieving for the company a monopoly of oil resources outside of Germany. The military and civil service representatives of the new elite stem from the old military and bureaucratic families. Some business men were given access to vast wealth by virtue of their affiliation with the Nazi Party. But on the whole the new-comers consist of Party members who have risen by way of politics. This new elite is in full possession of the essentials of power within the German state, the economy, the armed forces. Its number runs into several thousands.

The present war has concentrated economic power in the hands of the big corporations. The middle-sized and small industrialists have been unable to compete in efficiency and in political "pull" with the big companies. As the labor shortage increases, the government is compelled to concentrate production in the most efficient plants or in those able to adjust quickly and easily to war demands. The big companies have the capital and the skills to win the contracts, and the administrative machinery for coping with the redtape. The result has been that the managers and owners of these large companies have grown richer and more powerful than before and belong to or cooperate with the Nazi elite, while the lesser industrialists tend to join the ranks of the salaried employees and to lose their independence.

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B. Ethnic Groups and Resettlement. (1) Persistence of Regional Cultures in Germany. The Nazis have enforced complete centralization and unification of control over the German people while at the same time they have encouraged the cultivation of the old regional cultures- Franconian, Bavarian, Swabian, Saxon, and Prussian.

(2) Nazi Racial Policy. Along the frontiers of Germany the Nazis are attempting to Germanize the peoples in whose culture for centuries Germanic elements have been fused; in the West the French, the Luxemburgers, Dutch and Belgians; in the East the Poles and Czechs. The ideological basis for this mission is provided, by Nazi racism, the doctrine of the supremacy of the German Nordic race. Since the occupation of Holland, Dutch law has been retained there so far as it is compatible with German needs. But Dutch penal law and administration have been replaced by German law in cases of all crimes committed by Germans, former German citizens, or citizens of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. German penal law also applies to anyone who commits a crime against Greater Germany, the German people, the National Socialist party, its groupings or affiliated organizations, against a German citizen, against anyone employed by the Reich or in the service of German authorities; or if the crime is committed in buildings and plants serving the Reich, the party, and so on. A similar situation exists in the Protectorate. In the former Polish areas which have been annexed by Germany, German laws are being introduced as rapidly as possible, as is the case also in Alsace, Lorraine and Luxemburg, which are being prepared for formal annexation at an appropriate moment. In the Government General, the native population is apparently denied even the blessing of German law. In the countries of Germany's allies, such as Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, which retain their legal independence, German Folk Groups have a privileged

position.

The Nazis have employed their racial dogma as justification for the establishment of a veritable hierarchy of races in the conquered areas under their control. At the summit of this hierarchy is the master race. German citizenship in conquered territories is granted only to racial Germans. Even among racial Germans, however, there is a difference. Racial Germans in the Protectorate have become citizens, while those living in the Government General are considered Germans on a slightly lower level; they are called "members of the German race" or "Deutsche Volkszugehörige". (see paragraph 28)

Jews stand at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Then come the Poles. Above the Poles, the order is determined by expediency. The Dutch, because of their racial affinity with the Germans, occupy a more favorable position. Nazi discrimination among foreign workers in Germany is an indication of the bitter reality of this doctrine of the hierarchy of races. It is implicit in the discussion of the following Ethnic groups now included within the frontiers of Greater Germany.

C. Alsace-Lorraine. (1) History. Germany acquired in 1871 all of historic Alsace and about half of Lorraine, the other half remaining with France, and had to restore them to France in 1919.

Lorraine had belonged during the middle ages to the Holy Roman Empire, but owing to the expansion of French culture and political power eastward, all of Lorraine ceased to belong to Germany politically or culturally by the early part of the 18th century. Between 1871 and 1919 Germany did not succeed in changing the Lorraine people into Germans.

Alsace had been an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire down to the second half of the seventeenth century when the French monarchy

conquered most of the province. The Alsatians were allowed by the French kings to maintain their old German province at the time of the French Revolution. In the course of the nineteenth century the French succeeded, however, in gaining the full allegiance of the majority and the Germans after 1871 were unable to undo this work.

(2) Government. As a consequence of the conquest of France in 1940 Germany took over both Alsace and Lorraine without, however, putting them this time under a common administration. Lorraine is ruled by the Reich Governor of the Westmark who is commissioned to take all necessary steps preparatory to the full union of Lorraine with the Westmark. In the same fashion the Reich Governor of Baden and his minister of state are acting in Alsace with a view to a future merger of Alsace and Baden. Together with the Saarpfalz (Saar and Palatinate). Lorraine now constitutes the Gau Westmark of the NSDAP. The party has also been established in Alsace, which however is not yet incorporated in a Gau.

(3) Population. Population statistics are as follows:

Alsace-Lorraine

Department (former Government District)	Square kilometers	Population 1931	German and Bilingual	Language French	Religion Catholic
Upper Alsace	3506	513,817	440,085	30,734	436,455 Protestant-53,371 Israelite-5,664
Lower Alsace	4781	686,098	601,628	36,523	Catholic-441,185 Protestant-201,69 Israelite-14,538
Lorraine	6228	685,908	483,330	135,397	Catholic-623,385 Protestant-33,981 Israelite-8,123

(4) Language. Alsatian German is mixed with many French words. It is a dialect which Reich Germans have difficulty in understanding. The local French, in turn, is full of Germanisms. Since the above language figures come from a German source, one may conclude that any native who knows even a few words of German was included in the bilingual list.

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The present population of Alsace and Lorraine is probably smaller than the figures indicate. Wide regions of these French border provinces in which the Maginot line was built were evacuated by the French high command in September 1939, and many were refused readmission by the Nazis. The Germans also deported groups to France after occupying the territory.

(5) Economy. Alsace has a varied agriculture - vineyards, fruit, cattle, vegetables, hops. Her iron and coal deposits are of little significance. Rock and sand are plentiful in all parts, and a large deposit of salt is located at Essisheim and some oil at Pechelbronn. Among industries, textiles, centering in Mulhausen, occupy the first place, with metal, chemicals, paper, shoes and tobacco also being manufactured in relatively small quantities.

In Lorraine the rich deposits of iron ore constitute the most important product. Some iron and steel, chemical and textile industries have developed in the province, but much of the iron ore is exported. The coal beds are insufficient to supply the needs of the province itself.

(6) Nazification. The Germanization and Nazification of Alsace-Lorraine are being pushed forward with vigor. The Nazis expelled some ten thousand from Alsace and some hundred thousand from Lorraine. In Lorraine all larger estates have been taken over and are being eliminated completely. In addition the large economic enterprises are now under German ownership. French interests are being eliminated completely. In general the large German companies that owned the industries and mines prior to 1918 are recovering their possessions.

The Alsatians are noted for their independence, their inclination to oppose, their dislike of centralized rule whether by France or Germany, and their love of their own land. They have struggled for local self-government against both Germany and France, and have tenaciously preserved their own culture. The Lorrainers being more French than

German react in the same way. Both Alsatians and Lorrainers continue to resist Nazification, in spite of vigorous efforts of the Nazis to win them over.

D. 1. Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was formerly a German state, and though it achieved its full political independence in the nineteenth century it belonged to the German customs union until 1918. In 1922 it formed a new customs union with Belgium. Luxemburg was invaded and occupied by German troops in May, 1940. An exiled government is in existence and recognized by all United Nations.

The country has an area of 2,586 square kilometers and a population of 301,367, practically all of them belonging to the Roman Catholic Church. The common people are Germanic and speak an old German dialect or patois; French is, however, the language of the educated and of the government.

One-third of the hilly country is covered by forests and woodland, the rest is mostly divided into small peasant holdings, and only the southernmost region is industrialized. This district is one of the most important iron-producing districts in Europe. In 1938, 66 mines were worked, two-thirds of them being surface mines, and they produced 5,140,600 tons of iron ore. Even greater is the steel production which uses iron ore imported from French Lorraine in addition to the Luxemburg output. The country has 35 blast furnaces with a steel-producing capaci of over 3,000,000 tons. Due to marketing problems the Luxemburg industries were never occupied to full capacity during the last twenty years and the steel production never rose above the value of 2.9 million marks In 1938 iron mines and iron industries employed 33,470 workers. In addition, Luxemburg has wood industries, quarries, and leather industrie.

The civil administration of Luxemburg is now in the hands of the Gauleiter of Moselland. Moselland is a Gau of the NSDAp, which includes

Luxemburg as well as Koblenz and Trier. The Nazis have joined Luxemburg to the German customs system and have incorporated the Luxemburg industries into the economic structure of the Reich. They have transferred ownership or control of the main industries, banks and insurance companies to Germans. They have required the Natives to take the German form of their Christian names in place of the French form. They have introduced the German administrative system of economic control. Reports indicate that the Luxemburgers do not like Nazi rule, and resist Germanization. The economic conditions have declined since the Nazi conquest.

(2) Eupen and Malmedy. After the first World War Belgium in a speedy plebiscite annexed two border districts, Eupen and Malmedy, from Germany. These districts have an area of 1,056 square kilometers and a population of 68,600 of mixed Germanic and Walloon nationality; Roman Catholicism predominates. The districts are an agricultural region without special significance.

E. The Protectorate. Next to the Poles, the Czechs form the largest non-German national minority in Greater Germany. They occupy mainly the area known as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

(1) Historical. Bohemia and Moravia, together with parts of Silesia, have formed an administrative entity for many centuries, under varying rule and with varying geographic extension. For three centuries these lands were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918 they became part of the newly created independent state of Czechoslovakia. In 1938 and 1939, most of Czechoslovakia was occupied by Germany, Hungary and Poland. It is now divided as follows:

1. The Sudetenland, which in Germany constitutes the Reichsgau Sudetenland and parts of the Gaue of Niederdonau, Oberdonau, Bayerische Ostmark, and Oberschlesien.

2. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

3. The nominally independent state of Slovakia.

4. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and parts of the former province of Slovakia were annexed to Hungary.

(2) Government. The Sudeten districts are being assimilated int the German Reich and do not form a separate administrative entity (see paragraph 28,c). The same is true of the former Czechoslovak districts which are now part of Hungary. Slovakia is administered as an independent state and maintains regular diplomatic relations with the Axis states and a few neutrals.

In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the supreme authority is the "Reichsprotektor for Bohemia", who maintains a comprehensive staff of Reich Germans to supervise every phase of the country's life. The Reichsprotektor has the right to veto or approve all measures proposed by the "Autonomous" Czech government, and to issue laws and decrees without consulting the Czech Cabinet. In theory, the functions of government are exercised by the President of the Protectorate, Dr. Emil Hacha, and his cabinet. The cabinet consists of seven members: the Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Justice, and the Ministers of Interior, Economy and Labor, Education and Public Enlightenment, Agriculture and Forests, Transport and Technics, and Finance. The prese Minister of Economy and Labor is a Reich German, Dr. Walter Bertsch; the other cabinet members are Czech nationals. The administrative structure of the Protectorate government was thoroughly reorganized in January 1942, and now corresponds exactly to the divisions of the German Reich cabinet and of the office of the Reichsprotektor, except for foreign affairs and military matters, which are handled directly by the German government. The Protectorate is divided into fifteen administrative districts, each administered by a German Oberlandrat. A number of the larger cities have been declared "Reich cities" and are governed by German commissars. Generally, however, local and municipal administration as well as most of the central office of the central administration are carried on almost entirely by Czech officials. Only a handful of these Czech officials may be classed as "quislings" or

active collaborationists; the vast majority could be depended upon to continue loyal service if their country were liberated from the Germans.

(3) Law in the Protectorate. The legal system in the Protectorate derives from the German decree of March 16, 1939. Article II, Section 1, makes "every folk-German inhabitant of the Protectorate" a German citizen and subject to the German administration of justice exclusively. Pre-occupation Czech laws are left in force insofar as they do not "contradict the essence of the protection by the German Reich", but Czech courts are not permitted to impose any penalties less severe than the minimum in force in German Law for the same offenses. Offenses "against the German Reich", whether committed by Czechs or Germans, are dealt with by special German courts.

The German civil judiciary has jurisdiction over all Germans, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants. By a significant fiction, all partnerships, limited liability companies, joint stock corporations, foundations, and institutions are classed as German citizens if their central office is in the Reich and sometimes even if their headquarters are in the Protectorate. German courts have jurisdiction in all marital disputes where the wife is a racial German, even if the husband is a citizen of the Protectorate. Only in the most exceptional cases can a German be a party to an action before a Protectorate court. Much of the substantive law of the Czechoslovak Republic has been retained, yet even here a number of exceptions have been made for racial Germans. The most important is the introduction of German marriage law and certain changes in labor and patent law.

(4) Ethnic Groups in the Protectorate. According to the 1940 administrative count by the Germans, based on the issuance of ration cards, the Protectorate has a population of 7,380,000 - excluding Germans who have settled there since March 15, 1939, and excluding members of the German army. It is estimated that there are about 250,000 in the German

army of occupation, about 100,000 members of the Gestapo, the S.S., the S.A., and similar formations, and possibly another 150,000 Reich and Sudeten Germans functioning as civil and industrial administrators in the Protectorate - a probable maximum of 30,000 from Bessarabia and Burowina have been settled in scattered rural areas. A few of the German civil administrators and possibly a larger group of the Germans in industrial positions may be considered as permanent settlers. But it is probable that the vast majority of the Germans who have come to the Protectorate since March 15, 1939, could not be classed as settlers and would probably flee the country before the arrival of an occupying army. German women and children from badly bombed districts have been housed in the Protectorate for varying periods, but these, too, are not permanent settlers.

The exact ethnic divisions of the present Protectorate population are not known, but according to the 1930 census, the last official count showing ethnic groups, there are probably about 95 percent Czechs and Slovaks, 3-4 percent native Germans (i.e., those already living there before March 1939), and a few thousand Poles, Hungarians, and others. In 1930 there were between 8,000 and 9,000 Jews in the area; an unknown number have since emigrated or been deported.

The Czechs and Slovaks are descendants of Slavic tribes which settled in the territory about the sixth century A. D. There have been German settlers in the country since the 12th century, mainly in urban centers. The population is highly mixed, especially in the border regions. National feeling is strong and frequently chauvinistic among both Czechs and Germans.

(5) Language. The principal language in the Protectorate is Czech, a Slavic language akin to Russian but written in Latin characters. Other closely related Slavic languages, including Slovak, Polish, and Ukrainian, are frequently used in private communication.

Under pressure of German occupation authorities, the German language is becoming more and more widely known in the Protectorate. It is probable

that most of the inhabitants can now understand it. All official communications, and street signs, are now written in both German and Czech, but many newspapers, books, and periodicals are still published only in Czech, and there is no attempt to bar the use of the Czech language in private life. Before the German occupation, the peasants and lower working classes spoke only Czech, but German was well known to most of the educated classes and was widely used in commerce. French and English were also generally studied, though to a lesser extent than German. Many Czechs, especially among the highly educated classes, speak both French and English fluently. Among workers and farmers, however, neither language is widely known.

(6) Character of the People in the Protectorate. The Czech people are highly literate, cultured, and attached to the democratic way of life. Except for certain poverty-stricken rural districts, there are few extremes of wealth or poverty. Before the war the Czech standard of living, while somewhat lower than in the United States, was entirely adequate. The Czech standard of living included a relatively higher percentage of "cultural" expenditures than the average American budget.

In general, the Czechs are hard-working, industrious, frugal and clean. They tend to be suspicious of "outsiders" and do not accept them readily as intimates, but once they have accepted them, they are very hospitable and loyal. Their nature is a curious mixture of Western material standards and Slavic mysticism.

(7) Attitude toward German Rule. As a result of centuries of Austro-German rule, the Czech attitude toward Germans has been most unfriendly, although after 1918 they made sincere efforts to arrange a tolerable modus vivendi in an area of inextricable racial intermixture. Since the Munich partition, and especially since the German occupation, their unfriendly attitude has grown into implacable hatred. Nevertheles the sober realism and discipline characteristic of the Czech people have prevented riots, rebellions, or other serious outbreaks.

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Realizing that they are outnumbered, disarmed, and subject to superior force, most Czechs have consciously decided to avoid provocation. They have retreated into an intense private concern with Czech history, literature, music, and art, and have outwardly continued with their normal mode of life.

As a result of this realistic attitude, the Czechs today have escaped most of the destruction and pillage which have occured in other territories occupied by Germany. Despite some German inroads, the physical and administrative structure of the country has remained practical intact.

The Czechoslovak army, which had 1,500,000 trained men in active and reserve forces, was demobilized completely in March 1939. Germany has not permitted them to service in the German forces, except for a few Czechs from Vienna and the Sudetenland. The maintenance of order in the Protectorate is entrusted to German forces, which fluctuate constantly in both personnel and numbers, and which consist mainly of convalescents which have been wounded. On paper, the protectorate is entitled to maintain a small volunteer "government army" of 7000 men for police purposes, but it is believed that, aside from a small group of officers, this "army" has not yet materialized.

German citizens, which means all "folk-Germans", in the Protectorat are subject to military service. There remains, however, an untapped reservoir of young Czech men, most of whom have had military training of at least one year under the Czechoslovak system of compulsory service. The last class to be called up for training was the one born in 1919, but these actually served only a few days in March 1939 before being demobilized. But it may be assumed that all physically fit Czech men born in 1918 or earlier have had military training and would be prepared to serve again on short notice. Their presence enhances the value of Czech industrial production to a considerable extent, and would be of great importance to an occupying army. It is impossible to give an

accurate estimate of the total size of this group. A few thousand young men escaped from Czechoslovakia and are now serving in the army in exile including about 1000 in the British Air Force, but the total number is small. The number of physically fit men who have had military training is estimated roughly at 500,000. In addition, four more age groups have reached military age since 1939, totaling perhaps 250,000 young men fit for military service but without actual army training.

(8) Attitude toward Nationalities Other Than German. Czechoslovakians have always admired America, believing that President Wilson and the Americans were chiefly responsible for their having become independent in 1918. American technical and business methods are frequently imitated. Up to the time of the Munich pact, Czechs also felt great friendship for France and Great Britain. French culture was eagerly studied, and the Institut Francais in Prague had a widespread cultural influence. After the "betrayal" of Munich, however, disillusioned and disappointed Czechs changed their attitude to one of sorrowful repudiation. Even if conditions should alter and the French and British should appear as liberators of Czechoslovakia, it will be extremely difficult for them to recapture the wholehearted admiration of former days.

Despite their political and economic orientation toward the Western world, the Czechs are basically Slavic. As such, they have always been friendly toward Russia. They have also admired much of Soviet Russia's economic experiment, refusing at the same time to accept basic communist ideology. The Communist Party in Czechoslovakia never mustered any great strength. Political orientation was always closer to Western liberal democracy, with a tinge of evolutionary socialism, rather than to radical ideas whether of the Right or Left.

(9) Occupations in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. The following table shows the occupational composition of the population of the Protectorate. The figures are based on the 1930 census.

Occupation	Percentage
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	27.8
Industry and trades	38.2
Commerce and banking	8.4
Transport	6.2
Civil service, professions, army	6.8
Other occupations	12.6

(10) The Sudetenland. The Sudetenland includes all the territory taken from Czechoslovakia as a result of the Munich agreement in the fall of 1938. It has a total area of 29,099 sq. km. (11,243 sq. mi.) and a population of 3,408,400 according to German figures based on the census of 1939.

The Sudetenland does not form a single administrative area. Most of it is included in the Reichsgau Sudetenland with an area of 22,587 sq. km. (8,727 sq. mi.) and a population of 2,943,187 (1939). It includes almost all the land taken from northern Bohemia and northern Moravia. Three fragments of southern Bohemia and Moravia were added to the Gaue Bayerische Ostmark, Oberdonau and Niederdonau. The district of Hultschin and Teschen in northern Moravia were incorporated in the Gau Oberschlesien.

The German census of May 17, 1939, contains no ethnic breakdown. On the basis of the Czechoslovak census of 1930, Sudetenland consisted of 78.92 percent Germans, 20.65 percent Czechs and Slovaks, and 0.19 percent Jews. Taking into consideration all the changes that have taken place, the figures 80 percent Germans and 20 percent Czechs are close estimates.

Most of the Czechs are located in areas contiguous to the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. In language and national feeling they are not different from the Czechs of the Protectorate. German-Czech mixed marriages have always been fairly common in this border area. Unlike the Czechs in the Protectorate, the Czech minority in the Sudetenland has been deprived of all its national cultural and educational institu-

tions and is exposed to ruthless Germanization ever since the fall of 1938. Over a short-run period this would only increase anti-German feeling. It may be added, that there were about 120,000 Czechs who left Sudetenland as refugees into the Protectorate region. At least some of these will seek reinstatement in Sudetenland if there is a political change.

The Sudeten Germans may be compared with Austrians. They are Catholic, and their political and social background is similar. Because of their long national struggles with the Czechs, they are more consciously German nationalists than the Austrians. At the same time, they have an intensely strong local patriotism.

F. Austria. Austria has formed an integral part of German all through German history. From 1438-1806 the rulers of Austria were German Emperors, and from 1815-1866 Austria presided over the German Confederacy. After 1866 Austria was separated from the German Empire which was then dominated by Prussia, but from 1879-1918 the Austrian and German Empires were joined by a treaty of alliance. Austria belongs racially largely to the Bavarian tribe and the Austrian dialect is a variation of the Bavarian language. Certain border districts like the "Inn district", where Hitler was born, changed from Bavarian to Austrian sovereignty at a more recent date and were therefore particularly inclined to cultivate the idea of unity between Austria and her German neighbors.

In spite of these similarities Austria has acquired a different character from Germany. Vienna was not merely the capital of the old German Empire but the center of great European empire containing many non-Germanic races. In the course of the nineteenth century Austria felt herself chiefly responsible for the Danube basin and her old ties with Germany had already grown tenuous when Bismarck severed them by force. The industrial revolution which transformed Germany after 1870

into one of the mightiest industrial nations did not change Austrian life to a similar extent. Austria moved at a slower pace and preserved many of her older traditions. Most important among them is the preservation of her religious homogeneity. More than 90 percent of the Austrian people belong to the Roman Catholic Church. It was a Catholic government that fought the infiltration of Nazi ideas into Austria and succumbed to brute force when Hitler marched into Austria in March, 1938

G. The Poles. General remarks. The Poles are the largest non-German group in Germany. They became so in 1939, when some 9½ million of them were annexed to the Reich after the September conquest. Since then perhaps 1½ million of these have been deported to the Government-General The main body of those remaining, situated in the northeastern part of the Reich, now number (in 1942) more than 8 million, compactly settled on some 40,000 square miles of territory. They are important because the areas they occupy (Upper Silesia, Wartheland, West Prussia and the southern half of East Prussia) are a vital coal, grain, lumber and textile producing region; because they hold the principal sector of the German-Slav frontier, which has been a battleground for centuries; and because they are intensely nationalistic, with an aggressive anti-German orientation dating back, in its present form, at least 70 years. They have been the victims of a more rigorous and comprehensive Nazi policy than any other national group in the present war.

(1) History. Poles have lived in the Warthe and lower Vistula valleys for at least 1,500 years. In what is now called Wartheland, the Posen district, called Poznan, or "Great Poland" (Wielkopolska) by the Poles, was the birthplace of the first Polish state 1,000 years ago. The bones of the earliest Polish kings are buried in the cathedral at Gniezn (Gnesen). Friction with the Germans dates back to 1225, when the Teuton Knights commenced colonizing the lower Vistula valley from headquarters

at Marienburg. In the eighteenth century Poland was internally weak and was partitioned by Prussia, Russia and Austria in three great invasions. Frederick the Great seized West Prussia in 1772; his successor annexed Poznan, Lodz, Warsaw, Bialystok, in 1793 and 1795. Of these, Prussia managed to retain Posen and West Prussia after the Napoleonic wars. Since then Germany has depended heavily upon the Poles for agricultural and industrial labor. At the same time (1815-1919) unsuccessful attempts were made to suppress Polish nationalism. Before World War I, Bismarck imprisoned many Polish priests and colonized German peasants among the Poles, while his successor von Bülow passed a law to expropriate Polish-owned farms and eliminated the use of the Polish language in the schools. The only result was intensification of Polish nationalism. In 1919 Posen and West Prussia, with part of Upper Silesia, were taken from Germany and given to the Polish Republic, by the Treaty of Versailles. It was these areas, particularly West Prussia (the "Corridor"), that the Nazis were clamoring to regain on the eve of the war in 1939.

(2) Nazi Policy. The Nazi government, fearing the Poles because of their high birth rate, their uncompromising Roman Catholicism and their nationalism (which has been very resourceful and troublesome under German rule in times past), has systematically tried to Germanize the Polish areas annexed in 1939. Half of the Polish population, including the leading classes, were marked for deportation to the Government-General, their places to be taken by German colonists, while the other half were to be Germanized and allowed to remain. But deportation, even of only half the Polish population, has proved impossible. By the middle of 1942 only some 1,500,000 had been deported and only half a million Germans colonized in their place. To deport further numbers of Poles would seriously depopulate the Wartheland and other annexed areas, since enough Germans to fill their place would not possibly be found without disrupting war production in western Germany.

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Hence a new policy has been introduced. Emphasis is now placed on Germanization of as many Poles as possible. The means used are a mixture of threats and enticements. A "National Registry" (Deutsche Volkliste) has been set up. Poles with some German ancestry or connections, or even a mere willingness to accept German nationality and to cooperate with the authorities, are expected to sign this registe They then receive more civil rights, comparable to those of Volksdeutsche, but must remain on probation for a time while being schooled and tested in German ways and outlook by Nazi party organizations. Poles who refuse to sign the Volksliste and who thus show their colors as uncompromising Polish nationalists, are promised the harshest treatment, including possible deportation.

This Volksliste policy is being applied at differing tempos to different groups of Poles. It is being pressed most speedily upon the Upper Silesians and the West Prussian Poles, especially the Kassubes, because the Nazis regard these groups as most susceptible to persuasion. It is used more sparingly in Wartheland, because the Poles there are regarded as more incorrigibly anti-German. However, since the most nationalistic strata, the intellectuals and the middle class in general, have been largely wiped out by death or deportation, there is a general tendency among the remaining Poles to give in to German pressure. For the most part they comprise the humbler classes, too poor as well as too apathetic to risk penalties for resistance. Especially in West Prussia and Upper Silesia, they are registering in the German Volksliste in large numbers.

(3) Government. The annexed Polish districts have been completely fused with the old Reich in administrative matters. Parts have been joined to the Prussian provinces of East Prussia and Upper Silesia. Other parts, Wartheland and Danzig-West Prussia, have been erected into Reich Gaue headed by Reich Governors, Arthur Greiser and Albert Forster respectively. All have been subdivided on the familiar pattern of

Government Districts (Regierungsbezirke) and Counties (Kreise), the latter administered by Councillors (Landräte or Stadträte). The Reich system of courts has been extended to them, and Nazi "law" has been rapidly introduced, bringing these areas into conformity with the rest of the Reich. All schools have been taken away from the Poles and completely Germanized. There are lower rations and a special, severe criminal code for Poles not on the Volkliste. Names of all towns have been Germanized.

(4) Culture. The Polish districts incorporated in the Reich comprise the most literate and progressive parts of former Poland. Even so, the majority of Poles here live on a standard which even in normal times is lower than the German average. Most have had some schooling, although again the level of literacy is lower than the German. A majority, even of the poorer rural classes, especially among the older generation, understand some German. Farming is the predominant occupation, except in the Lodz (Litzmannstadt) textile-mill district and in the coal and steel area of Upper Silesia where almost all the miners and steel workers are Poles. Polish farms are small and poor, and technically far inferior to the farms of western Europe.

The vast majority of Poles are active Roman Catholics. The chief exception in the Reich is the Protestant Masurians of East Prussia, who differ from other Poles in dialect and other ways as well. In temperament the Poles tend to be somewhat more openly emotional than the Germans, in outlook somewhat more democratic and individualistic. They make good soldiers. They have a high birth rate and have been handicapped to the present day by poverty, maldistribution of land and a feudal social structure with an insufficient middle class. They are very patriotic. Their strongest traditional friendship has been for France and the United States.

(5) Poles in Western Germany. In addition to the main body of Poles in northeastern Germany, there are Polish communities in Berlin and other large German cities, and particularly in the Ruhr industrial area,

where they have been settled for many decades as miners and steel workers, with schools and churches of their own.

Finally, there are some 1 - 1½ million uprooted Poles from all parts of Poland working as manual laborers in all parts of the Reich. The majority of these are being employed in German agriculture. An additional large number are used in migrant squads for road-building and railway maintenance. Still others are at work in heavy industrial jobs such as coal mining and the making of munitions (e.g., in the I.G. Farben plants). The Polish labor contingent in Germany includes a large number of women and young people, as well as former war prisoners. They are given less wages than Germans or other foreign workers, are kept somewhat segregated, and are compelled to wear a conspicuous letter "P" to denote their nationality.

H. The Jews. In 1933 the Jews amounted to about 1 percent of the German population in Greater Germany or about 760,000. By the autumn of 1941 the number had declined to 250,000. In 1941 in Greater Germany over 75 percent of Jews were above the age of 40; over 50 percent were over 50 years of age. There are only about 50,000 below the age of 40. Since the end of the eighteenth century the Jews had been absorbed into German culture, and have supplied Germany with many important persons in every field of activity. The Nazis aimed from the first to destroy the Jews not merely in Germany but throughout the world. The Nazis have no clear definition of a Jew. Those persons become Jews when they declare to be such, irrespective of race or religion. Thus some racial Jews are at present in high positions in Germany, while many Christians, Free Masons, and democrats of so-called Aryan blood are declared to be "voluntary Jews".

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Since the accession to power in January 1933, the Nazis have treated the Jews as follows:

(1) They have deprived them of citizenship and the right to hold public office.

(2) They have driven them out of all professions (medical, dental, teaching) except for a few cases in which they are permitted to serve other Jews.

(3) They have barred them from the public schools of all grades.

(4) They have prohibited them from intermarrying with Germans and punish severly any violation of this law.

(5) They have confiscated practically all their property and turned it over to Nazi officials and other party members. They have eliminated the Jews from German economic life.

(6) They have forced as many as could emigrate to do so and have deported thousands of Jews into desolate areas of Poland where many have starved.

(7) They have killed and imprisoned many who could not leave, being especially cruel toward the intellectuals and Jewish leaders. There have been approximately 10,000 Jewish suicides in Germany and Poland.

(8) They have set Nazi party organizations, especially the Nazi youth, to work destroying Jewish property and burning synagogues.

(9) They have forced the Jews into ghettos, where many starve or die of disease.

(10) They have placed the Jews at the arbitrary mercy of the Nazi party and the secret police, who boast that they show no mercy.

(11) They are now in such need of labor that they compel the Jews to work at lower wages, for longer hours, and under less protection with less food and on harder tasks than any other group including the Poles.

Jews are already too few to be of consequence for an invading army, and they are under complete control by the police. Most of the

Jews live in the cities, where they try to conceal themselves; but since they are doing forced labor, it is impossible to tell where they are located.

I. (1) The Resettlement of Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche. Since the outbreak of the war it has been the policy of the Nazis to recall all German citizens living outside the frontiers of Greater Germany. In the treaty with Russia in 1939 this policy was extended to racial Germans (Volksdeutsche) living in Russia and the Baltic states for hundreds of years. With the success of German arms on the continent this policy has been reversed. Folk Germans are now being encouraged to remain where they are, particularly in Eastern Europe. In certain areas they are being employed to control non-German populations.

German estimates of the number of Volksdeutsche who actually returned to the Reich vary from 500,000 to 751,000. The latest German statistics of such persons are given as follows:

Territory	Date of beginning of return	Number
Esthonia and Latvia	November 1939	63,832
" " " (second wave of migration)	February 1941	16,244
South Tyrol	November 1939	219,094
Volhynia, Galicia and Narew territory	November 1939	134,267
Govt. General	September 1940	30,496
Bessarabia-N.Bukowina	October 1940	136,989
Dobrudga-S.Bukowina	December 1940	76,756
Lithuania	January 1941	50,471
France	June 1941	6,096
Laibach	November 1941	15,800
Bulgaria	December 1941	423
Serbia	December 1941	993
Total	. . . . .	. . . 751,460

(2) Re-Settlement in the Annexed Polish Areas. To make room for these Germans, approximately 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Poles have been deported from the annexed Polish areas to the "Polish Reservation", the Government General. By September 1941 more than 500,000 Germans had been settled in this area. The majority of those emigrating from Bessarabia,

the Dobrudja, South Bukowina, Volhynia, the Government General and (probably) South Tyrol, are peasants. But from the Baltic states, out of 100,000 emigres, peasants numbered only 20 percent; and from North Bukowina only 30 percent. The rest were professional people and tradesmen.

The new peasant Volksdeutsche, Nazified in German camps before re-settlement, are established in Polish territory in units of about 500 (Dorf), 1,000 (Hauptdorf) and 10-20,000 (Burg). Most of those from Eastern Europe have been placed in the Wartheland in order to build a "wall of German peasant farms" along the new frontiers of the Reich.

In Alsace-Lorraine similar policies of removal of Frenchmen and Jews are being carried out. It is reported that about 100,000 persons have been expelled in 1941. It is probable that expulsions have been more numerous in Lorraine than in the more Germanic territory of Alsace. Joseph Bürckel, Nazi head of the civil administration in Lorraine, is colonizing the Lorraine frontier area with thoroughly Nazified peasant-workers, who will till a small plot of ground and work in small and medium-sized factories. The war has slowed down his efforts for lack of man-power.

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No. 18

LANGUAGE

Standard German is the chief language used for all written and printed communications all over Germany (including Austria and Sudetenland). This Standard German - usually called by the Germans "High German" - is taught in all schools and used in official documents, on the stage, among educated people, and wherever Germans from different regions come together. Within the various regions various dialects are spoken, particularly in the villages and towns. The chief dialects are the Alemannic-Suabian, Bavarian, Franconian, Lower Saxon, High Saxon-Silesian, and East German. A man from one region is usually unable to understand all the other dialects, and he will in that case use Standard German. The dialects have colored the pronunciation of Standard German in the various regions. It is generally assumed that educated Hanoverians speak the best Standard German. Among the dialects the Lower Saxon, spoken in Hanover and the Northwest, is closest to Dutch and English.

The Nazis have not been able to change the linguistic situation very much. They have tried to "purify" German speech from Latin and other borrowed foreign words, and many new words have come into existence. At the same time they have forced the German language upon the minorities within Germany and have pressed the occupied countries to require the teaching of German in their public schools.

English is spoken by many educated and by a fairly large number of ordinary persons. Formerly English and French were equally taught in the public schools. In 1937 the Nazis made English the chief foreign language to be taught in German schools.

Every local police authority and every county police authority has a complete roster of the Germans able to speak a foreign language. This list is broken down according to age. The list is one item on the card of information about persons. This system is known as the Volkskartei.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEOPLE

A. 1. Recent Changes in Historic Traits. National characteristics are the result of geographical, natural, historical and social circumstances. In the case of the 80,000,000 Germans, these vary considerably, and it is not simple to find a common denominator. As to racial origins, the Germans represent a mixture of a variety of Germanic and other races. In the West there is a strong Latin and Celtic influence, in the East a strong Slav admixture. Germans in the Northwest do not appear very different from certain Dutch or Scandinavian types, whereas in the East they have traits not so very different from the Russian.

This large variety of physiological types has been accentuated by the differences in political and social history. Down to the middle of the last century, the Germans were primarily Prussians or Bavarians, Austrians or Bohemians. The political unification of 1871 and the industrial revolution affected the life of the various regions differently. Germany, therefore, contains a large variety of human types. This wide variation in part at least explains the craving for a unified pattern which National Socialism has promised to provide.

It is not surprising, therefore, that regional variations have been very pronounced. In the old sections of Bavaria, a racial, cultural, religious homogeneity has prevailed for more than 1000 years. The Bavarians believe in the full continuity of their political history over the same period. But this feeling is not shared by the Franconian parts of Bavaria which have a different history, dialect, and religion. Württemberg, comprising a substantial part of the old duchy of Suabia, comes close to Bavaria in its regional pride, whereas Baden and Hessen are less solidly unified. Within Prussia the Rhinelands have a regional consciousness of their own founded on their peculiar history and common religion. The Rhinelands have never possessed a state of their own, however, and their regional feeling is not so strong as that of Bavaria. Hanover is unified by racial, linguistic, cultural, and religious ties and by the memory of

a common statehood. The separatist movement has not been very active since 1866 when Hanover became a Prussian province. Regional sentiment is naturally strongest in Austria which did not form a province of Germany between 1866 and 1938, and served as the ruling country in the Danube basin which inevitably affected the outlook of the Austrians. The more cosmopolitan attitude of the Viennese is largely due to the historical traditions of the Hapsburg Empire in which the influences of many races were operative.

The distinctive traits of the various regions are fading under the impact of the industrial and political transformations of the last hundred years. Germany's economic unification, her urbanization, her national army, and the thorough political centralization introduced by the Nazis have brought all provinces into close contact with one another. It is often remarked that every second Berliner was born in Silesia, and Berlin has been called the fifth largest Suabian city. This may serve as an example for the considerable intermigration and intermarriage going on between various German provinces.

Perhaps as important as these vertical divisions along regional lines have been the horizontal divisions in social classes. Germany was slower to overcome its feudal past than other Western nations. A feudal organization of society persisted particularly in Prussia down to 1918; and though the Weimar Republic strove to level down the class divisions, it was not very successful. The National Socialists have continued with much greater determination the effort to break down class divisions. The class distinctions are, on the whole, more significant in the Eastern regions in which serfdom of the peasants was only abolished less than 120 years ago. In the other regions of Germany, serfdom never existed at all. The line of division between the upper and lower classes is very much strengthened by the differences in education. The vast majority of the Germans attend merely the primary schools for eight years, after which they will attend vocational or technological schools. About ten

percent of the students leave grade school after three or four years and attend high school (gymnasium) for eight or nine years. Graduation from high school and university is the key to all higher professions. This monopoly of education has created a greater cleavage between classes than differences of income or family have done in other countries. The respect for the rich man is probably less developed in Germany than elsewhere, but the respect for academic degrees has assumed extraordinary proportions.

The Nazis have done their utmost to break down regional and class divisions. Most of their leaders are of plebian origin who encourage the peasants and workers to regard themselves as equals of the higher classes. The modern German army has been fairly successful in defeating class exclusiveness.

2. Common Traits. The Germans have proved to be one of the most energetic, hard-working and thrifty peoples of the world. Around 1800 it was a common saying that Germany was condemned to eternal poverty; but in spite of its poor soil and very limited resources, Germany became in the course of the nineteenth century one of the leading countries of the world. The sudden acquisition of economic wealth and political power has scarcely, however, improved the German character. The German character has been notorious for its instability. The lack of experience in democratic government coupled with an exaggerated national pride made it impossible for them to master the chaotic circumstances which followed the defeat of 1918. Since then they have been willing to surrender not merely their political rights, but even their cultural freedom which had a much more solid tradition in Germany than the idea of political freedom. The Germans have always been conspicuous for their lack of "civilian courage", as Bismarck called their political cowardice, though they have never been lacking in military courage or in exploring the intellectual riddles of the universe. The part of the population which reached maturity before 1933 adheres in general to the old habits and practices of Western civilization such as are found in the United States. The young people and the older ones who are Nazis have lost contact with these, and have

developed standards and habits largely antagonistic to our culture.

3. Military Qualities. The Germans are famous for their military qualities - moral stamina, dependability, endurance, intelligence in action, willingness to face death, loyalty to their leaders, acceptance of orders, and technical skill. Their courage has always been great, but in defeat they have usually been utterly confounded.

4. Physical Fitness. Physical fitness has been one of their main characteristics. Under the Nazis athleticism has been given special prominence. The Germans suffer somewhat at present from reduced food rations, but since they are still the best fed people in Europe they remain one of the most physically fit people in the world.

5. Devotion to Authority. The Germans are noted for their devotion to order and authority. Any government of Germany, including that of Hitler, which establishes order can count on some support from the population. Similarly, the Germans have been drilled for centuries to respect authority. It would be wrong to assume that liberal and democratic forces have been entirely lacking in Germany. Most Germans, however, have been satisfied with cultural freedom, and have proved relatively indifferent to the achievement of political democracy. Twice the liberal and democratic elements in Germany came close to establishing political freedom, the first time in 1848-49, the second time after 1918; but both times they failed.

6. Capacity for Self-Government. The capacity of the Germans for self-government has been notoriously weak. They think and act in terms of bureaucratic order, not in terms of politics. The Nazis have accentuated the faith in officialdom and the respect for authority, while at the same time they have stimulated their followers, especially the young, in ardent political activity within the strict limits set by the Nazi leaders.

On the other hand, Nazi influence has undermined all respect for authority not based on ruthlessly administered power. Nazis will not hesitate to use any means against an army of invasion or occupation. The young Nazis will be especially dangerous. The political tendencies in modern German history have pointed toward conservatism, but with the

Nazis a radical nationalism swept into control of Germany, swaying the entire younger generation. The Nazis exalt Germany above every other nation and teach their followers to regard themselves as the main or only source of culture and as the natural rulers of every other people.

The Germans have been drilled by the authoritarian bureaucracy and by modern industry to keep their emotions under control. The influence of the Nazis, however, has tended to loosen this control. The population may, under the stress of Nazi ruthlessness and the uncertainty of the present war, behave in a highly emotional and unstable way.

7. Literacy. The Germans are entirely literate, and have been so for generations. In general intelligence they rank among the leaders of the world, and their civilization is one of the finest. Even the Nazis have not succeeded in destroying their culture. Practically all of the creative writers, many of their foremost artists, and a large number of their scientists and scholars left Germany after 1933. These were by no means merely expelled for racial reasons. The scientists and engineers remaining were numerous enough, however, to continue high standards of technical education and to provide the technical knowledge necessary for a gigantic war machine. In the creative arts and literature, German civilization has become unproductive; and in all fields of writing which implies an historical or a religious position, for example in history, the same is true. German book production, formerly greater than that of any other country, has fallen off sharply, and the educated Germans have preferred to read whatever foreign books they could get in the original or in translation. American novels in particular are widely read. Not even the Nazis, who had predicted a new Golden Age of German arts and letters would arrive with the Third Empire, have found that it has arrived as yet.

8. Attitude Toward Other Peoples. Prior to the Nazi regime, Americans had little difficulty in establishing friendly contacts with individual Germans and found the individual Germans courteous and hospitable, though perhaps a bit too much inclined to teach others. Many Germans,

particularly those not thoroughly Nazified, have remained so at the present time, but the Nazis have grotesquely accentuated this German bent towards policing and teaching the world. Moreover, they deliberately have inculcated bad manners, rudeness, brutality, and ruthless and passionate hatred of people and things not German.

9. Capacity for Organization. The German ability for organization and administration is equally strong in the governmental, military, and industrial fields. With their disregard for individual happiness and individual liberties, they achieve this result fairly easily, and the Nazis have exploited this gift. Their remarkable ability to administer and to be administered is evident in the conduct of the present war, and constitutes one of their chief sources of strength. The Nazis emphasize the coordination of government, economy, and the military field for the conduct of the war.

The Germans have not been successful ruling over other peoples. Prior to the Nazi rule and particularly since 1933 they have been unable to win the cooperation of the non-Germanic peoples under their domination. They lack the ability to adjust their administration to the mentality and the habits of non-Germans, and insist on doing what they think efficient irrespective of the reaction of the native population.

10. Attitude Toward the United States. Most Germans have great interest in and admiration for the United States. Many have travelled in the United States and have relatives here. The Germans usually display an attitude of superiority to the Americans in cultural matters and consider the latter to be without interest in intellectual and spiritual affairs and devoted to the worship of success and material goods. The Nazi propaganda likes to harp on these themes, and the presentation of American democracy as a plutocracy appeals to most Germans. The political history of the United States is so little known in Germany that many Germans believe any statement about the United States - for example, that the United States is on the brink of civil war between its various racial groups, and that it never had a military

history worth speaking of. How far the better knowledge of those who know America will prevail against the Nazi propaganda will depend largely on the course of the war. It has not been forgotten, however, that the United States brought the decision in the first World War.

20. Living Conditions and Home Environment

The German standard of living, at the time the National Socialists came to power, was lower than at any time since the economic collapse of the early twenties. Under the Nazis, employment took an upward turn, national income increased, and the standard of living, particularly of the lower income groups, improved. At the same time, however, governmental controls were put into effect to keep the standard of living sufficiently loan to facilitate maximum war production and to prepare the civilian population for wartime restrictions. The cumulative expansion of production and national income, therefore, was not accompanied by a comparable increase in the standard of living, that is, in the amount of consumer goods and services available to the population. For the German people, the outbreak of war did not represent a sudden shift from peacetime plenty to wartime scarcities; instead, it meant only a further tightening of previously established restrictions on consumption.

a. Food

(1) Restrictions on Food Consumption, 1933-1939.

The restriction and control of civilian food purchases began in 1933, when the newly-created Reich Food Estate (Reichsnährstand) applied an overall embargo on the sale of agricultural products. This meant that considerable control of food supplies was possible before they reached the market, since the owners of agricultural products were permitted to dispose of them only with the approval of the Food Administration.

In 1936 a general retail price-freeze was enacted, and a new Price Commissar appointed. Beginning with the winter of 1935-1936, butter and eggs were rationed informally from time to time as shortages appeared.

In spite of rationing and shortages, the German people had more and better food during the rearmament period than they had in the depression years immediately preceding the Nazi regime. On the other hand, it is clear that 1933-1939 was not a period of plenty; the best that can be said is that

at least a subsistence level was consistently maintained, and that malnutrition was no more prevalent there than in other large industrial nations.

(2) The Food Situation During the War.

(a) Rationing: Procedure and amounts

A provisional rations system was employed beginning August 27, 1939, under which 14 groups of food were rationed, all on one card. Each consumer was required to register with one retailer, from whom all food was obtained. It was the dealer's responsibility to limit the amounts given to a single customer.

Direct wartime rationing began on September 25, 1939, when the license system was abandoned for the multiple-ration-card system, and the obligation to register with one dealer was partially withdrawn. Rationed commodities were classified into six groups: bread and flour, meat and meat products, milk and milk products, oils and fats, potatoes and potato products, sugar, sugar beets and sugar products. Within each of the above groups, the consumer may choose whatever foods he wants; occasionally, he is permitted to substitute one group for another (i.e., he may buy fifty grams of sugar, but charge it against his bread coupons.)

In addition to the six groups of foods for which specific amounts (See Table I) are allotted for a given time period, supplementary allowances of non-rationed, but controlled, foods are distributed when supplies allow. Fresh vegetables, and most fruits are handled in this fashion. Also, supplementary allotments of rationed foods are announced when temporary surpluses occur, or when conditions warrant. Additional rations of tobacco, coffee, and chocolate, for example, are frequently awarded to the citizens in bombed areas after heavy air raids. Consumers must register with a single dealer for supplies of sugar, jam, fats, cheese, whole milk, and eggs.

Cards for rationed commodities are of two kinds: federal cards, which are valid anywhere within the boundaries of the Reich, and local cards, valid only in the district of the local food office which issues them. The federal cards cover the six large groups of rationed foods, while the

local cards apply to foodstuffs which are alloted more informally, such as tea, coffee and coffee substitutes, and fresh fruits and vegetables. In addition, there are special cards for soldiers on leave, and food stamps to be used in restaurants or while traveling. A special bread card is available containing small coupons for the purchase of rolls and cakes at bakeries.

(b) Classes of consumers

Rations are based on the age and/or occupation of each consumer. The following are the principal rationing groups:

Normal consumers

Night workers (and long-hour workers)

Heavy workers

Extra-heavy workers

Self-suppliers (primarily farmers who raise their own food.)

Children under 3

Children 3 - 5

Children 6 - 9

Children 10 - 13

Youths 14 - 18

Elaborate specifications were issued with the first rationing order, defining clearly the occupations which deserved to be placed in the various preferred classes. Rations for the armed forces, of course, are much higher than the most liberal civilian ration. Extra-heavy workers and self-suppliers are the preferred civilian category, receiving on the whole nearly twice as much as normal consumers (see Table IV). In fact, the normal consumer receives very low rations; only the children below six years of age receive less than this group, which includes roughly one-third of the civilian population.

No exact information is available as to the specific type of civilians who are classified as normal consumers. By the process of elimination, the category appears to contain all the unemployed aged people, most white-collar employes (office workers, clerks, teachers), members of the

professions, civil servants, and housewives not otherwise employed. Rations for the normal consumer are apparently based on minimum-subsistence family budget studies and general per-capita consumption figures, adjusted to the very conservative and cautious supply policy of the military authorities. It is significant that in the preamble to the basic rationing decrees, the High Command takes precedence over the Ministry of Food.

Since the demands of the armed forces are fixed and will be reduced only in case of extreme emergency, and the requirements of the industrial workers - the privileged groups in the civilian rationing scheme - are relatively inflexible, food shortages are likely to fall most heavily on the normal consumer group. It is among these civilians that undernourishment and serious dissatisfaction with food supplies may be expected to develop most rapidly.

Self-suppliers form a category within the rations system which receives special treatment. Contained in this group are all individuals who produce enough of any given food to satisfy their own needs; thus, a family with a few chickens and a potato patch will be rated as a self-supplier for those foods, but may be a normal consumer for other commodities. Self-suppliers have been given higher rations than any other class of civilian consumer; however, their consumption is carefully watched, and those suspected of holding back food either for their own use or for sale or barter in the black market are heavily punished.

(c) Changes in rations since 1939.

Since the permanent food rationing plan came into force on September 25, 1939, the following major changes have occurred:

Cut in the meat ration, June 2, 1941.

Cut in bread, meat, and fats rations, April 6, 1942.

The following table shows the percentage change in rations for the normal consumer as of January, 1943.

Commodity Affected	Reduction Since September, 1939	Remarks
Bread	6%	But rations for children and adolescents 10 to 20 increased 8 percent.
Meat	30%	- - -
Fats	24%	- - -
Cheese	50%	- - -
Sugar	10%	But jam rations increased 75%.
Coffee substitutes	37.5%	Ration to children under 3 discontinued.
Milk (children 3 - 5)	50%	But butter ration increased 100%.

(d) Pre-War Contrasted with Wartime Food Consumption.

Table III indicates the level of food consumption in Germany during the first two years of the war as compared with pre-war standards. Overall consumption sank to 91 percent of pre-war, but there are important variations concealed by this average. Carbohydrates consumption is up to 103 percent, while proteins and fats are 87 and 74 percent, respectively, of the 1934 - 1939 figures. These estimates are averages for all classes of consumers; the consumption of heavy and extra-heavy workers is at least equal to their pre-war level, while that of the normal consumer is certainly less than the 91 percent average.

Table IV is an estimate of the caloric intake of the various consumer classes, compared with the norm for each class. This table should be read with the following reservation: adequate or nearly adequate total calories does not necessarily mean an adequate diet, since a rough kind of balance between types of food must be maintained, and adequate vitamins must be present. Farmers, according to this estimate, receive their exact caloric requirements, while children under 14 receive calories above their daily needs. The latter situation results in expanding somewhat the diet of adults in families with several small children.

TABLE III[1] FOOD CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA IN GERMANY, 1939-1941, COMPARED WITH PRE-WAR PERIOD[2]

Foodstuffs	Percentage of Prewar Consumption (In %)	Index of Absolute Quantities Consumed			
		Proteins (In %)	Fats (In %)	Carbohydrates (In %)	Calories (In %)
Bread and Flour	100	28	2	47	30
Other Grain, Rice, etc.	50	1	-	2	1
Legumes	80	1	-	1	1
Potatoes	130[3]	10	-	30	17
Sugar	105	--	-	15	8
Fruits and Nuts Cocoa, Tropical Fruits, Vegetables	80	2	2	4	3
Beverages cont. Alcohol	60	1	-	1	2
Fats and Oils	70	-	43	-	13
Fresh Milk (inc. Skimmed Milk)	80	13	10	4	6
Cheese	70	4	2	-	1
Meat	80	22	14	-	7
Fish	50	2	1	-	1
Eggs	65	2	1	-	1
Total	91[4]	87[5]	74[5]	103[5]	91

1. Table adapted from Richter, J. H.: "Food Consumption in German Worker Families," Foreign Agriculture, February, 1942, p. 77.

2. Estimated by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations.

3. Represents an upward revision from 115 as previously given: Richter, J. H.: "Food Rationing in Germany" Foreign Agriculture, 5: 423-441, 1941

4. Average, weighted on a calorie basis.

5. Representing wartime consumption as percentage of prewar level.

CONFIDENTIAL

GERMAN FOOD RATIONS

Forty-Second Four-weeks' Period, 19th October to 15th November, 1942

(Average weekly rations in grammes. - oz. in brackets)

	Normal Consumers	Heavy Workers	Very Heavy Workers	Children and Young Consumers			
				Under 3	3 - 6	6 - 10	10 - 20
Bread *	2,250 (80)	3,650 (129)	4,650 (164)	1,100 ** (39)	1,200 (42)	1,700 (60)	2,600 (92)
							10 - 15
Meat and meat products	350 (12½)	700 (25)	950 (33½)	200 (7)	200 (7)	400 (14)	400 (14)
Butter	125 (4½)	125 (4½)	125 (4½)	125 (4½)	188 (6½)	203 (7)	157 (5½)
Melted butter	12 (½)	12 (½)	12 (½)	Nil	Nil	Nil	12 (½)
Margarine	50 (1½)	88 (3)	170 (6)	Nil	Nil	63 (2½)	81 (3)
Pig fat /	16 (½)	78 (2½)	265 (9½)	Nil	Nil	Nil	16 (½)
Total fats	203 (7)	303 (10½)	572 (20½)	125 (4½)	188 (6½)	266 (9½)	266 (9½)

Cheese or Quark	All consumers	31 (1)	and Quark 31 (1)
	" "	94 (3)	
Sugar	" "	225 (8)	
Jam ø	" "	175 (6)	except children 6 - 14 who get 225 (8)
"Nahrmittel" (cereal products, alimentary pastes, etc.)	" "	150 (5¼)	except children under 3 who get 275 (9½) and children 3-6 who get 212 (7½)
Coffee substitutes	" "	62 (2)	except children under 3.

Whole milk (litres - pints in brackets)	Children under 3	0.75 (1.3)	daily
	" 3 - 6	0.50 (0.9)	"
	" 6 - 14	0.25 (0.4)	"
	Expectant, lying-in and nursing mothers	0.50 (0.9)	"
	Workers in unhealthy occupations	0.50 (0.9)	"

Other rations	**Potatoes, 4 kg. per person per week.** Artificial honey 31 (1) and cocoa powder 15 (½) to children, on fats card. Eggs, 2 per person per month.

* Or flour, cake, pastries and biscuits on certain coupons. ø Or 87 (3) sugar.
** Or infants' food for children under 1½ on certain coupons.
/ Or lard, subject to 20% reduction, if available.

(c) Organization and Administration of Food Rationing.

1. Administrative Control: Planning and Statistics.

No separate and independent rationing administration was necessary when Germany turned to direct food rationing at the outbreak of the war. Executive activities of the Food Ministry were taken care of by the regular authorities, and the various provincial and local boards of the food administration were established as sections of the provincial or local agencies of the Food Estate. These regular government agencies took on such additional staffs as the particular case required.

The most important administrative unit in German food rationing is the local food office. These centers control the supply and the distribution of foods within the district; they keep records for each farm in the area, containing details of acreage, production, inventories, etc., and they accumulate evidence on numbers and type of consumers, and the aggregate ration requirements of hospitals, restaurants, factory canteens, and communal kitchens. Consumer statistics are obtained with the assistance of building superintendents, landlords, and the local police.

A powerful aid to the rationing machinery is the Blockwart, the district representative of the Nazi Party, whose task has always been to assure that families under his jurisdiction understand and cooperate with government decrees and policies. The Block is a relatively small unit, containing sixty to seventy families or households, which makes it possible for the Blockwart, a paid official, to establish direct contact between the government and the individual consumer. It is the responsibility of the Blockwart to collect the old and distribute the new ration cards every four weeks and to keep consumers in his area informed of changes in the ration system.

The German policy is to avoid the use of volunteer workers wherever possible. The enforcement administration in this war is exclusively manned by salaried professionals, taken from various other branches of the general administration, as for example, tax revenue collectors, customs officers, retired policemen, and watchmen.

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TABLE IV

ESTIMATED DAILY CALORIE INTAKE FOR THE VARIOUS CONSUMER CLASSES IN GREATER GERMANY.

Class of Consumer	Daily Calorie Intake			Daily Calorie Requirements
	Before April cut.	Lowest Level ø	Current Rations x	
Normal Consumers	2,500	1,800	2,100	2,500
Heavy Workers	3,600	2,550	2,900	3,200 - 3,600
Very Heavy Workers	4,400	3,300	3,700	4,000
Farm Population Adults	4,200	4,000	4,000	4,000
Children under 3	1,700	1,750	2,050	900
Children 3-6	1,700	1,750	2,000	1,000 - 1,400
Children 6-10	2,050	1,900	2,100	1,400 - 2,000
Children 10-14	2,550	2,250	2,450	2,000 - 2,800
Adolescents 14-20	2,650	2,100	2,350	2,800
Pregnant and nursing women	2,950	2,450	2,750	3,000

ø After April cut in rations and when potato allowance was only 2.5 kg. per head weekly.

x Taking potato ration as 4 kg. per head weekly.

(c) Organization and Administration of Food Rationing.

1. Administrative Control: Planning and Statistics.

No separate and independent rationing administration was necessary when Germany turned to direct food rationing at the outbreak of the war. Executive activities of the Food Ministry were taken care of by the regular authorities, and the various provincial and local boards of the food administration were established as sections of the provincial or local agencies of the Food Estate. These regular government agencies took on such additional staffs as the particular case required.

The most important administrative unit in German food rationing is the local food office. These centers control the supply and the distribution of foods within the district; they keep records for each farm in the area, containing details of acreage, production, inventories, etc., and they accumulate evidence on numbers and type of consumers, and the aggregate ration requirements of hospitals, restaurants, factory canteens, and communal kitchens. Consumer statistics are obtained with the assistance of building superintendents, landlords, and the local police.

A powerful aid to the rationing machinery is the Blockwart, the district representative of the Nazi Party, whose task has always been to assure that families under his jurisdiction understand and cooperate with government decrees and policies. The Block is a relatively small unit, containing sixty to seventy families or households, which makes it possible for the Blockwart, a paid official, to establish direct contact between the government and the individual consumer. It is the responsibility of the Blockwart to collect the old and distribute the new ration cards every four weeks and to keep consumers in his area informed of changes in the ration system.

The German policy is to avoid the use of volunteer workers wherever possible. The enforcement administration in this war is exclusively manned by salaried professionals, taken from various other branches of the general administration, as for example, tax revenue collectors, customs officers, retired policemen, and watchmen.

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Planning for food rationing presupposes information on the available civilian supply and on the number of consumers. The amount allotted to civilian consumers is the result of an understanding between the Reich Food Office and the High Command. The share of the armed forces, however, is inelastic, and the rationing of the civilian population has to be adjusted to what remains after the military requirements are satisfied.

Consumer rationing statistics are based on two official sources:

a. The yearly population census was originally intended for fiscal purposes; however, since it is obtained by statements of the tenants, made on special forms distributed to them through their landlords, these census statements contain all the details which are necessary for the proper distribution of rations.

b. The registration files of the police. Registration with the police is compulsory in Germany for everyone.

2. Equality of Sacrifice; Special Allowances for Low-income Groups.

When the rationing machinery was set up, no differentiation was made according to income, wealth, or accumulated stocks of goods. It was assumed that prices had been fixed at a level low enough to permit all Germans to purchase the commodities allotted to them. In general, this was true, but it soon became apparent that some adjustments had to be made; the lowest-income groups could not afford to buy the food their ration books allowed them. In order to maintain the equality principle of rationing, the adjustment was made not by lowering the prices generally, but by issuing bonus certificates (Verbilligungsscheine) for the poor, entitling the bearer to a rebate from the official ceiling price; these certificates are similar to the food stamps of the Surplus Marketing Act in the United States and are given preferably to industrial workers.

Another method of reducing the official ceiling price for the lower income group is price differentiation within the various grades of a commodity group. For instance, the prices of the higher grades of butter which the wealthy buy are set relatively higher than those of the grades used by low-income groups.

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TABLE IV

ESTIMATED DAILY CALORIE INTAKE FOR THE VARIOUS CONSUMER CLASSES IN GREATER GERMANY.

Class of Consumer	Daily Calorie Intake			Daily Calorie Requirements
	Before April cut.	Lowest Level ♂	Current Rations x	
Normal Consumers	2,500	1,800	2,100	2,500
Heavy Workers	3,600	2,550	2,900	3,200 - 3,600
Very Heavy Workers	4,400	3,300	3,700	4,000
Farm Population Adults	4,200	4,000	4,000	4,000
Children under 3	1,700	1,750	2,050	900
Children 3-6	1,700	1,750	2,000	1,000 - 1,400
Children 6-10	2,050	1,900	2,100	1,400 - 2,000
Children 10-14	2,550	2,250	2,450	2,000 - 2,800
Adolescents 14-20	2,650	2,100	2,350	2,800
Pregnant and nursing women	2,950	2,450	2,750	3,000

♂ After April cut in rations and when potato allowance was only 2.5 kg. per head weekly.

x Taking potato ration as 4 kg. per head weekly.

(f) Evasion of Rationing: the Black Market.

Nazi leaders claim that they have achieved their goal in food rationing, which was to provide for the minimum food needs of every German. The extent of black market dealings indicates either that this goal has not in fact been achieved, or that the minima established are below the subsistence needs of the population. This applies particularly to the normal consumer class, which bears the brunt of all food shortages.

As can be seen in Table III, the greatest deficiencies in Germany's war diet are in proteins and fats, and these foods make up the bulk of the black market food trade. Persistence in the bootlegging of food, in the face of repeatedly announced sentences of death and long imprisonment must be taken to mean that this illegal trade springs from serious inadequacies of diet in some segments of the population.

The sources from which commodities flow to the black markets are about the same as those in the last war, and the principle source is still the farmers. The increasing discrepancies between the prices which the Market Boards pay to the farmers and those paid in the black markets create a strong incentive for evasion. The government has tried to indemnify the farmer for increased costs of production by means of indirect subsidies; but these could not make up for the twenty to sixty percent differences between the official prices and those of the black market. Therefore, although the grip on inventories which the Food Administration had through the Food Estate and its administrative and commercial boards is much tighter than during the last war, and enforcement is better organized, the incentive for profiteering on the part of the farmer is strong, and that of the consumer even stronger. Processing of milk to butter is illegal, but it goes on during the night to be secretly sold not only to bootleggers, but to consumers directly. Owing to the diminished purchasing power of the mark and the scarcity of goods which the farmer can buy in the open market, he prefers to put the deal with the consumer on a barter basis. More particularly, in the vicinity of the big cities, bartering of household goods, cameras, dressmaking services against food, is flourishing. German newspapers complain that too many ration books are being lost, and

in the future, some ration boards have stated, they will supply new books only if the loss was due to accident (fire, air-raid damage) and not to carelessness or negligence. It is clearly implied that civilians are pretending to lose their books, in order to secure double rations.

Consumers are permitted to exchange their food coupons with other persons, and they may give them away, but the sale of coupons is forbidden. Likewise, coupons may not be used as a medium of exchange, i.e., it is illegal to exchange food coupons for other goods or services.

Although many death penalties have been carried out for black market dealings and other food control evasions, the policy of the government has not been consistent. Illicit trading is alternately prosecuted and tolerated, which probably indicates that the leaders, aware that the rations are insufficient, are forced to content themselves with controlling the volume of black market trade, rather than stamping it out. An additional embarrassment is the fact that minor and higher party leaders and officials are customers in the bootleg food traffic.

(g) Community Kitchens.

Mass feeding in community kitchens is, from the economic standpoint, the most efficient way of utilizing scanty food supplies. Food and fuel waste can be held to a minimum in well-managed communal kitchens, and families can be forced to consume a balanced diet who otherwise would or could not do so. But the resistance to mass feeding is high, and in the last war Germany availed itself of this plan only as a last resort.

When this war began, many factories already had restaurants where the workers could buy a cheap, hot meal at midday. For some time, Nazi spokesmen were opposed to extending this practice, since it tended to "minimize the importance of the home and family." However, industry is absorbing an increasing number of women from household tasks, for whom planning and preparing meals - and particularly shopping - is a heavy burden. An arrangement under which the entire family can obtain a hot meal at noon - at school or at work - is a tremendous boon to thousands of working wives and mothers.

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For these reasons, and probably also because food consumption must be made more efficient, to save dwindling supplies, various plans for communal feeding were put into operation in Germany in the winter of 1942 - 1943. The new community kitchen plans are essentially an extension of the factory-cafeteria plans already in existence; the object is to make sure of supplying workers with hot food, especially those doing war-important work. The Commissioner General for Labor, Sauckel, has issued instructions concerning the staffing of these communal feeding centers, which are to cater regularly for fixed groups of 400 to 3,000 people, comprising workers in factories, workshops, public offices, and shops in the vicinity of the feeding center. These centers are to be set up not only in large cities but also wherever possible in the medium-sized and smaller towns, in order to include all those workers who have hitherto not been catered for on a communal basis.

Stores and public halls will be taken over and equipped for the task, and workers will be required to eat all their noon meals there, probably on a meal-ticket basis; one plan calls for a weekly allowance per person of 30 - 40 grams of fats, 100 grams of meat, 100 grams of bread, and 50 to 100 grams of macaroni, rice, or similar products, which is believed sufficient for six or seven meals, priced from 50 to 90 pfennig. The strict observance of meatless days and other food control schemes is much simpler under mass-feeding programs, and an additional advantage is the more efficient use of manpower - cooks, serving staff, and so on. Restaurant proprietors and commercial caterers will be hired to manage these projects, and present restaurant staffs will be taken over, assisted by women volunteers. If necessary, the labor office will recruit labor under its compulsory war-service powers. As now organized, the Reich Group for Tourist Traffic and the Labor Front Tourist Traffic Office will administer the program.

Summary: Food.

The diet of the German people for six years prior to this war was gradually shifted towards a wartime level, so that the onset of direct

rationing merely increased restrictions which had already been in force. The pre-war diet was adequate, although not comfortable. Food rationing is well organized, and supported locally by efficient social-political agents, especially the Blockwart; however, since all basic foods are rationed, there is little elasticity to the system. Shortages in any one food cannot ordinarily be balanced by increased supplies in any other group. Industrial workers' rations are adequate, but rations for the normal consumer, which means roughly one-third of the civilian population, are not sufficient. The normal consumer group is hardest hit by food shortages, and it is probably the source for most of the impetus behind the black market. The most serious food deficiencies are those in fats and oils and in proteins (meat and eggs). There is nothing to indicate that these deficiencies will grow less serious as the war is prolonged.

The growing interest shown by the Nazi government in the community feeding idea is at this point a measure for the conservation of food, labor, and working time, rather than an emergency move, dictated by approaching exhaustion of food supplies.

b. Housing

(1) Pre-War Background of the Housing Shortage.

Germany has had a shortage of civilian housing since World War I. Extremely rapid industrialization during the last quarter of the 19th century resulted in a large-scale migration of the population toward urban centers, where an annual building program of 200,000 units was barely able to keep up with demand. Virtually no dwellings were built during 1914 - 1918, creating a shortage estimated at 1,000,000 homes, and this gap was not remedied in the post-war period. Nazi writers estimate that there was still a shortage of 1,000,000 apartments in 1933.

In 1934, Hitler described the housing situation as one of the most important and most difficult of the problems facing the government, and housing became an important part of the Nazi recovery program, partly because of the large number of workers which the construction industry

could draw from the ranks of the unemployed.

Under the Nazi regime, however, marriages increased as rapidly as dwellings were erected, and it was not until 1936 that the number of apartments built exceeded the number of new households established. Consequently in spite of numerous home-construction projects, including industrial workers' apartments, suburban resettlement programs, and individual workers' homes, German sources estimate the housing shortage at the beginning of the present war at 1 - 1½ million units.

Housing constructed during the rearmament period consisted primarily of single homes with garden plots attached, usually in suburban areas. This Siedlung (settlement) plan was favored by the Nazis over the apartment style of workers' dwelling as, for instance, in Vienna. The trend was toward medium-sized (3 and 4 room) homes as opposed to 1 and 2 room cottages and Luxus homes of 7 and 8 rooms.

However, as war industries expanded, and whole towns had to be built up in the isolated areas where large plants were located, compact 3 and 4 story apartment buildings became the rule, since they make possible the greatest savings in time, materials, and labor.

Table V compares the pre-war housing increment with the amount of building believed to have been completed in Germany during the first three war years.

Table V

Gross Increase in Dwellings in Germany

Annual Average, 1933 - 1939	280,000
1939	220,000
1940	115,000
1941	125,000
Total, 1939 - 1941	460,000

During the period 1933 - 1939, an average of 20,000 units annually were razed or converted to other purposes, leaving a net increase correspondingly lower. It is unlikely that this decrease is continuing during the war;

conversion of dwellings has virtually ceased, and houses are being used which in normal times would have been condemned and destroyed.

(2) Destruction of Dwellings in Air Raids.

Information on bomb damage to housing comes principally from aerial photography, intelligence reports (German press and radio) and inferences from British air raid experience, and none of these methods is completely satisfactory. Present estimates of dwellings destroyed must therefore be regarded as highly tentative, subject to a wide margin of error. The following figures are regarded as conservative, that is, more likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate:

Table VI

Damage to Dwellings in 85 Major Air Raids on 26 Built-Up Areas in Germany, from March 1st to September 30, 1942

Type of Damage	Number of Dwellings Affected	Number of Persons Displaced
Demolished, or fit for demolition	89,400	268,250
Seriously damaged, uninhabitable	166,000	498,200
Requiring immediate repairs	127,750	- -

The total of 255,100 dwellings demolished or uninhabitable is roughly 10 percent of the 2.6 million dwellings in the area, and a little more than 1 percent of the Reich's 18 million housing units. If the estimates are accurate, air raids would have destroyed in seven months more than was built in 1940 and 1941. The 766,450 persons estimated displaced by the 85 raids are about 9 percent of the 8.8 million who live in the bombed areas, and almost one percent of the Reich's 83 million total population.

In addition to the 127,750 houses requiring immediate repairs, at least twice as many units, not listed in the table, are believed to be slightly damaged - all of which constitutes a heavy drain on building materials, labor and transport.

(3) Housing Administration and Wartime Emergency Measures.

(a) Reich Housing Authority.

Administrative machinery for dealing with housing problems was shifted in 1939 from the Office of Economic Development (Reichstelle für Wirtschaftsausbau) to the Housing and Resettlement Authority (Reichstelle für Wohnungs- und Siedlungswesen), a division of the Department of Labor. In 1942, Dr. Robert Ley was given complete responsibility for all housing matters in Germany. As Reich Commissioner for Housing he will have charge of the construction of temporary buildings for air-raid victims, air-raid shelters, city planning, the workers' settlement projects, and the elaborate Social Housing Program (Gemeinnütziges Wohnungsbau) outlined by Hitler in 1940.

(b) Wartime Measures to Combat the Housing Shortage

1. New Building

Construction of new dwellings sank to a little more than 100,000 per annum in 1940 and 1941. In spite of a general construction-stop, building is permitted for workers in war industries and for rehousing bombed-out civilians. Some effort was made at first to keep up normal standards for construction - contractors were warned not to build "primitive" shelters - but 1942 reports mention workers' camps and workers' barracks more than apartments or dwellings. Government loans and some outright subsidies are available to private contractors, but a large portion of wartime construction is done under the auspices of the Labor Front, now the largest single housing owner in Germany.

2. Rebuilding

Repairs and additions to homes which will give shelter to air raid victims may be financed through Reich loans. Only the most urgent repairs can be made, and the use of skilled labor is reserved for tasks which the householder cannot do unassisted. All other repairs must be improvised. This applies particularly to the replacement of glass, which is a huge problem after air raids in residential districts. Arrangements have been made for the distribution of building materials in small

amounts for individuals who can make their own repairs. Stores of roofing tile and tarpaper are available in some large cities to facilitate the quick repair of the roofs of bombed dwellings.

3. Rationing Shelter

Housewives are pressed to sublet spare rooms by various financial and psychological appeals. Only part of the income from a rented room is deducted from the family allotment of soldiers' wives, leaving them with some financial gain. Newspaper articles warn householders that large homes must be shared during the war; if voluntary action does not open up spare rooms and apartments to war workers and young married couples, then compulsory measures are to be expected. In Karlsruhe a family is allowed as many rooms as there are persons in the household, plus one. Men in the armed forces are counted as members of the household, and two children under 1 year of age are counted as one person. It is expected that the dwellings left vacant when owners enter the army will be requisitioned, and special attention is being given to providing adequate quarters for women with children, even if this means the requisitioning of apartments.

4. Reconverting Office Space into Housing.

As of September 15, 1942, all office space which had once functioned as living quarters was to be reconverted for housing purposes, and an absolute ban was established against any future conversion of dwellings into offices. Since the demands of the expanding wartime bureaucracy conflict directly with those of the crowded civilian population, the law is expected to result mainly in a more efficient use of office space, rather than a large-scale emptying of offices. Some non-essential offices were abolished for the duration, but war-important agencies are required to relinquish space only if substitute premises are available. A more important result of this order is the rationalization of living quarters which will accompany the drive for more efficient use of office space. An indication that the housing shortage actually has priority over governmental and party agencies' requirements is the provision that the Minister of Labor may commandeer any type of business premises, if it is

determined that they are not sufficiently used.

5. Evacuation of Bombed Cities

The advent of mass air raids on industrial areas in Western Germany has accelerated the removal of women and children from these endangered districts. Mothers with their children are supplied with housing, and if possible with employment, in non-target areas. Husbands whose wives have been evacuated are given round-trip tickets twice a year for visits with their families, if the distance involved is at least 100 kilometers, one way. The mass evacuation of children is hardly a housing measure; usually these trips are for the purpose of building up the mental and physical resistance of the children.

6. Prefabricated Housing

Wood has not been a popular material for housing in Germany, but a significant expansion has taken place in this direction during the war; between 5,000 and 6,000 firms are now registered in the German Wood-Construction Association. Special attention is being given to the production of prefabricated (zerlegbar und versetzbar) wooden houses; these have been imported from Sweden, and arrangements for similar imports are being sought in France, Switzerland, Croatia, Hungary, and Denmark.

The Labor Front controls this development, experimenting with and rationalizing types of construction, with emphasis on replaceability of parts and simplicity of design. These simple wooden houses are used to shelter laborers on the road, armament workers, soldiers, prisoners of war, and resettlers, especially in the conquered territories in the East.

(4) Building Material

The shortage of labor and of transportation is the main obstruction in the building materials supply situation. Except for structural steel, the raw materials for construction are potentially available; cement capacity is ample, and there is no mention of a shortage of building bricks, although all supplies of the latter have been ordered turned over to the state. For absolutely necessary building, in large cities, the street railways have been used to transport building materials, presumably during the

less congested hours of the day. Special appeals have been sent to France for all classes of house builders, to assist in repairing air raid damage to dwellings. Bricklayers and tilers are in particular demand.

(a) Wood

(See also section (f) Prefabricated Housing, under Paragraph (3)(b), above.)

Controlling Austrian forests and huge reserves in the occupied Russian territories, Germany now has ample supplies of timber; here again, only labor and transportation are the limiting factors.

(b) Glass

If large scale bombings of urban centers continue or are increased, the strategic importance of the supply of window-glass will be intensified. The ability of the glass industry to replace bombed-out window panes is already strained; and the problem increases in importance in winter months when replacements must be made immediately for protection against the cold. The use of glass in picture frames and on desk and table tops was prohibited in 1942.

(5) Fuel

Coal is the most important fuel for domestic heating in Germany, and supplies at the mines are ample; however, the demands of industry place a strain on transportation facilities and labor supplies. It was necessary to ration coal for domestic heating in 1940. A points system was used, with allotments based on the number of rooms and number of persons in each household. This system was abandoned in March, 1941, at the time of the reorganization of the coal industry; the distribution of coal was turned over to coal dealers, who built up a list of customers to whom fuel is supplied according to directives from the local rationing offices.

Fuel quantities supplied and entered in customers' lists during the 1941-42 heating season are the basis for the 1942-1943 coal allotments, and in general the amounts to be allowed are fixed at 90 percent of the 1941-1942 ration.

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The government is attempting to restrict consumption to a minimum; household consumers are ordered to heat only one room in their apartments (a fairly common practice even in peacetime), and the use of hot water plants is restricted, or cut off completely, if necessary to safeguard the heating of rooms. Water is to be heated on no more than two days each week, and these must be consecutive. Lecture-demonstrations are given for janitors and caretakers, illustrating efficient wartime heating methods.

Electricity and gas are not rationed, but a vigorous campaign is being waged to keep down consumption, especially of electric current. Higher incomes and a surplus of purchasing power have resulted in a greatly increased electricity consumption in private households, double the rate of increase in gas and coal consumption. Rationing is foreseen if this increase continues.

War-economy demands for timber are so great that, in spite of large supplies, the use of wood for fuel in homes is restricted. Householders may burn only scrap wood, which cannot be used for other purposes. Before 1933, about half of all wood felled was used for fuel, while in 1939 only 20 percent of the annual cut was burned for this purpose. The percentage has declined further during the war.

(6) Household Goods

Air raid damage and the wear and tear of three years' use have seriously diminished household stocks of furniture, glassware, metal utensils, and similar equipment. In addition, requirements have increased as new households are set up and families increase in size. The repatriation of Germans from other European areas and the importation of foreign workers also contribute to the exhaustion of supplies.

The Nazis verified reports of the seriousness of the situation by announcing a compulsory wartime production program (Kriegsauflageprogram) late in 1942 to insure the supply of indispensable household goods, particularly with regard to families bombed out or suffering loss through air raids. The requirements of public institutions and other large scale

consumers of these goods will be met, and the decree added that it was hoped that in time the most urgent demands of the public at large could be satisfied. Furniture, household utensils, and tools were mentioned specifically as coming back into production. This is the first important instance in which materials and vitally needed manpower has been diverted from military to strictly civilian purposes.

As wholesale and retail stocks dwindle, the second-hand market has grown in importance; newspaper advertisements offering or requesting stoves, dishes, linens, etc., are common, and the prices have invariably been inflated. Early in 1942, the government fixed the prices for second-hand goods at a maximum of 75 percent of the price when new.

Many German households were supplied with reserves of household goods when the war began, and except for bomb-damage cases, these families must still be fairly well supplied. But until the government takes steps to requisition supplies from private homes in the interest of more equitable nation-wide distribution, there will be a continuing and increasing shortage among families who were caught without reserves, or lost their belongings through enemy action. The emergency production program for household goods cannot do more than supply the most urgent needs of bombed-out families. If air raids are intensified, it is doubtful that even emergency needs can be met without restricting military production.

(7) Summary: Housing, Fuel, Household Goods.

Germany has had a housing problem ever since the building stop of World War I. Home building was extensive under the Nazis, but households multiplied, too, and Germany entered this war with a deficit of more than a million units. However, this is a chronic shortage to which the population has adjusted itself in the past two decades. The deficiency in housing is relevant to the war effort only in that it creates an inelastic supply situation - sudden, large, local demands (caused by bomb damage or relocation of industry) are difficult to satisfy, since there is virtually no margin to fall back on. Heavy bombings in residential areas cause considerable local discomfort, and numerous emergency housing measures

have shown that this is one contingency for which the Nazis were not adequately prepared. Quick action was taken, however, in the form of expanded use of prefabricated wooden shelters, rationing of living space in large homes, and efficient use of spare rooms in localities adjacent to the bombed areas. Germany seems to have the housing situation under control in the fourth war winter (1943), although repeated heavy raids on residential and industrial areas will eventually strain her substitute and replacement facilities to the point where even efficient organization cannot cope with the problem.

Simultaneously, unless the Nazis abandon their plans to populate and exploit the occupied Russian territory, housing demands from the Ostgebiet will complete stoutly for materials also required in Western Germany.

c. Clothing

Shortages of the natural fibers cotton and wool plus the heavy military demands for these and other textiles have created a steadily deteriorating supply situation for civilian clothing. During the first two years of the war, reserves in civilian wardrobes constituted a backlog, but these supplies have now been largely consumed, or collected by the authorities for distribution to workers or soldiers in the East. In addition, wartime clothing supplies have an increasingly large artificial fiber content, which, although it is no longer as inferior as it was a few years ago, is still not as durable, as warm, or as comfortable as natural-fiber fabrics.

Clothing is rationed by the points system; each consumer receives a clothing card (differing for the various age and sex groups) and valid for a specified number of months. Each card contains about 100 points, against which the consumer may buy whatever clothing he needs, until supplies or points are exhausted. A shirt is rated at from 15 to 26 points, a woman's dress at 25 to 47, depending on fabric and quality, and a man's suit required 90 points on the third clothing card. On the fourth card,

suits are available only when a certificate of need, or purchase permit is secured, and only 20 points are needed. The permit is issued if the consumer can show that he has less than two serviceable suits. Men's and women's overcoats also require purchase permits, but for these garments no points are needed. In most cases, the worn-out article must also be turned in before a new garment is issued.

The number of points allotted to each card has been steadily reduced. The third card (1941-42) was originally designed to last 16 months and bore only 120 points, a 40 percent reduction from the previous issue, and the fourth card, valid beginning January, 1943, has only 100 points and is scheduled to last 18 months. To some extent, the latest reduction in points is justified by the change in the points-requirements for suits, from 90 to 20 points. The adoption of the purchase-permit system, on the other hand, can only be interpreted as indicating a further squeeze in the civilian textile supply.

The frequent extension of validity periods for the various cards is a clear indication that the supplies are not adequate even for the limited rations now issued. The second clothing card, issued late in 1940, and originally valid for only one year, has been extended until August, 1943. The third card, which should have expired in December, 1942, has been extended until June, 1944, and the fourth card, scheduled for an 18-month run, from January, 1943 to June, 1944, will probably be treated similarly.

The emergency appeal for woolens, furs, and footwear for the Wehrmacht in Russia during the winter of 1941-42 was successful from the standpoint of the army, but a severe blow to civilian reserves. In June, 1942, a second collection was made, this time for clothes to supply German and foreign workers, in the East. Finally, during the autumn of 1942, the Hitler Yough canvassed from house to house seeking discarded or surplus footwear.

An additional measure to insure adequate clothes for industrial workers is the development of factory-owned clothing supplies which are rented to workers and returned to the employer when the worker leaves.

This is applied not only to foreign workers, who frequently arrive in Germany in a ragged condition, but also to German workers. Factory-owned clothes are the only kind that foreign workers may get in Germany; and they are issued only if the need is great - that is, if work would be interfered with otherwise.

Footwear. The deficiency in leather supplies is one of Germany's most serious problems, from the standpoint of provisioning civilians. Pre-war civilian consumption of leather was about 130,000 tons a year; in 1941-42 about 70,000 tons were available, none of which was heavy sole leather; and in 1942-43 only 50,000 tons will be allotted to civilians. The character of civilian needs has changed so as to accentuate this shortage; the proportion of the population engaged in industrial work requiring heavy work shoes has doubled at the same time that supplies of heavy sole leather have disappeared.

On the other hand, there are indications that satisfactory, and even superior leather substitutes are in production, in quantity enough to supply civilian needs. Heavy-duty shoe soles made of various mixtures of reclaimed, artificial, and natural rubber have been tested and found more durable than the best sole leather. In addition, Germany is vigorously pushing the use of other substitutes; wooden soles and wooden shoes are finding increasing acceptance in industrial work and for sports and casual wear by women. Straw, rope, aluminum, and plastics are also used.

Rationing of footwear is handled on a permit basis; shoes for adults are issued on presentation of a purchase permit and the surrender of from two to six points per pair. To get a permit, applications must be made to the ration board, which consults an elaborate scale of occupations, to determine the consumer's priority rating. In addition, the worn-out shoes must be turned in. On the fourth clothing card, coupons are attached by which children under 15 years of age may get shoes without the elaborate permit procedure. The shoe supply for children has been a persistent problem, since growing feet demand frequent shoe renewals. As a partial solution, the government has established second-hand shoe

exchanges throughout the Reich, where parents may exchange children's shoes for a larger size, sometimes turning in two pairs of old shoes for each pair withdrawn. A common procedure in issuing permits for new shoes for adults is to require that they first make sure that no suitable replacements are available at the second-hand exchanges. About 4 million pairs of shoes were made for civilians in 1942. The Hitler Youth collection of shoes in 1942 was aimed at clearing out German households, for general distribution, not only of the spare shoes of civilians, but also the shoes left behind by the men who have entered the armed forces. Those who contributed to the collection were compensated either in money or by receipt of a permit to buy a pair of new light street or house shoes. The results of this canvass have not been announced, but it should be remembered that in addition to whatever quantities were actually collected, the civilian supply is strengthened by the reduced demand, over pre-war times, caused by the mobilization of millions of men.

Summary: Despite severe shortages of sole leather, Germany seems to have assured at least a minimum footwear supply through a combination of strict rationing, more efficient repair and exchange services, and expanded use of leather substitutes.

d. Recreation

Recreational opportunities are still widely available to civilians in Germany. Moving picture attendance has gained considerably over pre-war years; as early as 1940, semi-official reports indicated that the 1938-39 attendance figures had been doubled. The government regards this increase as valuable not only as recreation, but as establishing a controlled audience for propaganda. Newsreels are an important part of every cinema program; no one is permitted to enter the theater and take a seat during the showing of the newsreel. By a recent order, newsreels are classified as equivalent to the semi-sacrosanct official Nazi ceremonies (Feier.)

In addition to the motion pictures, spectator sports have been continued, on a reduced scale, and cafes, theatres, music halls, and dance

halls are reported to be very busy. In the bombed areas, such activities are considerably reduced, but in eastern Germany evening entertainment places are crowded until curfew time, when the crowds hurry home before the police begin making post-curfew arrests. Traveling and the use of resorts is strictly rationed; soldiers on leave get first choice in these matters, but next in the priority rating are workers in war industries. The latter are required to get a vacation permit from their employer showing the date, duration, and location of the proposed holiday.

In general, the Nazi war program has not ignored civilian recreational needs; it has permitted many activities to continue which would not be required in a straight eat-sleep-work-fight program. But there are not enough facilities to satisfy a population which has more money to spend and a greater desire to "escape" war worries than ever before. And in the areas subject to frequent air attack, bombs and the threat of bombs reduce public recreation and amusements to a minimum.

c. Financial Measures to Control the Standard of Living

A series of closely interrelated measures have been adopted for the control of living costs and the restriction of civilian living standards.

(1) Prices. The regulation of consumer goods prices began in Germany in 1936 with the appointment of a/now price commissioner and the adoption of a general price freeze. As the rearmament program developed, price controls were refined and extended. No major changes in the price-fixing procedure were necessary when the war began. Official statistics on the movement of prices since 1939 (see Table VII) are known to be underestimates, since they are based on official ceiling prices; however, the efficiency of the price control mechanism has obviously been high, considering the double pressure exerted by increasing shortages of goods and growing reserves of excess purchasing power.

(2) Wages. As industry expanded during the rearmament period, labor shortages developed, and competitive bidding for workers by employers threatened to start an inflationary wages-prices spiral. Ceilings on wages and restrictions on the mobility of labor began in 1938; additional

Table VII

OFFICIAL GERMAN COST OF LIVING ESTIMATES

12-Month Averages	Food	Clothing	Light, Heat	Misc.	Living Cost Without Rent	Housing (Rent)	General Cost of Living
1939	123	133	125	142	- -	121	126
1940	128	140	125	146	- -	121	130
1941	126	166	124	150	135	121	133
1942	132	172	123	151	140	121	137

powers vested in the Labor Trustees since then have given the Reich complete control over the wages and working conditions of all war-important workers.

(3) Taxes. Aggregate revenue from taxes and customs in Germany has increased from roughly 18 billion Reichsmarks in 1938-39 to an estimated 32 billion RM. in 1942-43. The war-surtax on income is 50 percent of the normal income tax. In addition, there are provincial, municipal, and other local taxes. War sales surtaxes have been introduced for tobacco, beer, liquor, and champagne.

The burden on individual incomes falls somewhat more heavily on the lower-income groups. The tax on an annual income of 2,350 RM. is roughly 24 percent of the total, while only 21 percent of an 8,443 RM. income is taken in taxes. Before the war-surtax was applied, this differential was even greater.

(4) Contributions. The money contributed to various welfare and insurance schemes is another significant drain on excess purchasing power. Compulsory social insurance has been systematically extended under the Nazi regime. Drives and collections are carried out constantly, on behalf of the Labor Front, the Hitler Youth, the Winter Relief Funds, and the like, and these contributions are in fact compulsory, although presented publicly as voluntary. The amount of money absorbed in this way is unknown, but the order of magnitude may be estimated from the amounts turned over to the Reich by the Labor Front: in 1937-38 the Labor Exchange and Unemployment Insurance Office alone had an income of 1.7 billion RM. from premiums, and fees paid into the Labor Front amounted to .6 billion RM. in 1940. Nearly a billion RM. was collected during the 1940-41 Winter Relief Fund campaign.

(5) Savings. Voluntary savings in public banks have accumulated rapidly since the war began, reaching a total of 65 billion RM. in November, 1942. Annual net increase in total deposits have been as follows:

Net Increase in Savings

1938	2.3 billion	RM.
1940	8.0 "	"
1941	11.5 "	"
First 6 mo.of 1942	10.0 "	"

These deposits are not frozen and may be withdrawn at any time, constituting thereby a serious threat to the anti-inflation program.

To neutralize some of this pool of potential purchasing power, an Iron Savings Plan was introduced in 1941. Under this scheme, a portion of the worker's wage or salary may be set aside, on his request, with the stipulation that it may not be withdrawn until one year after the end of the war. As incentive, the government deducts Iron Savings from total income before computing an individual's income taz. A maximum of about 40 marks monthly may be saved in this fashion. As of November, 1942, the admittedly insignificant total of about 750 million RM. had been assigned to Iron Savings, and the monthly rate was about 70 million RM. In contrast, about 1.6 billion RM. is being set aside monthly in regular savings accounts.

Savings earmarked for specific purposes (after the war) are encouraged by the Nazis. Money is still being accepted in payment for future delivery of the Volkswagen (People's Car), and funds set aside in special accounts for future home construction amounted to 1.5 billion RM. in 1941.

None of these savings methods are officially compulsory, as is the Victory Tax in the United States, but the nature of state and party control in Germany is such as to make most of them compulsory in fact.

The campaign to curb civilian spending has been successful. When all direct and indirect taxes and deductions are considered, the public demand on Germany's national income is conservatively estimated at 70 percent of the 100 billion RM. total income in 1940, compared with a public demand of about 47 percent in 1937.

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SUMMARY

German measures for controlling living standards may be grouped under two main heads:

(1) Strict rationing of consumer goods, so that a maximum of the nation's productive capacity may be expended on military requirements.

(2) Freezing or confiscating excess civilian purchasing power, both to finance the war and to prevent an inflationary spiral of prices and wages.

The rationing system has been carefully planned, and has shown considerable flexibility in adjusting to a steadily worsening supply situation. In general, there seems to be little public questioning of the equitably of rationing; the equality-of-sacrifice principle appears to have been maintained. A possible exception is the public's attitude toward party officials, particularly minor functionaries, who manage to secure extras which are denied to the ordinary citizen.

The campaign to curb civilian spending has been successful. Taxes, compulsory fees and contributions, and various types of saving make the bulk of the rising national income available for war production. On the other hand, the response to the Iron Savings Plan has not been enthusiastic, and the demand is great for articles of "permanent" value (jewelry, real estate, cameras, etc.) These controls over standards of living must still face the test of a prolonged war and increasing shortages of all types of consumer goods.

(3) A third dimension affecting the living conditions of the Germans in wartime is the propaganda ministry's effort to substitute psychic income for material shortages and personal privations. One element in this program is the encouragement of recreational facilities, particularly those which can be used for propaganda as well as relaxation. The value of these propaganda substitutes in prolonging civilian resistance in spite of physical deprivations, should not be underestimated. There is no reason to believe, for example, that the horror of Bolshevism, cleverly emphasized, cannot justify a 20 percent cut in bread rations, or that the promise of a

large, fertile farmstead in the Ostland will not encourage a family to accept primitive housing and long hours of factory labor for the duration. At every point where the war has necessitated retrenchments for the civilian population, psychological experts in Germany have attempted to ease the strain with compensatory appeals. Their success in this field is as potent a factor in maintaining civilian morale as are heads of cattle and carloads of wheat.

21. Labor conditions

a. The labor shortage

(1) Germany's experience in the last war.

The labor problem was badly managed by Germany in World War I. The question of strategic distribution of manpower had not been thoroughly studied and had to be settled by improvisation under pressure of war time confusion. Throughout the period before the present war, German military and economic experts sought to profit from the mistakes made between 1914 and 1918. Their Economic General Staff and War Economy Institute made a thorough study of the use of manpower in that period, with a view of arriving at a better policy for future contingencies.

The results of these studies were a set of beliefs on the basis of which Germany's present manpower program was formulated. They concluded that the Hindenburg program of 1915-16, which had emphasized arms production to meet Allied superiority in matériel, and restricted the flow of men to the army in order to preserve industry, had been mistaken. It was generally agreed that General von Wrisberg of the Prussian Ministry of War had been right in demanding that every male capable of military service be drafted into the army. General von Wrisberg had suggested that their places in industry be taken over by women, children, wounded, prisoners of war, or workers from conquered and neutral countries. The result of the adoption of the Hindenburg program had been a fatal weakening of the armed forces, now considered a decisive factor in the crumbling of the front in 1918. Germany's military-economic experts pointed out that economic strength is obviously useless, if not protected by a fully adequate military establishment.

It was concluded that the determination of strategy must take into account, and be influenced by, the availability of manpower.

If the necessity of labor for armament production requires limitation of the size of the army, the whole plan of campaign must be changed to avoid the use of large bodies of troops. The needs of the army, however, must have a prior claim as against the demands of industry. Industry should gain additional labor at the expense of the army only when conduct of the war is hampered by a lack of adequate materiel for those already in military service.

Particularly stressed was the necessity of preparing in peacetime for the shifting of manpower from civilian production which takes place on the outbreak of the war. Such preparatory measures include the collection of adequate detailed information on the available supply of labor, particularly of skilled labor, and the retraining of workers in non-essential industries for wartime needs, before the actual requirement for a shift in their employment arises. The failure to recognize the importance of political and psychological factors in sustaining labor productivity was also deemed a major error.

(2) The present program.

The Germans admit that the greatest point of strain in their war economy is the shortage of labor. In 1939 Germany was in the position of virtually full employment. Workers and salaried employees totalled 25.3 millions; total employed, including farmers, shopkeepers, professional men, the army, and family helpers, amounted to 39.8 million. Since 1939 important changes have taken place in the constitution of the labor supply within Germany. In general, Germany has followed closely the plan advanced in 1915 by General von Wrisberg, as well as the principles laid down by the various war planning groups and institutes. This may be seen in the following table:

CHANGES IN GERMAN LABOR SUPPLY CAUSED BY THE WAR

MOST RECENT FIGURES COMPARED TO SEPTEMBER 1939
(In millions)

1. Increases in Labor Available		
(a) Official German statistics		
Increase in women workers (8.1 million in 1939)		1.600
Increase in foreign workers in Germany		
Foreign workers in 1942	3.0	
Foreign workers in 1939	-0.5	
	2.5	2.500
Natural growth in working population		0.341
		4.441
Allowance for double counting of foreign women workers in official statistics for foreign and women workers		-0.500
		3.941
(b) Estimates of other sources of labor		
Students above primary school in summer work in agriculture and industry		
Number	0.034	
Part of a year which they work	x0.25	
	0.008	0.008
Children over 14 subject to compulsory summer work in agriculture		
Number	0.2	
Allowance for lower productivity	x0.5	
Part of a year which they work	x0.25	
	0.025	0.025
Retired workers called back into production		0.378
Germans resettled from Baltic, Tyrol, Southeastern Europe, France, etc.		
Number	0.751	
Part of population which works	x0.5	
	0.375	0.375
Working prisoners of war not counted under foreign labor		3.0
TOTAL INCREASE IN LABOR AVAILABLE TO GERMANY		7.727
2. Decrease in Total Employed		
Decrease in "Workers and Salaried employees" according to official statements		
Total "Workers and Salaried" end of 1939	25.280	
Total "Workers and Salaried" at beginning of 1942	-24.084	
	1.196	
Estimated decrease in employment of other than "Workers and Salaried" (total employment 1939 is 39.8)	0.804	
ESTIMATED DECREASE IN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT	2.000	2.000
3. Result of Mobilization for Army		
Total increase in labor available to Germany plus estimated decrease in civil employment equals gap caused by mobilization to army, according to above estimates		9.727
Estimated actual increase in German army (for purposes of comparison with above)		10.000

(3) Germany's need for manpower is of course much greater under wartime conditions than in 1939. Indeed the possible uses for labor and fighting forces, assuming they were available, are limitless. Quantitative statements, such as the above table, are somewhat misleading, because the shortage is most serious in certain skilled categories, including mining, metal work, and engineering and other professional services. These are fields in which replacement is difficult, requiring many years of training in some cases. The shortage of professional personnel, partly due to the Nazi discouragement of higher education in earlier years, is one of the weakest points in the whole German system. The number of engineering students in Germany, averaging 2,700 per year from 1929 to 1935, fell to 1,000 in 1938 and 1939, and Nazi sources spoke of a shortage of 18,000 engineers, technicians and draftsmen at the outbreak of the war. The total number of university students, almost 150,000 in Germany before 1933, fell to about 60,000 (including Austria) in the summer of 1939.

(4) As sustained heavy fighting on the Russian Front put a serious strain on Germany, the labor problem became acute for the first time in the war. For the first time the demands of the army required the mobilization for the front of skilled metal workers, miners, and other categories previously considered indispensable in home industry. In general, every possible source of manpower for the front was tapped. The Siemens electrical works, once given first rank in exemption of its labor from the draft, lost 40 percent of its male employees to the army this Spring and was moved down to fourth rank for occupational exemption purposes. The Heinckel airplane factory similarly lost 15 percent of its men, and large withdrawals were made from Demag (machine tools), Mercedes (automobiles and engines) and other basic armaments plants. For the first time, also, agricultural workers were mobilized into industry to fill the places of those taken for the army. The use of foreign labor and

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THE GERMAN LABOR CONTROL SYSTEM



other new sources has proved sufficient to supply most of the needs of agriculture,but industry remains dangerously short of workers. The manpower problem appears to be increasing in intensity.

b. The Organization of Control

(1) The German answer to the labor problem was a more thorough and more careful use of domestic labor, and an accelerated importation of foreign labor from the rest of Europe. Both measures necessitated an even more effective unification of the control of labor than had previously been established.

(2) The Controller-General for Labor Allocation.

With this in view, Fritz Sauckel, Party Gauleiter of Thuringia, was appointed Commissioner-General for Labor Allocation (General-Bevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz), in March, 1942. He replaced Dr. Werner Mansfeld, who had held a similar office for only a few weeks. Sauckel, previously known chiefly as a thorough-going Party functionary, was appointed within the Four Year Plan Organization by General Goering, at the request of Speer, Minister of Armament and Munitions, to work in close cooperation with the latter. (See chart on Labor Control in Germany)

Sauckel has been given full power over all State and Party organs insofar as labor problems are concerned. He acts as a supreme coordinator, with control over civil conscription, allocation, and "combing-out" of labor from non-essential tasks. He is particularly concerned with increasing the flow of foreign workers. Sauckel has appointed the Party Gauleiters as Gau Controllers of Labor Allocation, to act as his watchdogs over officials, businessmen, and workers, equipped with full powers to enforce conformity with the new labor program. The Gauleiter are directed particularly to prevent the official and semi-official bureaucracy from interfering with the Labor Allocation program to advance the interests of their own sphere of control.

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(3) The administrative details of labor allocation (or rationing) are carried out mainly through the existing apparatus of the Labor Ministry, whose Departments III (Wages) and V (Labor Allocation) have been placed at Sauckel's disposal. The Labor Ministry works through its regional Trustees of Labor (Treuhänder der Arbeit), who have the power to fix wages, and through its Regional and Local Labor Exchanges, which conscript labor and pass on virtually all hiring or dismissal of workers. The Trustees carry on much of their work through the regional and local Labor Exchanges (Arbeitsamt).

Enforcement of labor priorities in individual industries, plants or localities is in the hands of the "combing-out" commissions," of the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions, which have also been placed under Sauckel's supervision. These are somewhat informal groups composed of Labor Exchange and other government functionaries, members of the official Chambers of Commerce and Industry, of the Army Economic Command, and sometimes the Labor Front. Recruiting of foreign labor is centralized in a Foreign Employment Bureau, which has control over labor exchanges set up in virtually all the conquered territories. This bureau has also been placed under Sauckel.

(4) Military conscription.

Drafting for the army is managed by a flexible system which allows no blanket occupational exemptions. All those liable for military service are considered as mobilized. Those who are "irreplaceable" in vital industries are then given "factory leave" for an indefinite period. Others, placed in the category of "difficult to replace", are called up, and either sent to government munitions plants under military discipline and at soldier's pay, released to the armed forces, or given thirty days' leave to return to their former employment. These last may have their leave renewed so long as their work is considered essential. In this way all exemptions are subject to continuous review. The draft authority responsible for this is the

Wehrkreis (district military board), which is able to make its decisions with the aid of knowledge gained through its control of munitions contracts in its district, and can call on the Labor Exchanges for consultation in individual cases. The Wehrkreis authorities do not have to conform to any national plan, but are expected rather to judge each case according to local needs. They seem, however, to grant regular exemption for certain vital occupations at various times, and to revoke such exemptions uniformly throughout the country when the situation changes.

"Factory leaves" for soldiers and the transfer of workers into the army are normal methods, used to meet the continual changes in the relative importance of the two branches of the German war machine. This system of interchange between production and the armed forces has been reduced in importance, however, because of the Army's need for men on the Russian front. Plans for relieving the strain on industry by the return of men from the army had to be sharply curtailed during the winter of 1941-42.

c. The Methods of Labor Control

To meet the labor shortage, government control of labor has gradually developed. When full employment has been reached, as in Germany, labor control entails stable wages and prevention of competitive bidding for labor, mobility of labor and shifting from less essential to more essential activities, retraining for new tasks, and the crushing or diversion of unrest. Just as in other branches of the economy, growing full employment led first to price (i.e. wage) control, then to rationing of labor, and finally to increased utilization of available supplies and to a search for substitutes.

(1) Wage control.

(a) Wages are now fixed by the Trustees of Labor of the Ministry of Labor. Since 1934 wages have been under increas-

ingly strict control. The final measure in this, the "Wage Stop", forbade all rises in wage scales except for extraordinary cases. In enforcing this measure, the Trustees of Labor not only decree maximum and minimum wages, but also enforce on employers the prohibition against offering extra inducements, such as social services and quick advancement to higher-pay positions. Employers are prevented from attracting workers away from each other by the requirement that all hiring (as well as firing) be approved by the local Labor Exchange organization. Agriculture, mining, and domestic service (only one servant being permitted) are exempted from this control because of the shortage of workers in these fields. The official Labor Exchanges compose the only legal employment service in Germany.

In general, weekly earnings by 1938 had reached about the level of 1929. Strict control of wages prevented weekly earnings from rising more than 9.2 percent from June 1939 to September 1941, and they have changed little since then. But with full mobilization of labor total family incomes have increased considerably in many cases.

(b) Higher wages, the usual stimulus to increased work, can no longer be used as such in Germany, since wages are fixed to prevent inflation and the shortage of consumer goods makes it impossible for the worker to spend much of what he receives. However, the promise of higher wages after the war has been made by Dr. Ley to attract additional labor to mining, an unpopular occupation. This promise has already been implemented by a new wage scale, which guarantees that at least 70% of the workers in any mine will have an "average wage" of RM 9.42 daily or higher. The net result is an increase of total wage payments over their original level. Miners have also been specially favored by increases of their social security benefits and payment of bonuses to workers over 50 having more than 15 years of service. The additional expense of social security measures for miners is met from the general unemployment insurance fund (Reichs-

stock fuer Arbeitseinsatz) rather than by increasing the miners' contributions to their own insurance pool. These decrees are significant as one of the few wartime departures from the wage-stop principle of inflation control.

Another exception to the general wage stop is made in favor of administrative and management personnel willing to work in Danzig, East Prussia, the Wartheland, and Silesia, in order to attract white-collar workers to these areas. Germans in the incorporated Eastern territories are also granted partial exemption from wage and salary taxes.

Additional food, in the form of unrationed hot meals at the factory, is one powerful incentive which has taken the place of wages. Rations are calculated according to the type of work being performed, and supplements are granted night workers and those putting in long hours. Vitamin tablets are distributed free of charge to workers in industries such as mining. Workers are demanding and obtaining buying services run by the factories. These attend to the purchase of goods difficult to obtain through regular retail channels, and are equivalent to part payment of wages in kind.

(c) Wage scales. Monthly earnings of skilled adult workers are about Rm 175-225. All wages are subject to a number of taxes, insurance premiums and "voluntary contributions", which take roughly one-quarter to as much as one-third of the worker's earnings. Wage rates vary from West to East in Germany, much as they decline from North to South in the United States. Unskilled workers may earn as much as 80-84 Reichspfennings hourly, or as little as 60-64. Although women are under Nazi wage theory entitled to equal pay for equal work, a pronounced differential exists between their wages and the wages of men. Their wages may average about 25% lower than the normal pay for men in their occupation. (See Appendix I, Wage Scales)

(2) Rationing or allocation of labor.

(a) The rodistribution of manpower to conform with wartime priorities is being carried through on the basis of years of planning. The German economic authorities know the efficiency and labor needs of almost every important firm, and have studied the characteristics of the available labor supply. Their control of the individual worker is effected through the issuance of Labor Books by the local Labor Exchanges. These books contain a full record of employment, training, specialization, air pilot licenses and familiarity with agricultural work, and must be presented before an employment contract may be made. A filing system in the Labor Exchanges duplicates this information, making it easy to find workers with desired skills. The Labor Book system operates as a continuing detailed census of labor supply, on the basis of which general planning of labor allocation is carried out.

(b) Because so much of the conversion of her industry to wartime needs was accomplished under the rearmament program before 1939, Germany's rationing of labor is somewhat different from what is usually understood by the term. Ordinarily, rationing involves the distribution of goods not previously in use, whereas rationing of labor in Germany requires the redistribution of manpower resources already employed, and often already at work in high-priority industries. "Rationing " activity is therefore largely devoted to the allocation of workers to those occupations needing them most, with need judged according to the necessity of the industry to the war effort.

(c) The comb-out Commissions.

This activity is undertaken by the "comb-out" commissions (Auskämmkommissionen, called Prüfungskommissionen in administrative structure). In cooperation with the local Labor Exchange Officials, they engage in inspection tours, suggesting means of increasing ef-

ficiency in individual plants and deciding where workers can be released from non-priority or wasteful employment. The visits of the "comb-out commissions" are preceded by an investigator from the local Labor Exchange, who gathers background statistics and prepares recommendations for the main body.

Criteria used by the comb-out commissions are: (1) Comparison of the development of man-hours of employment and volume of sales over past years and months. (2) Inspection of the firm's current contracts to determine the actual necessity of its production and to investigate its probable labor requirements in the future. (3) Adequacy of measures taken by the firm to subcontract its work, particularly to plants in the occupied territories. (4) Number of women workers and development of the ratio of women to men employees. (5) Efforts made by the firm to retrain workers. This may have a decisive effect on the final judgement of the Commissions. (6) Use of skilled workers in the tasks for which they are fitted, and provision of sufficient assistance by semi-skilled auxiliary workers so as to "dilute" highly-skilled manpower throughout the plant, Scientific arrangement of the flow of work along rational lines, and provision of well equipped workplaces. (7) Activity of the firm in seeking new sources of war workers. If the firm under investigation has simply thrown the burden of finding new workers on the Labor Exchanges, rather than taking the initiative itself, it is not considered to have done its duty. (8) Examination of the firm's requests for deferment, to disclose whether it is hoarding labor. Reasons for recent dismissals of workers. State of plant discipline and morale. Establishment of "social institutions", such as canteens, restrooms and Labor Front facilities. (9) Working hours in force. If the plant still operates on less than the average work week for its industry, it will not be given new workers without detailed justification of its reasons for limiting working time. (10) Efficiency and degree of modernity of the

machinery of the plant. Degree of utilization of installed machinery.

Besides forcing labor to shift into war industries through "comb-outs", the closing down of non-essential plants and propaganda and Party pressure induce a voluntary flow of individuals in the desired direction. The voluntary shift of labor is particularly important for women workers not currently employed.

(d) Where such measures do not suffice to shift workers to the desired occupations, the Labor Exchanges have the power to conscript labor for essential tasks. This is not often necessary, as the worker knows that it will be undertaken if he does not accept whatever job is officially offered to him, or if he tries to leave his work against the desires of the authorities. Labor conscription orders have been largely used for extraordinary temporary tasks, such as the construction of fortifications. From the middle of 1938 to the middle of 1940 a total of two million conscription orders were issued.

(e) Temporary conscription orders have been used increasingly to provide labor for clearing of air-raid damage and for stand-by service during alarms. The employers of workers called for these purposes must give leave without objections, and must continue to pay regular wages during the time the worker is away. The employer is reimbursed from the unemployment insurance fund (Reichsstock fuer Arbeitseinsatz) through the local Labor Exchange. Independent craftsmen, particularly those subject to call by the Technical Emergency Service (Technische Nothilfe) are paid directly by the Labor Exchanges at the standard foreman's wage scale in force in the locality.

Workers conscripted for semi-permanent employment in compulsory labor services obtain only basic army pay, plus a separation allowance of RM 19 per week if they have families, and certain bonuses for long service, dirty work, work clothes, and to permit continuation of fixed obligations to dependents, landlords, insurance companies, etc.

Conscripted workers who live too far from their assigned work to commute may, at the discretion of the employer, be paid a separation allowance in addition to their regular wage. This provision, however, applies only to married men or widowed or divorced men with dependent children. The allowance is limited to RM 1.50 per day, from which the value of room and board provided by the employer must be subtracted. Workers receiving such separation allowances numbered only 7.1% of the total labor force in December 1941.

(f) Shifting of labor from consumer to war industries and from less essential to more essential tasks within industries requires much retraining. The Germans made strenuous efforts to solve this problem at a relatively early date. No other country has placed a comparable emphasis on apprenticeship training. The following agencies participate in establishing technical schools and apprenticeship plans: Labor Front, Ministry of Labor, Hitler Youth, Labor Service, Storm troops (which have opened free schools for shipyard worker training) and individual factories. The vocational training program comprises a network which is even extended to small villages by means of motorized workshops. The Labor Front maintains a school for technical instructors, the graduates of which are given preference in government and private trade schools. Thus high standards of instruction are assured, and at the same time the trade school becomes a means of inculcating Nazi doctrine. Employers are forced to participate in the training program. In the metal-working industry, by order of Sauckel, all firms must increase their training of new workers, whether needed by them or not. This is in addition to requirements laid on them since April 1940 by their local Labor Exchanges, which were to arrange for the yearly training of new workers numbering 15-20 percent of the metal workers employed in the Labor Exchange districts. Apprentices are given an incentive to complete their course by a ruling which reduces the pay of apprentices 10% for one

year if they do not meet the required standards of training.

Technical excellence, always highly prized by Germany, is now seen as her greatest strength, permitting her to develop her war machine and maintain her control over the rest of Europe. Ideally, Germany would have liked to give every worker two skills: one for peace-time and one for war-time tasks. Because of the tremendous expansion of her arms industry, however, she has been hard put to train armament workers as the need for them arose, and has been unable to create the desired reservoir of trained labor.

(g) The decline in the number of young people leaving school, due to the fall in the birth rate during the war and post-war inflation periods, is especially serious to Germany, because it limits the age-group most subject to military demands. A special plan for mobilization of youth into industrial employment has been established to allocate available youth reserves to those branches of the economy needing them most (Nachwuchsplan). This must bridge the gap between available candidates and the demand for apprentices. In 1941 627,000 offers of apprenticeship employment were recorded, of which only about 420,000 could be filled. Boys leaving school are registered, and quotas are set for the number of new apprentices "desired" in each industry. Though no compulsion is used in individual cases, the Labor Exchanges suggest certain occupations, and can refuse permission for employers to hire more apprentices when the quota for their industry is filled. In certain important industries businessmen are required to take on what the authorities consider a sufficient number of apprentices.

Priority is given to agriculture and forestry, mining, masonry, coppersmiths and plumbing, shipwrights, chemistry, textiles and clothing, building trades, transportation, retail and wholesale trade, public administration, and elementary school-teaching. Also included are minor trades such as book-binding and piano-making. The

list, as is evident, departs somewhat from strict war-time necessities, with the intention of preserving a normal post-war development in certain branches of the German economy. The present program gives particular attention to the allocation of the more capable young people to the higher-skilled jobs of the vocation which they enter. It will probably soon be supplemented by a similar control system for young people seeking university education, in order to restore the balance between professions and between immediate work and continuation of academic training. Refinement and extension of the program in these ways is necessitated by the decline in skilled and professional workers under wartime and Nazi ideological pressures.

(h) The Labor Service, originally designed to train urban youth in manual labor and to meet the shortage of farm workers, has meanwhile become an auxiliary of the army, and is thus no longer important as a means of labor control. All boys of 17 and over are required to spend one year in this compulsory work service, and are now used as uniformed Construction Units on military roads and airport and fortification work, as well as in transportation. Some Labor Service units are now motorized and all are armed.

The Girl's Labor Service was formerly obligatory only for students and unemployed. A year of labor service is now required before girls may obtain any other job. It continues to be spent in farm work and in domestic service with large families, to meet the shortage of labor in those fields, but work in munitions plants has been added for the second half year. In 1939, 360,000 boys and 100,000 girls were in the Labor Services. The number of girls has since risen, perhaps as high as 150,000.

(i) These are the methods used to shift available labor to necessary tasks. The amount of labor which can be transferred to direct war production depends upon the degree of curtailment of consumer goods production the German people will stand. It is thus

influenced by psychological imponderables. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that not much more consumer production can be sacrificed without seriously impairing the efficiency of Germany's civilian population. Most of what little remains is being turned to export orders, and thus does not aid the domestic population. The proportion of consumer goods production to total output is probably less than 20% at present.

(3) Increased utilization of available labor supplies.

(a) The available supply of labor is the population of Germany, plus that part of the population of Axis-controlled Europe which the Reich can mobilize for its own needs. Increased utilization of the home population involves drawing women, children and retired workers into employment, as well as increasing the output of those already employed.

By the end of 1940 37.2% (about 8.4 million) of all German workers were women. Women are employed in munitions industries, on the railroads, as streetcar conductors, and in other fields where they were not previously to be found. The number of women employed is now about 9.7 million. The increase exhausts the unemployed among unmarried women. Under normal circumstances probably no more than one million could be raised from among German married women, as most of those not already in industrial employment are occupied in housework or as family helpers on farms and in retail shops. This figure will probably be somewhat exceeded, however, since Germany is now undertaking large-scale communal feeding, using existing restaurant facilities. These plans are intended to release an increasing number of women from household work. Large numbers of foreign women may be imported to take over household tasks; one report declares that the Nazis plan to use as many as 400,000 Russian women to release German women for industry.

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(b) In the Spring of the year 1942, by order of Sauckel and the Leader of the Hitler Youth (Axmann), school children were to be conscripted if necessary for farm work, from the middle of April to the middle of November. Boys over 14 could be used for the entire period while children over ten were to work for short periods near their homes. The total number subject to this provision is estimated at 200,000.

All pensioned and retired labor still able to work has been called back into production. The halt and the blind are not excepted from Germany's demands for additional labor. Special apparatus has been installed by Junkers and Siemens to permit the employment of blind workers. About 60 percent of the 400,000 cases of open tuberculosis and 80-90 percent of those in arrested stages of the disease have also been employed. Many Jews have been returned to work, some in responsible technical positions.

(c) Increasing exertion of workers.

Increases in output involve increasing working hours and improving efficiency in the use of labor. Working hours in munitions industries usually amount to at least ten per day, and sixteen hours is not unheard of. Some aircraft factories still work on eight-hour schedules. These include Junkers-Magdeburg, Askania (aircraft instruments), Dornier, and Siebel. Others, like Bayerische Motorenwerke, work on a ten-hour day, seven days a week. MIAG (engines) and some sections of the Junkers-Dessau plant run twelve-hour shifts, with one free afternoon per week besides at least one Sunday off every fortnight. Women workers are seldom used on night shifts, and rarely work a seven-day week. They are often given extra time off for household tasks, and very many work only five hours per day. The number of legal holidays has been reduced, and observance of religious holidays has been shifted to the nearest Sunday. In agriculture, Sunday work has been made compulsory during seasonal rush periods, and it is fre-

quently required of industrial workers as well. The authorities are introducing "efficiency wages" based on piece-work rates, by cutting the wages of those producing least. This is designed to act as an added stimulus to increased effort, though Labor Front propaganda declares it to be part of the New Order of social justice, guaranteeing to the worker payment in full for the product of his labor.

(d) Threats and force aid in speeding up production. Really dangerous discontent is taken care of by the police. Shock troops of Nazi Party members have been organized in each important plant to watch for slackness and political unreliability and to set an example of increased production. Factory discipline has become almost as strict as military discipline. Throughout Germany, the entire working force of large factories is periodically assembled in military formation before going to work, and is addressed by Labor Front propagandists or their employers. This ceremony is known as the Factory Mustering (Betriebsappelle). Absenteeism or unauthorized holidays are punishable by fines or imprisonment. Regulations to this effect, formerly issued by the individual Provincial Trustees of Labor, have now been unified and restated by Sauckel. The new rules must be prominently posted in all work-places except households. Employers may also take away the supplementary food rations of workers who persist in delinquency. The manager is given the title of Factory Leader (Betriebsfuehrer) and has wide disciplinary powers. In one factory, considered exemplary, he is a Major of the SS, who wears his uniform constantly. His assistants are likewise uniformed, and special Plant Police watch over the German and foreign workers employed by him.

(e) A propaganda campaign for greater production is carried on (especially by the Labor Front) along the lines of the Russian Stakhanovite movement. A special medal, for "Pioneers of Labor", is awarded to those with exceptional production records. A frequent slogan is "two for three", two workers to perform the task

of three.

(f) Replacement of labor by machinery is hampered by the strain on the machine tool industry. Nevertheless, some progress has been made in the mining industry, and assembly-line techniques have been introduced in manufacturing at an accelerated rate. This so-called "rationalization" of work also includes the speed-up and the scientific use of labor. Thus, older workers are kept separate from younger employees, so that the latter are not held up by the slower rate of production of the former.

(g) "Fluid equalization", or the shifting of workers from plant to plant, is practiced to provide for seasonal and special needs without tying up labor in one plant longer than necessary. In this practice the Germans have the advantage of full control over their workers; no personal or other objections are allowed to stand in the way of the needs of the State. Skilled workers are "diluted" among plants in an industry, with the intention of using a minimum of skilled labor and a maximum of unskilled helpers. Whole industries are reorganized, and less efficient plants are consolidated or eliminated entirely in order to save labor. In the tobacco industry, over two-thirds of the factories have been shut down to save one-sixth of the labor formerly employed.

(4) The results of labor control.

The rationalization program alone cannot solve Germany's problem in finding adequate labor supply. With consumer goods production already cut to the bone, "comb-outs" can no longer free workers in the numbers needed. The main source of additional labor for Germany is foreign workers. (See below, C)

German labor is now beginning to feel the strain of four years of unremitting activity. A high official of the Reich Medical Association admits that men after the age of 45 and women after the age of 30 begin to show serious signs of decreased working ability.

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Deterioration of health is also indicated in the increase in the proportion of claims allowed to premium income of Labor Front insurance companies, from 70.9 percent in the first half of 1940 to 75.65 percent in the first half of 1941. Average loss of time due to illness, about 3-5 percent in the early days of the war, has risen to as much as 20-25 percent in some plants, according to one neutral source. Feigned illness and slowing-down at work became so serious that many plants paid "health bonuses" to workers who performed their regular jobs without malingering. This practice had to be specifically prohibited by the Ministry of Labor. As yet, however, the decline in efficiency has not been great except in coal mining. It operates more as a factor limiting future exertion than as a serious impediment to German working capacity.

d. Hitler's Labor Policy

When Hitler came to power the majority of German labor was Socialist or Communist, at least in outward affiliation. Somehow, Nazism has succeeded in destroying the traditional Marxism of German Labor, and has suppressed a class conflict which once made Germany the center of world radicalism. Even the German communists have been prevailed upon to support the war on Russia, their former "Worker's Fatherland".

This has by no means been the result of force alone. Though the well-known brutality of Gestapo suppression of labor or other discontent should not be underestimated as a factor in this astonishing change, it cannot be considered the most important. German labor has accepted, at least passively, the linking of its destiny with Hitler.

(1) The fate of the former trade unions

(a) Before 1933 the vast majority of German workers belonged to trade unions which had developed on a voluntary basis since 1860. These nationwide organizations were divided accord-

ing to crafts and industry. This together with their voluntary character distinguished them sharply from the Nazi Labor Front. By far the most powerful among the older associations was the group of the Free Trade Unions to which millions of workers belonged. They were organizations created and directed by the Social Democratic party, the largest political party of Germany from 1912 to 1932. Next to them in importance came the Christian Trade Unions with a membership of about half a million.

(b) The German Republic found in the Trade Unions its staunchest supporters and the cooperation of the government with the trade unions found expression in the progressive labor legislation of that period. Each firm had a council of employees, while labor courts settled conflicts arising from cases of individual workers. Wages were negotiated between trade unions and employers; if necessary state arbitrators presided who could settle a conflict in case of a deadlock between labor and employers.

(c) This whole system has been destroyed. Labor now constitutes the only group in Germany that has no organization of its own. Labor's bargaining power has been suppressed. Under cover of a so-called "community of interests", the Nazis have turned over the control of labor to a combination of government, Nazi Party, army and employer authority. The strict discipline thus imposed, however, is only the negative side of the Nazi labor program.

(2) The Nazi labor strategy.

(a) In their effort to persuade German labor that it has profited by the advent of Hitlerism, the Nazis have three important appeals. The first is the semblance of equality and bargaining power embodied in the Labor Front. The Labor Front provides a substitute for the dissolved trade unions, even though it is a labor organization in name only. The second is the improvement in material conditions resulting from the Nazi economic program. During the depths of the depression, Germany had the greatest ratio of unemployment of

any country except the United States, and far smaller resources for relief. Since 1937, Germany has been in a state of virtual full employment. The Nazis have given the German worker the security and self-respect of a job.

The third is the Nazi propaganda effort, which has taken two conflicting lines, often simultaneously. These are indicated in the full name of the Nazi Party: National Socialist German Workers Party (National-Sozialistischer Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei). The "Socialist" and "Workers" aspects frankly arouse class discontent to suit the purposes of the Party. The "National" and "German" aspects, on the other hand, attempt to submerge all class and other differences among Germans in a highly emotional feeling of the community of Germans against the rest of the world. This sentiment of "Volksgemeinschaft" (community of the folk) is one of the most important bulwarks of the Nazi system. German society, once on the verge of dissolution, has been knit together again, by the common goal of mastery of the world and the common feeling of predestined leadership in an inevitable "New Order". The propaganda effort has had an interesting and significant history.

(b) Nazi propaganda for labor.

The original program of the Nazi Party, known as the "Twenty-One Points", contains many scathing references to profiteers, monopoly capitalists, middlemen and bankers. It was this program which attracted a mass following to the Party. Once Hitler attained power, however, he abandoned his anti-capitalist phraseology in order to obtain the aid of Germany's industrialists for the construction of a war machine.

But as Germany's preparation for war was completed, the old radicalism was revived. At the outbreak of the war it served to counterbalance the cautious opposition of conservatives such as Fritz Thyssen and certain army leaders, and to weaken the resistance of radical groups in democratic countries. Most important of all, the

revival of radicalism gave the home population a means of justifying themselves in taking up arms. Unlike the psychology of the Allies, which long remained one of passive defense against the Nazi threat, the Germans were provided with the positive aim of creating a new social order. As greater physical sacrifices were required of labor for the war, it was thus given greater psychological satisfaction in return. Nazi German's economic penetration methods were declared to be the substitution of labor value for capitalistic gold. Her opponents were characterized as the "Plutocratic democracies", and Axis aggression was described as the revolt of the proletarian countries for a "New Order" of socialistic prosperity. This New Order was to be the final victory of the workers over capitalistic selfishness. Post-war plans which are stressed include a new wage law, free medical care, trade education, housing developments, vacation camps and old-age care. Germany, it is declared, will thus become the first social state in the world.

- Nazi propaganda has succeeded in winning at least the formal allegiance of German labor. Though competent observers note a remarkable lack of enthusiasm for the war, there is at the same time virtually no active opposition. Many Germans believe that they are fighting against capitalism and for a German socialism. Many more feel that Nazi rule is preferable to a return of laissez-faire uncertainty and anti-social control by "international bankers." Important radical leaders in Holland, France, and other conquered countries have been won over to collaboration with the invader by the belief that National Socialsim would succeed where Marxian Socialism had failed. (Among these are Jacques Doriot, Belin, and DeMan). That Nazi propaganda has won over foreign radicals as well as German labor, shows how effective its socialist appeal is. Thus while British appeasers were willing to give the Nazis the continent of Europe to forestall the communist revolution they feared, the Nazis were just as

willing to stir up radical unrest to help them conquer Europe.

(c) When necessary the Nazis are prepared to make substantial concessions to keep labor contented. At the beginning of the war conscription of workers was used freely whenever requested by employers in essential industries. The unrest caused by these measures, however, has resulted in their use being limited to circumstances where other methods fail. Overtime and holiday pay, ordered cut at the outbreak of hostilities, were gradually restored and even increased in order to remedy complaints and a decline in workers' morale.

(3) The Labor Front

(a) The tasks of the Labor Front.

The German Labor Front is an integral part of the Nazi Party. Though not a government agency, it is a service organization performing important tasks which assure the best possible use of available labor. It is particularly important in aiding workers pressed by wartime conditions to readjust and maintain themselves. Its work may be divided into:

(1) Propaganda, reaching almost every German employee and employer, almost all of whom are included in its 28,000,000 membership. In the last analysis, the amount of production depends on the will and efficiency of the individual worker. The Labor Front aims to stimulate each worker to maximum effort, by awakening a desire to help Germany win the war. Much of the "New Order" propaganda is carried on by the Labor Front. Dire consequences are painted for the working classes in the event of a German defeat. In the Autumn of 1941 about six thousand meetings were held each month, attended by audiences totalling 300,000, composed of Labor Front functionaries, whose duty it is to spread the political directives thus received. A special campaign is now under way to "educate" factory managers and technicians to their wartime responsibilities.

(2) Education. The Labor Front conducts (a) a large share

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT



of German occupational training and retraining, (b) training of Labor Front leaders, and, recently, of technicians and administrators for the Occupied Territories. Labor Front technical education is carried on with the sometimes unwilling cooperation of industry. It is often superficial, intended to fit the worker to operate a specific machine, but is nevertheless valuable in providing partly skilled workers. In 1941 almost four million workers participated in "refresher" courses held in 500 special workshops. About 4,000 apprentice training shops were also maintained by the Labor Front. The Labor Front provides special technical school and university scholarships for the training of promising young workers destined for managerial posts. In the occupied territories of Eastern Europe the Labor Front conducts 2,500 courses in the German language to prepare natives for collaboratory positions.

(3) Labor Efficiency. A large part of the propaganda effort is directed to increasing the efficiency and tempo of German labor. A yearly national efficiency contest is carried on. Scientific research in labor utilization methods is conducted, and time-study experts and efficiency engineers are trained in Labor Front schools.

(4) Social welfare. The Labor Front and its "Strength through Joy" movement provide recreation and "induce" employers to establish washrooms, hot luncheons for war workers, and other contributions to labor's standard of living. Workers are told that the Nazi regime is helping them to better their lot at the expense of the capitalists. At the same time, the fact that their employer must be a member of their organization, and must take part on an equal footing in propaganda meetings, "Strength through Joy" excursions, and summer schooling camps gives them a feeling of equality with the rich. This and other means of raising the prestige and self-respect of labor are a very real contribution by the Nazis to worker morale, since Germany never before enjoyed the fluid class structure and lack of social

barriers such as is found in the United States.

The "Strength through Joy" division conducts sports programs, social affairs, vacation trips, and other ways of making the life of the worker more pleasant. Its "Beauty of Labor" bureau organizes pressure on employers to make work surroundings more attractive by painting, cleaning up, planting gardens, and improving illumination.

(5) Labor peace. The Legal Advice Offices, with a monopoly on the practice of labor law, provide free services for members. They are largely occupied in arbitration of disputes. During the war they help members obtain benefit payments due them and advise on the complicated legal obligations under the war laws. The "Councils of Trusted Men", established in every plant, are the only organs through which labor complaint is tolerated, though chosen by the Labor Front and Government Trustees of Labor rather than by the workers. They have become a mere formality, though nevertheless useful as such. It has become necessary for the Trustees of Labor to demand that the Councils of Trusted Men meet at least once a month, in order to prevent them from disappearing through inanition. A "Social Honor Court" system supposedly punishes violations of the spirit of "cooperation" between employer and employee, but is unimportant in practice.

(6) War tasks of the Labor Front. The "strength through Joy" division is charged with almost all "cultural" work among troops. A large part of its present activities are in servicing the army with recreational and cultural facilities, somewhat along the lines of the U.S.O. in the United States. For troops home on leave, "Strength through Joy" provides theatre tickets and canteen service. For troops in the field, entertainment is provided by 4,000 travelling actors, who gave 188,000 performances in 1941. In cooperation with the Propaganda Ministry, a half million meetings were arranged in 1941 by the "Strength through Joy" division, with a total soldier audience of 167 million. Since 1938, "Strength through Joy" has conducted a foreign language

teaching program involving over one and a half million of its members, and having obvious military significance. The labor camps for German conscripted for special work and for foreign industrial workers in the Reich are administered by the Labor Front's Bureau for Labor Allocation. All questions of housing, feeding, recreation and "enlightement" of foreign workers are centralized under this bureau. Together with the Reich Group of the Hotel Industry, the Labor Front has been charged with the execution of the new program of communal feeding.

(b) The organization of the Labor Front.

The Labor Front is organized simultaneously along horizontal geographic lines and vertical occupational lines. Membership is compulsory for all Aryan workers and employers. Members belong to the Labor Front directly, under control of the geographical hierarchy. Special regional delegates have been named for foreign workers. At the same time, members belong to the "Plant Community" constituted by their factory. The factory "Plant Community" is affiliated with one of the 18 national Plant Communities, set up for each major industry. The geographical organization deals with general propaganda and activities, and the occupational "Plant Communities" supposedly concern themselves with specific industrial problems such as trade schools. The most important of these two strata of organization is the geographical one. (See attached chart on organization of the Labor Front and Appendix II, Labor Front organization).

(c) The Labor Front as a capitalist.

The great commercial and industrial holdings of the Labor Front were built up out of the resources confiscated from the German trade unions in 1933. At present they are concentrated in five fields:

(1) Financial penetration of occupied territories. New Labor Front banking and insurance firms have recently become important

in Poland and the Lowlands. They are usually directed by the long-established

(2) Banking and insurance enterprises. The Bank of German Labor, originally a comparatively small institution, has become the fourth largest bank in Germany. The insurance companies owned by the Labor Front, which have also enjoyed great prosperity under its ownership, now write one-third of all life insurance policies issued in Germany.

(3) Housing. The Labor Front's "Neue Heimat" housing firms alone have completed 63,000 dwelling units, and 25,000 more are under construction. So great is the housing activity of the Labor Front that special firms have been set up to do its construction work, such as the "Deutsche Bau, A.G."

(4) Nazi economic tasks. The "People's Car" project was set up partly to drain off excess consumption power from the lower classes. A huge plant was built to construct cheap automobiles, which were to be bought on the installment plan. None of the cars has been delivered to the purchasers, since they have all been turned over to the Army, to be used similar to the employment of our "Jeeps". The Stettin Vulkan Shipbuilding Company, originally bought to build boats for Strength-through-Joy cruises, now is working on war orders.

The Labor Front recently took over all the consumers' co-operatives in Greater Germany, preparatory to their eventual liquidation.

(5) Propaganda and publishing. Besides the enterprises producing official Labor Front newspapers and trade magazines (which had a circulation of over 15,000,000 until their number was cut down as a war measure to save paper) the Labor Front owns several general publishing firms of importance. (See Appendix III, Labor Front property).

e. Foreign labor in Germany

(1) Ever since the closing decades of the last century, the employment of foreign labor has been a permanent feature of the German economy. Poles especially were employed in German mines and as seasonal agricultural workers on the large landed estates of Northeastern Germany. Italian, Bulgarian, and Slovak agricultural workers were also imported in large numbers for seasonal work in recent years before the war. Today, foreign labor is the most important single source of relief for the labor shortage in Germany. Roughly one worker in five in the Reich is now a foreigner.

The total of civilian workers is officially placed at two and a half million. It has risen as follows:

September 1939	500,000
End of 1940	950,000
October 1941	2,100,000
Spring 1942	2,500,000
Fall 1942	3,000,000

About one-fourth of the foreign workers are women. In addition, 1,600,000 non-Russian prisoners of war are at work in the Reich, and over 300,000 Russian prisoners are engaged in agriculture alone. Foreign civilian and prisoner workers total close to six million at present.

(2) These estimates refer only to the number in the Reich at a particular time. There are important seasonal movements which raise the effective amount of foreign labor used by Germany. There is also a large turnover, with many foreign workers returning home and being replaced by new contingents from their countries. Foreigners are also used in unspecified numbers in the semi-military construction gangs of the Organization Todt. Most of these are Eastern workers forced into service in the Russian Front areas, and Norwegians or others conscripted for work on coastal fortifications within their own countries. Some, however, particularly Belgians and Dutch, are recruited for work outside their homelands, in Northern

France and the Eastern areas of Poland and Russia. Flemish volunteers have even been used as prison camp guards in Russia.

(3) Almost half the foreign civilian workers are Poles, whose numbers include many former prisoners of war. Other important contingents are formed by Italians, French, Russians, Belgians, Czechs, Yugoslavs and Dutch. Virtually every country in Europe has contributed more or less important groups. There is a tendency for members of each nation to be put to work in the part of Germany nearest their homes; on the other hand the type of worker naturally varies according to the country of origin, and distribution within Germany must conform to the location of industries and areas with particular labor shortages. Thus, many nationalities are to be found scattered throughout the Reich. (See Appendix IV, Number and Location of Foreign Workers).

Although Nazi theory and propaganda have long been averse to the mixture of foreign elements into the German center, the pressure of wartime necessity has made for a policy of importing foreign labor in the greatest possible numbers. In accordance with their racial theory, the authorities try to keep different national groups apart by concentrating the workers of each country in one region of Germany, and maintaining separate barracks for each group of foreign workers if this proves impossible. It is the intention of the Reich to "exchange" foreign workers between the various regions of Germany to bring this separation about. Such measures would have the advantage of preventing contact between the subject peoples, which might lead to results unfortunate from the point of view of the conqueror. The puppet Croat government, for example, has "requested" that Serb workers should not be employed in the same enterprises as Croats, or should at least be housed separately. This suggestion was passed on to German employers by the Reich Ministry of Labor. Because of war exigencies, however, it has been impossible to carry through the

desired aim, since each new conquest has brought an unexpected flow of additional foreign workers, who were sent to areas requiring them, most without regard to this principle.

(4) Labor Resources of the Continent. Additions to the German labor supply now come from the whole of Europe. The Germans have made a careful study of the available labor reserves of the Continent, both as to quantity and skills, but the growing pressure of the labor shortage has made it difficult to apply their carefully worked out plan in practice. So great is the drain of labor to Germany that industries working abroad on German orders have been hampered. Sauckel has had to insist that occupation governments release labor for the Reich despite pressing reconstruction needs in the conquered territories. In many cases foreign workers brought to Germany had to be returned home to meet needs even more important to the Nazis than those within the Reich.

Unemployed reserves have been reduced to the vanishing point in many countries. Italy suffers from a shortage of metal workers, miners, and agricultural workers, and has been forced to introduce conscription of labor largely because of German demands for workers. Roumanian unemployment has disappeared because of military needs and the full occupation of her industry by German orders. Greece still suffers from great unemployment, but this is now being reduced by shipments of workers to Germany. Norway has few unemployed, with most of the country working under German orders in industry, agriculture, and fortification construction. Denmark's 96,000 unemployed are now being absorbed by the growth of German orders for her industry. Finland has an even greater manpower shortage than Germany. Poland has perhaps 200,000 unemployed left, after losing over a million workers to Germany. A shortage has developed in skilled and semi-skilled categories particularly needed by the Reich. In the Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate unemployment is virtually non-existent. Women are employ-

ed for such tasks as collecting fares on tramways. In Slovakia, where only 5,700 remain unemployed, there is a definite shortage of agricultural, forestry and skilled labor. A ten-hour day, sixty-hour week has been introduced in Serbia. France still has several hundred thousand jobless, though the transfer of highly skilled metal and building workers and miners to Germany has resulted in shortages of these categories. The policy of cutting hours of work to spread employment has been reversed. A minimum of 48 hours a week is now required in metal working and other industries in the Unoccupied Zone. Belgium has 71,000 unemployed and many working only part time, but a labor shortage has appeared in mining. Holland has about 170,000 unemployed. Unemployment is large is Spain. Unemployment in the whole of the Continent of Europe may be something over two and a half million

(5) Recruiting of foreign labor by compulsion. In order to utilize those resources still available, Germany has introduced a system of control outside her borders duplicating her internal arrangements. The compulsory shutdown and amalgamation of factories, intensified training of labor for skilled work, comb-outs and reallocation, are carried on in varying degrees depending on the extent of German control in the individual countries. Labor Exchanges and conscription of workers are now established throughout the occupied territories. In Belgium, for example, it is reported that men from 18-45 and up to 15% of the labor force of any one employer, are now liable to conscription for the Reich. Belgian and Dutch workers, employed or unemployed, must accept any position offered them by the Labor Exchange authorities, whether at home or located in Germany. In August, 1942, Sauckel decreed that all workers in occupied countries were to be subject to the same rules as German labor, including the 54 hour week, and penalties for absenteeism and leaving employment without permission. All surplus labor made available by the

closing of factories or the longthening of the work week is to be available for transfer to Germany. In France (and Algeria) and Norway, labor may be requisitioned for work within the country, particularly for agriculture and construction jobs. A labor book system is being introduced in Norway, with the threat that only those holding labor books will be granted ration cards. Finland has introduced war conscription of labor.

In Poland all residents from fourteen to sixty, and in the Protectorate all from eighteen to sixty, are liable for compulsory service in the Reich. In addition, the Protectorate Government has instituted its own forced labor system, requiring up to three months of agricultural labor, and the Nazi governors of Poland demand unlimited service in reconstruction. In Lithuania, once the volunteer system had proved insufficient to meet Nazi demands, compulsion was introduced. Young men are now rounded up and forcibly deported to the Reich. Italy has a civil mobilization law for all males from eighteen to sixty-five. The Balkan countries have all introduced similar measures, authorizing conscription of labor for construction, transportation and agricultural work for the German occupying authorities.

Compulsory youth labor service has been introduced on the German model in France, Holland, Norway, the Protectorate, and Slovakia. It is theoretically voluntary in Belgium and the Baltic countries, but is actually filled by more of less subtle pressure. It is voluntary, and very small, in Denmark. Selected youths are sent from many of these countries for six months' service in the Reich Labor Service, particularly at the Braunschweig camp. They act as leaders in their national labor services when they return home. Where direct compulsion is not resorted to, Nazi-dominated governments and Nazi Parties take over the task of inducing a flow of labor to Germany. The Nazi groups in Norway and Denmark have various means of inducing a flow of labor to Germany.

In France, the Vichy Government has agreed to fulfill Nazi needs, but its efforts have touched off a wave of opposition which makes the success of its campaign unlikely. As yet, the Vichy Government has not dared to enforce the conscription law it has passed. The Vichy Government has promised to send 150,000 additional French workers to the Reich. Laval, in a speech delivered June 22, 1942, called on French workers to volunteer en masse for work in Germany to help gain victory over Bolshevism. French prisoners of war would be released in return, he promised, and the foundation would be laid for a future Socialist society. This was accompanied by the closing down of 1,300 French factories, throwing into unemployment 22,000 highly trained workers and thousands of others with lesser skills. When this measure proved insufficient more direct means of pressure were used. To meet the need for technicians, every 25 workers are to be accompanied by a foreman, and every group of 50 is to have one engineer. The proportion of prisoners released to skilled workers volunteering has since been set at one to three. Recruiting of Spanish workers is the task of the Syndicate organization of the fascist Falange, in cooperation with its German counterpart, the Labor Front, and the German Ministry of Labor.

(6) The general picture is that of a Continent fast becoming fully employed in the German war machine. While there are still large resources of foreign labor for her to draw on, Germany will find such transfers becoming progressively more difficult. Most of the foreign labor now arriving is completely unskilled, as European resources of trained workers are almost exhausted. The Nazis nevertheless intend to double the already huge number of foreign workers in the near future. Even children are to be used. From 10-20,000 Dutch children will be put to work on the German farms this summer.

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(7) The inducements offered in recruiting and retaining foreign labor for the Reich are manifold. Apart from the often irresponsible recruiting promises as to wages and working conditions, a very powerful real attraction is the knowledge that Germany has more food to offer than is available at home. Work in Germany is often the only alternative to slow starvation. This is particularly true of Greece and Spain. Recruiting propaganda among the French emphasizes equal treatment and an opportunity to obtain new technical skill. Some French women were promised the release of prisoners of war related to them if they came to work in Germany. Where promises do not succeed or seem expedient, Germany has the power to force workers to enter her service, either by conscription, or by cutting off industrial employment in their home countries.

(8) Foreign labor may be recruited only by the administration for the allocation of labor. The German businessman must apply to his local labor exchange for all foreign labor desired, and is expressly forbidden to advertise or otherwise seek foreign workers himself. Exceptions to this rule are made by the Minister of Labor for very large enterprises, which establish their own recruiting stations in occupied countries. The foreign workers are shipped to assembly camps scattered throughout the Reich, and from there are distributed to surrounding employers. A Foreign Employment Bureau in Berlin acts as the central authority for recruiting and supervision of foreign workers. Many special commissions and offices are established in the occupied countries in preparation for increased use of foreign labor. In the Paris region alone about twenty-five such offices have been opened recently. (See Appendix V, Foreign Recruiting Offices.) One of these is located in the Saint-Denis town hall, headquarters for the French fascist leader, Jacques Doriot.

(9) Organization of procurement from newly-occupied territories. Labor procurement from newly occupied territories has

been reduced to a routine by the Nazis as a result of their wide experience. Its administrative pattern is well illustrated in the handling of labor supply in the areas conquered from Russia. The control of native manpower was undertaken in four stages.

(a) No attempt was made to set up any organization in the combat zone. The advancing troops were, however, given general directions to aid their use of local labor in immediate military tasks. This was somewhat different from the procedure in the Polish campaign. In the conquest of Poland formal organization was undertaken from the beginning. An agency of the Silesian Provincial Labor Exchange had been set up in Rybnik on September 3, 1939, the third day of the war, and thirty agencies had been established within two weeks, increased to seventy by the end of September. Labor procurement authorities were in many cases the first German officials to arrive behind the troops, sometimes beginning work while fighting was still in progress.

(b) In the rear areas of newly won Russian territories, there were quickly established Economic Commands (Wirtschaftskommandos) and Economic Inspectorates (Wirtschaftsinspektionen) to which experts on labor procurement (Sachbearbeiter fuer Arbeitseinsatz) were attached. The experts on labor procurement were given control of the use of civilian labor for military reconstruction, agriculture, raw material exploitation, and transportation. They set wages and working conditions, supervised the procurement of workers by military forces, and, if required, organized the interchange of available labor between their military districts to equalize requirements and available supply.

German troops, accustomed to home standards, at first caused some trouble by paying wages in roubles above the scale deemed sufficient by the Nazi administrators. This problem was solved at first by a "wage stop" prohibiting wage rates above those prevailing

as of June 22, 1941. Later a unified wage tariff was issued by the employment officers of the Eastern Economic Staff (Wirtschaftsstab Ost). An interesting feature of the new scale was the payment of markedly higher wages to white collar workers, undertaken in the hope of winning over a core of administrators to aid the Germans in exploiting the conquered territories. While skilled labor was allowed about 400 roubles a month, 650 roubles was granted employees in especially responsible posts, leaders and academically trained workers were given 900 roubles, and factory chiefs were allowed up to 1500 roubles.

The Economic Commands were further instructed to lay the foundation for a new permanent labor administration during this second period. The new system was to be instituted as soon as an economically unified area was brought under control.

(c) When such an area was established, Labor Procurement officers of the Economic Command took over leadership of the new labor apparatus, using wherever possible any remnants of former governmental bureaus still existing, and seeking to draw in natives (especially those speaking German) for all subsidiary positions. In the Baltic States no great difficulties were encountered, since suitable buildings, adaptable personnel, and some governmental structure were found by the occupying troops.

In the areas of Russia proper, on the other hand, no such facilities were to be found. Most towns were at least partly in ruins, and much of the population had fled or was regarded as unreliable. Necessity confined the labor authorities to the so-called "military stronghold system" of organization (Stuetzpunktsystem). Available German personnel set to work in the major towns. An attempt to tap the labor resources of the surrounding countryside was not made unless supplies in the towns were inadequate for the tasks at hand.
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The number of labor procurement officers used was relatively small. At most, only 272 were placed in the sectors under military rule, and another 250 in the territories now under civil administration. Few of these were present in the main period of advance of the armies. Nevertheless it was possible to establish 140 labor procurement offices (Arbeitseinsatzstellen) in the Ostraum (excluding those in the Galician and Bialystok districts). Some of the labor procurement offices were able to begin sending workers to Germany almost immediately. Thus, the procurement officers and impressment forces in Lithuania shipped 12,000 workers for East Prussian agriculture within two or three weeks in July and August of 1941.

(d) The fourth stage involved the transfer of administration from the hands of the army to semi-civilian governments, and the beginning of organized transfer of labor to Germany. The Bureaus of Labor Procurement were enlarged and reorganized as Labor Exchanges (Arbeitsaemter) under the Territorial Commissars (Gebietskommissaren) of the "civil" government. The Labor Exchanges in the occupied territories were given all the powers held by their German counterparts, such as the right to conscript labor to pass on all hiring or dismissal of workers, and to register all labor. A full census of available manpower was made wherever possible, including both unemployed and employed, and prisoners of war. Acquirement Commissions (Anwerbekommissionen) from the various localities of the Reich, equipped with a knowledge of local needs, were sent out to tour the occupied territories. Full cooperation was granted to them by the established Labor Exchanges. Export of workers to Germany now began in increasing tempo, though limited to a large extent by the lack of transportation facilities. Russian workers are now brought to the Reich in groups of about 1,000, usually all from the same village or locality.

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(10) In general, workers from Eastern Europe are considered less valuable than those from the West, because they do not have the training and background to fit into complex factory work. Nevertheless, either because they are more docile and less expensive to maintain, or because the Western countries cannot provide a sufficient number for Germany's needs, the Nazi intention seems to be to increase greatly the importation of labor from the Baltic and Southeastern European areas.

(11) Status of foreign labor. The status of the foreign laborer in Germany depends (a) on his origin (b) on his character as a "volunteer" or a prisoner of war. Workers from neutral countries or allies of Germany obtain the best treatment. These include the Italians, Spaniards, Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks and Swiss and Swedish. Then come those from the conquered countries of Western Europe. Among these the Flemish-speaking Belgians and the Danes are considered "members of a friendly nation" because of their Germanic origins. Though the Dutch and Norwegians are also theoretically on an almost equal plane with the Nazi master,race, their spirit of opposition is embarrassing to German efforts to cultivate "Aryan solidarity". Last come the "inferior" peoples of Eastern Europe, ending with the Poles, Russians, and Jews.

In most cases the foreign worker is not granted entire freedom of movement. "Volunteers" must sign a six-month to one year contract, which binds them under penalty of imprisonment to their place and work assigned to the. Those seeking to return home after their contract has terminated find many difficulties in their way, unless they promise to come back to work after visiting their country, or are physically or politically unfit for work in Germany. The Dutch radio recently announced that all Dutch workers in Germany whose contracts have expired will have their release postponed indefinitely. If any attempt to escape, their disappearance is reported immediately to the Gestapo.

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The usual form of shelter, even for the Italian allies of the Reich, is in barracks managed by the Labor Front. Most foreign workers are subject to supervision by special police, sometimes even by military guards. Non-German workers are usually grouped into "cells" of about ten members, to each of which a Nazi Party member is assigned. The Nazi "leader" keeps in touch with his cell constituents, investigates their skills, talents, and political reliability, and carried on propaganda. Poles are required to wear a yellow square with a purple "P" on their chest, Jews wear a yellow star, and Russians an "O" (for "Ostarbeiter"). Foreign workers of "inferior"nationalities are strictly segregated from the local population. They, along with prisoners of war, may not be spoken to except in regard to their work. Violations of this order are a penal offense, punishable by from five to fifteen years of imprisonment.

(12) Some indication of the lower productivity of foreigners can be gained from the growing use of piece-rates in paying them, after unsatisfactory experiences with weekly wages. Foreign bricklayers do less than half the work per shift performed by Germans. A chemical trade journal gives the following figures as representing the productivity of prisoners of war compared to Germans: Frenchmen 80-90%, Belgians 75-80%, Poles 65-75%, Serbs 60-70%, Englishmen 45-55%, Russians 40%. A Reichsbahn official suggests 65% as a reasonable estimate of prisoner productivity for cost-accounting purposes. The Nazis attempt to solve this problem by setting a minimum output for all foreign workers. Those failing to fulfill this norm are investigated by the police. If an intentional attempt to slow down is found, the worker may be sent to a concentration camp.

(13) Wages. Legally, foreign workers (except for some "inferior" nationalties) are supposed to have the same rights, pay and obligations as German labor. Foreign employees must pay the same taxes and contributions, amounting to from 20-25 percent of weekly

wages, must carry a Labor Book and adhere to German regulations, receiving in return social security and other benefits allowed Germans. French workers are even promised that pensions will be paid to them after they return from Germany, if they are injured while working for the Reich. Wages of foreign workers are supposed to be equal to those of Germans, in order to prevent employers from seeking to replace Germans by foreigners to increase their profits. Almost all reports from non-German sources, however, contradict this claim to equal treatment. In practice, it would appear, foreigners are often classified in lower wage groups than Germans doing the same work. Official pronouncements stress that the provision for equal wages applies only if the foreigners perform equal work. It is safe to assume that they are not considered as efficient as the most capable German workers, and it is known that all German workers tend to be paid as much as the most productive. Thus middling efficient foreigners probably are paid less than middling efficient Germans. It is known that many plants pay a supplement above the official minimum wage to their"basic labor free" (Stammarbeiter). Foreigners are almost never able to qualify for this category. Poles are paid at the lowest wage scale for workers of their age and training, regardless of their actual productivity.

Wages vary according to the nationality of the worker. Jews get no family allowances or other benefits, and must pay a 15% additional tax on their earnings. Unskilled Frenchmen get perhaps 20-30 RM per week if unmarried, and an additional 10 RM if married, though often promised double that before coming to Germany. French women generally get lower wages than men, forcing some to seek sources of income outside their regular work. Highly skilled workers are paid 60-65 marks a week plus lodging. This is about equal to the scale for German workers. Spaniards are supposed to be paid 30-40 pesetas per week for personal expenditures, and their families in Spain are to obtain the wages they drew before leaving for Germany. Poles get about

the same wages as other foreigners, but must pay a 15 percent additional "Social Equalization Tax" (Sozialausgleichsabgabe) to compensate for their supposed racial inferiority. This tax is not applied to Poles working in agriculture under special wage-scales designed to provide cheap assistance to German farmers. Workers from the Baltic States must likewise pay a 15 percent tax. However, the stigma of social inferiority is removed in their case, by calling the levy a "wage equalization tax", imposed in theory in order to adjust German wages to the standard of living to which they are accustomed. Russians fare worst of all. Their wages are taxed according to a sliding scale which takes at least RM 5.60 out of all weekly wages over RM 20.65 and RM 12.60 out of wages of RM 31.15, and everything over about RM 30 on higher salaries, besides a standard deduction of RM 10.50 for room and board. Their food supply is under special regulations, separate from those governing other foreign workers.

Though the Hague Convention requires that prisoners of war must be paid the same amount as Germans performing equal work, prisoner workers receive little more than pocket money directly. Many private employers must pay for prisoners of war labor at regular wage scales. However, in many fields where prisoner labor is used extensively, such as public works, peat cutting, agriculture and land improvement, and the beet-sugar industry, special piece-work schedules have been established by the Ministry of Labor and the Army. The special wage paid by the Reichsbahn, for example, is believed to be about RM 0.33 per hour - less than half the minimum rate for unskilled German workers.

The full amount due prisoners is turned over to the State Prison Camp Administration, which deducts expenses for food and lodging, and then pays out in canteen scrip (and sometimes in cash) only what seems advisable. Some of the remainder may be transmitted to their families. Definite legal provisions allow for the scaling down of actual amounts turned over to the prisoners in accordance with the dis-

ciplinary interests of the camp administration and the desire to prevent prisoners from building up resources for escape. Skilled laborers among war prisoners may obtain fairly high wages, or may even be released into the ranks of civilian "volunteers", as has been done in the case of numerous Poles.

(14) Limitations on the number of foreign workers. The introduction of more foreign workers is limited (a) by the ability of the Germans to keep them under control, and (b) by the ability of the Reich to feed them.

(a) By decree of Sauckel, issued in May 1942, the Labor Front has been given full control of the "spiritual and cultural ministration" to the foreign workers, as well as over their board and lodging in the 8,000 barracks and camps already established. It is to draw on its experiences in keeping German labor contented. In each camp, the separate nationalities are represented by "men of confidence" (Vertrauensmann), who aid the "Camp Leaders" of the Labor Front in keeping the peace. In the national offices of the Labor Front are "National Delegations", appointed with the cooperation of the puppet governments of the occupied and controlled areas, and forming a Reich Liaison Office. These keep in contact with "Camp Leaders" of barracks occupied by members of their nationality. Complaints by foreign workers must be addressed to the "national delegation" representing their country, which then may or may not take up the difficulty with the "Camp Leader" involved. Branch offices of the national foreign workers' Liaison have been set up in the provincial sections of the Labor Front. National Delegations have been appointed for Bulgarian, Flemish, Walloon, French, Italian, Croatian, Dutch, Roumanian, Serbian, Slovak, Ukrainian, Spanish, Hungarian, Norwegian and Danish workers. In addition, the Labor Front has foreign liaison offices in Rome, Paris, Madrid, Brussels, the Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Pressburg, Belgrade, and Agram.

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The Labor Front publishes newspapers for foreign workers in French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Flemish, Danish, Slovak, Croat, Ukrainian, Ruthenian and Bulgarian. Religious services and entertainments are also arranged in many languages. Courses in German have been organized for foreign workers throughout the Reich by the Labor Front. Whenever possible, food is prepared in the manner to which the foreign workers are accustomed, by cooks from their own country. This was proved particularly important by earlier complaints and gastric disturbances caused by unfamiliar German cooking. A special "Service for French Civilian Workers in Germany" has been established by the French Government in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, Dresden and Hannover, to aid the Germans in making French workers comfortable. In Vienna a regular branch of the Dutch Nazi Party (NSB) has been established.

Where more trouble is caused by Nazi measures than they are worth, the Germans seek to remove the irritation. Thus the Dutch workers, once greatly annoyed by the necessity of paying substantial fees to both the Dutch and German Labor Fronts, now pay only the German fee.

Propaganda and kindness alone cannot hold the foreign workers in check, however, particularly since Nazi racial theory does not tolerate reasonably equal treatment for the Eastern nationalities now composing the bulk of the foreign labor force. Foreign workers are therefore closely watched. Petty trouble-makers are set across the border of their country without ceremony or traveling expenses, while would-be saboteurs are treated to a harsher fate. Despite this supervision, significant numbers of foreign workers are able to roam from place to place, and even to escape. German employers, eager to add to their labor force, facilitate this by offering stray foreigners work. They have been warned repeatedly that no foreigner may be employed without the consent of the Labor Offices, and that all foreigners who have broken their contracts elsewhere must be returned

to their original place of employment. The threat of severe penalties for violations of this rule does not seem to have halted them entirely.

(b) The feeding of foreign workers presents a complex problem, having important implications for the morale of the domestic population as well as for the efficiency of the foreigners. The home front is beginning to look with suspicion on the growing hordes of foreigners, who may have to be fed by a reduction in their own rations. In partial solution of the question, Germany is already attempting to feed the foreign workers to some extent by withdrawing additional food from the countries they come from. Imports of food for foreign workers are allowed exemption from German customs duties. France, especially, is sending large amounts of food and clothing for her prisoners of war working in Germany. The Vichy Government supports this movement with organizational assistance as well as the exemption from rationing of purchases intended for prisoners. But such measures will have a serious effect on the morale of the foreign workers. Many have come to Germany in order to help relatives at home. If they see the amount of food available in their own countries reduced rather than increased by their absence, discontent is liable to mount among them.

One solution of the food problem, adopted particularly in the treatment of Russian civilian and prisoner labor, is to feed the foreigners only enough to keep them alive and performing some useful work. Russian prisoners are divided into two groups: those fitted by training and present physical condition to perform industrial work, and those less useful to Germany at the moment. The former are sent to special camps where they are built up by adequate feeding, and are then put to work. The latter continue manual labor on a starvation diet, of some use to Germany yet costing her virtually nothing.

(15) Jealousy on the part of native German workers may well become an increasingly difficult political problem for the Nazis. The new wage scale in mining was introduced partly to still

the complaints of German workers against the payment of nearly equal wages to "inferior" foreigners. Press remarks on the efficiency of foreign labor are to be minimized, because native German workers feel resentment against the singling out of their foreign rivals for praise. The "blood and soil" wing of the Party is showing increasing unrest over the influx of foreigners. An article in the Voelkischer Beobachter, official Nazi Party newspaper, castigates the "industrialists" for encouraging the importation of foreign workers because of their desire for cheap labor, and declares that the German peasant is being driven off the land by the competition of foreign workers and by the derogation of his calling through association with inferior races working on his soil. An eye-witness reports that foreign workers, particularly French, Dutch, Belgians and Italians, often appear better dressed than the Germans with whom they associate. The German home front seems disgruntled at the fact that foreigners are taking the more or less comfortable places of the men sent to the front.

(16) The Germans have had varying decrees of success in their effort to make use of the different nationalities. Dutch labor is generally considered uncooperative and sullen. The Germans now find it preferable to use Dutch manpower by giving orders to Netherlands industry, rather than attempting more direct supervision in Germany. The French, on the other hand, are more satisfactory. Many return home with pro-Nazi sentiments. The annual report of the Allgemeine Elektrizitaets Gesellschaft states that 30 percent of their French workers are considered excellent, 60 percent satisfactory, and only 10 percent have to be sent back to France. This success has already brought practical fruits. It has been possible to instruct selected French workers in German and Nazi administrative methods, and then to use them to replace German administrators in the occupied territories. The Italians, at first reasonably content, are now beginning to show signs of dissatisfaction, along with demands to be sent

home. The Italian problem is particularly delicate because the Germans are unable to take strong measure for fear of trouble with their ally. The Poles, once held under strict guard, are now often permitted to work alone, an indication that the Nazis consider them trustworthy to some extent. Norwegians are most unsatisfactory from the German point of view, and have been used only in small numbers. The increased confidence of the German authorities in prisoner of war labor is indicated by a recent decree of the Minister for Armaments, providing that by March 31, 1942 half of all prisoners (except British) employed in heavy construction labor were to be transferred to more responsible aramont factory work. Use of Russian prisoners of war is being increased, but only with strict precautions to prevent their doing any damage. Apart from their political unreliability, they have been mistreated to an extent which has substantially reduced their productivity.

f. Conclusion

As yet, the labor problem has not become a major hindrance to the German war effort, but this is only because of the extreme measures taken to provide a partial solution. The guiding principle, as throughout the German economy, has been to provide fully for the needs of the army and essential war industries, making whatever adjustments are necessary at the expense of less vital branches of the economy, or at the expense of the conquered territories. With only a small proportion of available labor still engaged in non-war activity, however, the margin for meeting increased demands for manpower is small. Certain essential replacements and extensions, particularly of capital equipment and durable consumer goods, are already being neglected because of the lack of manpower for any but the most pressing military needs. Most manpower reserves of Germany, and even of the whole continent of Europe, have been or are being mobilized under the new program directed by Sauckel. This program includes:

(1) Complete centralization of labor control in the hands of Party Galeiter Sauckel, who has full authority over the rest of the governmental labor control apparatus and all Nazi Party organs concerned.

(2) Prevention of inflationary wage rises and of the "pirating" of labor.

(3) Allocation of available labor to the tasks where it is most needed, by propaganda, threats, and conscription of workers where necessary.

(4) Removal of workers from non-essential or wasteful employment by "combing out" individual plants.

(5) Intensive retraining of workers to permit their being shifted to necessary tasks.

(6) Growing employment of women, children, over-aged and even smi-invalid workers; all Germany is being put to work.

(7) Increasing use of foreigners and prisoners of war, now one of the most important sources of manpower in the German system.

(8) Efforts to increase efficiency by technical planning.

(9) Propaganda directed to giving labor a stake in the war, and seeking to induce increased effort by the individual workers.

German labor has had to sacrifice much of its normal satisfactions under war conditions. Long hours of work and congested transportation facilities leave the worker little time for home life. What spare time he has in encroached upon by propaganda meetings, waiting in line for rationed and unrationed goods, civilian defense activities, and air raids. He finds it difficult to buy anything beyond the barest necessities of life, all of which are strictly rationed.

On the other hand, German labor receives new psychological incentives. The German worker has been convinced that if Germany loses the war his fate will be exploitation by the capitalistic Allies, if nothing worse. Allied propagandahas as yet offered him little al-

ternative to continuing his war effort. The Altantic Charter is far more conservative than even the milder Nazi promises to labor.

No. 23

EDUCATION

A. 1. General Remarks. The German youth is passionately Nazi. The schools and the Hitler Youth movement train the youth in National Socialism and constitute main bulwarks of the present political regime. The German youth has been so thoroughly politicised that it is one of the most dangerous opponents for an army of invasion or occupation to handle.

2. The Ministry of Education. Control over the educational system has been centralized by the Nazis in the Reich Ministry of Education.(1) The ministry contains the following divisions:

(a) Central office: administration, legislation, foreign affairs;

(b) Office of the Minister;

(c) Office of science (Wissenschaft): universities and other institutions of higher education and research;

(d) Office of education: elementary, middle, and secondary schools, schools for vocations, agricultural and social education;

(e) Office of public instruction: art academies, libraries, museums, castles, care of public monuments, national parks, etc., music and cultural art, literature and theater, films and radio;

(f) Office of physical education: gymnastics, physical education, and care of youth;

(g) Land Year Division: schooling of leaders, inner organization of the land year.

Within each state, education is under the control of a state education office responsible to the Reich Ministry of Education. Each local government, - province, county, city, town or village, has educational officials for its domain.

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(1) Alina M. Lindegren, Education in Germany (Office of Education, 1938, Bulletin No. 15).

3. The German School System.(1) The types of elementary and secondary schools are as follows:

For boys:

Present organization


School year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pupil's age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Class 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Foundation School
Gymnasium
Science-Math line
Upper School
Language line
Aufbau School
Certificate of Maturity
Elementary School
Class . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

For girls:

Present organization


School year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pupil's age 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Class 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Foundation School
Language line
Upper School
Home Economics line
Aufbau School
Certificate of Maturity
Elementary School
Class . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Education is compulsory from the age of 6 to the age of 17 wherever facilities are available. The facilities are available for every pupil at least up to the end of the 13th year, but in a few rural areas there may be no secondary schools. In this case the pupil attends for only

(1) See Lindegren

8 years.

Every pupil is required to attend the Foundation School for four years, After that he may enter either the old-line Gymnasium, of which a few are left, or the Upper School, which is the normal type. Or he may continue in the elementary school for two more years, and enter the Aufbau school, primarily a boarding school for the rural districts. Or he may continue in the elementary school for the full eight years. If he enters the Upper School he may at the end of his 14th year specialize in the branch which emphasizes science and mathematics or the one which emphasizes the language line. In the case of girls the two lines are that of language or that of home economics.

The main cost of education is covered, not by the Reich, but by the states and the communities. All private schools are being squeezed out.

4. Curriculum. In general the choice of subjects taught resembles that of any western country.

5. Statistics. Statistics on the Primary and Secondary Schools (Volkschulen) in the German Reich(a) on May 25, 1940(b) are as follows:(1)

	Primary and Secondary Schools of all kinds	State Schools	Private Schools
Number of schools	57,318	57,255	63
" " classes	200,376	200,235	141
" " pupils	8,243,077	8,240,319	2,758
" " boys	4,148,394	4,146,892	1,502
" " girls	4,094,683	4,093,427	1,256
" " teachers (c)	199,404 (d)	199,261	143
" " male "	137,544	137,489	55
" " female "	61,860	61,772	88

(a) Excludes the new Reichsgaue Danzig-Westpreussen and Wartheland, but includes the former Regierungs-Bezirk Westpreussen.

(b) In the Reichsgaue of the Ostmark and in the Reichsgau Sudetenland the census was taken Oct. 31, 1940.

(c) Includes only those whose principal duty was teaching. In some cases the war has altered the number of teachers employed.

(d) 1,023 persons (of whom 890 were women) with principal duties in other fields also did a certain amount of teaching. In addition 33,113 persons (of whom 20,183 were women) were engaged in teaching along with the exercise of a different principal occupation.

(1) Wirtschaft und Statistik, July 1941, No. 2.

6. Nazi Educational Policy.(1) The Nazi ideals for the training of youth consist of the following:

(a) the worship of power;

(b) the racial basis of social achievement;

(c) absolute devotion to the German fold and to the Führer;

(d) the superiority of the German folk over every other folk.

The Nazi educational policy emphasizes the following points:

(a) physical and pre-military training;

(b) moulding the total personality and not merely the intellect into a loyal Nazi;

(c) repudiation of rationalism in favor of the harmonious development of reason and emotions;

(d) the special study of the Germans and their culture;

(e) sharp curtailment or elimination of non-German material in education;

(f) the use of all subjects, from arithmetic to history, to inculcate Nazi ideals;

(g) wide distribution of vocational training.

7. Technical Training. The need for technical training became acute before the war began. Technical training is essential for workers in industry and for soldiers in modern mechanized war. The apprentices of today are the soldiers of tomorrow in special services. Germany has a widespread system of technical training at all levels. It is uder the direction of the Reich Institute for Occupational Training in Commerce and Industry and the German Labor Front. Beginning with simple training work at the lower grades, this system includes hundreds of elementary industrial, agricultural and commercial schools and many at the advanced level. Among the latter are 23 naval schools, 55 construction schools, 77 technical training schools, a few for forestry and for mining, and several hundred handwork and textile schools. At the highest level are the technical

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(1) A Handbook on National Socialist Germany (O.S.S., 1942).

high schools listed later.(1)

Since the war began the number of openings for apprentices has exceeded the supply by one-third. The period of training has been speeded up, and the training given a practical turn by being connected with the job itself. The training has become so standardized that the same examination in each specialty is given to all apprentices.(2)

At present the Reich has 2096 apprentice training centers with a training capacity of about 124,000 persons. In addition there are 33 cooperative training centers with a capacity of 1300 positions. The machine industry is most active in apprentice training. It is followed by the electrical, iron and steel wares, textile, clothing, motor, iron, mining, metal industries. The economic districts which lead in this training are Bavaria, Westphalia-Lippe, Berlin-Brandenburg. Twelve thousand persons, among them 1700 engineers, teach in these centers.(3)

The vocational training of females has not kept pace with that of males. But since 1934 the number of positions for female apprentices and vocational teachers has increased fourfold or even fivefold.(4)

Vocational guidance has received as careful attention as vocational training. The entire youth of the Reich is tested as to its vocational aptitude during the last two years of the public school, and the Hitler Youth and the German Labor Front cooperate with the schools in directing the youth into those occupations which need apprentices. They have been so successful in guiding youth into the metal industries that in 1941 they had to reduce the number by one-third, but they have not been able to supply the need of, among others, agriculture and of mining especially.

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(1) Reichsaddressbuch, 1941, p. 179-186; Deutscher Volkswirt, March 13, 1942, pp. 765-66.
(2) Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung, Feb. 5, 1942. Brusseler Zeitung, April 22, 1942, reports that the S.A. has schools with a 9-months' course for unskilled workers.
(3) Deutscher Volkswirt, March 13, April 24, 1942.
(4) Deutscher Volkswirt, March 13, 1942.

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8. Teachers. In 1940 in the public elementary schools 99,909 full-time teachers, i.e., 50.1%, belonged to the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, 82,006 or 41.2% were Catholic, 367 teachers were members of other Christian denominations, 26 were members of non-Christian denominations, 296 belonged to a philosophic-ethical society, and 16,547 were "Believers in God" (these include the group not closely affiliated with a particular denomination.) (Wirtschaft und Statistik, July, 1941; No. 2).

A large percentage of the Nazi leaders, especially of the lower ranks, were secondary school teachers.

The Nazis tried to eliminate all teachers who opposed their views, but the lack of manpower in the present war has compelled them to recall teachers of doubtful voluntary loyalty. The younger teachers are thoroughly nazified; the older ones are less so, for they have known another regime than the present one.

The teachers are carefully trained and noted for their efficiency, but the profession is not popular. The Nazis are making special efforts to induce able young men and women to enter it.(1)

9. Nazi Youth Organizations and Party Schools.(2) The Nazis dissolved every other youth organization and compel every boy and girl to belong to the Hitler Youth from the 10th to the end of the 18th year. The Hitler Youth influences the character of the youth as much as or even more than the family and the school.

The organization of the Hitler Youth covers the entire Reich, with regional and local units responsible to the Reich Youth Leader, Arthur Axmann. He and the organization are responsible, not to the State but to the party. Among the functions of the Hitler Youth are the following: drill in Nazi ideology, physical education and other forms of pre-military training, aid in vocational guidance into lines of work desired by the Nazi government.

(1) See Frankfurther Zeitung, April 18, 1942; Berliner Borsen Zeitung, Feb. 6, 1942.
(2) A Handbook on National Socialist Germany (O.S.S., 1942).

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For the training of Nazi leaders in all phases of life but especially in the party, the Nazis have developed their own party education. The party schools provide the model for the future educational system of Germany, for the Nazis are not satisfied with the present system. These schools are:

(a) The National Political Institutes, with a program of study similar to that of the Upper School. The following are known to exist.(1)

Prussia:

Bensberg near Cologne

Berlin-Spandau

Ilfeld in the Harz

Köslin in Pomerania

Naumburg on the Saale

Neuzelle near Guben

Oranienstein on the Lahn

Plön in Holstein

Potsdam

Schulpforts near Naumburg

Stuhm in West Prussia

Austria:

Troiskirchen near Vienna

Vienna-Breitensee

Vienna-Theresianum

Vienna (Baerhauegasse) and Hubertendorf near Amstetten

Sudetenland:

Plaschkowitz near Leitmeritz

Amhalt:

Ballenstedt

Köthen

Saxony:

Klotzsche near Dresden

(1) Deutsche Schulerziehung. Jahrbuch des Deutschen Zentralinstituts für Erziehung und Unterricht, Berlin, 1940, E. S. Mittler, pp. 248-9. Munchner Neueste Nachrichten, May 8, 1942.

Württemberg:

Backnang

Rottweil

Bavaria:

Neubeuern on the Inn

These schools are under the special protection of the S.S.

(b) The Adolf Hitler Schools are similar to these. They are organized as a 6-year upper school, and are under the direct jurisdiction of the leaders of the Hitler Youth. Each of the 34 Hitler Youth districts is to have a school, but up to March 1941 only 31 had been completed.

(c) The Ordensburgen constitute the highest type of the party schools for leaders. Men primarily between the ages of 21 and 25 enter them. The four schools are located at Krössinsee, Vogelsand, Sonthofen, and Marienburg. Each contains about 140 of the ablest young Nazis.

(d) Training of party lower leaders also takes place at the Braunschweig Academy, the Reich Leader School of the Hitler Youth is Potsdam, and the Reich School of the Nazi Teachers Union at Donnsdorf near Bayreuth.

In addition to these schools, the Nazi party conducts many less formal training centers where instruction lasts for a short time, frequently only a few weeks.

The Hitler Youth has special corps for preliminary training in the marines, mechanized units, air force, cavalry, technical and other military and naval services.

10. German universities and technical high-schools rank among the most efficient of all time as to both personnel and equipment. After 1933 the Nazis dismissed over a thousand teachers of all ranks in the higher institutions, and hurt the international standing and undoubtedly the quality of the latter. Since the war began, the

Nazi Government has emphasized practical scientific training. The period of higher education has been shortened so as to supply badly needed technicians as quickly as possible. Even the universities have been largely turned into training schools for war needs.

The universities and technical high-schools are as follows:(1)

UNIVERSITIES

Berlin, Bonn, Breslau, Erlangen, Frankfurt,a.M., Freiburg i.B., Giessen, Göttingen, Graz, Greifswald, Halle, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Jena, Kiel, Köln, Königsberg, Leipzig, Marburg, München, Münster i.W., Prag, Rostock, Tübingen, Wien, Würzburg.

TECHNICAL HIGH SCHOOLS

Aachen, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Braunschweig, Breslau, Brünn, Danzig, Darmstadt, Dresden, Hannover, Karlsruhe (Baden), München, Prag, Stuttgart, Wien.

COMMERCIAL HIGH SCHOOLS

Berlin, Bodenbach, Dresden, Eger, Koenigsberg i. Pr., Leipzig, Mährisch Schönberg, Nürnberg, Trautenau, Weinheim (Bergstrasse), Znaim.

MINING ACADEMIES

Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Freiberg i. Sa.

AGRICULTURAL HIGH SCHOOLS

Hohenheim b. Plieningen (Württ.), Tetschen-Liebwer

COLONIAL HIGH SCHOOL

Witzenhausen (Werra)

FOREST HIGH SCHOOLS

Eberswalde, Hannover-Münden, Tharandt (Bez. Dresden)

11. Organization of Students and University Teachers. University teachers are organized into a Nazi Dozent Union and all students in universities and in the technical schools are united in the Professional Union of the German Reich.

(1) Reichsaddressbuch, 1941, VI, p. 177-78.

12. Nazi Education and Propaganda Abroad. (See also Section IV, 30E) The Nazis seek to spread their influence abroad by their educational system. (a) They bring foreign students and specialists from other countries i.e., Bulgaria, Rumania, etc., to Germany for special training. (b) They bring Folk Germans from settlements in other countries back to Germany for their higher education. (c) They have a special Colonial Institute in Witzenhausen for preparing Germans for settlement in colonies which they expect to acquire. (d) They have a special school in Berlin for training sabotage experts,(1) and schools for preparing propagandists for work abroad.

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(1) The Washington Post, July 2, 1942.

No. 24

RELIGION

24. Religion. a. Diversity of Religious Groups. In 1933 more than 95 percent of the German people belonged to one of the Christian churches. There were in addition 600,000 Jews. Only two and a half million people did not belong to any religious group. Out of the 65,000,000 Christians, 41,000,000 belonged to Protestant churches, or, as the united Lutheran and Calvinist churches were called in Germany, Evangelical churches. The annexation of the Saar district, Austria, Sudetenland and the Polish provinces, added a large group of Roman Catholics to the German Reich. At the present moment only 60 percent of the inhabitants of Greater Germany are Protestants.

Roman Catholicism is the religion of the vast majority in the Rhinelands, Northern Westphalia, Southern Baden, Southern Bavaria, Northern Franconia, along the Main River, in all of former Austria, Sudetenland, Upper Silesia and the Polish provinces. There are important Protestant regions in Southern Germany, like the Palatinate (Heidelberg), Wuerttenberg, and Central Franconia (Nuremberg). On the other hand, there are, in addition to the regions already mentioned, old Catholic regions in the heart of Protestant Northern Germany, such as Hildesheim in Hanover and Ermland in Eastern Prussia. The geography of the denominational map too has been blurred, however, by the large intermigration during the last half century. The urban centers, in particular, usually have strong minorities of denominations which had their original roots in other territories. The population of Munich, for example, is nowadays one-third Protestant, whereas Nuremberg's is one-third Roman Catholic. The same mingling of the two denominations is to be found in Berlin and Hamburg.

The religious statistics do not reveal much about the actual state of the Christian churches in Germany. The high percentage of the population organized in the Christian churches merely indicates that the Germans are born into their churches and do not join them voluntarily. In order to leave his Christian church, the individual has always been obliged to make

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

PROVISIONAL EDITION

FREE

ECCLESIASTICAL PROVINCES OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN "GREATER GERMANY"

NORTH SEA

HOLLAND

BELGIUM

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND

LIECHTENSTEIN

ITALY

YUGOSLAVIA

HUNGARY

LITHUANIA

U S S R

GOVERNMENT GENERAL

DANZIG

FRAUENBURG

ERMLAND

PELPLIN

Under Archdiocese of Vilno

SCHNEIDEMÜHL
Under the Holy See

BERLIN

GNESEN

POSEN

WLOCLAWEK

PLOCK

WARSAW

LODZ

OSNABRÜCK

HILDESHEIM

MÜNSTER

PADERBORN

KÖLN

AACHEN

LIÈGE

Malmedy

LIMBURG

FULDA

MEISSEN

BAUTZEN

BRESLAU

LEITMERITZ

KÖNIGGRÄTZ

PRAG

KATOWICE

CRACOW

TRIER

MAINZ

WÜRZBURG

BAMBERG

LUXEMBOURG

OLMÜTZ

SPEYER

METZ

BRÜNN

EISENSTADT

REGENSBURG

BUDWEISS

STRASBOURG

ROTTENBURG

PASSAU

AUGSBURG

Freising

LINZ

ST. POLTEN

WIEN

FREIBURG

MÜNCHEN

SALZBURG

EISENSTADT

INNSBRUCK

GRAZ

KLAGENFURT

0 25 50 75 100 Miles

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 Kilometers

ECCLESIASTICAL CENTERS

SEAT OF ARCHBISHOP

SEAT OF BISHOP

BOUNDARIES

CLAIMED BY THIRD REICH FOR "GREATER GERMANY" JANUARY 1, 1941

DIOCESE

ARCHDIOCESE

(Source material on ecclesiastical boundaries dated 1939 and 1940)

ECCLESIASTICAL PROVINCES

- CHURCH PROVINCE OF BAMBERG
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF BRESLAU
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF FREIBURG
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF KÖLN
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF GNESEN - POSEN
- UNDER JURISDICTION OF THE HOLY SEE
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF WARSAW
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF PADERBORN
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF SALZBURG
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF WIEN
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF OLMÜTZ
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF PRAG
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF MÜNCHEN - FREISING
- CHURCH PROVINCE OF CRACOW

MAP NO. 762 DECEMBER 17, 1942

REPRODUCED BY THE OSS REPRO. SECTION

COMPILED AND DRAWN IN THE BRANCH OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, OSS

PROVISIONAL EDITION

FREE

GREATER GERMANY
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ROMAN CATHOLICS

0 25 50 75 100
Miles

Hamburg
Stettin
Danzig
NETHERLANDS
BERLIN
Hannover
Posen
Warsaw
Lodz
Radom
GOVERNMENT GENERAL
Leipzig
Dresden
Liegnitz
BELGIUM
Köln
Frankfurt
Prag
Krakow
SLOVAKIA
Regensburg
Stuttgart
FRANCE
Ulm
München
Wien
Budapest
SWITZERLAND
Innsbruck
HUNGARY
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA

LEGEND

- LESS THAN 30 %
- 30 % TO 50 %
- 50 % TO 70 %
- 70 % OR MORE
- BOUNDARY OF GREATER GERMANY

MAP NO 913 OCTOBER 7, 1942

DRAWN IN GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, O.S.S.

a public declaration of his withdrawal; and since the state frowned upon dissidents, very few people took this step, although they were no longer practising Christians. In the four decades prior to the first World War, the Social Democratic Party conducted a fairly lively campaign against the Christian churches, but only a small number of Socialists officially withdrew from the church. Most of them discontinued participating in church affairs. The Roman Catholic could count on a fuller support of its members than the Protestant churches, owing to the fact that it was less of a state church, and because its priests were selected from all social classes. Roman Catholicism also possessed a stronger religious discipline. This situation is reflected in the capacity of the two churches to resist persecution. The Protestant opposition to Nazi persecution is socially and regionally scattered, and, for the moment, not politically dangerous.

The general organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany follows the universal pattern. German Catholicism had certain ancient privileges of its own, for example, the strong position of the cathedral chapters in the election of bishops. Its relationship to the individual states varied. In Austria, where nearly 95 percent of the population was Roman Catholic, the church enjoyed an extraordinary position in public life. To a lesser degree, this was true in Bavaria, whereas in Prussia, the relation between the Roman Catholic Church and the State had not become regularized before the days of the Weimar Republic. This historical past made Roman Catholicism largely a champion of regional or state rights. Permanent diplomatic relations between the Reich and the Vatican did not exist before 1919, the present Pope having been the first nuncio to the Reich from 1920-32.

The Protestant churches, too, were divided along territorial lines, with a few important exceptions. The map of Protestant churches in Germany had come into being as territorial churches under the leadership of the territorial princes. Prussia succeeded in bringing all its Protestant churches into one and the same organization in 1825 - the so-called Evangelical Church of Old Prussia, which constituted the largest single Protestant

church in Germany. But when Prussia annexed Hanover, Frankfurt, and Schleswig-Holstein in 1866, the churches of these provinces refused to join the Prussian church and remained independent. A similar unification took place among the Protestant churches of Bavaria, but in most other cases territorial organizations older than the nineteenth century were reflected in the organization of independent Protestant churches. Twenty-eight of them were in existence in 1933, although they had created in the days of the Republic a coordinating committee similar to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the German Evangelical Church Federation.

As a consequence of the revolution of 1918, the Protestant churches in Germany were faced with an entirely new situation. All Protestant churches were state churches with the kings or princes acting as primates. Inter-state synods existed, but they had little authority over the separate churches. Since only active church members participated in elections, Protestant ministers were unfamiliar with problems of ecclesiastical self-government. The financial administration of the churches was in the hands of the state and church taxes were levied by the state. Theological training was carried on through the theological faculties of the universities which were not under the supervision of the churches. These faculties were the most liberal elements within Protestantism. Within the church organizations proper, however, the conservative elements remained dominant. Supported by the nobility and middle classes, the Protestant churches preached the unity of "throne and altar".

The Weimar Republic made an effort to separate church and state. There was never any political pressure on the church during the republican period. The separation of church and state was not executed once it became apparent that the churches did not desire it. The theological faculties in the state universities were maintained and the state continued to collect taxes for the churches, but every effort was made to abstain from using these opportunities for political influence and patronage. The state took a disinterested attitude, even after it became apparent

that the churches remained a bulwark of conservative social and political tradition.

There were many movements aiming at the establishment of a "people's church" to take the place of an official church represented chiefly by its clergy. However, most of the Protestant clergy were afraid to admit those political and social elements to active church life which had no interest in the church at all. The suffrage of church elections was manipulated in such a manner as to exclude these groups from proper representation. Instead of preaching the identity of "throne and altar", they now glorified the state, not, to be sure, the weak authority of the Republic, but the powerful national State which was to avenge the German defeat of 1918. This made the Protestant churches a fertile ground for Hitler's propaganda, and the Protestant churches carry a heavy responsibility for the National Socialist revolution of 1933.

Hitler, however, did what the Republic had avoided. He imposed suffrage on the church, and, by sending his stormtroopers to the church polls, uprooted the old ecclesiastical bureaucracy. This first clash between the churches and the Nazi state was concerned chiefly with the administrative control over the church, and was not yet a truly religious conflict. This came later.

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward National Socialism was quite different. Roman Catholicism had gained enormously by the establishment of the Weimar Republic. Whereas under the Empire, particularly in Prussia, the Catholic Church was regarded with suspicion, the Weimar Republic took a neutral attitude. For the first time many prominent Catholic leaders were appointed to cabinet seats, in fact, most of the time a leading Catholic was German chancellor. The relations with the Vatican were on the whole friendly. The German Catholics, constituting a more progressive and liberal group than those of Austria or France, sensed from the very beginnings in the Nazi movement a recrudescense of the religion of state. After the first great electoral victory of the Nazis in 1930, the bishops began to fight

National Socialism openly to the extent of denying church burials to Nazi leaders. Most of the Catholic leaders were therefore heavily committed to an anti-Nazi attitude in 1933. The political representation of the Catholic Church in the German Reichstag placed Catholics in a position to lead a parliamentary opposition to the Nazi government. The Catholic Center party could have thwarted Hitler's attempts to gain a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag in the act enabling him to suspend all constitutional rights. At this moment, however, the open fight was given up under the influence of the Vatican.

It was, of course, doubtful whether the Nazis would have respected constitutional rights in any case. The president of the popolari, the Catholic party in Italy, seemed a deterrent. On the other hand, the facist government of Italy had ultimately made peace with the Church, and the Vatican Concordat had, for the time being at least, stabilized the Church in Italy. Therefore, the Vatican decided to conclude a concordat with Hitler, which implied the discontinuance of all political activities on the part of the Catholic Church and its organizations in return for the promise to respect the religious activities of the Church. The Concordat was violated at once by the Nazi government, but by the time the Catholic Church resolved on a more determined attitude, it had lost the political organization which could have given strength to its resistance.

b. Nazi Attitude toward Religion and Ethics. The Nazis claim to be the creators, not merely of new political world order, but the prophets of a new civilization and culture. They cannot achieve their conception of a totalitarian state without subordinating and dissolving the Christian churches. Hitler's concept is a tribal state which acts at the same time as church, as in the days of militant old Israel. National Socialism and historic Christianity are incompatible. Hitler considers himself not merely the political leader, but the sovereign pontiff of the Germans. There can be no doubt that his ultimate aim is the complete dissolution of the Christian churches, as indicated by the training given in the SS

elite schools, in the Hitler youth, and in the labor service. But Hitler knows that the struggle against Christianity will last a long time and that victory cannot be gained by frontal attack. Moreover, an open expression of this desire would have made it impossible for him to exploit the anti-Bolshevist sentiment which was such a powerful force in the rise of Nazidom in Germany and abroad. For this reason the party program declares itself in favor of a "positive" Christianity, but as Hitler's Minister for Church Affairs declared in February, 1937, "The divinity of Christ is ridiculous and unessential. A new authority has arisen as to what Christ and Christianity really are--Adolf Hitler."

The Nazi religion, based on the deification of the Germanic race and glorification of the omnipotence of Hitler's state, justifies the achievement of greater power for the German folk by any means, including war and treaty violations in dealing with foreign nations, lying, deception, and murder at home. Obedience and sacrifice to the nation are its supreme ideals. National Socialism challenges Christianity in its denial of a universal brotherhood of men, in its respect for family from which children are taken away for state indoctrination and party service. The wish to increase the birthrate has led to public approval of illegitimate childbirth; racial policy sanctions the killing of the insane and the sterilization of undesirable persons.

c. Response of Protestantism to National Socialism. The response of Protestantism to National Socialism has been mixed. The unification of the churches in a Protestant Reich Church by itself would have hardly met strong opposition, had it not been for the type of people placed in control of the church organization by the Nazis. The new men were at once suspected of compromising Christianity. The majority of Protestant ministers and congregations, however, were willing to go a long way with the Nazis. It should be kept in mind that in Lutheran teaching the individual owes complete obedience to the political acts of his government. Even the outward organization of the church is a matter of no religious consequence, since

the true Christian church is not identical with its secular appearance, but a mystic entity. Only in matters of faith and conscience, no compromise is allowed. Only passive resistance and martyrdom are admitted. None of the groups of the Protestant opposition in Germany has ever departed from this line, though individual theologians like Karl Barth have taken a different position. Pastor Niemoeller's attitude has been in line with the original Lutheran theology, although there have been some doubts as to whether a church, in which the teaching of the Gospel has become impossible, can still be considered a Christian church at all. Martin Niemoeller of Berlin-Dahlem (arrested in 1937, tried, acquitted, and since March, 1938 held in a concentration camp) has been the chief exponent of the "confession church. Many of his colleagues like Pastors Wolff, Wenberger, Knoll, Brandt Jakobi, Asmussen, Niesel and Dr. Ehlers, have been sentenced by the Nazi government. The movement has not been annihilated by the Nazis, however, and all over Germany it continues to exist in small groups. On the whole, it is the most active opposition to the Nazi regime and probably the first movement of opposition in which members of the higher middle classes have taken an active interest. There have been many people in high places (General von Runstedt) who at one time or another have endeavored to give assistance to this group. Niemoeller was brought to a concentration camp after Generals von Fritsch and Beck were removed from the army command, and the army chaplains have repeatedly tried to mitigate Nazi anger against the "confessional" church.

On the other hand, groups have sprung up which were more or less in agreement with the pagan ideas of National Socialism. Most of them were the outgrowth of the fanciful thought of certain German professors. The so-called German Faith Movement of Hauer which tries to merge Germanic and old Indian nature and folk cults with the older Christian ritual belongs to this category. A similar philosophy is preached by Ernst Bergmann who, like Hauer, takes his cue from Rosenberg's ideas about race and the special mission of the German people and tries to purge Christianity of its Jewish ingredients. These groups form only a small fringe of the church. More

important and dangerous are the millions of "German Christians", an organization of the Nazi party, developed for the purpose of Nazi church control. The movement is used as a mere mouthpiece and ecclesiastical SA of the National Socialist leaders. In the course of time it changed ~~it changed~~ its complexion to suit the political wishes of the party. Originally under the leadership of Mr. Müller, an army chaplain who established contacts between Hitler and General von Blomberg, and was made Reich Bishop by Hitler in 1933, it has pretended less and less to be a movement for the regeneration of the Christian church, but rather a movement for the establishment of a Germanic church. It is in these circles that attempts were made to rewrite the Bible or to revise the Ten Commandments.

The largest group of German Protestants, for the most part Lutheran in background and training, do not belong to any of these groups. They are devoted to Germany and willing to admire what the Nazis have done in the political field, yet uneasy and troubled over Nazi excesses and moral standards. They are convinced that the Christian revelation was unique and universal and are unwilling to compromise it completely by identifying it with nationalistic passion. They are profoundly convinced, however, that Germany was unjustly treated at Versailles and are inclined to believe that love for country and the desire to right its wrongs must have some religious significance.

d. Response of the Catholic Church to National Socialism. By the conclusion of the Concordat of 1933 the Roman Catholic Church tried to maintain its ecclesiastical organization without compromising with National Socialism philosophy or ethics. Great efforts were made on the part of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to find a working agreement with government and party, but after the destruction of the political organization of German Catholicism the struggle against all ecclesiastical organizations was carried on with relentless vigor and the Church found it increasingly difficult to present its Christian point of view to the public. The Roman Catholic Church in Germany has a better control over its membership and greater experience in

opposing a hostile political force than the German Protestant churches. On the other hand, considerations of universal church policy have frequently hampered the Catholic opposition. It may suffice to mention Spain or the fact that the Vatican is located in Facist Italy. In Austria the full moral support of the Catholic Church and clergy was thrown behind the Dolfuss-Schuschnigg government which fought the Nazification of Austria with all its power. The invasion of Austria in 1938 placed the Austrian Catholics in great jeopardy and weakened the Catholic opposition all over Germany.

The Catholic Church opposition has proceeded largely along local and regional lines. Individual priests and bishops, occasionally the conference of German bishops, are the actual directors of an opposition movement which must be carried on largely under cover. The Catholic clergy as a whole has taken a stronger stand against racialism than the Protestant churches. It has in recent days through Bishop Count Galen of Muenster-Westphalia accused the government openly of murder in the killing of the feeble-minded and crippled persons which has been going on in Germany for the last year. It should be said, however, that the opposition of the Catholic clergy has been strictly confined to religious and moral issues. Political opposition has been carefully avoided. In strongly Catholic regions, the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church has helped greatly to maintain the tradition of older moral concepts and to slow up the Nazification of German youth.

e. Nazi Efforts to Control the Christian Churches.

(1) Protestant Churches. The Nazis have attempted to control the Protestant churches and force them into line by the following means: (a) In 1933 they established the Office of Reich Bishop for the unified Protestant churches and have appointed Nazi or pro-Nazi men to all the important posts. The Reich church was to be organized along the "leadership principle", i.e. the Reich Bishop should have absolute power to appoint and dismiss ministers and to control church finances. (b) Since this was a partial failure, they created a Reich Ministry of Church Affairs in 1935

and appointed one of Hitler's closest henchmen, Kerrl, to the office with full powers. (c) Pressure has been used in an effort to make all pastors take the following oath: "I swear to be loyal and obedient to the leader of the German Reich and folk - Adolf Hitler, to respect the laws and to carry out my official duties, so help me God!" (d) They abolished all youth organizations of the church and forced the children to join the Hitler Youth where they were to undergo training in Nazi doctrine. (e) They closed the theological faculties of the German universities and suppressed the private theological schools set up by members of the "Confessional Church". (f) By encouraging pagan or semi-pagan cults, they tried to undermine the respect for Christian ideas, as they tried to induce people to withdraw from the Christian churches altogether.

(2) Catholicism. (a) All Catholic organizations were dissolved, including the youth and educational organizations directed by priests. (b) A "smear campaign" was opened against the Catholic clergy and monastic orders, accusing them of vice and moral depravity. (c) Church property was taken over by the state and monastic orders dissolved. (d) Catholics or Protestants attending church are defamed, and by obligatory meetings of the Hitler Youth on Sunday, the children are kept from attending church.

f. The Christian Churches and the War. The Christian churches in Germany have supported the war. Only the members of one small Christian sect, which had been dissolved by the Nazi government before, have actively agitat for absolute pacifism. It is generally assumed that a few hundred of these Jehovah's Witnesses have been shot by the Nazis in 1939-40. From the official churches no criticism of German war policy was heard. Many people hoped that the war situation would lead to a discontinuance of Nazi attacks upon the Christian churches, but this has not proved to be the case. In a recent circular letter to party officials Bormann, the deputy Führer of the party and the successor of Rudolf Hess, stated that National Socialism and Christianity were absolutely irreconcilable, that therefore the party had given up the idea of creating a unified Reich church, but would rather weaken

the church as much as possible. "The people must be liberated from the churches and their organs, the pastors . . . it is in the interest of the Reich not to overcome, but rather to maintain and intensify the division of the churches." The fight against the influence of the church is thus continued openly as well as surreptitiously. Rationing of paper is used as a pretext to dissolve monasteries and other church institutions since they had to be used for the housing of the SS. Protestant pastors are serving with the troops, not as chaplains, but as privates and their pulpits are kept vacant. The lack of provision for the spiritual care of German troops is a matter of many complaints. Still, the churches have abstained from political criticism as before. On the other side, the Roman Catholic Church has avoided blessing Hitler's propagandistic assertion that in fighting Russia he was fighting for a Christian Europe. After the opening of the German-Russian war, the Pope did not bless the German weapons, but prayed for peace, a gesture which has made a deep impression on German and Austrian Catholics.

g. The Nazis and the Churches in the Occupied Countries. In Norway, Denmark, and Holland, the Protestant churches have remained the chief centers of national life. The same is true for the Catholic Church in Poland and Belgium. In France the situation is confused.

(1) Norway. The church is under constant control, and even the most innocent remarks are considered attacks upon the government. Everything is done to discredit the church leadership of Bishop Berggrav. The Protestant clergy has been extremely stubborn in its resistance, and many ministers were imprisoned. In recent months the Church has broken off relations with the Quisling government.

(2) Holland. In Holland the Nazi pressure is steadily increasing. The two chief issues on which the struggle is centered are the Nazi legislation in the racial field and the independence of the Christian schools. With regard to racialism, a considerable number of Christian bodies and university faculties have preferred to be dissolved rather than to accept

the new decree that persons of non-Aryan ancestry can only be members of purely Jewish organizations. With regard to Christian schools, the Nazis have broken their promise that they would not interfere with their independence. The schools are now under ideological as well as financial control, and teachers are dismissed if they do not agree to teach according to Nazi ideas. The Protestant churches have for the first time in Dutch history made a common approach to the authorities together with the Roman Catholic Church in a strongly worded protest against the perversion of law and justic against the deportation of Jews, and against the superimposing of Nazi ideology on the Dutch people.

(3) Occupied France. The Roman Catholic Church in France is divided into "Collaborationists" and "Resisters". It seems that the idea of resistance has made considerable progress, but the groups actively engaged in the resistance movement are still small.

(4) Poland. Most of the districts of Poland in which a considerable Protestant minority existed have been annexed to the Reich. The German Lutheran church of Poland which formed one of the strongest German agencies within Poland has run into considerable difficulty with the Nazi government. Their leaders have recently pointed out that their relations with the Nazi government were perhaps even less harmonious than those with the former Polish government. Within the Government-General the Catholic Church has not encouraged cooperation.

(5) Occupied Russia. The religious situation is even more confused than in France. In general the directors of German occupation seem to consider religion a useful weapon against Communism and seem to try to exploit rather than persecute it. There are reports, however, about limitations placed upon the activities of the Orthodox Church. The situation seems rather chaotic since there are, in addition to German control which is divided between the army and party, Rumanian and Roman Catholic influences at work. The Rumanian government follows a policy of Rumanization in the territory which it has occupied and uses Rumanian Orthodox priests from Italy who seem to work for the position of the Vatican in the occupied

territories. The Germans seem to tolerate these activities because they can use the prospect of an expansion of Roman control over the Ukraine for bargaining purposes with the Vatican.

25. Public Order, Police and the Elite Guard (SS.) - a. Public Order.

The respect of the German people for law and order is proverbial and consequently often exaggerated. This reputation is founded on traits exhibited by a large segment of the population. An overwhelming desire for order has at times prevented revolution, caused the people to endure social and political injustice, and even to accept foreign rule. However, there has always existed a less docile, more active element of the population, quite capable of stubborn, hard-bitten resistance to a regime not of its choice.

Laws, courts and police exist primarily for the perpetuation of the National Socialist state. Where the interests of the National Socialist state conflict with justice, justice yields. The limits of crime are determined not alone by the statutes, but by the "healthy racial feeling" of the judges. Ex post facto criminal laws may be enacted. The already lon list of criminal offenses has also been lengthened to enforce certain National Socialist concepts. Thus the notorious Nuremberg Laws (1935) forbid "racial infamy," i.e., marital and extramarital relations between Aryan and Jew. Developments in the spring and summer of 1942 clearly indicate increased political interference with the functioning of German courts.

Crime in the first year of the war seemed to be on the decrease, a development normally to be expected. Yet the number of minor offenses tended to increase, no doubt, as a result of the voluminous, new, war legislation. On the other hand, the homicide rate declined markedly. The greater role accorded to women in the war economy brought an increase in female criminality. Also the number of youthful criminals showed a slight increase. Yet, on a whole, Germany is tending to repeat the experience of England and Wales during the last war, when crime declined. In most countries crime is committed largely by the age groups from 18 to 25, especially the males of these age groups. During a war most males of these age

groups are absorbed into the armed forces with a consequent drop in the incidence of civilian criminality.

b. The Police. - (1) General Observations.

For generations the Germans have been accustomed to rigid police control. While in the United States it is still possible to live one's life oblivious to the presence of the police, even the most law-abiding German rarely passes a year without standing several hours at the bar of the local police precinct office. Under the National Socialist regime the police control of the individual is still increasing.

At the same time the police organization is assuming new importance as an instrument of political and military power. The first phase of this development antedates the present regime and reaches back to the Revolution of 1918. As a precaution against revolutionary movements the militarized, barracked, police formations were expanded and placed in areas where they never before had been stationed. Hitler's march to the Munich Feldherrnhalle during the revolt, November 8/9, 1923, was routed by such a militarized police formation. With the acquiescence of the Reichswehr, control of the militarized provincial police was usually tantamount to de facto control of the state. The Social Democrats sought this control by introducing into the police organization cells consisting of members of the Social Democratic party guard. At the decisive moment, however, this precaution proved ineffective.

The National Socialists took over the government of the Reich, firmly resolved to avoid the pitfalls of their predecessors. Nevertheless, consolidation of the police was not achieved without a clash of personal ambitions. Göring as Minister President of Prussia gained control of the militarized Prussian Protection Police, the strongest police unit in the Reich. Immediately he set out to weld this formation into a weapon of personal power. In the spring of 1933 he forbade members of the Protection Police to belong to the SA., the SS or the Stahlhelm on the grounds that members of the SA.,

SS and Stahlhelm were subject to their organizations' disciplinary regulations. He followed up this measure by dismissing (August 15, 1933) the auxiliary police (Hilfspolizei) consisting of SA. members. Obviously there was no room in the Prussian Police for men serving any master but Göring.

Not content with control of the Protection Police (Schutzpolizei) Göring founded in the spring of 1933 the notorious Gestapo or Secret State Police. He assumed direct command of what was then a purely Prussian organization. Retaining the title Chief of the Secret State Police, Göring entrusted the active direction of the Gestapo to Diels, an Oberregierungsrat formerly in charge of the Department for the Observation of Communism, attached to the Prussian Ministry of Interior.

[While Göring consolidated his control of the police in Prussia, SS Reich Leader Himmler, starting from Bavaria, gradually gained command of all political police outside of Prussia. Certain developments in the first part of 1934 seem to have placed Himmler in a favorable position to bring the Göring-controlled Gestapo under his sway. Chief among these developments is believed to have been the detection by Himmler's SS Security Service of a plot against Göring's life. The plotters are said to have been arrested in Berlin without the knowledge of Göring's own Secret State Police. Whatever the immediate circumstances, Diels was replaced by Himmler, (April 20, 1934,) who became Deputy Chief of the Secret State Police, Göring retaining his position as Chief. After gaining this foothold in Prussia Himmler managed in the space of two years to become Chief of the entire German Police, including both Göring's Secret Police and Protection Police (June 17, 1936.)]

Himmler's rise to power in the German Police has been paralleled by increasing interpenetration of the SS and the Police, both in the point of organization and personnel. (See chart 1.)

Paragraph 25, Chart 1.

Branches of the German Police and other Organizations under Himmler's Control. (1940-41)


Himmler, Reich Leader SS, Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissar for Strengthening of German Folkdom
The Organization of the Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Folkdom
The SS or Elite Guards
Security Service of the SS Reich Leader
The Military SS
The General SS
The Chief of Security Police and Security Service
The Security Police
The State Police
The Criminal Police
The Secret State Police "Gestapo"
The Frontier Police
The Reich Surgeon of the SS and the Police
Veterinary Corps
Medical Corps
Ordnance Department
Dental Corps
Special Police: The Air Police, Mountain Police, Railway Police, Stream & Navigation Police, Waterways Protection Police, Marine Coast Police
The Police Administration
The Technical Emergency Corps (Technische Nothilfe)
The Fire Protection Police
The Volluntary Firemen
Chief of the Order Police
The Protection Police
The Barracked Protection Police
The Gendarmerie
The Motorized Gendarmerie
The Alpine Gendarmerie
The (Local) Protection Police of the Communities

(10698)

(2) Strength Statistics of the German Police.

A pre-war (1939) estimate places the strength of the German police at 150,000 to 180,000. No estimate of present strength is available. However, it seems quite conceivable that the present total strength, including all units abroad or serving in the SS Police Division(s) or similar formations may be double the pre-war strength. Since the war there have been marked increases in the Order Police and Gestapo. As a consequence of the first "thousand-plans" raid (actually 906) on Cologne Himmler ordered that the personnel of the fire departments in the Reich be increased to the required peace-time strength (Friedenssollstärke) and that in areas especially menaced by air raids the personnel be increased to twenty percent above the required peace-time strength.

Before the war there was a partially trained police reserve which was mobilized at the outbreak of hostilities. Its present strength is unknown.

At the end of 1941 the combined strength of the SS and Police was believed to have been less than 1,000,000. (Concerning the SS see below, subparagraph c.)

(3) Organization of the German Police.

The police of Germany constitute for most practical purposes one single organization, centrally controlled. The supreme police authority is vested in the Führer. Every Reich Minister within the sphere of his authority uses the police to carry out his directives. The General Police as an organization is nominally subordinated to the Reich Minister of the Interior (Dr. W. Frick).

(a) The Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police, Der Reichsführer - SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei im Reichministerium des Innern (abbreviated RFSSuChdDtPol)

Heinrich Himmler, the bearer of this ponderous title, constitutes the directing force of the entire German Police organization. (For further data on Himmler see above, General Observations; see be-

low, subparagraph c-3 on the SS). According to law, Himmler is personally and directly subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. Actually he is a semi-independent Reich official. He takes part in consultations of the Reich Cabinet as far as these touch his competency. His decisions have ministerial character. He controls a vast network of organizations comprising the Police, the SS, and the newly created agency for the consolidation of German folkdom (see chart 1). The two key-men under Himmler are the Chief of the Order Police and the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. After these two chiefs the most important executives seem to be some twenty-five or thirty-five Higher SS and Police Leaders.

Aug. 1943 changed.

Directly responsible to Himmler is the Inspector of the Concentration Camps.

(b) The Higher Leaders of the SS and Police - Höhere SS und Polizeiführer.

In contrast to the Chief of the Order Police and the Chief of the Security Police, who are each in command of a single branch of the German Police (see chart 1), the Higher SS and Police Leaders are the regional representatives of Himmler and may command both of the main branches of the Police. Functionally the Higher SS and Police Leaders are the projection into a certain area of Himmler's executive authority as Leader of the SS and as Chief of the German Police, sometimes also in his capacity as Commissar for the Strengthening of German Folkdom.

There are three categories of Higher SS and Police Leaders. (1) the Higher SS and Police Leader for Special Purposes (Höherer SS und Polizeiführer z.b.V.), two of whose staff majors can be identified; (2) the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the Corps Areas (Wehrkreise); (3) the Higher SS and Police Leaders in German-occupied countries. Such executives are known to be established in Occupied France, the Netherlands, Norway, Cracow, Riga, and Southern Russia. One or two more are assumed to be in Russia, one probably at Kiev; others presumably direct the German police in Southeastern Europe.

Due to its large size, the following document has been filmed in segments. The order of the segments is as follows: left to right, top to bottom.

CONFIDENTIAL

Paragraph 25, Chart 2

Organization of German Police

Summer 1940


Führer
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police
REICHSFÜHRER-SS UND CHEF DER DEUTSCHEN POLIZEI
Chief of the Main Office of Budget and Buildings
Main Office of Budget and Buildings
The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. CHEF DER SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI UND DES SD (SICHERHEITSDIENSTES.)
Chief of the Order Police
CHEF DER ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI
Main Office for Security of the Reich
REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT
Main Office of Order Police
HAUPTAMT ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI
General Inspectors
Higher Leaders of the SS and Police
One in each of the Corps Areas
One in France, the Netherlands, Norway, Government General, and Eastern German-occupied areas, perhaps elsewhere
Inspectors of the Security Police and Security Service
Inspectors of the Order Police
Security Service (SD)
16 Main Sections
41 Sections, also outposts.
State Police and Gestapo
17 Main Branches
54 Branches
Also outposts, Frontier Police Commissariats, and Frontier Police Posts
In city and county of the Gestapo headquarters Gestapo activities are conducted by the Gestapo itself, elsewhere they may be transferred to the county and local police.
Branches of the Criminal Police
18 Main Branches
46 Branches
Higher Police Authorities:
District Presidents
Land Governments
REICHSSTATTHALTER
County Police Authorities:-
(1.) Rural Counties: Land Councillor
(2.) City Counties: Lord Mayor
Local Police Authorities:
The mayors of the cities and villages (Landgemeinden).
State Police Administration Units
August, 1941: 133 units
74 Police Presidios (POLIZEIPRÄSIDIEN)
42 Police Directions (POLIZEIDIREKTIONEN)
10 Police Offices (POLIZEIÄMTER)
7 Police Units managed by Land Councillors
These units perform many county and local police functions in their particular county.
69 Criminal Departments in places without a Branch of the Criminal Police
Police Precincts; in larger cities also Sections and Groups.
Most State Police Administration Units have barracked formations of the Protection Police (SCHUTZPOLIZEI).

HIGHER POLICE AUTHORITIES:

COUNTY POLICE AUTHORITIES:

LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES:

The following diagram illustrates the powers of a Higher SS and Police Leader in any one of the Corps Areas of the Reich (see also Chart 2 and c-6-c-2 of the subparagraph on the SS).


HIGHER SS AND POLICE LEADER
Chief of Staff of the Main Section of the General SS in the Corps Area
Inspector of the Security Service & Security Police
In- spector of the Order Police
Assistants for special tasks, e.g., resettlement
Staff
Staff
Main Section of the General SS
Mili- tary SS
Security Police
Security Service
Order Police

The H igher SS and Police Leader directs the preparations made for the defense of the Reich by the Corps Area Order Police, Security Police and Security Service in collaboration with the SS. When it becomes necessary to employ these agencies as a unit, the Higher SS and Police Leader takes command. Thus, it seems, that these agencies would be mobilized to suppress revolutionary movements or to repel suprise attacks by air, land or water directed against the Corps Area. The command exercised over the agencies mentioned is temporary, except in the case of the General SS.

The Higher SS and Police Leader in German-occupied countries or areas exercises continuous command. He has authority roughly equivalent to that of Himmler within the Reich. The appended diagram, in most respects, is believed typical of the powers of an Higher SS and Police Leader in occupied areas.

(10698)


HIGHER SS AND POLICE LEADER
Commander of the Security Police and Security Service
Staff
Formations of the Military and General SS
Armed Formations of racial Germans
Units of the Police Flying Squadron
The Technical Emergency Corps
Commander of the Order Police
Staff including a higher officer of the Fire Protection Police

The German Police fall into two large categories, the General Police and the Special Police, of which the former is far more numerous and important. Within the General Police are two service branches (Dienstzweige), the Order Police and Security Police. The Order Police concerns itself principally with the maintenance of public order. The Security Police, on the other hand, is engaged chiefly in the prosecution of ordinary crime and of political offences. The functions of both service branches at times overlap.

The two service branches are organized along military lines and are centrally controlled. Members of the Security Police generally wear the service uniform of the SS. Members of the service branches within the Order Police wear the regular police uniforms. (For the correlation of police ranks with the ranks of the SS, the German Army, and the U.S. Army see the subparagraph on the SS c-2)

(c) The Order Police - Ordnungspolizei.

In maintaining public order the activities of the Order Police are extremely numerous. They police the streets and are present at larger gatherings of the populace. They regulate traffic. In this connection the Motorized Gendarmerie, a branch of the Order Police, performs many useful tasks by enforcing traffic regulations and recovering stolen automobiles. Certain branches of the Order Police en-

force the fish and game laws. Others enforce regulations concerning water and forests. The Order Police are also charged with taking care of the needy as well as the sick and wounded, when no other agency is at hand. In addition, the Order Police play a vital part in the passive air-raid defense system. Before the war the Order Police started to absorb the most important fire-fighting units and now (January 1942) have acquired direct control of the professional fire-fighting services in eighty-nine cities. After the first "thousand-plane" raid (actually 906) on Cologne Göring transferred (June 1, 1942) the command of an important branch of the passive A.R.P. to the Order Police (viz., the Sicherheits-und Hilfsdienst I. Ordnung which was renamed the Luftschutz-polizei or A.R.P. Police.)

1. The Chief of the Order Police - Chef der Ordnungspolizei - is the commanding officer of all members of the Order Police. He is directly subordinate to the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police.

Aside from Himmler, the most prominent figure in the German police force today is Kurt Daluege, Chief of the Order Police. Recently (April 20, 1942) Daluege was promoted to the unprecedented rank of Colonel General of the Police, (also SS-Oberstgruppenführer), a rank never attained by the late Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. Daluege, now forty-five, was born in Upper Silesia, joined the German Army in 1916 after graduating from a junior college (Realgymnasium.) He emerged from the war a deputy first sergeant (Vizefeldwebel.) After the war he graduated as an engineer from the well-known Technical College at Charlottenburg. Prior to 1933 he won distinction as a National Socialist street-fighter and participant in meeting-hall brawls. He was also leader of the SS in the Berlin district. Elected a member of the Prussian Diet in 1932, he specialized in police questions. In the autumn of 1933 Göring made him Generalleutnant (Brigadier General, U.S.A.) of the Prussian provincial police (Landespolizei.) His relations with Göring are believed to have re-

Paragraph 25, Chart 3
Organization of German Police
Summer 1940

REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR — REICHSMINISTERIUM DES INNERN

Other Sections of the Reich Ministry of the Interior

The Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police — Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei

Directly responsible to the Reich Leader and Chief: the Inspector of the Concentration Camps

Chief of the Main Office of Budget and Buildings Chef des Hauptamtes Haushalt und Bauten	The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Sicherheitsdienstes)	The Chief of the Order Police Der Chef der Ordnungspolizei	
Main Office of Budget and Buildings Hauptamt, Haushalt und Bauten	Main Office for the Security of the Reich Reichssicherheitshauptamt Controls Security Police training schools	Main Office of the Order Police Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei Controls Reich Office of Emergency Aid (Technische Nothilfe), Office of Voluntary Firemen, and Order Police training schools.	1. General Inspector of the Protection Police. (Schutzpolizei) 2. General Inspector of the Gendarmerie and the local Protection Police 3. General Inspector of the Schools 4. General Inspector of the fire prevention agencies

Office of the Budget (Amt Haushalt)	Office of Buildings (Amt Bauten)	Office (Amt) I Administration and Law (Verwaltung und Recht)	Office (Amt) II Investigation of Opponents (Gegnererforschung)	Office (Amt) III German Vital Areas (Deutsche Lebensgebiete)	Office (Amt) IV Combating Opponents (Gegnerbekämpfung.) Formerly Office of the Secret State Police (Gestapo)	Office (Amt) V Combating Crime (Verbrechensbekämpfung) Formerly Reich Office of the Criminal Police.	Office (Amt) VI Foreign Countries (Ausland)	Office of Law & Administration Amt Verwaltung und Recht Handles Matters concerning police administration, legal affairs, and budgetary matters of the Order Police	Command Office Kommandoamt Handles all matters concerning the Uniformed Order Police.

mained cordial. Daluege maintains close connections with the SS Police Divisions (see below c-7-c-3-e), which are drawn largely from the Order Police. For unknown purposes he keeps certain formations of police reservists at his exclusive disposal.

Beside an adjutant, four General Inspectors of the Order Police belong more or less to the personal entourage of the Chief of the Order Police.

2. The General Inspectors of the Order Police - are directly subordinate to the Chief of the Order Police. They are (1) the General Inspector of the (Reich) Protection Police, (2) the General Inspector of the Gendarmerie and the Local Protection Police, (3) the General Inspector of the Police Schools, (4) the General Inspector of the Fire Prevention Agencies (Feuerlöschwesen.)

3. The Main Office of the Order Police - Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei - under direct command of Daluege and located in Berlin, handles matters concerning the State Police Administration Units (Staatliche Polizeiverwaltungen), the (Reich) Protection Police, the Gendarmerie, the (local) Protection Police of the Communities (Gemeinden), the Fire Police, and the Technical Emergency Corps (see chart 1.)

The subdivisions of the Main Office of the Order Police are (see Chart 3):

a. The Command Office - Kommandoamt - handles all matters concerning the Uniformed Order Police. At present (January, 1941) the Chief of the Command Office is Generalleutnant (Major General, U.S.A.) von Bomhard, a former army officer and one-time adjutant of General von Epp. The more important positions in the office are occupied by some forty or fifty police officers from the rank of colonel to captain, and a small group of civilians.

b. Colonial Police Office - Kolonial-polizeiamt - (omitted in chart 3.) - The creation of this office is indicative of German thoroughness and confidence in the outcome of the

war. In charge of the Office is Generalleutnant Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, one-time General Inspector of the Order Police, and subsequently commander of the SS Police Division during the Western campaign (see below c-7-c-3-e.)

c. The Office of Law and Administration - Amt Verwaltung und Recht - handles police administration as well as legal and budgetary affairs.

———— • ————

The Main Office of the Order Police also controls thirty or forty schools and training institutes, a hospital, convalescence and recreational centers, the office of Voluntary Firemen (Freiwillige Feuerwehr,) and the Reich Office of the Technical Emergency Corps (Technische Nothilfe.)

———— • ————

4. The Inspectors of the Order Police. - One Inspector is assigned to each Senior District President (Oberpräsident) or other administrative official of equivalent rank. In his district (a Province in Prussia) he has charge of all Uniformed Police; i.e., Protection Police of the Reich and Communities, Gendarmerie, Motorized Gendarmerie, and Fire Protection Police. He is subordinate to and an assistant of the Higher SS and Police Leader (see above 3 b, also chart 1.)

The Inspector of the Order Police usually holds the rank of police colonel or brevet major general (char. Generalmajor). Sometimes he is assisted by a staff which may include a major of the Fire Protection Police.

5. The Protection Police - Schutzpolizei - is concentrated in the cities, while the rural areas are policed by the Gendarmerie. The Protection Police falls into two groups: the Pro-

tection Police of the Reich and the Protection Police of the Communities or Gemeindepolizei. The latter are appointed by the local mayor. They are, nonetheless, closely regulated by the Reich and functionally a part of the Reich police organization. The Reich Protection Police, on the other hand, are found in 133 important cities with State Police Administration Units (see Appendix, Part 2.) In these areas they perform many police duties within the city and surrounding county (Kreis.) The performance of the remaining duties is relegated to the local Protection Police (see chart 1.)

a. Commanders of the Protection Police - Kommandeure der Schutzpolizei - The Protection Police of each State Police Administration Unit are led by a Commander. The Commander is directly subordinate to the head of the Administration Unit (see chart 4.)

b. Barracked Protection Police - Kasernierte Schutzpolizei - Most State Police Administration Units have barracked formations of Protection Police. These are composed of younger men who spend a certain number of years in such formations. Thereafter they are transferred to the Police Precincts and may live at home. The barracked police are organized into centuries (Hundertschaften) and battalions (700 men) and regiments. Police battalions numbered as high as 322 have been identified. Also identified were the 32nd, 61st, 309th, and 314th police battalions.

c. Local Organization of the Protection Police - The Protection Police in Berlin, Vienna, and Hamburg are organized into Police Groups (Polizeigruppen,) Police Sections (Polizeiabschnitte,) Police Precincts (Polizeireviere.) Elsewhere Sections and Precincts, sometimes only Precincts are found.

d. THe Typical Organization of the Police in a Larger German City - (see chart 4.) Chart 4 indicates the police organization in a city of about 500,000. The city has a State Police Administration Unit led by a Police President. The

Paragraph 25, Chart 4

The Typical Organization of the

Police in a Larger German City.


Main Branch of the State Police (Gestapo)
Main Branch of the State Criminal Police
Leader identical
CRI- MI- NAL PO- LICE
Com- man- der
PRO- TEC- TION PO- LICE
Barracked Protec- tion Police
Police Veterinary
Police Physician
Police Auditor
Police Cashier (Polizeikasse)
Police Presidents
Deputy
ADMINISTRATION POLICE
Dept. for Foreig- ners, Pass- ports, Regis- tration, and Matters of Nation- ality
Dept. for Traffic, Water and Fire- Police
Dept. for Trade Police, (Ge- werbe- polizei)
Dept. for Penal- ties, Health & Veter- inary Police,& Matters of Legal Aid
Dept. for Budget, Account- ing, & General Adminis- tration, in parti- cular for Board and Lodging, Clothing and Equipment of the Protection Police
Praesidial Depart- ment
Police Sections
Police Precincts

Praesidial Department of the Unit evolved from what was once the office of the Police President. The Main Branch of the State Criminal Police is independent, except that it is usually housed in the same building as the State Police Administration Unit and its Leader is also in charge of the Criminal Police of the Unit. The Main Branch of the Gestapo is entirely independent. The same division of the Administration Police into departments is found in smaller State Police Administration Units.

e. Police Registration of Germans and Foreigners. - In most localities of the Reich all inhabitants of a city or area must register with the police. To combat espionage and sabotage the requirements concerning registration have been tightened since the outbreak of the war. Thus foreigners must register with the local police within twenty-four hours after entering a locality; Germans must register within three days. The same time limits apply to visitors and to individuals changing their address within a city. Most foreigners entering the Reich are provided with a document (Passbegleitschein) defining the travel route which they may take. This document must be presented to the local police authorities in every locality in which the traveler remains overnight. It is returned upon leaving the Reich.

In most communities the registration forms are filed alphabetically according to the surname of the registrant. These files are of great use to the military authorities and to agencies gathering statistics or collecting taxes. However they would be inadequate for making out lists of individuals belonging to the National Socialist Party or its affiliated organizations. In 1938 the Deputy of the Führer (Hess) requested that information concerning membership in the Party or its subsidiaries be omitted in the registration files.

f. The National Roster - Volkskartei. In order to call up a class of men (Jahrgang) before the introduction of the National Roster the police had to rely on public announcements,

at the same time checking the results by going through the police registration files (see above e.) Since most registration files were alphabetically arranged, this involved an enormous amount of labor and, in spite of the great care exercised, individuals liable for service were easily overlooked. To remedy this weakness, the National Roster was devised and introduced in the first part of 1939.

The National Roster comprises all people of German nationalit between the ages of 5 and 70. It includes both sexes, members of the Armed Forces, Labor Service, etc., also Jews. The cards for the National Roster which were filled out by males gathered the following data: (1) date and place of birth; (2) present occupation, the occupation for which one was trained; (3) whether or not one has a wonkbook (Arbeitsbuch); (4) whether or not one is physically incapacitated, the degree of incapacitation; (5) name, indication of whether one is single, divorced, a widower or married; (6) education beyond the primary schools (Volksschulen), viz., trade and professional schooling, college and university; field of specialization; (7) residence abroad exceeding three months; purpose; ability to speak foreign languages; (8) experience and expert knowledge in special branches of industry, technique, science or agriculture, (9) special skills: motorcycle, automobile (driver's license?), aviation (pilot's license?) riding, typing, shorthand; training in nursing, first aid, A.R.P. work; membership in the Technical Emergency Corps (Technische Nothilfe) or Red Cross; (10) Service in the Army, Navy or Air Force: length and date of service, unit in which one last served, last rank; period of Labor Service, if any; (11) address plus space for future changes of address.

On the cards filled out by females the items 1 to 7 are essentially the same as in the case of males. However, item 5 lists the number of children under fifteen years living at home. This item is to be taken into account in estimating the availability of women for war work and public service. Item 8 gathers information concerning the knowledge and experience of the female population in bookkeeping,

shorthand, typing, sewing, cooking, farming, gardening, factory work, and science. The remaining items are essentially the same as in the case of males, except that item 10 lists merely Labor Service.

The primary purpose of the National Roster is to facilitate the rapid induction of certain age-classes of men or women into the Armed Forces, Labor Service, etc. For this reason the cards of males and females are filed separately. Within each file the cards of all individuals born in the same calendar year are kept in the same compartment. By means of a system of colored tabs attached to the top of the cards it is possible to segregate, for example, all males born in 1914 and able to speak a foreign language. The National Roster is also said to eliminate the possibility of one individual being earmarked for service by several war agencies. In order to keep the National Roster up-to-date it is not centrally located but left in the hands of the State Police Administration Units (b-3-f) and, where these are not established, entrusted to the mayors (Bürgermeister) of the Communities. However, in Rural Counties (Landkreise) duplicate cards for the whole county are kept on file by the Landrat. Thus prompt answers can be given to any inquires of the military authorities or other governmental agencies.

6. The Fire Protection Police - Feuerschutzpolizei. - Until November 1938 the professional fire brigades were exclusively municipal organizations. Their efficiency was largely dependent on the ability or willingness of a municipality to provide adequate funds. Uniformity of training and equipment was lacking. To remedy this serious weakness in the defense of the Reich (especially A.R.P.) was one of the main purposes of the reorganization inaugurated November 29, 1938.

As a result of this and subsequent reorganizations of fire-fighting forces of the Reich have been integrated into a national organization under the command of the Chief of the Order Police Daluege.

Within the Main Office of the Order Police (b-3-c-3) Daluege has for his assistance a staff of fire-fighting and fire-prevention specialists. The affairs of the Fire Protection Police, in particular, are the concern of Group F (Gruppe F) within the Main Office. In addition, Daluege is assisted by the General Inspector of the Fire Prevention Agencies (b-3-c-2). The General Inspector is competent for both the Fire Protection Police and the Fire Brigades (Feuerwehren) as well as the schools for fire-fighting. He conducts unannounced inspections of fire-fighting units throughout the Reich and makes suggestions to Daluege regarding the organization, training and future development of fire-fighting agencies.

To the Inspectors of the Order Police in the Corps Areas (b-3-c-4) and to the Commanders of the Order Police (cf. second diagram b-3-b) are assigned officers of the Fire Protection Police. These perform on a regional scale the same duties incumbent on the General Inspector of the Fire Prevention Agencies. One duty, for example, is to see that proper fire-preventive measures are taken in the erection and upkeep of structures connected with national defense, the supply of raw materials, and the food supply.

The fire-fighting services of the Reich fall into two main categories: (1) the Fire Protection Police (Feuerschutzpolizei) and (2) the Fire Brigades (Feuerwehren). The Fire Brigades comprise (a) the Voluntary Fire Brigades (Freiwillige Feuerwehren), (b) Obligatory Fire Brigades (Pflichtfeuerwehren), and (c) the Factory Fire Brigades (Werkfeuerwehren).

The Fire Protection Police is an integral part of the national (Reich) organization of the Order Police. It was created in 1939 by absorbing the professional fire-fighting forces of the larger cities into the national police organization. At the beginning of 1942 Fire Police Protection units existed in eighty-nine cities (Appendix, Part 5). The Fire Protection Police is sometimes called the "engineer unit" (Pioniertruppe) of the Order Police. In fact, only thirty percent of

the calls for help concern fire-fighting; the remaining calls demand aid of a technical nature. Thus the Fire Protection Police render First Aid to the drowning and asphyxiated, conduct decontamination, and rescue persons caught in debris.

The Fire Protection Police of a community are subordinate to the mayor in his capacity as local administrator of the police (Ortspolizeiverwalter.) The officer directly in command of the Fire Protection Police is termed a Leader (Leiter) and, if he holds the rank of major or higher, he has the additional title of Commander of the Fire Protection Police. Of fundamental importance, especially in A.R.P. work, is the fact that the Leader of the Fire Protection Police commands not only the Fire Protection Police but also the Voluntary and Obligatory Fire Brigades, if such exist in the same community. In addition, Fire Protection Police from neighboring cities can be called in. During a recent large-scale attack by the R.A.F. the Fire Protection Police from towns as far distant as 200 miles are said to have come to the assistance of a raided community. Further centralization of A.R.P. services was achieved recently by the transfer of the Auxiliary and Security Service to the jurisdiction of the Order Police (see b-3-i-3).

Before the war the strength of personnel and quantity of equipment of German fire-fighting agencies in the typical larger city would have been considered inadequate measured by American standards. However, the quality was high, and the damp climate as well as the strict enforcement of building regulations aided in keeping fire damage at a reasonable level. As a result of the war, part of the personnel of the Fire Brigades and Fire Protection Police was lost to the Armed Forces (see also e-7-c-3-n). The first British "thousand-plane" raid on Cologne, during which large numbers of incendiary bombs were dropped, made a reinforcement of the fire-fighting agencies imperative. A few days after the Cologne raid Himmler ordered that all Fire Brigades (Feuerwehren) be without delay reinforced to the required peace-

time required strength. In addition, the personnel of Fire Brigades of areas especially threatened by air-raids was to be increased to twenty percent above the peace-time required strength. Although no concrete evidence is available, it seems probable that the personnel of the Fire Protection Police has likewise been reinforced. Fire-fighting equipment from former Czechoslovakia is also said to have been transferred to the western areas of the Reich.

According to statute, members of the Fire Protection Police are to be pensioned at the age of sixty. At present, however, firemen above sixty are known to be serving. On the other hand, the normal complement of young and middle-aged fireman has been seriously depleted More and more civilians, including women and youths, are being pressed into service in the Voluntary and Obligatory Fire Brigades.

The officer candidates and noncommissioned officers of the Fire Protection Police are trained at the Reich Fire Brigade School (Reichsfeuerwehrschule) in Eberswalde. The same institution conducts post-graduate courses for officers of the Fire Protection Police and for higher leaders of the Voluntary Fire Brigades. The Reich Fire Brigade School serves at the same time as a research and testing laboratory for fire-fighting methods and types of equipment.

The contribution to the war effort made by regiments of Fire Protection Police operating with the Armed Forces is treated elsewhere (c-7-c-3-n-1).

7. The Gendarmerie - is that branch of the Order Police principally concerned with law enforcement in rural areas. The organization of the Gendarmerie is shown in chart 5.

a. The Alpine Gendarmerie - Hochgebirgsgendarmerie - is that subdivision of the Gendarmerie operating in alpine areas. Special alpine training is given in Tyrol to members of the Order Police, thus providing trained police personnel for Norway and other occupied alpine regions.

Paragraph 25, Chart 5. The Vertical Organization of the Gendarmerie within the Area of a Higher Police Authority.


Provincial Inspector of the Order Police
Senior District President
District President
Commander of the Gendarmerie
Gendarmerie Captainships, i.e., larger units of the Gendarmerie
Task Unit of the Motorized Gendarmerie
Land Councillor (Landrat)
Gendarmerie of the Counties (Kreise)
County Branches: 2 to 5 Gendarmes
Outposts consisting of a single Gendarme

b. The Motorized Gendarmerie - Motorisierte Gendarmerie - is that branch of the Gendarmerie charged with the supervision of traffic on the main roads. It is housed in barracks. In the summer of 1940 it comprised three sections (Abteilungen) and fifty-two Task Units (Bereitschaften.) Task Units are assigned to the Higher Police Authorities and subordinated to the Commanders of the Gendarmerie. The personnel of the Motorized Gendarmerie is said to be drawn almost exclusively from the storm trooper detachments (SA.)

c. The Commanders of the Gendarmerie - Kommandeure der Gendarmerie - command the Gendarmerie in the territories of the Higher Police Authorities (see b-3-g-1.) They are subordinate to the Higher Police Authorities.

d. The Leaders of the Gendarmerie Captainships. - The Gendarmerie within the territory of a Higher Police Authority is organized into formations called Gendarmerie-Hauptmannschaften or Gendarmerie Captainships. In command of such a unit is a Gendarmerie-Hauptmannschaftsführer.

e. The Leader of the County Gendarmerie - Gendarmerie-Kreisführer commands the Gendarmerie in a rural county (Landkreis.)

(d) The Security Police - Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) - constitute one of the most important bulwarks of the National Socialist regime. They are subdivided into two branches: (1) the Criminal Police, engaged in the prosecution of ordinary crime; (2) the State Police, which includes the Secret Police (Gestapo) and which is charged with the prosecution of political offences and the preservation of the National Socialist system.

The mission of the Security Police and Security Service coincides in many respects. It is both domestic and foreign. The domestic mission included or includes surveillance of the Jews, Communists, Free Masons, Rotary Club, denominational youth organizations, émigrés; the combating of sabotage, terror, and espionage; the organization of a frontier police; the protection of youth; the prosecution of homosexuals; the combating of abortion; the enforcement of legislation for the purity of the German race.

The foreign mission is not less important. In fact, the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service received public commendation for his share in facilitating the German invasion of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia-Moravia. To this list should be added Poland and other invaded countries. It seems that the Security Police and Service prepare strategic surveys of areas marked for invasion. Persons and

Organizations of special interest are carefully investigated e.g., the Czech Legion. Units of Security Police and Security Service then follow on the heels of the invading forces and execute their well-laid plans.

The Security Police publicly admits very close relations with countries friendly toward Germany. The liaison officer from the Italian Police is Ciavechini. Recently the Reich sent a Police Attaché, Colonel Schroeder, to its Lisbon Legation. Schroeder is assisted by Major Hellmuth, who also has a diplomatic passport. These Reich officials represent presumably not only the interests of the Security Police but those of the Order Police as well.

1. The Chief of the Security Police and Security Service - Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. - is the commanding officer of the Security Police and Security Service. He is directly subordinate to the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police.

Since its creation this dual office was occupied by Heydrich until his assassination. Heydrich, at one time a German naval officer for radio and communications, attained the rank of Lieutenant (j.g.) (Oberleutnant zur See) before he left the service. Himmler brought him to Munich and made him (July 1932) chief of the intelligence service (SD.) When Himmler was appointed Deputy Chief of the Secret State Police, Heydrich became head of the Gestapo. Heydrich seems to have been a man of boundless energy, keen intelligence, and inflexible determination. His position will not be easily filled, as it requires both extraordinary loyalty and ability. A reorganization is quite possible.

2. The Main Office for the Security of the Reich - Reichssicherheitshauptamt - is concerned with functions of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service within the Reich Ministry of Interior. It is subdivided into six offices (Aemter): (I) Administration and Law, (II) Investigation of Opponents, (III) Ger-

man Vital Areas, (IV) Combating Opponents, formerly the Office of the Secret State Police or Gestapo, (V) Combating Crime, formerly the Reich Office of the Criminal Police, (VI) Foreign Countries. (See chart 3.) The Main Office for the Security of the Reich controls several police training schools.

3. Inspectors of the Security Police and Security Service - Inspekteure der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. - One Inspector is stationed in each Corps Area. He is subordinate to the Higher Leader of the SS and Police. He takes directives from the Senior District President (Oberpräsident) or those of equivalent rank outside of Prussia, as far as such instructions harmonize with instructions of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. He keeps in touch with the Senior District President, informs him of the observations and operations of the Security Police and Security Service, makes suggestions for the authorities of the General and Internal Administration. He is the leader and trainer of the Security Police within his Corps Area. The attachment of the Inspector of the Security Police and Security Service, seemingly as a political advisor, to the staff the Senior District President appears to be a recent development. It may be interpreted as a further extension of Himmler's influence on the general administration of the Reich.

4. The State Criminal Police - Staatliche Kriminalpolizei or Kripo - is that branch of the Security Police engaged in combating ordinary, non-political crime. The organizational apex of the Reich criminal police system is Office V (Verbrechensbekämpfung or Combating Crime) of the Main Office for the Security of the Reich. This office is sometimes designated as the Office of the Reich Criminal Police (Reichskriminalpolizeiamt). The regional organization comprises eighteen Criminal Police Main Branches (Kriminalpolizeileitstellen,) forty-six Criminal Police Branches (Kriminalpolizeistellen,) and sixty-nine Criminal Departments (Kriminalabteilungen,) the latter as departments of the State Police Administration Units. The Criminal

Police of a State Police Administration Unit and a Branch of the Criminal Police located in the same city are under the leadership of the same person, thus insuring coordination between both organizations (see chart 4.) A Main Branch of the Criminal Police supervises all agencies engaged in the prosecution of crime within its territory. (See Appendix, Part 3 for the location of State Criminal Police Branches.)

The State Criminal Police lay much stress on ultra-modern methods. At the beginning of 1942 a Criminal-Biological Institute was founded in Berlin (Kriminalbiologisches Institut der Sicherheitspolizei im Reichskriminalpolizeiamt.) The purpose of the Institute is to render both practical assistance to the Criminal Police and conduct scientific research into biological factors affecting criminality. The Institute intends to assign a specialist in criminal genealogy to the Main Branches and ordinary Branches of the State Criminal Police.

A special school for training Criminal Police exists at Berlin-Charlottenburg (Kriminalfachschule der Sicherheitspolizei). The integrity of the personnel employed in the Criminal Police is considered to be especially high.

5. The State Police and Secret State Police - Staatspolizei or Stapo and Geheime Staatspolizei or Gestapo - is that branch of the Security Police engaged in the prevention and prosecution of political offences.

The Gestapo was founded by Göring in 1933 (see b-1.) Prior to 1933 Political Police existed as a Special Department of the various municipal Police Presidios. Göring separated these departments from the Police Presidios in Prussian cities and organized them centrally into the Secret State Police. In 1933 the most important department of the Gestapo was the one for combating Bolshevism. The executive arm of the Gestapo at that time was the Protection Police Detachment for Special Purposes (Schutzpolizeiabteilung z.b.V.) consisting of specially selected officers under Police Colonel Wecke.

The Gestapo enforces legislation concerning treason, open and covert opposition to the State and National Socialist Party, Military service and morale, economic sabotage, foreign exchange restrictions, and foreign radio broadcasts. It is concerned with any act having political significance, e.g., certain murders. The Gestapo enjoys wide discretionary powers in taking precautions against politically dangerous individuals. These measures range from warnings to the dispossession of property and personal freedom (concentration camp.) Decisions of the Gestapo are exempt from review by an administrative tribunal. Gestapo personnel is now drawn largely from the SS (Schutz-Staffel.) The Main Office for the Security of the Reich and, in particular, Office IV (Gegnerbekämpfung or Combating of Opponents,) constitute the apex of the Gestapo. The regional organization consists of seventeen Main Branches (Staatspolizeileitstellen) at the seats of the Senior District Presidents or officials of equal rank outside of Prussia and fifty-four ordinary Branches (Staatspolizeistellen) at the seats of officials of the next lower rank. This includes also an ordinary Branch in Prague and Brünn (Brno.) The head (Leiter) of an ordinary Branch acts as political reporter and adviser (politischer Sachbearbeiter or Referent) to the District President or Government of the Land (Landesregierung) or Reichsstatthalter, reporting on matters of concern to the political police. The head of a Main Branch fulfills the same function for administrative executives on a higher level: Senior District Presidents, etc. Gestapo tasks within the city and county of the seat of a State Police Branch are performed by officials of the Branch. Elsewhere the ordinary local and country police may be charged with the performance of Gestapo tasks. Also ordinary Branches and Main Branches may create outposts (Aussenstellen) according to their needs. These as well as Frontier Police Commissariats (Grenzpolizeikommissariate) and Frontier Police Posts (Grenzpolizeiposten) remain integral parts of the Branches and Main Branches. The dominant influence in the issuance of passports and visas as well as in the regu-

lation of foreign residents is exercised by the Security Police. (See Appendix, Part 4 for location of Gestapo Branches and Main Branches.)

Officers of the Security Police are trained at the Officers' School in Berlin-Charlottenburg (Führerschule der Sicherheitspolizei). Presumably in order to provide more training facilities for the larger numbers entering the Security Police, and in particular the Gestapo branch, a Reich School of the Security Police and Security Service (Reichsschule der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD.) was opened at Prague early in 1942.

a. The Frontier Police - Grenzpolizei - is a special branch of the Gestapo. The Frontier Police stand watch on the boundaries of the Reich proper and at the most remote frontiers of German Europe from the Bay of Biscay to the North Cape. They inspect the papers of individuals crossing the border; enforce export, import, and foreign exchange regulations; search trains and other vehicles. They are assisted by customs officials, the Gendarmerie branch of the Order Police, in certain areas by storm troops (SA) and probably at times by military formations.

A special school (Grenzpolizeischule) at Pretsch on the Elbe trains the Frontier Police.

(e) The Security Service of the SS Reich Leader - Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS (SD.RF. SS) - The National Socialist Party had in the course of its development a number of intelligence agencies, e.g., the intelligence service of the SA. However, the intelligence service of the SS or the Security Service of the SS Reich Leader gradually gained ascendancy. This development culminated in the prohibition of all Party intelligence agencies except the Security Service (June 9, 1934.) This occured in connection with Blood Purge of June 30, 1934. The best evidence of the high esteem which the SD.RF. SS now enjoys is the fact that the personal protection of the Führer is entrusted to the Reich Security Service (Reichssicherheitsdienst or RSD.)

Paragraph 25, Chart 6

Paragraph 25, Chart 6
Organization of the Security Service of the SS Reich Leader (SD.RF. 44.)
Summer 1940

Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police

Chief of the Security Police and Security Service (SD.)

Reich Security Service (RSD.)
for personal protection of Hitler

Main Office for Security of the Reich
REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT
Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8

Main Office for Security
SICHERHEITS-HAUPTAMT
Berlin SW 68, Wilhelmstrasse 102

SD. MAIN SECTIONS	SD. SECTIONS
Königsberg	Allenstein
	Tilsit
Stettin	Neustettin
	Schwerin
Berlin	Frankfurt a.O.
	Potsdam
Dresden	Leipzig
	Chemnitz
	Halle a.S.
Reichenberg	
Stuttgart	
Karlsruhe	Neustadt a.d.W. ?
	Darmstadt
Münster	Bielefeld
	Dortmund
Düsseldorf	Aachen
	Cologne
?	Koblenz
	Frankfurt a.M.
	Kassel
?	Braunschweig
	Weimar
	Dessau
Munich	Augsburg
?	Würzburg
	Nürnberg
	Bayreuth
	Karlsbad
Breslau	Troppau
	Liegnitz
	Kattowitz
	Oppeln
Hamburg	Kiel
	Lüneburg
	Bremen
Vienna	Linz
?	Salzburg
	Graz
	Innsbruck
	Klagenfurt
Danzig	Thorn
Posen	Hohensalza
	Litzmannstadt
Prague	

Today the SD.RF. SS is functionally the intelligence service of the National Socialist Party. Organizationally it is a branch of the SS. It is charged with the detection and observation of all forces, events and facts affecting the supremacy of the Party. (See also d-Security Police.)

The organization of the SD.RF. SS is built around a cadre of full-time, paid staffs assisted by honorary collaborators (ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter) of the SS. This enables the SS and Party to keep in close touch with the pulse of the nation. The SD.RF. SS registers each slight variation of public sentiment, favorable or unfavorable to the Party, and reports almost daily to high state and Party officials (Statthalter and Gauleiter.) Not infrequently these reports cause a modification of policy.

The Chief of the SD. is also the Chief of the Security Police and as such in charge of the Main Office for Security of the Reich (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). Certain matters concerning the SD. are handled in the Main Office for Security of the Reich. Also the regional Inspectors of the Security Police are at the same time inspectors of the regional SD. (see Chart 2.) Thus it appears that it would have been relatively easy to have effected a complete amalgamation of the

Typical Organization of an SD Main Section and SD Section



(See Chart 6)

Reich Security Police with the SD. of the SS. Nevertheless, the SS continues to maintain a separate SS headquarters for the SD., viz., the Main Office for Security (Sicherheits-Hauptamt) at Berlin SW 68, Wilhelmstrasse 102 (early 1941). Moreover, the personnel of the Main Office for Security (Sicherheits-Hauptamt) appears to be quite numerous, as most of the buildings from 100 to 106 Wilhelmstrasse are occupied by the SD. The dual headquarters of the SD. entail less inconvenience than appears on the surface. The Reich headquarters of the Security Police are only around the corner in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse. Both headquarters are also connected by a garden in the rear. One obvious advantage of maintaining the SD. as a semi-independent organization is that it can be used to check the efficiency and reliability of the Secret State Police (Gestapo). In addition, it would facilitate the separation of SD. from the Security Police, should this become expedient on political or organizational grounds.

The regional organization of the SD.RF.SS consists of sixteen SD. Main Sections (SD.-Leitabschnitte) and forty-one SD. Sections (SD.-Abschnitte). (See chart 6.) SD. outposts are established as needed.

The Communications Department of the Norwegian Hird (Hirdstabens efterretningsavdeling) is organized along lines similar to the German SD.RF.SS and the German Security Police. (See c-9.)

(f) The State Police Administration Units - Staatliche Polizeiverwaltungen - are located in metropolitan and industrial areas, in frontier cities and ports of entry, also in other difficult and important districts. By August 1941, one hundred and thirty-three units had been established, thus bringing these vital areas under the direct control of the Reich police (see list in the Appendix, Part 2.) A unit of the State Police generally includes administrative officials (Verwaltungspolizei,) Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei,) and Protection Police (Schutzpolizei.) See chart 4. In ascending order of importance a unit designated (1) as a Police Office - Polizeiamt, (2) a Police

Direction - Polizeidirektion, (3) a Police Presidio - Polizeipräsidium. There are seventy-four Presidios, forty-two Directions, and ten Offices, also seven units directed by Land Councillors (Landräte.) The Police Presidents in charge of the Presidios in large cities were in 1933 among the first officials to be replaced by loyal National Socialists. Much is dependent on their decisions in preventing disorder and incipient revolution.

Within the city and county of a State Police Administration Unit the police functions within this area are divided between the State Police and the local police. The local police are allowed to perform the functions which promote public welfare, such as enforcing trade, health, sanitary, building, and school regulations as well as to police the fields and forests. While performing these functions the local police are subordinate to the local police authorities. The State Police, on the other hand, assume the protection of the state and the individual.

(g) Police Authorities - Certain officials of the general and internal administration exercise together with other functions also police functions. They are accordingly designated as Police Authorities.

1. The Higher Police Authorities - Höhere Polizeibehörden - are the District Presidents of Prussia, and elsewhere, the officials or agencies of equivalent rank (see list in the Appendix, Part 1.)

2. The County Police Authority - Kreispolizeibehörde - is the Land Councillor (Landrat) in a Rural County (Landkreis;) in a City County (Stadtkreis), the Lord Mayor (Oberbürgermeister.) The Land Councillor exercises his police functions through (1) the Reich Gendarmerie, and (2) through the Local Police Authorities (Ortspolizeibehörden) within the Rural County, viz., the mayors (Bürgermeister.) The Lord Mayor (Oberbürgermeister) of a City County exercises his county police functions through the city police. These are

appointed by him. He is subject to the supervision of the Higher Police Authority. In counties with State Police Administration Units there are two County Police Authorities: (1) the administrator of the State Police Unit (Police President, Police Director, Police Councillor or Land Councillor,) (2) the regular County Police Authority. Each is the County Police Authority for the share of police functions performed by his police forces.

3. The Local Police Authority - Ortspolizeibehörde - is in a community (Gemeinde) located within a Rural County, as a rule, the mayor of the community (Bürgermeister.) He appoints the community police officers. In a City County the Local Police Authority is the Lord Mayor (Oberbürgermeister.) In cities with State Police Administration Units there are two Local Police Authorities: (1) the administrator of the State Police Unit, (2) the regular Local Police Authority. Each is Local Police Authority for that share of the police functions performed by his police forces.

(h) Special Police - Sonderpolizei - Within the Reich there are a number of special police formations or officials exercising certain police powers. Functionally these are a part of the centrally controlled police organization.

1. The Railway Police - Bahnpolizei - The employees of the railways, vested with the power of temporary arrest, are quite numerous. Within this larger group there seem to have been in August, 1939, about 6,000 men devoting their entire time to police duties. There is a railroad guard formation in each of the areas into which the German railroad system is divided. Units are armed with rifles and light and heavy machine guns. They are subject to the supervision of the Reich Transport Minister (J.H. Dorpmüller.) During the war, storm troop detachments (SA) have also been employed in guarding railway installations.

2. The Post Guards - Postschutz - protect postal communications, which include the telephone and telegraph systems. The personnel of the Post Guards is drawn from post office

employees.

3. The Factory Guards - Werkschutz - protect industrial concerns. The Guards are recruited from factory workers.

4. The Stream and Navigation Police - Strom- und Schiffahrtspolizei - Waterways Protection Police - Wasserschutzpolizei - are apparently supervised by the Reich Transport Minister. The headquarters (SW-Kommando) of the Waterways Protection Police on the Rhine is at the seat of the Senior President of the Rhine Province, on the Danube at the seat of the Reichsstatthalter of the Lower Danube. The Water Protection Police of Hamburg (SW-Gruppe) are subordinate to the Police President in Hamburg.

The personnel is trained at the Water Protection Police School (Wasserschutzpolizei-Schule) in Stettin.

5. The Marine Coast Police - Marine-Küsten-Polizei or MKP - guard coasts and harbors in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. They are subordinate either to the High Command of the German Navy or the Chief of the German Police, perhaps to both.

The Marine Coast Police are recruited from the Water Protection Police.

6. The Air Police - Luftpolizei - are subordinate to the Reich Minister of Aviation (H. Göring.)

7. The Mountain Police - Bergpolizei - enforce mining regulations and are subordinate to the Minister of Economic Affairs for Germany and Prussia (Dr. W. Funk.)

8. Customs Officials - and other officials of the Finance Ministry have limited police powers.

(i) Police Auxiliaries - The term is used heretto denote the various formations and groups employed to assist the regular German Police.

1. The Police Reserve - Polizeireserve - has played an important part since September, 1939, by releasing active

police for the military forces, for Police Battalions, and for training courses. Police Reservists serve in the Reich, in occupied areas, and on the front. The average age of police reserves called up in September, 1939, seems to have been about thirty-five. The proportion of Reservists to active police in one Bremen precinct was 12 to 8. The training of pre-war Reservists was obtained on Sundays and in evening study. It was largely military. Police Reservists called to duty in the precincts were subsequently given courses in law. At present (spring of 1941) there are barracked formations of Police Reservists organized into Police Battalions, Police Training Battalions, and Police Centuries (Polizeieinsatzhundertschaften.) Certain formations of Police Reservists are subordinate only to the Chief of the Order Police.

2. Auxiliary Police - Hilfspolizei or Hipo - After the conquest of Poland ex-Poles of German stock were enlisted as auxiliary police. German police on patrol duty in the cities were accompanied by an auxiliary policeman armed with a rifle. Facilities for training auxiliary police exist in Litzmannstadt, Posen, and elsewhere.

3. The Air Raid Precaution Police - Luftschutzpolizei, - formerly The Auxiliary and Security Service - Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst or SHD. After the first "thousand-plane" raid (actually 906 planes) on Cologne Göring transferred the command of the SHDD of the First Category (I. Ordnung) to the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler (June 1, 1942). The SHD. of the First Category comprises units organized by the Reich Authorities for work in the more important areas. This branch of the SHD. was then subordinated to the Order Police under Daluege and renamed the Air Raid Precaution Police (Luftschutzpolizei). Göring still remains in charge of all civil A.R.P. services.

The new Air Raid Precaution Police are chiefly engaged in fire-fighting, decontamination, demolition, and rescue work. A con-

siderable portion of the A.R.P. Police is housed in barracks. There are also Motorized Battalions -- Abteilungen (mot.).

The personnel includes both sexes and is drawn from those obligated to perform A.R.P. service (Luftschutzdienstpflichtige). This obligation extends to all who are physically and mentally fit and not needed for other war-important purposes. Thus men can be drafted and be sent to another locality, where they render full-time service. An analysis of A.R.P. Police personnel (July 1942) based on insufficient data indicates that the ages of males serving is between 39 and 54 and averaging about 45. Every individual in the group was married and had several children. However, none of those apparently rendering part-time service was engaged in a war-important occupation.

4. The Technical Emergency Corps - Technische Nothilfe, also TN or Teno - is controlled by the Order Police. Its purpose is to provide essential services during emergencies. It is distributed throughout the Reich and German-occupied areas. It supplies trained personnel for the repair and supervision of power plants, water works, canal locks, bridges, etc. It identifies and disposes of mines, old munitions, "duds" as well as damaged structures dangerous to the public. Its personnel also includes divers, experts in decontamination and fire fighting. As an adjunct to the Commander of the Order Police in the Government General a TN Command Office is established in charge of all TN units within the Government General. An analogous set-up probably exists in other conquered territories. Located at the seat of the TN Command Office in Cracow is an elaborately equipped TN-Bereitschaftshaus comprising repair shops, garages and replacement supplies. Personnel of the TN has been organized into Technical Batallions for the armed forces.

Early in 1942 the strength of the TN was presumably about 100,000 members, most of whom were engaged in passive A.R.P. duties in Germany. TN personnel is limited to specialists. The male contingent is composed largely of men who are part-time volunteers of the older

age groups, who have either been deferred or have already performed military service.

5. Storm Trooper Detachments - Sturm-Abteilungen or SA. - aid the police by guarding railways, bridges, roads, communication facilities, and prisoners, regulating traffic on arterial highways used by military transports, assisting in air raid protection, countering hostile propaganda, helping in evacuation, protecting supplies in evacuated areas.

6. The National Socialist Motor Corps - Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps or NSKK - turned over to the police a number of NSKK Traffic Companies. These regulated traffic in Polish cities and in the country, put up German-language sign-posts at important crossroads, served as police couriers, made arrests of murderers and saboteurs. In the Western Campaign NSKK Traffic Squads piloted large troop transports through the cities and took precautions at dangerous points on the highways. Some NSKK-men were detached to strengthen the Motorized Gendarmerie.

7. The SS or Elite Guard - Schutz-Staffel - provides the regular police personnel, the Security Service (SD,) and can be mobilized at any time as a police auxiliary in maintaining public order and the National Socialist system. At the express order of the Führer, the SS and Police are to combat subversive elements and consolidate the National Socialist regime in newly conquered areas. Close coordination between police and SS is insured by the fact that the Reich Leader of the SS is Chief of the German Police.

(4) Personnel - The avowed aim of elements determining police policy is to recruit (1) the lower ranks (non-commissioned officers and men) from the SS Combat Divisions, (2) the commissioned officers from the SS Junker Schools. In line with this policy, recently commissioned police officers are being commissioned at the same time as officers of the SS. Promotion in the police organization is accompanied by promotion to equivalent rank in the SS. All full-time

employees of the SS, the SS Combat Divisions and other armed formations of the SS together with all Security Police, Security Service men and formations of the Order Police are exempt from courts-martial and subject to a special system of SS and Police courts. Beginning with the Chief of the German Police and including the higher police officials the personal union between SS and police has become practically complete. Nevertheless, it was estimated in 1939 that about one-third of the police personnel was being drawn from retired army non-commissioned officers. Police not yet members of the SS are gradually being absorbed into this organization. The indoctrination of the police with SS ideals is continuous and persistent.

Police personnel apparently receives excellent training. There are special schools for officers, for Protection Police, Gendarmerie, Waterways Protection Police, Traffic Police, Criminal Police, Frontier Police as well as a Technical School, a Riding Academy, a School for First Aid, a School of Athletics, and a School for Alpine Training. In the spring of 1941 a School for Colonial Police was opened. The German police have superb discipline and good physique. They are almost without exception incorruptible. A certain degree of economic security is enjoyed by even the lowest ranks.

(5) Police Control over Outlying Groups and Areas - In the sparsely populated districts of the Reich which are not adjacent to an international frontier the police control exercised by the Gendarmerie must have been reduced somewhat as a result of shortages of personnel and of gasoline. However, it is judged to be still quite effective. On the other hand, police control of the German frontiers is believed to be more effectively organized today than prior to the outbreak of the war. Recently the Danish equivalent of the Marine Coast Police (see above 3-i-6) was greatly reinforced. This reinforcement is believed to correspond to a similar reinforcement of the German Marine Coast Police in anticipation of an attempted invasion from the West. The regional subordination of the police and police auxiliaries

to the command of the Corps Area Higher SS and Police Leader should enable a prompt mobilization of available forces to meet any armed incursion (see above 3-b.)

(6) The German Police Occupied Areas - (see above 3-b.) More information on the organization of the German Police in the Government General is obtainable than for other occupied areas. (see chart 7.) According to available data the pattern of the Government General seems to have been used in the Baltic States. The highest degree of autonomy in police affairs appears to have been granted to Denmark. On the other hand, as far as is known, the Germans have not been able in any conquered country so far, to dispense entirely with police auxiliaries recruited from the native population.

Paragraph 25, Chart 7. The German Police in the Government General.


Führer
Governor General Dr. Frank in Cracow
Himmler, RF SS uChdDtPol.
The Higher Leader of the SS and Police Krüger, (Cracow) in charge of the Security Department of the Government General
The Commander-in-Chief of the Security Police and Security Service (SD.)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Order Police
The Technical Emergency Corps, and other special units
Selbstschutz Formations of racial Germans
District Chief of Gen'l Admin.
Warsaw District SS & Pol. Leader
Cmdr.Sec. Pol.& SD.
Cmdr.Ord.Pol.
N.B. The set-up in remaining four Districts is the same as that in the Warsaw District.
Lublin District
Radom District
Cracow District
Lemberg (Galicia) District

Each District is subdivided usually into ten counties (Kreise.) The civil administration of a county, including the police operations of the rural constabulary or Gendarmerie, is directed by the County Captain (Kreishauptmann.) At his disposal are smaller units of Gendarmerie - Main Platoons and Auxiliary Platoons (Haupt-und Hilfszüge) - also the Special Service (Sonderdienst) composed of male, racial Germans from 18 to 40. All the units of the Gendarmerie within a District are under command of the District Commander of the Order Police.

Paragraph 25. Public Order, Police and the Elite Guard (SS).

c. The SS or Elite Guard - (Schutz-Staffeln.) - (1) General Observations.

SS penetration of the German police has been going on since 1933. Fusion of personnel, functions, and even of organization has resulted. Indeed, the German police seem destined to become a department of a larger SS organization. No analysis of the German police is complete without a discussion of the SS.

The National Socialist Party is a state within a state; the SS a party within the Party. The National Socialist Party contains many opportunists of doubtful loyalty. It lacks the homogeneity, singleness of purpose, completeness of conviction needed to make it a reliable instrument in the hands of the Führer. Such an instrument Hitler has found in the SS. Through it he maintains his grip on Party and State.

The SS was created by Hitler in 1925 as a squad of eight men to protect the Führer and Party speakers from physical violence. Its "choicest" task still is the protection of the Führer. To this mission have been added the protection of the German nation, its blood and unity; maintenance of internal security; protection of Party leaders; guaranteeing and strengthening Party control of Germany; finally the mission of developing, expanding, and enforcing National Socialist doctrines as a world movement. To fulfill these missions the SS has successively developed an intelligence service, a police force, and a closed community for the practice of National Socialist eugenics. It is now rapidly creating an army.

The SS seeks to be the vehicle for realizing the purest National Socialist ideals. It accepts no compromise. It is fanatical in its loyalty to Hitler. It is outspoken in its criticism of business men, judges, even Party measures. Criticism of the SS weekly newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps (circulation in 1939 over one half million) often heralds coming changes.

The SS is a sworn enemy of bureaucracy and red tape. SS economists say bureaucracy lacks initiative. They maintain that private initiative is the source of economic progress. In the post-war economic New Order they demand a place for private initiative, so that genius for invention and organization may develop unhampered. On the other hand they reject the "plutocratic" socio-economic system, in which wealth confers social status, and lust for money shapes the economic structure. In the post-war economy the SS envisages prices and the consumption of goods controlled by the State in a manner that the standards of living will depend only on the sums paid for wages and the cost of raw materials, and not on the profit lust of speculators, department store proprietors and cartels.

Other pet hates and aversions of the SS are the Jews, Free Masons, humanitarians, capitalists, Americans, British, Russians, even Germans who do not conform to SS concepts. SS veterans of the Russian campaign, however, seem to harbor a secret admiration for the courage of the Soviet soldier. Soldiers of the British and French army do not command this respect.

America as portrayed by "Das Schwarze Korps" is a plutocracy, populated by fast-living, slow-thinking Yankees under the domination of the Jews and the House of Morgan. The country is crime-ridden, and the population consists mainly of starving farmers, and unemployed inhabitants of slums. The average American has only such ideals as he can conceive of in terms of dollars and cents. American intervention in this war can at best postpone but for a few months the ultimate German victory.

The SS is a sharp critic of religious denominations suspected of political aims. Especially actions or tendencies of religious denominations which may affect national unity meet with stern rebuke. SS men, on the other hand, are expected to believe in God and the divine mission of the Führer. The SS man may secure immortality through his posterity. Each is expected to have children and

thus contribute to the eternal life of his clan (Sippe) and of the nation.

The SS is distinguished by its vigorous application and development of National Socialist racial theories. Since Himmler became head of the organization in 1929 selection of SS members is based on physical stature and other Nordic qualities of the applicants. They must measure for most formations of the Military SS at least 5 ft. 6.9 ins., in exceptional cases 5 ft. 6.1 ins. For the SS-Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" 5 ft. 10.9 ins. is the minimum. Leaders or officers must trace their Aryan origin as far back as 1750; other ranks as far as 1800. Achievement tests of physical agility and willpower must be passed annually by SS members, especially officers. The fiancée of an SS man must meet SS eugenic standards. Men who marry unacceptable women are dropped from the organization. In the course of centuries a super-race of Nordic elite is to be developed by means of progressive eugenic selection.

A corollary to this policy is the emphasis on large SS families. This is designed to combat the dysgenic affect of small families among the German middle and upper classes, at the same time offsetting the decline in birth-rate due to the war. There is convincing evidence that the more prosperous SS elements are now having larger families. Cooperative institutions of the SS provide advantageous living conditions.

Since 1937 the new SS aristocracy has striven for a fusion with the old German nobility. The Junkers or sons of the German nobility are welcomed into the organization and are now found in quite large numbers. Several high SS leaders have married into noble families. The union of the SS with the younger generation of nobility incidentally prevents the formation of the latter into a class holding itself aloof from National Socialism. Exceptionally large numbers of German university graduates are also included in the ranks of the SS.

(3193)

The SS is governed by a strict code of honor. (See below 6-i.) The SS man not only may but must defend his honor in armed combat. He also enjoys many privileges, among which is the right to listen to foreign broadcasts as well as to read foreign newspapers and magazines.

In pursuance of its racial ideals the SS plays a leading part in the so-called "mercy killings" of the insane and incurably ill. It is also prominent in the persecution and expulsion of the Jews from Germany and German-occupied territories. With the appointment after the defeat of Poland of Himmler as Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Folkdom the SS assumed the dominant role in the colonization of conquered areas. In this connection between 500,000 and 600,000 racial Germans from abroad have been "resettled" in Reich-controlled territories. The SS maintains intimate relations with the Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Raumforschung, a national resources planning board. It also has close connections with the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture. In SS ideology exalted status is accorded to the farmer. Certain categories of Military SS after completion of their military service may become "Wehrbauern" (defence farmers) and receive a piece of land in the eastern marches of the Reich. (See below 4-h-4.)

The SS touches all phases of its members' lives. Before the SS child is born his father and mother have complied with SS racial and eugenic standards. If the infant is a fourth or fifth child, he probably owes his very existence to SS propaganda for large families. He is born in a SS Mothers Home. He is delivered by an SS physician. His parents give him a pure Germanic name. The home of his parents if often a new SS apartment house located in a suburban SS settlement. The streets are named Staffelweg, Dienstweg or "Im Kinderland." Such SS settlements exist in Berlin-Zehlendorf, Oranienburg, Weimar, Schönbrunn-Vienna 87, Graz-Wetzelsdorf, and perhaps elsewhere. The health of a child from an SS family is guarded by SS doc-

tors or dentists. He often receives his high school and junior college training at a "Napola" school, in which SS ideas are taught.

He does not perform his military service with the regular armed forces,aas do other Germans. Instead, he enters a unit of the Military SS. Here his indoctrination with SS ideas is much more intensive than in the regular army. Upon completion of his full-time military service, his military efficiency is kept at a high pitch by the weekly drills of the General SS. After leaving the Military SS he may enter the lower ranks of the police, Gestapo or Party secret service (SD.) If he aspires to something higher, he may enter anSS Junker School. Upon graduation he may become an officer of the Military SS or Police, or secure one of the many positions open to him in the State or Party. If he attends the university, he will find anSS House (SS-Mannschaftshaus), which will keep him in close touch with SS ideals. Should war break out, he will not serve with the ordinary armed forces but rather with a unit of the Military SS. Should he commit any offense against military law he would not be tried by an ordinary court-martial but rather by a special SS court. His pension after the war will be administered by a separate SS organization. Should he fall on the battlefield, the same SS organization will care for his dependents.

The influence of the SS and its members reaches out and touches many phases of German life. This influence is increasing. The SS controls the police, Gestapo and Party intelligence service (SD.) It is dominant in the colonization and Germanization of conquered territories. A number of SS leaders hold key positions in the general administration of German-occupied countries. The German foreign service is assuming an SS tint. Both Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and the German Ambassador in Paris, Otto Abetz, hold high SS ranks. Ernst Bohle, head of the Foreign Organization of the Party, belongs to the SS. SS members occupy influential positions in the press, the Reich Propaganda Ministry and in German education. Incidentally, the weekly

newsreels are assembled under the direction of SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Hippler. The educational policy for German youth is to a considerable extent determined by SS leaders. In certain sectors of German agriculture, labor and finance there is also an appreciable SS influence. SS-Obergruppenführer Fritz Sauckel is Commissioner General for the Allocation of Labor. Baron Kurt von Schröder, the Cologne financial and industrial magnate in whose home the historic meeting between Hitler and von Papen took place (January 4, 1933,) is now an SS-Oberführer. SS-Brigadeführer Walter Granzow is Ppesident of the German Ronten Bank (Deutsche Rentenbank.) The adjutant to the President of the German Reich Bank (Reichsbank) and Reich Minister of Economic Affairs is SS-Standartenführer Dr. August Schwedler. The Chief of the Chancellery of the Führer is an SS-Gruppenführer. Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Lammers is an SS-Obergruppenführer. The same high SS rank is held by the Deputy of the Führer, Martin Bormann, in whose hands all the threads of the Party converge. In connection with transportation difficulties of the Russian campaign Hitler appointed SS-Standartenführer Jakob Werlin Inspector General of Motor Transport. Reichsstatthalter and Senior District Presidents belonging to the SS now rule about a dozen important provinces of the Reich. SS members constitute one third of the Reich Defense Commissioners. Penetration of SS men into the highest ranks of the regular armed forces, however, seems negligible.

(2) SS Ranks and Uniforms - The uniform of the General SS is entirely black except for a brown shirt. The cap has the national insignia below which is the distinguishing skull and cross-bones (Totenkopf.) A red armlet, having a black swastika on a circular white ground is worn on the left arm. Below this is a band indicating what is believed to the number of the SS regiment (Standarte.) The insignia of rank appear on the left lapel; the number on the right lapel is believed to indicate the number of the SS Company (Sturm.)

The Military SS has black uniforms similar to those of the

SS Ranks and Corresponding Ranks in the German Police, German Army, and U. S. Army.

(Chart)

SS Ranks

SS Unit	Corresponding SS Commander	Corresponding Units and Commanders			
		German Army		U.S. Army	
		Unit	Commander	Unit	Commander
	SS-Mann (Police: Anwärter)		Schütze Oberschütze (after 6 mos. service)		Private Private First Class
	SS-Sturmmann (Police: Unterwachtmeister)		Gefreiter		Lance Corporal
Die SS-Schar (?) or SS-Rotte (?)	SS-Rottenführer (Police: Rottwachtmeister)	Die Gruppe Der Trupp	Obergefreiter also Unter-Offiziersanwärter	Squad	Corporal
Die SS-Schar	SS-Unterscharführer (Police: Wachtmeister)		Unteroffizier		Sergeant
	SS-Scharführer (Police: Oberwachtmeister)		Unterfeldwebel		Staff Sergeant
	SS-Oberscharführer (Police: Revier-Oberwachtmeister, Zugwachtmeister)		Feldwebel		First Sergeant
	SS-Hauptscharführer (Police: Hauptwachtmeister)		Oberfeldwebel		Master Sergeant

SS Ranks and Corresponding Ranks in the German Police, German Army, and U. S. Army.
(Continued)

SS Unit	Corresponding SS Commander	Corresponding Units and Commanders			
		Germany Army		U.S. Army	
		Unit	Commander	Unit	Commander
	SS-Sturmscharführer (Police:Hauptwachtmeister)		Stabsfeldwebel		Sergeant Major
Der SS-Zug	SS-Untersturmführer SS-Obersturmführer	Der Zug	Leutnant Oberleutnant	Platoon	Second Lieutenant First Lieutenant
Der SS-Sturm	SS-Hauptsturmführer	Die Kompanie	Hauptmann	Company	Captain
Der SS-Sturmbann	SS-Sturmbannführer SS-Obersturmbannführer	Das Bataillon	Major Oberstleutnant	Battalion	Major Lieutenant Colonel
Die SS-Standarte	SS-Standartenführer	Das Regiment	Oberst	Regiment	Colonel
Der SS-Abschnitt	SS-Oberführer (Generalmajor der Polizei)	Die Brigade	Generalmajor	Brigade	Brigadier General
Der SS-Abschnitt; das SS-Amt	SS-Brigadeführer (Generalmajor or Generalleutnant der Polizei)	Die Brigade Die Division	General-major, Generalleutnant	Division Bureau	Brigadier General Major General
SS-Oberabschnitt, das SS-Hauptamt	SS-Gruppenführer* (Generalleutnant der Polizei)	Die Division	Generalleutnant	Division or Bureau	Major General

SS Ranks and Corresponding Ranks in the German Police, German Army, and U. S. Army
(Continued)

SS Unit	Corresponding SS Commander	Corresponding Units and Commanders			
		Germany Army		U. S. Army	
		Unit	Commander	Unit	Commander
SS-Ober-abschnitt. SS-Hauptamt Chef d.Sicher-heitspolizei	SS-Obergruppen-führer** General der Waffen-SS (General der Polizei)	Das Korps	General der Infanterie etc.	Corps or Department	Lieutenant General
Chef der Ord-nungspolizei	SS-Oberstgruppen-führer*(General-oberst der Polizei)	Die Armee	General-oberst	Army	General
Die SS	Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei*	Die Heeres-gruppe	General-feld-marshall	Group of Armies	-------

* The equation of the higher SS ranks to those of the army is highly problematical.

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General SS. However, units serving with the army wear a field gray uniform largely identical with the field service uniform of the army. It is distinguishable from the latter by the position of the national insignia, which are worn on the left sleeve instead of on the right breast. Below this a black band is usually worn with the name of the unit, e.g., "Adolf Hitler" (Standarte.) The SS insignia of rank generally appear on the left side of the collar. Members of the SS-Verfügungstruppen wear the runic sign "ϟϟ" on the right side of the collar. The same sign appears on the right side of the SS helmet as well as on automobile license plates and other equipment. Members of the SS Deathhead Division wear a skull and cross bones on the right side of the collar instead of the "ϟϟ." In addition, the Military SS have shoulder straps indicating rank as are worn by the regular army. In contradistinction to the General SS the Military SS is equipped with regulation side arms. The General SS wears the SS dagger.

The nomenclature for ranks in the Military SS and General SS is the same. But the holder of a rank in the General SS is not entitled to equal rank in the Military SS. A lieutenant colonel of the General SS was observed to be holding the rank of captain in the Military SS; a major of the General SS to be a first lieutenant of the Military SS; a captain a master sergeant; a second lieutenant a sergeant.

In the first part of 1942 an unusually large number (fifteen) of prominent government officials was advanced to the high rank of SS-Obergruppenführer. About the same time the new rank of SS-Oberstgruppenführer was created and conferred on the Chief of the Order Police as well as on the Party Treasurer.

(3) The Reich Leader of the SS - Reichsführer-SS - Heinrich Himmler became Reich Leader of the SS January 6, 1929. During the fourteen years of his leadership the SS developed from a group of 270 men into an organization numbering hundreds of thousands.

Himmler is the only individual in whose person all the lines of SS influence converge. Thus he is Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Folkdom, Deputy of the Plenipotentiary for Administration, Reich Leader of the Party, Member of the Reichstag, and Prussian State Councillor. (See chart 1) Himmler's position as Reichsführer-SS is particularly important, since he is responsible only to Hitler. No resort to intermediaries is needed to gain direct access to the Führer.

Himmler comes from an educated, Bavarian, Catholic, upper middle-class family. He served 1917-18 as an officer candidate in the Eleventh Bavarian Infantry Regiment. He graduated after the war from the agricultural section of the Munich Technical College. He took active part in the Hitler Putsch of 1923 and was at one time a protégé of Gregor Strasser, the organizing genius of the Party who subsequently became estranged.

Himmler exerts his influence largely through two sets of agencies: (1) the Central Offices (Hauptämter) of the Police and SS; (2) through his personal representatives in the Corps Areas and German-occupied countries, viz., the Higher Leaders of the SS and Police. His immediate assistants are a Chief Adjutant and a Police Adjutant.

(4) The Reich Command of the SS - Reichsführung-SS - The executive apex of the SS organization is the SS Reich Leader and the Main Office of his personal staff. This constitutes the Supreme Command of the entire SS. Under the Supreme Command (below c-4-a) of the entire SS are the High Command offices of the main branches of the SS: (1) the High Command of the General SS (below c-4-f); (2) the High Command of the Military SS (below c-4-g); (3) the High Command of the Security Service (SD) of the SS Reich Leader (above b-3-e). The High Command for matters concerning race and settlement is the Main Office for Race and Settlement.(below c-4-h).

The offices of the SS Reich Command are located in Berlin

unless otherwise stated.

(a) The Main Office for the Personal Staff of the Reich Leader of the SS - Hauptamt Persönlicher Stab des Reichsführers-SS - evolved from the adjutancy of the SS Reich Leader. This is now the central, supreme, command office for the entire SS (die oberste und zentrale Befehlsstelle der gesamten SS.) It is also a "catch all" for affairs of the Reichsführer which do not come under the jurisdiction of some other Hauptamt.

The Chief of the Personal Staff of the SS Reich Leader is SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, the same age as Himmler (born 1900), a graduate of a junior college (Gymnasium), infantry lieutenant in the World War, and former proprietor of an advertising agency.

The Main Office of the Personal Staff includes the following subsections:

1. The Press Bureau of the SS Reich Leader - Pressestelle RF SS.

2. The Culture "Referat" - das Kulturreferat - has charge of the SS Porcelain Factory at Allach near Munich. It is a "pet project" of Himmler and produces new-style, SS porcelain.

3. The Department of Cultural Research - Abteilung für kulturelle Forschung - supervises SS excavations to unearth prehistoric relics, supervises the publication of the results, and takes care of the excavation sites. It aims to correct the "biased", Greek, Roman, and clerical accounts of early German history.

4. The Study Society of "The Ancestral Heritage." - Studiengesellschaft "Das Ahnenerbe."

5. The Department of "Economic Aid" - Abteilung "Wirtschaftliche Hilfe" - handles questions connected with the liquidation of pre-1933 debts.

6. The "Fountainhead of Life" Association - Verein "Lebensborn" - is composed primarily of SS members. In its Mothers Homes it provides medical care at childbirth as well as pre-

and postnatal rest cures. It also accepts for discreet treatment premarital and extramarital confinement cases of racially sound mothers. Its homes are located in Steinhöring, Polzin, Klosterheide (Mark,) Hohehorst near Bremen, Wernigerode, Pernitz-Muggendorf (Lower Danube.)

7. The Administration of the Houses provided for SS Members attending colleges and universities - SS-Mannschaftshäuser.

8. The Bureau for the Four Year Plan - Dienststelle "Vierjahresplan" - handles the tasks assigned to the SS. These concern organizing and insuring the allocation of Labor in the Four Year Plan. Recently the SS gained indirect control over this whole field when SS-Obergruppenführer Fritz Sauckel was appointed Commissioner General for the Allocation of Labor in the Four Year Plan.

9. The Chief of the Protocol - Chef des Protokolls.

10. The Liaison Officers of the SS Reich Ministries and Party Bureaux.

(b) The Main Office for SS Personnel - SS-Personalhauptamt - handles all personnel questions of the officers corps for the entire SS. Its subdivisions:

1. Office for the Personnel Records of SS Leaders - Amt für Führerpersonalien. (See below 6-B-f-3.)

2. Office for Prospective SS Leaders - Amt für Führernachwuchs.

3. Office of Training and Education - Amt Erziehung und Bildung.

4. The Inspector of SS Junker Schools - Inspekteur der SS-Junkerschulen - is also responsible for the further education and training of Junker School graduates. Besides the Junker Schools at Braunschweig and Tölz, the Leadership School (Führerschule)

of the General SS at Munich-Dachau is under his control.

(c) The Main Office of the SS Court - Hauptamt SS-Gericht. - is located in Starnberg-Munich. The SS Court is directly responsible to the SS Reich Leader. It deals with matters which come within the jurisdiction of a disciplinary court and a court of honor. It handles appeals for leniency, both those concerning disciplinary measures as well as those pertaining to criminal law.

For the duration of the war special SS courts for criminal offenses have been established for the following categories of SS and Police: full-time (hauptberuflich) members of the Reich Command of the SS, members of the SS-Verfügungstruppe and the SS Deathhead Formations (Verbände), members of the SS Junker Schools, full-time members of the staffs of Higher SS and Police Leaders who command the aforesaid formations (Verbände,) all formations (Verbände) of the Order Police, the entire Security Police, and all full-time (hauptberuflich) members of the Security Service. These special SS courts supplant courts-martial, assume their functions, and apply their laws and procedures. Special mixed SS and police courts sit in cases involving members of the police. Such a mixed SS and police court exists in Norway (SS und Polizeigericht Nord).

In August 1942 after the death of SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Scharfe at the age of sixty-six, Scharfe was succeeded as Chief of the SS Court by Lieutenant General of the Military SS Franz Breithaupt.

The Main Office of the SS Court has the following subdivisions:

1. Office for Disciplinary Matters - Disziplinaramt.

2. Office for Law - Rechtsamt.

3. Liaison Office - Verbindungsamt. - This maintains liaison with other offices of the Party and Reich which have related interests.

(d) The Main Office for SS Administration and

Economic Matters - (SS-Verwaltungs-und Wirtschaftshauptamt) - handles budgetary and salary matters as well as all other economic matters.

Its subdivisions:

1. Office of the Budget - Amt Haushalt.

2. Office of Buildings - Amt Bauten.

Both 1. and 2. are identical with the Main Office of Budget and Buildings in the Reich Ministry of Interior. (See charts 2 and 3.)

3. Office of Economic Undertakings - Amt Wirtschaftsunternehmungen.

(e) Administrative Chief of the Guard Echelons of the National Socialist Party and Reich Treasurer of the SS - Verwaltungschef der Schutzstaffeln der NSDAP. und Reichskassenverwalter der SS. The finances of the SS come essentially from three sources: (1) the Reich Minister of Finance, who subsidizes the SS-Verfügungstruppe, the SS Junker Schools, the SS Deathhead Formations, and the Concentration Camp Headquarters (Kommandanturen;) (2) SS membership dues; (3) the proceeds from collections and similar activities of the SS. The use of Reich funds by military formations of the Party is not audited by the Reich after these funds pass into the hands of the Party Treasurer. The funds of the SS military formations are then transferred by him to the Administrative Chief of the Guard Echelons, who is a Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry of Interior. To maintain unity in the financial administration of the SS the administrative Chief of the Guard Echelons is also Reich Treasurer of the SS and as such administers also the proceeds from sources (2) and (3).

The administrative offices within the various SS Main Offices (see below f and h) are coordinated with one another and subordinated to the Administrative Chief of the Guard Echelons.

(f) The Main Office of the SS - SS-Hauptamt - is the High Command office (oberste Befehlsstelle) of the SS Reich Leader for the General SS and the barracked part of the SS. (The Command Office - see below g - which has since been created is believed to

BE responsible now for the barracked SS.)

The Chief of the SS Main Office since 1935 has been SS-Obergruppenführer August Heissmeyer. Heissmeyer fought in the World War as infantryman and aviator. He has university training in law and political economy as well as experience as a miner and technician in a dye factory. In 1940, at the age of forty-three he married Gertrud Scholz-Klink, Reich Women Leader and head of a number of National Socialist women's organizations. In his position as Inspector of the twenty-two National Political secondary schools (Napola) Heissmeyer has transformed these into centers for the propagation of SS ideas. Recently Berger has been mentioned as Chief of the SS-Hauptamt while Heissmeyer is said to be Leiter of the Amt Heissmeyer(?).

The subdivisions of the SS Main Office:

1. The Central Chancery - Zentralkanzlei (Zk.) - is the command office (Befehlsstelle) of the Chief of the SS Main Office. It is a coordinating and supervisory agency for the other subdivisions.

2. The Leadership Office - Führungsamt (I) - exercises some functions of a general staff for the General SS. It has charge of training, organization, assemblages of General SS units.

3. The Personnel Office - Personalamt (II) - handles personnel questions of all SS officers of the General SS from the rank of second lieutenant to captain. (See above c-4-b-1).

4. Liaison Officer with the SS Court - Verbindungsführer zum SS-Gericht (III.) (See above c-4-c-3.)

5. The Administration Office - Verwaltungsamt (IV) - handles the administration of the SS Main Office. It is coordinated with other administration offices and subordinated to the Administrative Chief of the SS. (See above c-4-e.)

6. Office for Medical and Health Services Sanitätsamt (V.) The different SS medical and health units are subordinate to this office.

Each unit of the Military SS has attached to it an SS surgeon and SS dentist. Active SS surgeons and SS dentists of the future will receive preliminary SS military training and then obtain their professional training at the SS Medical Academy in Graz. The SS dentists, and presumably SS surgeons, are also ordered to periodic refresher courses.

Dental and presumably medical care is extended to SS families. Similar arrangements are believed to existsfor the General SS. Many police surgeons are also SS surgeons. Recently the SS dental care has been intensified.

"Practically all the services of the military sanitation" in the German Army are said to be directed by SS members. In the winter of 1941/42 the lack of experienced German surgeons brought about a rise in the number of deaths from relatively slight wounds. The cases of exanthematic typhus, septicemia and other infections increased.

General Dr. Wolff at the beginning of the winter 1941/42 published an item placing the responsibility for inadequate medical and sanitary preparations on Dr. L. Conti. Dr. Conti is an SS Major General (Med.) -SS-Generalarzt - and chief of the German physicians (Reichsgesundheitsführer.) General Wolff advocated more practical instruction for German physicians by omission of ideologic courses, and immediate rehabilitation of Jewish physicians for military sanitation service. With the support of higher authorities Dr. Conti secured the refusal of General Wolff's first request. The second request resulted in a compromise: Jewish physicians were allowed to serve as auxiliary physicians in civil hospitals. In reprisal, the military commander mobilized all physicians up to the age of 60. (See below c-4-j.)

7. The Induction Office - Erfassungsamt (VI.) - is charged with the admittance of probationary and full members of the SS. It regulates transfers, releases and readmission of SS en-

listed men and noncommissioned officers. It maintains card catalogues with the personal record of all SS members. In addition, it computes the total strength of the SS.

8. The Office for Security Tasks - Amt für Sicherungsaufgaben (VII.) - plans the large-scale employment of SS units on special occasions, such as the presence of the Führer in public gatherings. It makes plans for the mobilization of the SS. These are worked out in collaboration with the High Command of the Armed Forces. It mobilizes reinforcements for the maneuvers of the SS Deathhead Regiments. In addition, it handles questions connected with the obligatory military service of SS members.

9. Office for Recruiting Military SS - Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS (VIII.) - (This office has probably been transferred to the Command Office of the Military SS. See below c-4-g.) The regional recruiting system seems to coincide with the SS Main Sections (SS-Oberabschnitte,) which in turn are geographically identical with the Corps Areas (Wehrkreise.)

10. The Procurement Office - Beschaffungsamt - procures equipment for the entire SS.

11. Office of Physical Training - Amt für Leibesübungen.

12. Office of Communications - Amt für Nachrichtenverbindungen (XI.)

13. Administrative Office for Veterans and Veterans' Dependents - Versorgungs-und Fürsorgeamt. (XII) - Veterans receive preferential treatment. (See below c-4-h-4.)

14. The Office of Education and Indoctrination - Schulungsamt (XIII) - is particularly concerned with indoctrination. Recently, however, the SS Main Office made arrangements with the German Association for People's Education (Deutsches Volksbildungswerk,) whereby the Military SS is to receive popularized instruction in general and cultural subjects.

The Leader of the SS-Schulungsamt is also Inspector for the indoctrination (weltanschauliche Erziehung) of the Order Police.

The following Inspectorates and Inspectors are subordinate to the Chief of the SS Main Office. A more recent list omits 18, 19, 20 and adds 15.

15. Inspector of Motor Transport - Inspekteur des Kraftfahrwesens.

16. Inspector of the SS Cavalry - Inspekteur der SS-Reiterei.

17. Inspector of the SS Riding Schools - Inspekteur der SS-Reitschulen.

18. Inspectorate of the SS-Verfügungstruppen - Inspektion der SS-Verfugungstruppen.

19. The Leader of the SS Deathhead Regiments and Concentration Camps - Der Führer der SS-Totenkopfstandarten und K.L.

20. Inspectorate of the SS Frontier and Guard Units - Inspektion der SS-Grenz-und Wacheinheiten.

The following institutions are subordinate to the Chief of the SS Main Office and the related Offices and Inspectorates:

21. Welfare (?) Camp at Schleissheim near Munich - Hilfswerklager Schleissheim.

22. Trade School of the SS-Verfügungstruppen at St. Georgen - SS-VT.-Berufsschule St. Georgen.

23. The SS Training Camp at Dachau near Munich - SS-Übungslager Dachau.

24. The SS Convalescent Home at Sasbachwalden SS-Erholungsheim Sasbachwalden.

25. The SS Motor Transport School at Berne in Oldenburg - SS-Kraftfahrschule Berne. In 1942 there was also anSS Motor Transport School (SS-Kraftfahrschule) at Vienna-Schönbrunn.

26. The Main Riding Academy of the SS at Munich - SS-Hauptreitschule München.

27. The SS Remount Institute at Hamburg - SS-Remonte-Anstalt Hamburg.

(g) Command Office of the Military SS - Kommandoamt der Waffen-SS. In 1939 the administration centers for the two branches of the militarized SS were (1) Chief of the Administration of the SS-Verfügungstruppen (Leiter der Truppenverwaltung der SS-Verfügungstruppen) at Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 188, and (2) Chief of the Administration of the SS Deathhead Formations (Leiter der Truppenverwaltung der SS-Totenkopfverbände) in Oranienburg. Early in 1941 the former office for administration of the SS-Verfügungstruppen at Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 188, appears with a new designation as Main Office of the SS Command (SS-Führungshauptamt). Late in 1941 the Command Office of the Military SS (Kommandoamt der Waffen-SS) can be identified. There is good reason for assuming that most functions pertaining to the Military SS are now concentrated in the new Command Office. The organization of the Command Office seems to be quite complex, consisting of at least six Main Offices (Hauptämter), which are presumably subdivided into Offices (Ämter). Main Office VI, which has been identified, is concerned with the education, indoctrination, and the care of SS troops (Schulung und Truppenbetreuung). Also identified is the Office for Medical and Health Services (Sanitätsamt.)

The Chief of the Command Office of the Military SS is SS-Gruppenführer Max Jüttner. Significantly, Jüttner is one of the few SS officers known to have served as a general staff officer in the World War. He became an active officer of the field artillery in 1907 and in 1918 was general staff officer of the 119th Infantry Division. Until 1933 he belonged to the conservative Stahlhelm. In 1940 Jüttner was SA.-Obergruppenführer and Chief of the Command Office (Führungsamt) in the SA. High Command. Should he still retain this

position the use of the SA. as an auxiliary of the SS would be facilitated.

(h) The Main Office for Race and Settlement - Rasse-und Siedlungshauptamt - handles all matters concerning family and ancestry of SS members, and seeks to rejuvenate German farming by the settlement of selected SS families.

The Chief of this office for many years was the Reich Minister of Agriculture Darré. Herbert Backe, his successor as Reich Minister, is also a member of the SS. Himmler himself is by training and inclination strongly interested in agriculture. When appointed Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Folkdom (following the conquest of Poland) Himmler leaned heavily on the SS for the execution of his resettlement program.

The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VM.) under SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Lorenz had previously collected material on racial Germans abroad. The Central Office for Emigrants (Einwandererzentralstelle or EWZ) was then created as an adjunct to the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. An SS Colonizing Staff (SS-Ansiedlungsstab) at Litzmannstadt together with a Resettlement Command (Umsiedlungskommando) now operate in the field. Six hundred and thirty SS students are said to be attached to these latter formations (summer 1941.)

Between 500,000 and 600,000 racial Germans from Southern Tyrol, Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia, Volhynia, Galicia, the Narew Area, the Government General, Bessarabia, the Bukovina, and the Dobruja have been resettled in Reich-controlled areas. Also assisting in these operations are the SS medical and health service, the SS Main Sections (c-6-c-2) Alpenland, Northwest, Baltic, Fulda-Werra, South, Southeast, and SS Main Office (c-6-c), the Vienna National Political School, and the SS Riding School at Hamburg. Aside from the SS, the National Socialist Folk Welfare units, the SA., and medical units of the Armed Forces collaborated with Reich Commissar Himmler.

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Members of the Reich Commissar's staff and SS Main Office for Race and Settlement maintain close relations with the Reich Office for Space Organization (Reichstelle für Raumordnung.) The latter is said to have prepared the geopolitical plans for the partition of Poland in October 1939.

The subdivisions of the SS Main Office for Race and Settlement follow:

1. Administration Office - Verwaltungsamt. This is coordinated with other SS administration offices and subordinated to the Administrative Chief of the SS. (See above c-4-e.)

2. The Office of Family and Blood Relationships - Sippenamt - handles the petitions of SS members who intend to marry. Both parties submit to a medical examination and bring evidence of sound heredity and Aryan origin. Witnesses attest the political reliability and good character of the prospective bride. The resort of last appeal is the SS Reich Leader. The independent units of the SS maintain Genealogical Offices (Sippenpflegestellen) to aid the individual SS members in collecting data.

3. The Office for Racial Matters - Rassenamt - seeks to maintain uniform standards in the racial entrance examinations. It also trains the racial specialists (Referenten) with the SS units.

4. The Settlement Office - Siedlungsamt - is in charge of establishing selected SS families in suburban SS colonies and on farms.

Arrangements between the SS and Hitler Youth exist, whereby the Farm Service of the Hitler Youth (Landdienst der HJ.) is to become a reservoir from which men will be recruited for the Military and General SS. Former members of the Farm Service who complete their period of enlistment in the Military SS (4 or 12 years) are eligible for settlement on new farms as these become available. The Defence Farmers (Wehrbauern) will be established preferably in stra-

tegic areas where men with military training may be needed.

(i) The Main Office for the Security of the Reich - Reichssicherheitshauptamt - is identical with the office bearing this name at the Reich Ministry of Interior and is considered also part of the SS organization. Together with the Main Office for Security (Sicherheits-Hauptamt) it constitutes the High Command office of the Security Service of the SS Reich Leader. (See above b-3-e and chart 6.)

(j) The Reich Surgeon of the SS - Reichsarzt-SS - is directly subordinate to the SS Reich Leader. (See above c-4-f-6.) At present (1942) the Reich Surgeon of the SS is SS-Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant of the Military SS Prof. Dr. Grawitz. Grawitz is also Reich Surgeon of the Police. (See chart 1.) The medical personnel of the police and SS is at many points identical.

(k) The Chief of the Order Police - Chef der Ordnungspolizei - belongs to the SS Reich Command. (See b-3-c-1.) He ranks as Chief of a Main Office.

The personnel of the SS Main Offices is composed of full-time, paid (hauptamtlich) SS commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

(5) The Higher Leaders of the SS and Police - Höhere SS-und Polizeiführer - are perhaps with few exceptions the most powerful executives of the regional SS and police organization. Each Leader commands a mobile striking force to crush any serious opposition to National Socialist rule in his area.

A Higher SS and Police Leader is established within each Corps Area of the Reich. In addition, there is a Leader in the Protectorate, in the Government General and other German-occupied eastern regions, in the Netherlands, and in Norway. Recently SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor der Polizei Oberg was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Paris.

The Higher SS and Police Leaders are delegates and permanent

representatives of the SS Reich Leader and Chief of the German Police. They are his commissioners for police and SS tasks, as well as other duties assigned to them. Thus SS Reich Leader Himmler made the Higher Leaders at Königsberg, Danzig, Posen, and Breslau his commissioners in executing his duties as Reich Commissar for Strengthening German Folkdom.

The forces at the command of each of the Higher SS and Police Leader are: (1) The General SS of the Corps Area, which is organized as an SS Main Section (SS-Oberabschnitt.) The Higher Leader has permanent command of this unit. (2) The Order Police, Security Police, and Security Service, which the Higher Leader commands in certain contingencies. (3) The Military SS, commanded by the Higher Leader in time of peace. Provisions are believed to have been made to organize one division of General SS and one division of Military SS in each Corps Area.

The Higher Leader's staff is composed of (1) the Staff Leader of the SS Main Section in the Corps Area, (2) the Inspector of the Security Police and Security Service within the Corps Area, and (3) the Inspector of the Order Police, usually with the rank of brevet major general of the police (char. Generalmajor der Polizei.) In the Government General the Higher SS and Police Leader has a Commander (Befehlshaber) of the Order Police and a Commander of the Security Police attached to his staff. These seem analogous to the Inspectors mentioned above. In addition, the Higher Leader commands the Selbstschutz formations of racial Germans. The staff of Higher SS and Police Leaders in other occupied areas is believed to follow this same pattern with appropriate modifications. (See diagrams b-3-b.)

(6) The General SS - die Allgemeine SS - (a) General - The General SS is the continuation of the original SS organization. Its mission is substantially that of the entire SS as described above under "1. General Observations." The special mission of the General

SS is to maintain liaison with professional SS units in the police, the Military SS, and Security Service. These must not be allowed to go astray from Party ideology as a result of narrow professional specialization. An additional special mission is to give pre-military training to those who still lack military training and post-military refresher courses to those who have already had military training.

The bulk of the members of the General SS is engaged in other occupations. Many members hold key positions in the State, Party, and private economic life. It is this far-flung dispersion of the General SS throughout the population which constitutes a particular element of SS strength and keeps the SS leaders in touch with the pulse of the nation.

(b) Strength Statistics of the General SS -

1. Total Strength: 200,000 in 1936. This figure apparently includes the General SS, Military SS, and other SS Formations. Source: SS Reich Leader Himmler.

240,000 in 1939. This figure is specifically stated as that of the General SS only. Source: Gunter d'Alquen, editor of "Das Schwarze Korps."

200,000 to 300,000 on November 1, 1939. This estimate is believed to include all SS formations. Source: M.I.D.

240,000 early part of 1940. This figure is specifically stated as applying only to the General SS. Source: Herbert Grau, head of the SS Reich Leader's Press Bureau.

The strength of presumably all SS formations is placed (July, 1942) by a Swedish newspaper at 750,000.

2. The Active Strength of the General SS - is made up of the full-time, paid staffs of the SS Main Sections, SS Sections, and SS Regiments. At the beginning of 1941 there are believed to have been 20 SS Main Sections, 43 SS Sections, 124 SS

Foot Regiments, 20 Mounted Regiments, 14 Signal Corps Battalions, 14 Combat Engineers Battalions. The staff strength of each of these various units is unknown. However, the total strength of all staffs may be 20000 to 10,000. Many former members of these staffs are now with the armed forces and have been replaced by older men.

3. Strength of the Trained Reserve of the General SS - All General SS members have received at least the rudiments of military training. (See below c-6-i.)

There are three main groups of SS reserves:

a. The "active" General SS - aktive Allgemeine SS - comprising men usually between 18 and 35. This group is not active in the military sense of full-time service. It receives military training (in addition to that already obtained in the armed forces) in its free time and presumably at summer encampments. The first five years of training are intensive. After the age of 25 the training relaxes somewhat to permit more time for family obligations.

b. The SS Reserve - SS Reserve - comprises the men from 35 to 45 and corresponds to the Landwehr of the German Army. It is drawn from "active" SS members who at 35 apply for admittance.

c. The SS Cadre Section - SS-Stammabteilung - comprises men from the SS Reserve who at the age of 45 apply for admittance. It corresponds to the Landsturm of the Germany Army.

Insufficient data forbid an itemized estimate of strength for a, b, and c.

At the end of 1941 it was estimated by one source that only half of the General SS had been absorbed into the armed forces. Making allowances for subsequent increases in General SS strength, for men lost to the armed forces, and for indispensable SS members in key positions, it seems that the effective strength of the General SS

which could be mobilized immediately lies between 100,000 and 200,000 men. This group while comprising many older men would contain a considerable number from the "active" General SS.

4. Untrained Reserve - Strictly speaking there is no untrained reserve of the General SS, but rather a reserve with various degrees of military training.

5. The Police and Constabulary - must be considered as a well-trained, well-equipped auxiliary of the SS. Identical leadership in the higher central and regional executive offices of the SS and police should insure prompt and close collaboration.

6. The SA. and Other Semimilitary Organizations - are less closely integrated with the SS than the police. Yet in certain contingencies they would collaborate with the SS. (See above c-4-g.)

(c) Organization of the General SS -

1. Reich High Command of the General SS - The Reich Commander of the General SS is SS Reich Leader Himmler. The High Command Office is the Main Office of the SS (SS-Hauptamt.) (See above c-4-f.)

2. The SS Main Sections - SS-Oberabschnitte - are the largest regional units of the General SS. Their territory coincides with that of military Corps Areas (Wehrkreise.) They are designated according to their geographical location, e. g., Northeast, Baltic, etc. The headquarters of an SS Main Section is situated often in the headquarter's city of the Corps Area.

The Commander of an SS Main Section (Führer des SS-Oberabschnitts) ranks usually as SS-Obergruppenführer or SS-Gruppenführer. Eventually it seems that all SS Main Sections will be commanded by the Higher Leaders of the SS and Police. This is the case already in SS Main Sections Northeast, Spree, Rhine, Danube, Vistula and perhaps other Main Sections. Sepp Dietrich, Commander of the SS Main Section

Spree, which includes Berlin, is also General of the Military SS.

The Commander of an SS Main Section is assisted by a staff.

SS Main Sections in first part of 1941

SS Main Section SS-Oberabschnitt	Headquarters	Corps Area
Northeast	Königsberg/Pr.	I
Baltic	Stettin	II
Spree	Berlin-Steglitz	III
Elbe	Dresden	IV
Southwest	Stuttgart	V
West	Düsseldorf	VI
South	Munich	VII
Southeast	Breslau	VIII
Fulda-Werra	Arolsen-Waldeck near Kassel	IX
North Sea	Hamburg	X
Center	Braunschweig	XI
Rhine	Wiesbaden	XII
Main	Nürnberg	XIII
Danube	Vienna	XVII
Alpenland	Salzburg	XVIII
Vistula	Danzig	XX
Warthe	Posen	XXI
New SS Main Sections Identified First In 1941.		
Lerraine/Saar- Palatinate	Saarbrücken	?
Northwest	The Hague	?
North	Oslo	?

The strength of an SS Main Section is believed to be roughly equivalent to that of a division. The SS Main Section is divided geographically into SS Sections, each of whose strength approximates a brigade.

All the SS Mounted Regiments (SS-Reiterstandarten) and SS Signal Corps Battalions (SS-Nachrichten-Sturmbanne) of an SS Main Section are under direct command of Main Section headquarters. Thus, on an average, there are one or two SS Mounted Regiments and one SS Signal Corps Battalion attached to the SS Main Section Headquarters.

Typical Organization of an SS Main Section



NB. The organization of Sections I and III the same as Section II, of Regiment 1 and 3 the same as Regiment 2, of Battalion 1 and 3 the same as Battalion 2.

3. SS Sections - SS-Abschnitte - are organizedgeographically within an SS Main Section.

SS Brigades or Sections at the beginning of 1941

Corps Area	Headquarters	SS Section (Abschnitt) Number
I	Königsberg	VII
I	Allenstein/Pr.	XXII
II	Stettin	XIII
II	Schwerin	XXXIII
III	Berlin-Steglitz	III
III	Frankfurt (Oder)	XII
III	Berlin-Steglitz	XXIII
IV	Chemnitz	II
IV	Halle (Saale)	XVIII
IV	Reichenberg	XXXVII
V	Stuttgart	X
V	Karlsruhe	XIX
V	Konstanz	XXIX
VI	Essen	V
VI	Münster	XVII
VI	Dortmund	XXV
VII	München (Munich)	I
VII	Augsburg	XXXII
VIII	Breslau	VI
VIII	Hirschberg (Riesengeb.)	XXI
VIII	Oppeln	XXIV
IX	Weimar	XXVII
IX	Kassel	XXX
X	Bremen-Horn	XIV
X	Altona-Elbe	XV
X	Kiel	XX
XI	Hannover (Hanover)	IV
XI	Dessau	XVI
XII	Koblenz a.Rh.	XI
XII	Neustadt a.d.W.	XXXIV
XIII	Würzburg	IX
XIII	Bayreuth	XXVIII
XIII	Karlsbad	XXXVIII
XVII	Linz	VIII
XVII	Wien (Vienna)	XXXI
XVIII	Graz	XXXV
XVIII	Innsbruck	XXXVI
XX	Danzig	XXVI
XXI	Gnesen	XXXXII
XXI	Litzmannstadt (Lodz)	XXXXIII
Sections XXXX and XXXXI have not been identified.		
-	Prag (Prague)	XXXIX

The Commander of an SS Section (Führer des SS-Abschnitts) ranks usually as SS-Oberführer or SS-Brigadeführer. He is assisted by a staff. An SS Section, roughly equivalent to a brigade, usually consists of two or three SS regiments, which are geographically separated. Under direct command of SS Section headquarters are all the SS Combat Engineer Battalions (SS-Pionier-Sturmbanne,) the SS Motorized Companies (SS-Kraftfahr-Stürme,) and SS Medical Companies (SS-Sanitäts-Stürme) of the Section. There are believed to be, on an average, one battalion of SS Combat Engineers, seven or eight SS Motorized Companies, and at least one SS Medical Company attached to each SS Section.

4. SS Regiments - SS Standarten - which compose an SS Section are usually stationed in different localities within an SS Section. Early in 1941 there were at least 124 SS Foot Regiments. At the beginning of 1940 there were 20 SS Mounted Regiments (SS-Reiterstandarten.) They are numbered with Arabic numerals, e.g., 6.Standarte (Foot Regt.), or R. 8 (Eight Mounted Regt.) In addition, the SS Regiment often has a name, e.g.,1. Stand. "Carl Laforce". (Incomplete list of SS Regiments, Appendix, Part 6.)

An SS Regiment (SS-Standarte) is commanded by an SS-Standartenführer. Its normal strength is three battalions (Sturmbanne.)

5. SS Battalions - SS-Sturmbanne - are commanded usually by an SS-Sturmbannführer (major) or SS-Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel.) The normal strength is four SS Companies (SS-Stürme.)

The numbers of the Signal Corps Battalions (SS-Nachrichtensturmbanne) and Combat Engineer Battalions (SS-Pionier Sturmbanne) run consecutively for the entire Reich. They are designated: N 8 or Na. 8 for Eight SS Signal Corps Bn.; Pi. St. 7 or Pi. 7 for Seventh SS Combat Engineers Bn.

6. SS Companies - SS-Stürme - are commanded normally by an SS-Hauptsturmführer (captain) and are subdivided into Züge (platoons) and Scharen (squads.) The companies of a SS Regiment are numbered. Thus "SS-Mann 12/54" belongs to the Twelfth Company of the 54th SS Regiment.

SS Motorized Companies appear to be numbered consecutively for the entire Reich. SS Motorized Company 314 (SS-Kraftfahrsturm) is abbreviated "K 314."

(d) Personnel of the General SS - Younger personnel is drawn almost exclusively from the Hitler Youth. At the age of eighteen the SS candidate (SS-Bewerber) from the Hitler Youth is accepted as a probationary member (SS-Anwärter.) On completion of his labor and military service he submits to intensive ideological indoctrination and receives instruction concerning the SS code of honor and SS marriage regulations. The following November 9th he swears that he and his family and posterity (Sippe) will adhere to the principles of the SS. He is now a full member of the SS and may wear the SS dagger. He is also bound by the SS code of honor.

A number of older SS members comes from the SA. High SS rank appears to be conferred on individuals prominent in public life. The aristocracy, the upper middle classes, and men with university training are strongly represented.

A part of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the General SS comes from the men who have served in the militarized SS-Verfügungstruppe.

Physical requirements for entry into the SS are high. SS members, even older members, must also maintain certain standards of physical fitness. (See below c-6-i.)

The exact age-structure of SS personnel is not known. However, the SS numbered 52,000 in 1933. The youngest man in this group is now (1942) about 28. Assuming that an influx of older men has compensated for diminution of the original 52,000 through death and other

causes, it can be assumed that at least one-fifth to one-sixth of the General SS belongs to the age-group above 28.

For the offices of the SS Reich Command which deal with personnel questions see above c-4-b, c-4-f-3, c-4-f-7.

(e) Finances of the General SS - The principal sources of income for the General SS, according to semioffical sources, are SS membership dues; the proceeds from collections and similar activities. The income from collections is admittedly large.

The staffs of the SS Main Sections, SS Sections, and SS Regiments are full-time, paid employees. However, they receive assistance from unpaid, honorary SS workers. Presumably the rates of pay for full-time SS members are at least equivalent to the pay-scales of the German Government for similar work. (See above c-4-e.)

(f) Supply and Equipment - Very little information is available on this subject. However the fact that in 1939 there were only 36 SS Motorized Companies, while now (1940-41) the 314th SS Motorized Company has been identified, seems to indicate a great increase in motorized equipment for the General SS. SS equipment is believed identical with that of the German armed forces and to come from the same sources. The Procurement Office (see above c-4-f-10) of the SS Main Office secures all SS equipment.

(g) Mobilization System - Orders for a general mobilization of the General SS can be given by the Führer, the Reich Leader of the SS, and possibly by others. Regional mobilization of the General SS within a Corps Area, i.e., an SS Main Section, can be ordered by the regional Higher Leader of the SS and Police. (See above c-5.)

The Main Office of the SS (c-4-f) is particularly charged with mobilization tasks, especially its subdivisions: the Leadership Office (2,) the Induction Office (7,) and the Office for Security Tasks (8.) The Office for Security Tasks works out mobilization plans in collaboration with the High Command of the Armed Forces.

Mobilization is greatly facilitated by the existence of active, full-time, paid staffs of the SS Main Sections, Sections, and Regiments in well over a hundred localities throughout the Reich.

(h) Strategic and Tactical Doctrines - The Strategic and tactical doctrines of the SS are believed to parallel the doctrines current in the German Armed Forces. Much stress is placed on the offensive. The aggressive spirit of the SS surpasses that of the regular German army and at times borders on rashness. Certain Military SS and SS Police units have revealed a lack cohesion in attacking. Advance units failed to maintain communications with rearward units and were at times in danger of encirclement. Subordinate SS commanders display even greater independence than is usual in the regular armed forces and are known to attack on their own initiative.

(i) Training, Morale, and Efficiency - Most younger SS men have received six months of semi-military training in the Labor Service and two years training in the German Armed Forces. Many older members saw service in the First World War.

Attached to the various regiments of the General SS are Training Companies (Ausbildungsstürme.) It is not known whether these companies exist merely for those SS members without initial military training. However, it is certain that all SS members receive a vigorous course of instruction until the age of 25. This is obtained at the weekly drills and at summer encampments.

SS members are expected to acquire the Reich Sport Insignia and the SA. Defence Insignia.

The Reich Sport Insignia may be obtained by passing one examination in each of the following five categories: (1) swimming over 300 meters; (2) high-jumping or broad-jumping, ski-jumping, agility in the use of the vaulting-horse; (3) running 100, 400 or 1500 meters; (4) throwing the discus and javelin, shot-and rock-put, agility with parallel bars and the horizontal bar, swimming, skating, rowing,

paddling, weight-lifting, gliding, shooting; (5) walking (Laufen) over 10,000 meters or endurance-march, swimming, skating, skiing, cycling, rowing, paddling, riding, cross-country run with the motor-cycle.

The exercises to meet the requirements of the SA. Defence Insignia fall into three main groups. (1) Physical exercises: 100 meter dash; broad-jump; shot-put; club-throwing, which simulates the use of German hand-grenades equipped with a handle; 3,000 meter run. (2) Basic exercises: 25 kilometer march with full equipment, shooting with small caliber arms, throwing clubs (hand-grenades) at a target, and other exercises not mentioned. (3) "Terrain Sport" (Geländesport): analysis and utilization of terrain, camouflage, estimating distance, etc. These exercises must be repeated yearly.

After acquiring the Reich Sport Insignia and the SA. Defence Insignia the SS man may try for the SS Achievement Insignia (SS-Leistungsabzeichen.) Its requirements are unknown, but apparently more rigorous.

Indoctrination proceeds apace with physical and military training. Disloyalty is an unpardonable offence in the SS code of h honor. The SS owes its rapid rise more to its relatively unblemished record of loyalty than perhaps to any other single factor. The next virtue in the SS code of honor is obedience - blind, trusting obedience to the SS Leaders. In order to educate SS men to absolute honesty and respect for State and private property, beginning in 1936 all locks were removed from lockers in SS barracks. The results are said to be good. Truthfulness is another virtue held up to SS men. The word of an SS man is to be as good as a written agreement. An SS man who tends toward drunkeness must givenhis word of honor not to touch alcohol for two or three years. Should he break his word of honor he is expected to act in accordance with the old law of soldiers and presumably commit suicide. Should he refuse to give his word of honor, he is discharged from the SS.

The following SS institutions are known or assumed to be connected with the training of the General SS: the Leadership School of the General SS (Führerschule der Allgemeinen SS) at Munich-Dachau, the SS Training Camp (SS-Übungslager) at Dachau, the Main Riding Academy of the SS (SS-Hauptreitschule) at Munich, the SS Riding Academy (SS-Reiterschule) at Hamburg, the SS Motor Transport School (SS-Kraftfahrschule) at Berne in Oldenburg. Probably the training institutions of the Military SS (see below c-7-i) are utilized also by the General SS.

The military efficiency of the General SS is believed to be reasonably high.

(j) SS Strongholds - Unconfirmed reports state that two pill boxes have been installed on every elevated railway station in Berlin. The SS is also said to occupy apartments at strategic intersections in the capital and to control the approaches to Berlin.

The SS suburban settlements at Berlin, Vienna and elsewhere constitute potential strongholds in time of civil strife. It is possible that the SS Defence Farmers (Wehrbauern) are concentrated not only on the frontiers but also in politically uncertain ares of the Reich.

(7) The Military SS -Waffen-SS - (a) General - Armed SS units existed from the very beginning of the National Socialist regime. The SS Staff Guard Adolf Hitler (SS-Stabswache Adolf Hitler) paraded May 1, 1933, equipped with steel helmets and carbines. Shortly thereafter the organization of Hitler's own regiment, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, was completed under command of Sepp Dietrich and stationed in Berlin. Subsequently Standarte SS 1 "Deutschland" was organized and stationed in Munich, Standarte SS 2 "Germania," in Hamburg, Arolsen and Radolfzell, the SS Signal Corps Battalion in Dresden. Then the Standarte SS 3 "Der Führer" was organized in former Austria and stationed at Vienna, Klagenfurt, and Graz. These

full-time, barracked SS Formations are designated SS-Verfügungstruppen (VT.) In peace and war they are at the exclusive disposal of the Führer.

The SS Deathhead Formations (SS-Totenkopfverbände) constitute a second branch of the Military SS. Originally they were volunteers drawn from the General SS and employed to replace the Storm Troopers (SA.) in guarding the concentration camps. They still perform this function and other tasks connected with state security. Their unsavory reputation for cruelty hardly seems exaggerated.

Formations from both branches of the Military SS have fought with the German armed forces almost from the beginning of the present war.

The pre-war missions of the Military SS were to provide absolutely reliable protection for the Führer, to guard the concentration camps, and to constitute a mobile striking force to crush any internal disorder. The expansion of the Military SS now in progress creates a loyal, armed corps to quell disorder within the Reich and suppress any future incipient mutiny of the armed forces. The distribution of the SS Divisions on the Russian Front late this spring (1942) shows two SS Divisions in the Northern Sector, two in the Central Sector, two in the Southern Sector - a convenient distribution for dealing with mutiny, which of course does not imply that the distribution was not dictated by other considerations. The expansion of the Military SS prevents the dispersion of the General SS through induction into the regular armed forces. Members of the General SS are already found in considerable numbers among all branches of the Wehrmacht and constitute, no doubt, valuable listening posts for the Security Service of the SS Reich Leader (see b-3-e.) However, continued induction of General SS members into the Wehrmacht would have immobilized large numbers of the most loyal supporters of the regime, whereas concentrated in formations of the Military SS they can be withdrawn as fighting units and employed at the discretion of

the Führer. The formation of new units of Military SS, recruited largely from former non-adherents of the SS, also serves to divert charges that the SS is not making a sufficient sacrifice of life in the present conflict. This diversion of public opinion is aided by increased emphasis in German news on the military feats of the SS. Actually a considerable fraction of the old, loyal General SS is still in civil life. Lest its ubiquity provoke criticism, SS men in Austria are said to be forbidden to wear their uniforms.

Reports of friction between the Military SS and the German armed forces are perennial. Himmler, the officer candidate of the World War, seems in his early days in Berlin to have sought admittance into circles frequented by the General Staff. In this he failed and his failure was aggravated by the fact that the late Hühnlein, Leader of the National Socialist Mounted Corps, and Hierl, Leader of the Reich Labor Service, both former general staff officers, succeeded where he had failed. The SS criticized the Army as reactionary. However, after the changes of February 1938 there was greater co-operation between the two. Friction increased again with the rapid expansion of the Military SS in the present war. Members of both forces are reported at certain times and in certain areas to have displayed reluctance in saluting or to have omitted this amenity altogether. Members of the armed forces claim that the feats of the Military SS obtain an undeserved share of publicity. The Wehrmacht looks askance at the growing power and independence of the Military SS. Unconfirmed reports speak of recriminations between Hitler and the generals of the Wehrmacht, Hitler charging the Wehrmacht with wanton sacrifice of SS troops, the Wehrmacht replying that the losses result from recklessness and lack of skill. Notwithstanding repeated rumors of dissensions between Wehrmacht and SS the German military machine does not seem materially weakened. In fact complimentary remarks and frank admiration for the Military SS are not infrequent among the other branches of the Armed Forces.

For ranks and uniforms of the Military SS see above c-2.

(b) Strength Statistics of the Military SS. - (1) Active Military SS. - A reliable source estimated that there were in the early part of 1942 at least twelve SS divisions and five SS police divisions in the field. In addition, regiments and smaller units were stationed in Germany and German-occupied Europe. The strength of the Military SS is still decidedly on the increase. Rumors speak of twenty to forty divisions.

2. Trained Reserve - Members of the General SS still in civil life constitute a trained or semi-trained reserve of the Military SS. In the early part of 1942 the strength of this category is believed to have been between 100,000 and 200,000. The police on duty within the Reich and those in police-training battalions constitute a trained reserve for the SS police divisions. Lack of adqquate data forbids a numerical estimate. However, with an acute shortage of police for domestic duty it seems that few could be spared from this source.

(c) Organization of the Military SS - 1. Relation to the other Armed Forces - An official statement of the German General Staff (September 17, 1941) declared that the Military SS is in principle under the command of the SS Reich Leader, however, that in the present war several units of the Military SS are under temporary command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army for performanceof military missions. Members of these formations are soldiers in regard to rights and duties. Nevertheless the SS Reich Leader directs the indoctrination of SS soldiers and retains the right of substitution. In the latter part of 1940 Hitler is believed to have assured the Army that the strength (in peace time?) of the Military SS would not exceed 5-10% of the peacetime strength of the Army. It was reported in the early part of 1942 that the Military SS had achieved independent status as a sort of fourth arm.

2. The Commanders of the Military SS -

Hitler is supreme commander of Military SS by virture of his position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and as supreme Commander of the entire SS.

There is considerable evidence that some, if not all, SS divisions operate on more or less independent missions, being shifted from one corps to another after completion of a particular task. A reliable Polish source now (September 1942) speaks of an SS Army Corps composed of two SS divisions. This SS Corps' numerical strength totaled forty thousand men; a large part was located on the French Channel Coast near Caen and Verneuil.

The senior SS general is Josef ("Sepp") Dietrich. Dietrich, now (1942) fifty, was born in Bavarian Suabia, received a meager education (Volksschule,) and during the World War rose to Deputy First Sergeant. He holds the rank of General of the Military SS (General der Waffen-SS.) i.e., a rank often held by German army corps commanders. Dietrich commands the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, now expanded into a larger formation.

Max Jüttner, Chief of the Command Office of the Military SS, has professional military qualifications. Jüttner now Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS (Major General, U.S.A.) served more than ten years as an active officer of the former Imperial Army, including service as divisional general staff officer. (See above c-6-g.)

3. Units of the Military SS - The SS division is believed to be somewhat smaller and more maneuvrable than the normal motorized division of the Germany Army. Save certain SS Police divisions, all SS divisions are believed to be motorized. The following units have been identified:

a. SS-Division "Adolf Hitler (motorized)

- is believed to have been formed from the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler."

Commanding Officer: General of the Military SS Sepp Dietrich. (See above c-2.)

The Leibstandarte-SS was mentioned in April, 1942, at Tanganrog on the Sea of Azov.

b. SS Division "Reich" (motorized)-

Commanding Officer: Generalleutnant Paul Hausser, (62 years old,) listed late in 1940 as Inspector of the SS-Verfügungstruppe.

G.S.O.1: SS-Sturmbannführer Ostendorff.

Composition: Standarte SS 1 "Deutschland" and Standarte SS 3 "Der Führer," possibly other Standarten, SS-Verfügungstruppe Artillery Regiment (A.R.), Divisional Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. (P.A.A. Panzeraufklärungabteilung,) Combat Engineers Battalion, Signal Corps Battalion, Motorized Divisional Trains (Kraftfahrkol.) and Medical Company (San. Kp.)

The division was formed from previously independent regiments. It fought with great dash in Poland and the West, at times incurring casualties through over-confidence.

c. SS-Division -

Commanding Officer: Generalleutnant Demmelhuber, former commander of Standarte SS 2 "Germania."

d. SS-Division -

Commanding Officer: Generalleutnant Schmidt (probably Schmitt.)

e. SS Police Division - SS-Polizei-division -

Commanding Officers: (1) (Western campaign) Generalleutnant Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, (2) (Russian campaign until Aug. 10, 1941) Generalleutnant der Polizei Arthur Mülverstedt, killed while attacking the Luga Position near Leningrad, (3) Generalmajor Waffen-SS Walter Krüger.

G.S.O.1: ?

Composition: Police Rifle Regiment 1 (Pol. Sch. R.1, i.e., Polizei-Schützen-Regiment 1), Police Rifle Regiment 2, Police Rifle Regiment 3, SS Police Artillery Regiment, Divisional Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (P.A.A.), Combat Engineers Battalion, Signal Corps Battalion, Motorized Divisional Trains (Kraftfahrkol.), and Medical Company (San. Kp.)

The SS Police Division was formed October 1939, by drafts from police units in all parts of Germany. Early in the war Hitler ordered 26,000 police recruits trained in the shortest possible time. Part or all of this group had been inducted as enlisted men and non-commissioned personnel into the SS Police Divisions at the commencement of the Russo-German conflict.

The division distinguished itself in the Argonne Forest (1940), and presumably was stationed for a time in Paris. At the beginning of the Russian campaign it marched 1000 kilometers cross-country on unimproved roads to the front (Leningrad Sector.) It had few motor transports and was largely horse-drawn. As a part of the Army of Colonel General Höppner it penetrated the Stalin Line near Luga.

f. SS Police Division -

Commanding Officer: Generalmajor der Polizei Wünnenberg. Wünnenberg is mentioned in this position February 15, 1942. It is not known whether he succeeded Krüger (c) or commands a second SS Police division.

g. SS Deathhead Division - SS-Totenkopf-Division or SS-T-Div. (motorized.)

Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Theodor Eicke, listed late in 1940 as Führer of the SS Deathhead Regiments and the Concentration Camps.

G.S.O.1: SS-Standartenführer Frhr. v. Mortigny.

Composition: SS Deathhead Infantry Regiment 1 (SS-T-I.R.1), SS Deathhead Infantry Regiment 2, SS Deathhead Infantry Regiment 3,

SS Deathhead Artillery Regiment, Divisional Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Combat Engineers Battalion, Signal Corps Battalion, Motorized Divisional Trains (Kraftfahrkol.) and Medical Company.

The SS Deathhead Division was formed October, 1939, mainly from existing concentration camp guard units. It was hotly engaged throughout the fighting in France; its morale was less high than that of SS Division "Reich" (b.)

h. SS Division

Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Klepper

i. SS Division "Viking"

Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Steinfer (possibly Steiner, former commander of Standarte SS 1 "Deutschland.)

Composition: Standarte SS 2 "Germania" (peacetime stations Hamburg, Arolsen and Radolfzell,) Standarte SS "Westland" (composed largely of Dutch and Flemish volunteers), Standarte SS "Nordland" (composed largely of Danish and Norwegian volunteers, the latter drawn mainly from Quisling's Hird, includes also some Swedes and Finns.) Other details concerning composition are lacking.

Late in 1941 the division consisted mainly of Germans with 10% Scandenavians and an unknown percentage of other Germanic volunteers. It saw action at Stalino and Dnieprepetrovsk, where it was forced back to the west bank of the Dnepr after suffering considerable casualities. Discipline is said to be not good, the training of replacements quite faulty, especially in rifle marksmanship. Early in 1942 the division was reported withdrawn, owing to general undependability and disorders. Late this summer (1942) it was serving in Finland, where it was recently visited by Himmler.

j. SS Division "Nordmark".

Commanding Officer: Generalmajor Kepler (probably SS-Gruppenführer Georg Keppler, former commander of Standarte SS 3 in Vienna.)

k. SS Mountain Division.

In April 1942, one SS Mountain Division was reported being organized.

l. SS Security Divisions - Sicherungs-divisionen - Russian guerrilla forces cause great havoc by sabotage along the lines of communications and by attacking supply units on the march. To combat this, the German Armed Forces organized Security Divisions composed of SS troops. Sich. Div. 265 has been identified.

m. SS Cavalry Brigade - SS-Kavallerie-Brigade. (Horse-mounted.)

Commanding Officer: SS-Standartenführer Hermann Fegelein (judged by photograph to be between 30 and 40.) The father of Fegelein was proprietor of a riding academy.

Composition: Probably includes the SS Deathhead Mounted Regiment, formerly commanded by Fegelein, also bicycle and motorcycle units (Radfahrer, Kradschützen,) infantry howitzers, Kübelwagen (light five-passenger personnel carriers used as antitank gun prime movers,) munition and baggage trains.

The Brigade fought principally in the southeastern sector of the Russian front. In the middle of March, 1942, it was operating in the Leningrad sector. It won distinction in January, 1942, by checking strong Soviet forces which had broken through the lines and threatened the rear of a German division.

n. Fire Protection Police Regiments - Feuerschutzpolizei-Regimenter - These are special units of the Order Police attached to the armed forces, and employed to save vital installations, and perform other tasks. They are not designated as belonging to the SS, but are indirectly under its control. One regiment served in the Western campaign (1940.) Another was organized the middle of 1941. (Cf. b-3-c-6.)

(1) Fire Protection Police Regiment "Sachsen."

Commanding Officer: Colonel of the Fire Protection Police Rumpf. The tasks performed by this regiment during the Western campaign included extinguishing fires which originated in the zone of operations during the night, the purpose being to deprive the enemy of a means of orientation. It sought to preserve, in particular, supply dumps and the living quarters of the troops. During the advance, companies of the regiment were assigned special tasks by the High Command of the Army. Thus they were charged with the preservation of storage facilities and the long-distance telephone equipment in specified localities. This regiment earned the gratitude of the Armed Forces by saving 100,000 tons of oil from the oil storage facilities ignited by the retreating enemy in France.

o. Other Units of the Military SS - There are SS regiments and smaller units stationed in Germany and German-occupied Europe. Other units are the SS Volunteer Legion Flanders (SS Vrijwilligerslegioen Vlaanderen,) the Volunteer Legion of the Netherlands, and similar formations.

In addition to the types of units already mentioned there are antitank units, antiaircraft units, mine detection battalions (Minensuchabteilungen,) and SS propaganda companies, the latter with the dual function of maintaining troop morale and providing propaganda for domestic use.

During the Western campaign (1940) SS Workshop Companies (Werkstatt-Kompanien der SS) followed the mechanized SS combat units, repairing automobiles, motorcycles, etc. The personnel comprised auto mechanics, saddlers, cabinet-makers, blacksmiths, welders, painters, technical officers. The equipment included Diesel motors, oxy-acetylene welding apparatus, lathes, portable hydraulic automobile platforms, cables, replacement parts and electrical apparatus.

In March, 1941, Hitler is said to have ordered the formation of SS naval units 20,000 men strong. Presumably the German Admiralty dissuaded Hitler, as evidence of SS naval units is still lacking.

In the autumn of 1941 SS panzer troops in tropical uniform were reported being trained in the Berlin area.

SS air units existed in 1933, however, all traces of them then disappear, possibly at the insistence of Göring. Recently many rumors have been current that the SS is demanding an independent air force.

Actually, the SS has had indirect control of aviation units for some time. In the German-occupied eastern areas from the Far North to the Black Sea task units (Flugbereitschaften) of the Police Flying Squadron (Polizeifliegerstaffel) are under the command of the Higher Leaders of the SS and Police. The task units are based at the larger airports in the area. Their radius of operations extends to 3000 kilometers. The types of planes employed are Messerschmitt Taifun, Fieseler Storch, and no doubt others not identified. The personnel includes fighter pilots. The Fieseler Storch type of plane belonging to the Police Flying Squadron was used in November 1941, to transport munitions and provisions to encircled units of the Police and Wehrmacht fighting in the central sector of the Russian front.

(d) Personnel Characteristics of the Military SS.

The bulk of the personnel is drawn from volunteers, though it seems that those who are already members of the Military-SS Reserve must accept the call to active duty when it comes. In rare instances replacements for SS units are reported to have been secured by transfer of formations from the Armed Forces, possibly only to make up for heavy losses until SS replacements are at hand. However, for the occasional subordination of certain smaller units of the Wehrmacht to the command of SS officers there is definite evidence.

The lowest ranks of the Military SS are composed principally of German, former non-adherents of the SS, and now increasingly of foreign volunteers, and finally to a lesser extent of members of the General SS. Foreign recruits are to be of Germanic stock, al-

though the Walloon contingents fighting on the Russian front are now said to be permitted to join the SS. A strenuous effort is made to gain volunteers among the Alsatians, Flemings, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians, and Estonians. Prossure is put upon Swedish volunteers in Finland to join. Among the volunteers for the Military SS are also Finns. The already large contingent of racial Germans (Volksdeutsche) will now be swelled as a result of a recent development permitting 18,000 German-Hungarians to enter the Military SS.

The general requirements for admittance to the SS officer training schools (SS-Junkerschulen) and to the units of the Military SS follow:-

(1) Aryan origin: for enlisted personnel verification as far as 1800; for officer personnel verification as far as 1750.

(2) Good reputation.

(3) The qualities of character and mind needed for military service.

(4) Compliance with SS selection standards.

(5) In the case of minors the permission of parents or guardians in written form.

Physical as well as age requirements differ for the various formations of the Military SS.

SS-Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" (November 1941) - Age: 17-22. Minimum height: 1.78 meters or 5 ft. 10 ins. (Summer of 1940: 1.80 meters or 5 ft. 10.9 ins.) Period of service: 2, 4½, and 12 years.

SS-Verfügungstruppe-Division (Summer of 1940) - Age: 17-22. Minimum height: 1.70 meters or 5 ft. 6.9 ins. Period of service: 4 years.

SS-Deathead-Division (Summer of 1940) - Age: 17-26. Minimum height: 1.70 meters or 5 ft. 6.9 ins. (In exceptional cases: 1.68 meters or 5 ft. 6.1 ins.) Period of service: believed to be 12 years.

SS-Deathead Regiments (Summer of 1940) - Age: 28-39. Minimum height: 1.70 meters or 5 ft. 6.9 ins. (In exceptional cases 1.68 meters or 5 ft. 6.1 ins.) Period of service: believed to be 12 years. These regiments of older men apparently guard the Concentration Camps.

The Military SS* (April, 1942):-

(1) Volunteers for the duration of the war -

Age for infantry, tank, signal corps units (radio operator): 17-25.

Age for other units:17-45.

(2) Volunteers for 4½ years' service -

Age: 17-35.

(3) Volunteers for 12 years' service -

Age: 17-23.

* The term "Military SS" in this context is believed to include all militarized units.

The above data indicate that as the war progresses physical standards are being relaxed and older personnel accepted. Even so, the quality of the Military-SS personnel is superior to that of the regular armed forces. In fact, the loss of high-quality human material to the Military SS reduces the general average of the Wehrmacht, thus creating an additional grievance.

In the point of age the enlistment standards for foreign volunteers are slightly less lenient than those prevailing in the Reich:

SS-Standarte "Westland" (April, 1942) -

For Flemish volunteers.

Age: 17-40. Minimum height: 1.70 meters or 5 ft. 6.9 ins. (For volunteers under 20:- 1.68 meters or 5 ft. 6.1. ins.)

Volunteer Legion Flanders (SS Vrijwilligerslegioen Vlaanderen), April 1942:

Age: 17-40. Minimum height: 1.60 meters or 5 ft. 3 ins.

The requirements for Dutch volumteers are similar.

All future police are to be recruited, as far as possible, from the veterans of the Military SS. At the same time it was decided that those already members of the police force should prove themselves in SS units at the front and shed their blood like other contingents of the armed forces. Therefore police from all parts of

the Reich were drafted October 1939, to form the first SS Police Division. All ranks, commissioned and non-commissioned, were drawn predominantly from the Protection Police (Schutzpolizei.) Later 26,000 newly trained recruits were inducted into the lower ranks as privates and noncommissioned officers. The age-limits for police volunteers (November 1941) were 17 to 35.

Little is known about the source of noncommissioned officers for the Military SS. Some are drawn from the General SS. Others are taken from the ranks and trained in SS Noncommissioned Officer Schools. (See below c-7-i.)

The officers corps of the Military SS (1936) was judged to be far from homogeneous. Meanwhile this situation has, no doubt, improved. The higher ranks still include a number of former Imperial and Reichswehr officers as well as some former noncommissioned officers. However, many of the younger officers, trained and indoctrinated in the SS officer schools, represent a rather homogeneous grou The youngest officers, those commissioned during the war, come chiefl from the ranks of the combat SS. Often they have gained the Iron Cross for bravery in action. A considerable fraction has a laboring-class origin. As a group, the officers of the Military SS exhibit a esprit de corps which is distinctly different from that of the Wehrmacht officers. They are much more radical in their views concernin social problems.

(c) Finance - Service in units of the Military SS is considered fulfillment of the legal obligation to serve in the armed forces. The pay-scale is equivalent to that of the regular armed forces. The same rights to preferential treatment and support of dependents are acquired by the Military-SS veterans as by veterans of the regular armed forces.

The funds for the support of the SS-Verfügungstruppe, the SS Deathhead formations, and the SS Junker Schools come from the Reic Minister of Finance. They are administered by the Administrative

Chief of the Guard Echelons of the National Socialist Party. (See above c-4-e.) The same set-up is believed to apply to other formations of Military SS.

The SS has an independent administrative system for veterans and veterans' dependents. (See above c-4-f-13.) Regional branches exist. By special arrangement with the interested agencies it was agreed that the SS administration would also secure preferential treatment of former members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps and care for their dependents.

In regard to Defence Farmers (Wehrbauern) see above c-4-h-4.

(f) Supply and Equipment - The organization of supply and the types of equipment of the Military SS are believed to be much the same as found in the regular German armed forces. Some, if not all, SS divisions are said to have equipment of the most modern type. Last winter (1941-42) sufficient numbers of Junkers transport planes were made available to transfer an SS regiment (SS-Standarte "Langemarck") within 24 hours from a position in the rear to a sector of the Russian front. The Procurement Office (see above c-4-f-10) secures all SS equipment.

(g) Recruiting and Mobilization System - The Office for Recruiting Military SS at Berlin (see above c-4-f-9) is the apex of a recruiting organization which seems to coincide regionally with the SS Main Sections. Branch recruiting offices exist in Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and elsewhere. One method of gaining recruits is to have the heros of the Military SS (Ritterkreuztrager) extol SS ideology and SS valor in a series of talks to the Hitler Youth and Jungvolk.

The mobilization system is described above c-6-g.

(h) Strategic and Tactical Doctrines. - See above c-6-h.

(i) Training, Morale, and Efficiency. - (See also section on the training of the General SS c-6-i.)

Nothing is known about the military training given SS privates, although it is assumed to be similar to that of the German Army. Indoctrination with SS ideas, no doubt, is assigned an important role, as many volunteers have had no previous connection with the SS. When SS troops are behind the front lines, participation in athletics is encouraged and serves to keep up morale. (See above c-4-f-14.)

Noncommissioned personnel is trained at SS Noncommissioned Officer Schools (SS-Unterführerschulen), the exact location and number of which is unknown. One SS Noncommissioned Officer School is probably located on the shores of the Lake of Constance.

The SS noncommissioned officer candidates (Unterführeranwärter) are selected from those SS men who have made good at the front and at the same time possess the other necessary qualifications to become a noncommissioned officer. Each group of candidates usually includes men with the Iron Cross First or Second Class, with the Storm Insignia (Sturmabzeichen), and sometimes the Wounded Insignia. The course of training lasts four months. The daily schedule is rigorous and occupies the noncommissioned officer candidate from six in the morning until ten at night. The candidates are housed in pleasant barracks, six men occupying one room. The quarters are decorated with inscriptions such as "Ich dien*" ("I serve"). The staff of instructors is made up of commissioned and noncommissioned SS officers, who usually have won distinction and not infrequently are slightly incapacitated from wounds. Details concerning the training are lacking, except that it is known to include close-order drill and sports along with instruction in the use of machine guns and light artillery.

Officer candidates are chosen from the Military and General SS. In the Military SS the choice is made by the Commanders (Kommandeure.) The selection is based on the character, and military and

* The motto of the Prince of Wales; first assumed by the Black Prince after Crecy, 1346, where John, King of Bohemia, whose motto it had been, was killed in battle.

mental ability of the applicant. Previous social and financial status is said to play no part. There are no formal educational requirements. However, those without junior college (Gymnasium) training must be above average and work day and night in order to complete the course. The number of officer candidates periodically selected from a unit is a matter of conjecture. A photograph of such a group chosen from the SS Deathhead Division while it was stationed in France (early 1941) showed 60-70 men. If this group was the only one selected, then this number of officer candidates constituted about 1/2% of the division's total strength.

The SS officer training course lasts about 16 months. It consists of two parts running parallel with each other: (1) indoctrination with SS ideas, (2) military instruction corresponding to that given at the military academies (Kriegsschulen) of the Armed Forces. For the first two or three months the candidates are instructed by officers, who in some, if not all, cases belong to the same division. After this preliminary instruction the candidates become SS Junkers in the Junker Schools at Tölz or Braunschweig. The duration of the course here is ten months (1940.) Before the war it lasted a year. During the first part, the officer candidate rises to the rank of Standarten-Junker. After passing the intermediate examination he is promoted to Senior Standarten-Junker (Standarten-Oberjunker.)

Before the war, the average day at an SS Junker School began with early morning exercises in riding. The remainder of the morning was filled with theoretical instruction consisting of (1) indoctrination with SS ideas; (2) military science and tactics, including a knowledge of air power, combat engineers, and of the press; (3) instruction in history, racial science and languages. The afternoon was devoted to practical training. This centered around infantry exercises in open fields. Sports were encouraged. In order to secure more time for study the Junkers are relieved of the "menial

tasks" ordinarily performed by enlisted men. These are attended to by units of crack troops, which also serve as examples for the future officers.

Upon completion of the curriculum at the Junker School the officer candidate is given a final course of instruction lasting three months. The purpose of the course (Einweisungslehrgang) is to familiarize the candidate with his tasks and practical duties as a platoon commander (Zugführer.) Following this course the candidate is commissioned a second lieutenant (SS-Untersturmführer,) either on the anniversary of the Munich Putsch, November 9, or on the Führer's birthday, April 20. At the commissioning ceremonies the young second lieutenant receives the SS sword from the Reich Leader of the SS and is presented by him to the Führer. The further training of the newly commissioned officers is supervised by the Inspector of the SS Junker Schools.

In addition to Junker Schools, the SS maintains a riding academy at Munich and Hamburg, a motor transport school (Kraftfahrschule) at Berne in Oldenburg, an Engineering School for the Military SS at Vienna, and an SS Medical Academy (SS-ärztliche Akademie) at Graz. (See above c-4-f-6.)

An SS Motor Transport School, recently (July 1942) identified at Vienna-Schönbrunn, trains members of the Hitler Youth aged 16 to 17 from all over the Reich who either have applied or expect to apply for admission to the Military SS. The course lasts six weeks and the normal enrollment is three hundred. The curriculum includes the theory of the internal combustion engine, instruction in driving as well as making minor repairs. The instructors are SS sergeants (Unterscharführer). Instructional films are also utilized on a large scale.

Some SS units are said to be lacking in training and skill. On the other hand, it would be a serious error to conclude that there are no SS units whose skill is not equal, perhaps superior, to that

of an average unit of the Armed Forces.

While it is true that the morale of certain SS units is reported to be not good, the morale of the Military SS as a group is believed to surpass that of the Wehrmacht. The fact that most SS soldiers are volunteers, coupled with the continuous indoctrination, and the privileges of SS members seems to guarantee the maintenance of a reasonably high morale.

(8) The Security Service of the SS Reich Leader - is handled in the section on the police. (See above b-3-d.)

(9) The Foreign SS - The powerful German SS is the prototype for similar organizations abroad, principally in Germanic countries. However, even the Slavic Hlinka Guards of Slovakia imitate the SS in many respects. Hungary is also said to be organizing a formation similar to the German SS.

In Norway, Quisling's Hird has developed along much the same lines as the German SS. Thus early in 1942 the first battalion of Military Hird (vapenhirdbataljon) was formed. This was then expanded to include the so-called Depot Battalion, the Holmestrand Armed Hird Battalion, and the Führer's (Quisling) Guard. Eventually the Hird is to be permitted by the German authorities to obtain full equipment for 20,000 men, thus forming the nucleus of a new defence force and releasing German soldiers for other tasks. The strength of the Hird was unofficially reported in February, 1942, as 12,000 men. The Hird is developing aviation and has an air corps using 22 gliders, which may later be replaced by motor-driven planes.

In the spring of 1941 the Hird created an intelligence service similar to the Security Service of the German SS. (See b-3-e.) Under the title of Communications Department of the Hird Staff (Hirdstabens efterretningsavdeling) this intelligence service is charged with the mission of keeping the Nasjonal Samling's leaders informed of sentiment among the Norwegian people. The agents of the intelligence service are carefully selected from reliable Hird men.

As a general rule the Communications Department reports directly to the Nasjonal Samling's Führer (fører). Similarly the head of the Communications Department is personally and materially responsible to the N.S. Führer. However in disciplinary matters he, together with the functionaries of the Communications Department, is subordinate to the Hird High Command. The Department has its own budget. The temporary head (leder) of the Department was (1941) Alf Gyssler. And most important from the standpoint of the German SS, the head of the Communications Department is to have a German counselor with whom he must work in intimate collaboration. Following the experience of the German National Socialist Party which decided (June 9, 1934) that there was to be no other Party intelligence service beside the SS Security Service, the Nasjonal Samling gave the Communications Department exclusive privileges as the Party secret, information-gathering agency. The agents of the Department are to report on the effectiveness of Nasjonal Samling's propaganda; gather information concerning the methods used by hostile propaganda, such as rumors, leaflets, illegal newspapers; combat hostile propaganda; report to the police persons or groups disseminating hostile propaganda, combat provocations coming from certain persons or groups within the Nasjonal Samling; spy on persons, combinations and organizations with anti-National Socialist tendencies.

The Norwegian SS (Norges SS), which was created May 25, 1941, was renamed July 23, 1942 the Germanic SS Norway (Germanske SS Norge). It is to be an independent branch (underavdeling) of the Nasjonal Samling, directly under the control of the Leader of Nasjonal Samling and directly responsible to him. At the same time the Germanic SS Norway will be a branch of the Greater Germanic SS. Incidentally the General SS of the Reich has established an SS Main Section (SS-Oberabschnitt) with headquarters in Oslo (c-6-c-2). The rules of the new Germanic SS Norway are reported to have received the

approval of Himmler, who added suggestions of his own. One of its official purposes is to preserve the purity of the Norwegian race. It will also function as a political police force.

Those eligible for the Germanic SS Norway are: (1) male members of Nasjonal Samling, (2) Norwegian citizens who have served in the Military SS or the Norwegian Legion, and (3) other Norwegian citizens approved by the General Secretariat of Nasjonal Samling. The Leader of the Germanic SS Norway is Minister Jonas Lie.

The Germanic SS Norway intends to establish strongholds (stoettepunkter) throughout Norway. At weekly meetings the members will receive instruction in the use of weapons. In addition, new members will be put through four weeks' training under German SS leaders at Kongsvinger.

On the left sleeve of the Germanic SS uniform will appear the Sun Cross and on the right the SS badge. The counterpart of Das Schwarze Korps will be the Germanic SS newspaper Germanen.

The General SS Flanders (Allgemeine SS-Flandern) was founded at the end of 1940. By order of the Reich Command of the SS (September 1, 1941) the Flemish General SS was organized as the 1st SS Regiment Flanders (1. SS-Standarte Flandern) and is now incorporated as a part of the Reich SS. The Flemish equivalent of Das Schwarze Korps is the weekly entitled De SS-Man.

The volunteers of the Flemish SS are instructed at the preliminary training school of the Military SS (Waffen-SS-Vorschule) at Schoten (believed to be Schooten on the outskirts of Antwerp). Incidentally Belgians serving with the Military SS or Wehrmacht are freed from paying taxes.

Recently in the Netherlands 800 Dutch SS men took an oath of allegiance to Hitler. The oath had the following text: "Adolf Hitler, Germanic Führer, to you I pledge allegiance, and obedience to my superiors appointed by you, until death, so help me God." At

the same time Mussert transferred, as far as necessary for fulfilling Germanic tasks, the Dutch SS to the Reich Leader of the German SS. The General SS of the Reich has for some time maintained an SS Main Section with headquarter at The Hague (c-6-c-2).

At the end of this summer (1942) Hitler ordered the foundation of an Estonian Legion as part of the Military SS. Estonia suffered relatively more from the previous Soviet occupation and the Estonian people have collaborated with the Germans to a greater extent than the Latvians and Lithuanians. Latvia and Lithuania have as yet no SS legion.

Recruiting offices for the Estonian SS Legion have been opened in all important centers and appeals are made through both the radio and the press. The new recruits must sign up for the duration of the war. German sources state that all Estonians now incorporated in German military units as well as the thirteen thousand Estonian volunteers now serving with police battalions in the Leningrad sector will be attached to/the Estonian SS Legion.

(10) Conclusions

The SS with its auxiliaries constitutes an efficient organization for defence, offence, and the consolidation of military and political gains. The careful intelligence work of the Security Police and Security Service prior to the invasion of Austria, Bohemia Moravia, Poland, and other countries enabled the German police following in the wake of the German armies to checkmate subversive elements effectively, protect communications, and restore order, thus releasing a maximum of German troops for immediate military tasks. In the conquered territories earmarked for future annexation the SS proceeded to consolidate the German foothold by expulsion of certain categories of inhabitants and to conduct the strategic-political colonization of the territory by racial Germans. The domestic role of the SS as protector of the National Socialist regime is not less importa

Competent observers believe that, as long as the SS with its auxiliaries remains unimpaired and as long as the German Armed Forces suffer no major military disaster, the SS and police will continue to constitute an almost insuperable barrier to a German revolution. The SS and Police are well prepared to cope with such a situation. Few revolutionary plots escape the surveillance of the Security Police and Security Service. Those that ripen beyond this stage can be met effectively by the Order Police backed by the Military SS and, if need be, by the General SS.

As an organization the SS contains elements of strength and weakness. In evaluating factors of SS strength one should not allow the indisputable cruelty of SS-controlled agencies such as the concentration camps to emotionalize one's judgment. Thus, easily overlooked is the idealism which attracts some of the best elements of German youth. Instead of a shallow sort of racialism centering around anti-Semitism, the SS offers an intensely practical system of positive eugenics. To those who lack idealism the SS offers social status in the new SS aristocracy; it offers economic security by placing its members in government and Party positions; it facilitates the promotion and advancement of those already established in positions. Since the SS has much to offer, it was before the war in a position to reject all applicants except those with the highest qualifications, in this way further increasing its strength through the acquisition of choice personnel. The SS has benefited by clever, consistent leadership, unmarred by "brilliance." It has known how to retain the favor of the Führer. To these elements of strength should be added a powerful, centralized organization, an efficient intelligence service, SS control of the police, and a self-contained SS army.

Elements of potential weakness are found (1) in the difficulty of proper indoctrination and assimilation of the greatly expanded Military SS and (2) in the professionalization of SS members

serving in the police, Security Service, and Military SS. Both these threats to homogeneity are being actively combatted.

No. 26

PRESS, PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP(1)

1. Organization of Control. Each department or organ of government has a propaganda section, and the party has the special purpose of carrying on propaganda. Among the chief agencies engaged in this work are the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, The German Labor Front, and for propaganda abroad, the Auslandsorganization, the SS and the Foreign Office.

The methods of propaganda employed vary according to purpose and the group aimed at. Any method is used which the Nazis think will be effective. The propaganda within Germany is paid for out of public funds, and that abroad by the same means and by voluntary or forced contributions from local Germans. The Nazis are indifferent about the source of pay so long as the work is done.

For internal propaganda and control of public opinion the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment is overwhelmingly important. It dominates with complete power the following: press, radio, motion picture, theater, the arts, literature, music. Each of these branches is organized in a chamber to which every person active in that line must belong. The Press Chamber, for example, contains the following corporate and special organizations:

a. Reich Federation of German Newspaper Publishers (2,225 members)

b. Reich Federation of German Periodical Publishers (2,800 members)

c. Reich Federation of German Correspondence and News Services (450 members)

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(1) Alexander F. Kiefer "Government Control of Publishing in Germany." Political Science Quarterly, March 1942; Handbook on National Socialist Germany (Washington, 1942); Nationalsozialistisches Jahrbuch, 1941. (Munich,)

d. Association of the Clerical-Religious Press

1. Protestant Press (533 members)

2. Catholic-Clerical Press (1,577 members)

e. Association of the Radio Press (43 members)

f. Reich Federation of the German Press (15,360 members)

g. Association of Publishing House Employees (4,000 members)

h. Reich Foundation of German Press Stenographers (640 members)

i. Reich Federation for the Promotion of Periodicals (1,591 members)

j. Reich Federation of Circulating Library Proprietors (487 members)

k. Federation of German Newspaper and Periodical Wholesalers (181 members)

l. Association of German Newspaper and Periodical Retailers (5,300 members)

m. Reich Federation of German Railway Station Book Dealers (127 members)

The Leader of each Chamber and over him the Reich Minister has the power to accept or reject any application for membership. This power enables the Nazis to control the personnel active in these fields.

Control of the press and all other cultural institutions is exercised not merely through the central Reich agencies but through an inclusive regional and local organization. Each Gau is in these matters under the direction of a culture guardian (Landeskulturwalter). This official acts as chief of the office of the Propaganda Ministry and at the same time as Party Propaganda Chief for the Gau. Each locality in turn has local branches of the Chambers of Culture, each under its leader. These local leaders

are responsible to the Gau leader who in turn is responsible to the Reich Minister for Propaganda. Thereby the Reich Minister is able to exercise absolute control over all cultural activities and to exploit them for Nazis interests.

The Nazis do not wish a state-owned press. After eliminating the former owners of the press antagonistic or indifferent to them, they took possession of the main press and the news agencies as their private property. Hitler himself owns a majority interest in the Eher Verlag, the publishing firm closest to the party.

The Deutsche Nachrichten Bureau, formed in 1934 by the union of the Wolff's Telegraphen Buro and the Telegraphen Union, has a monopoly in the distribution of news in Germany. It is privately owned, but is understood to receive government subsidies. It acts practically as a government agent, particularly in controlling the news at its source.

2. German Press. Germany has a highly developed press. Among the leading newspapers and periodicals are the following (all of them Nazi):

Berliner Boersen-Zeitung Financial Circulation: 30,497	Dr. Richard Jügler (Ed.) A. Killisch v. Horn (Pub.) Berlin
Berliner Lokalanzeiger Circulation: 570,632 (3 editions)	Fritz Lücke (Ed.) August Scherl Nachfolger (Prop.) Berlin
Der Angriff Berlin organ of Labor Front Circulation: more than 110,000	Kurt Kranzlein (Ed.) Franz Eher Verlag (Pub.) Berlin
Das Schwarze Korps (Weekly) Organ of the S.S. Circulation: more than 500,000	Gunter d'Alquen (Ed.) Franz Eher Verlag (Pub.) Berlin
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Old Conservative paper.	Dr. Karl Silex (Ed.) Deutsche Verlag (Pub.) Berlin

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger and Preussischer Daily; publishes texts of laws and official announcements, also articles, summaries, etc.	Pres. Dr. Schlange (Ed.) Prussian State Ministry (Pub.) Berlin
Kölnische Zeitung Heavy industry Circulation: 204,252	Dr. Alfred Neven Doumont (Prop.) Dr. Johann Schäfer (Ed.) Cologne
Frankfurter Zeitung and Handelsblatt Finance and industry Circulation: more than 70,000	Frankfurter Societäts Druckerei G.m.b.H. (Pub.) Dr. Rudolf Kircher (Ed.) Frankfurt
Hamburger Fremdenblatt Circulation: 137,657	Dr. Sven von Müller (Ed.) Broschek & Co. (Prop.& Pub.) Hamburg
Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten Circulation: 148,064	Edgar Herfurth & Co. (Pub.) Dr. Hans Drexler (Ed.)
Hamburger Nachrichten Circulation: 24,261	Dr. Hermann Hartmeyer (Prop.) Fritz Rossberg (Ed.) Hamburger Nachrichten G.m.b.H. (Pub.) Hamburg
Münchner Neueste Nachrichten Circulation: 94,636	Dr. Gisolher Wirsing (Ed.) Knorr & Hirth Kommissions-Verlag Munich
Völkischer Beobachter Organ of National Socialist Party Circulation: 1,201,650(1)	Franz Eher Nachfolger G.m.b.H. (Pub.) Alfred Rosenberg and William Weiss (Eds.) Berlin and Munich
Der Deutsche Volkswirt (Weekly) Economic and financial Circulation: 86,000 (Periodicals)	Dr. Hans Baumgarten (Ed.) Der Deutsche Volkswirt G.m.b.H. (Pub.) Berlin
Das Reich Sponsored by Propaganda Ministry Circulation: Large (not given)	Deutscher Verlag (Pub.) E.Mündler (Ed.) Berlin
Der Stürmer (Weekly) Anti-Semitic Organ Circulation: 473,000	Julius Streicher (Pub.) Ernst Hiemer (Ed.) Nürnberg
Der Wirtschafts-ring (Weekly) Circulation: 3,600	Heinrich Freiherr von Gleichen (Ed.) Heinrich Freiherr von Gleichen Ringverlag (Pub.)
Neues Wiener Tagblatt Circulation: 45,000	Steyremuehl A.G. (Owner) Dr. Emil Loebl (Ed.)

(1) South German edition 46,176; Munich edition 120,475; North German edition more than 440,000; Berlin edition more than 310,000; Vienna edition 205,000.

(10698)

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten
Circulation: 65,000

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten
Verlag
Hans Mauthe (Ed.)

3. Censorship. Nazi censorship is exercised both directly by the police and indirectly by party and government. Press, radio, cable, mail, and all other means of communication are placed under Nazi power by the following means:

(a) the Nazis control the selection of all personnel in these lines;

(b) they own the main organs;

(c) they instruct the press, etc. on what it may or must print and on what it must not print;

(d) they censor material before publication;

(e) they hold the threat of severe punishment over the head of anyone who states anything in public of which they disapprove.

4. Effectiveness of Propaganda. Nazi propaganda in Germany has proved to be effective because the people learn nothing beyond that which the Nazis permit them to know. Especially all channels of contact with foreign countries are carefully guarded so that only approved news is published. The Nazis have succeeded even in controlling what the Germans are able to read between the lines.

The control is so thorough that it is exercised merely in the ordinary course of administration.

5. Anti-Nazi Propaganda. The only exceptions are provided by the Catholic Church, which succeeds in distributing information among the clergy, and by the Poles, Czechs, Social Democrats, and Communists, who carry on a limited amount of propaganda. But the Nazi power is entirely adequate to prevent their efforts from becoming effective.

ADDENDUM

POSTAL CENSORSHIP

Since the outbreak of the war, postal censorship has been exercised by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. This censorship extends not only to mail originating in or destined for Germany itself, but also to communications of German-occupied or dominated territories, Axis allies, and even neutrals.

The Germans seek to conceal the whereabouts of their censors by omitting, except for rare occasions, the name of the unit on enclosure slips; but it is known definitely that offices are located in Berlin, Munich, Cologne, Vienna, Bremen, and Königsberg. Hamburg has at least a naval censorship unit; Neubrandenburg (Mecklenburg-Strelitz) was mentioned in 1940 as a censorship center for Polish letters; and Frankfurt-am-Main handles foreign mail, so that although there is no direct evidence that letters are read here, it seems highly probable that a censorship unit exists. Small offices appear to be located in Oslo and Copenhagen, as well as a few in France. The currency control offices in Prague, Stuttgart, and Hamburg previously functioned as censorship offices; however, no recent examples have been noted.

The bulk of mail from the occupied territories to the outside world passes through censorship units in Germany - most of it through the four main offices at Berlin, Munich, Cologne, and Vienna. This does not preclude the possibility of the existence of local censorships in the various occupied zones. Indeed, it is highly probable that such units exist, and that their chief concern is with mail between the occupied territories, between Sweden and these, and between these and Germany.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, mail occasionally is oppned by the German currency control offices. These letters apparently are not reopened when they reach Berlin or Cologne for transmission abroad. All letters destined for abroad must be handed open over the counter at the office of posting. Those which contain securities are transferred to the Devisenkontrolle in the occupied territory before continuing their journey.

Routing of mail through Germany so that it may pass through the German censorship is one of the obligations imposed by the Nazis on their allies and dependencies alike. Italy is forced to route her mail for Portugal through Munich. The Balkan states are forced to send to Vienna not only their west-bound mail bags, but also letters destined for Palestine. Mail carried by the Lufthansa airline between Berlin and Athens via Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, and Salonika, as well as mail transported on the Balkan railways, is censored regularly at Vienna.

There is little doubt as to the fact of control of Italian censorship by the Germans, but exactly what form it takes is not known. As early as November 1940 the rumor was current that every post office in Rome had a German overseer. It is probably true that Nazi officials, if present in Italian censorship units, are attached in an advisory rather than an administrative capacity. Whether there are actually German censorship units operating within Italy has not yet been determined.

Even mail of neutrals is not always safe. Swiss correspondents, for example, frequently bewail the fact that letters are censored by the Germans, although the majority of Swiss mail appears to be still uncensored. The place of censorship is in doubt: one theory has it that mail bags are deposited - by accident or design -